On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent Can voters do it?

Sobre a punição/recompensa eleitoral do incumbente: Podem os eleitores fazê-lo?

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.335

Palavras-chave:

Bounded rationality, Elections, Voters

Resumo

The article analyzes the possibility of voters penalizing or rewarding the incumbent (economic) performance at the polls. For this, it is considered that voters have limited rationality. This does not prevent them from performing this task without bias, which should serve as an obligation to use the elections to eectively penalize or reward the incumbent and/or not elect those who do not deserve it.

Resumo

O artigo analisa a possibilidade de os eleitores penalizarem, ou recompensarem, nas urnas, o desempenho (económico) do governo. Para tal, considera-se que os eleitores dispõem de racionalidade limitada. Tal não os impede de desempenharem aquela tarefa sem enviesamento, o que deveria servir de obrigação de utilização das eleições para, efectivamente, penalizar, ou recompensar, o governo e/ou não elegerem quem não o merece.

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Biografia Autor

António Bento Caleiro, Professor at the Department of Economy, University of Évora.

António Bento Caleiro holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Évora, a master’s degree in applied math- ematics for economics and management by the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (Lisbon) and a doctorate in economics from the European University Institute (Florence). Since May 2001, he has been an Assistant Professor at the University of Évora, having taken part in the Economics Unit at the University of Évora in March 2011. His research interests are (evidently) of a multidisci- plinary nature, as the present work illustrates.

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Publicado

2019-06-21

Como Citar

Caleiro, A. B. (2019). On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent Can voters do it? Sobre a punição/recompensa eleitoral do incumbente: Podem os eleitores fazê-lo?. Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science, 20, 33–44. https://doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.335

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Vol. 20 (2019)

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Direitos de Autor (c) 2019 Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science

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