From Specific to General in Electoral Cycle Models
Do Específico ao Geral nos Modelos do Ciclo Eleitoral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.137Palavras-chave:
Ciclos Eleitorais, Persistência de OutputResumo
Neste trabalho considera-se uma forma de generalizar o modelo, dito estilizado, o qual é também específico, de ciclos eleitorais. Esta generalização consiste em admitir que o produto, de facto, exibe persistência, i.e. o valor corrente (poder) ser função (também) do seu valor passado. De uma forma integrada, analisam-se as consequências daquela generalização.
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