


A large, light gray, stylized letter 'P' is centered on a dark gray background. The letter is composed of a vertical stem and a curved top that tapers to the right. Inside the upper curve of the 'P', the title 'PERSPECTIVAS' is written in white, uppercase, serif font, stacked in three lines: 'ERS', 'PECTI', and 'VAS'. To the right of the 'P', the issue number '#18' is written in a smaller, light gray, sans-serif font. Below the 'P', the journal's name 'Journal of Political Science' is written in a white, serif font, and the issue date 'Junho | June 2018' is written in a smaller, light gray, sans-serif font.

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The Unfinished Presidencies: Why Incumbent Presidents may Lose their Re-election Bids

As Presidências Inacabadas: Por que os Presidentes em Exercício podem Perder a Reeleição

Luís da Vinha, Valley City State University
Niklas Ernst, University of New Brunswick

Abstract—With the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election in the US, presidential scholars have shifted their attention not only to the Trump presidency, but also towards his possible re-election campaign. Throughout the history of the United States incumbent presidents have usually won their bid for a second term in office. The presidency offers incumbents several inherent electoral advantages – e.g., party nomination and unified party base, name recognition and political experience, access to government resources. However, some incumbent candidates have been unable to capitalize on these advantages. The current paper analyzes the electoral bids of Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush, identifying the factors that can invalidate the advantages intrinsic to holding the office of President of the United States.

Keywords—Incumbency Advantage, Party Nomination, Presidential Elections, “Rose Garden” Strategy.

Resumo—Com a conclusão das eleições presidenciais de 2016 nos EUA, os analistas têm focado a sua atenção não só na presidência de Donald Trump, mas também na sua possível reeleição. Ao longo da história dos Estados Unidos, os presidentes têm geralmente ganho sua candidatura a um segundo mandato. A presidência oferece aos titulares várias vantagens eleitorais inerentes – por exemplo, nomeação e base unificada do partido, reconhecimento e experiência política, e acesso a recursos governamentais. No entanto, alguns presidentes não conseguiram capitalizar nas vantagens inerentes ao cargo. O atual artigo analisa as candidaturas eleitorais dos presidentes Ford, Carter e Bush, identificando os fatores que invalidaram as vantagens intrínsecas à ocupação do cargo de presidente dos Estados Unidos.

Palavras-Chave—Vantagem do Incumbente, Nomeação Partidária, Estratégia “Rose Garden”.

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1 Introduction

WITH the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election in the US, presidential schol-

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ars have shifted their attention not only to the Trump presidency but also towards his possible re-election campaign. In fact, Trump has already announced his campaign slogan for the 2020 election – “Keep America Great!” – and, according to official sources, kicked off his re-election campaign in a rally held in Melbourne, Florida in February (Blake 2017; Graham 2017). The Democrats, for their part, are also setting their sights on the next presidential election and recalibrating

their strategy (de Vogue 2017). Several Democrats are currently surveying the political environment and positioning themselves to secure their party's nomination for the upcoming presidential contest (DeBenedetti 2017).

Throughout the history of the United States, 20 presidents won two consecutive terms in the White House, whereas only ten lost their second presidential election. While the likelihood for an incumbent president to be re-elected is not as high as in the House or Senate races, data demonstrates that incumbent presidents usually win their bid for a second term in office. Despite some anomalies to this trend during the 1970s, over the last four decades four of the five incumbent presidents successfully secured their re-election bids. Political science has demonstrated that incumbent presidents have several advantages which they can use in order to help guarantee their re-election – e.g., party nomination and unified party base, name recognition and political experience, access to government resources. The "incumbent advantage" has been thoroughly studied and its theoretical assumptions are well developed.

However, despite these advantages, some incumbent presidents are unable to guarantee electoral victories. In the post-war years, Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush did not win their re-election bid, despite having access to many of the advantages that every other incumbent president had. The individual electoral processes have been studied by several presidential scholars and political commentators. Nevertheless, the explanation of these anomalies has yet to produce a theoretical framework which allows us to develop a sound understanding of the conditions under which the incumbent advantage is ineffective.

The current research paper analyzes what factors contributed to denying the incumbent advantage in the cases of Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush. More precisely, it employs a cross-case analysis of the factors and dynamics at work in each of these candidacies in order to try to identify a discernible pattern which may subvert the advantages that are characteristic of most incumbent candidates. The development of a theoretical framework explaining the different dynamics involving presidential re-election bids

will allow us to generalize about the relationships between the different variables and, to the extent possible, construct a general proposition about the potential success or failure of incumbent presidential candidates.

The article begins by identifying and analyzing the incumbent advantages that have received the greatest emphasis in the academic literature and are believed to offer incumbent candidates the greatest opportunities to be used as electoral assets. We then examine the presidential re-election bids of Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush, highlighting what incumbency advantages each benefited from and which were not available or successfully exploited to their benefit. We conclude by presenting a general assessment of the importance of the different incumbency advantages, with an emphasis on the challenges that President Trump might face in his 2020 re-election bid.

2 The Advantages of the Incumbency

The incumbency advantage has been defined by David Mayhew (2008, 205) as "an electoral edge enjoyed by in-office persons, not by in-office parties." Over the last few decades political science has devoted considerable attention to the advantages of incumbent candidates in presidential elections. The research thus far has identified several factors that provide incumbent candidates with electoral benefits (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998; Campbell 2008; Mayhew 2008; Wayne 2012).¹

To begin with, incumbents traditionally win their party's nomination fairly easily. Therefore, they are guaranteed their party's support and resources early on in the campaign. This also provides incumbent candidates with a unified party base from the outset that can be mobilized more efficiently towards the incumbent's agenda and activities. In contrast, the challenging candidate

1. Other advantages of the provided to incumbents are offered in the thematic literature. For instance, in his list of incumbency advantages, Campbell (2008) identifies political inertia and the disadvantages of the challenger. However, we have not identified these in our characterization since they are not an advantage inherent to the Presidency, i.e., we cannot attribute this advantage directly to the institution of the Presidency.

usually has to go through a long primary campaign to get endorsed as their party's contender. The primary campaign not only requires significant amounts of financial resources, but often also damages the candidate's reputation due to infighting to obtain the delegate votes required to secure their party's nomination. During this time, the incumbent president's team can focus its time, efforts, and resources on the general election itself, leaving the challenger in an inherently weaker position.

Recognition of the incumbent's brand name and what he stands for also works as an advantage. Research has demonstrated that voters traditionally tend to value the experience and the knowledge acquired by incumbents during their time in office (Campbell 2008). This perception benefits the president as "stability and predictability satisfy the public's psychological needs; the certainty of four more years with a known quantity is likely to be more appealing than the uncertainty of the next four years with an unknown one, provided the incumbent's performance in the office during the past four years has been viewed as generally favorably" (Wayne 2012, 226). Strategically, the president can use the public's familiarity and comfort with incumbents by running a re-election campaign highlighting the opponent's lack of experience and leadership skills. Because of his previous work, the incumbent already had the chance to prove that he possesses the characteristics needed to be a successful president.

Moreover, the experience acquired by the incumbent also extends to the campaign. In other words, they have already steered a successful campaign and know what the determinant factors for guaranteeing an electoral victory are (Weeks 2012). Incumbents by this time have forged a "winning electoral coalition" and possess a working campaign apparatus which led them to victory in the previous election. The people and the experience are still there as are many of the donors which supported the president in the previous campaign. Some of the topics in the election might differ, but the campaign "machine" is still operational and the incumbent can rely on its proven track-record (Abrahamson, Aldrich and Rohde 1998). Additionally, incumbent campaigns have

learned "from experience in terms of both how to wage a successful campaign and what works politically in office" to effectively run a campaign from within the White House (quoted in Weisberg 2002, 343).

Due to his role as head of state and head of government, the incumbent also has access to various government resources which can be used to maximize the incumbency advantage. More precisely, the president can "make news, affect news, and dispense the spoils of government" (Wayne 2012, 226). The so-called "Rose Garden strategy" allows the president to promote his agenda and remain in the spotlight by commanding the media attention without overtly campaigning (Weisberg 2002). As Wayne (2012, 226) has made clear, "All recent presidents who have campaigned for reelection have tried to utilize the symbolic and ceremonial presidency, signing legislation into law in the Rose Garden of the White House, meeting heads of state in Washington or their own capitals, making speeches and announcements, holding press conferences, honoring military and civilians for their accomplishments while standing at a podium featuring the presidential seal." In this sense, the public views the incumbent foremost as their president and not just as simple one candidate amongst all the others.

In addition, incumbents are able to consider the political effects of governmental decisions and their actions can actually influence and control events – e.g. trying to stimulate the economy in election years. American voters give significant relevance to the state of the economy when casting their ballot (Vavreck 2009). According to Campbell (2008) the economy is just as important as the incumbency status of the candidates in effecting voting behavior. Retrospective accountability in US presidential elections is real and voters tend to reward or punish presidential incumbents for the perceived growth or decline in their income (Achen and Bartels 2016). However, voters tend to focus on their income growth in the months prior to the election and generally disregard the performance of the economy over the entire course of a president's term. Considering that the US economy and income has been generally characterized by steady growth, we can assume that, all other things being equal, the state of

the economy helps an incumbent candidate more often than it hurts him. In addition, a healthy economy leads to a more positive perception of incumbents as trust in government rises and the country as a whole is perceived to be heading in the right direction (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2016).

Therefore, all other things being equal, the impact of these advantages on a presidential election is expected to increase the success for the incumbent. However, despite the repeated claims supporting the incumbent advantage, several post-war presidential incumbents failed to win their re-election bid – i.e., Ford, Carter, Bush. What were the reasons for the failure of the incumbency advantages in these cases? More precisely, what distinguished these re-election bids from their successful post-war counterparts? The following sections will provide a comparative case study of the Ford, Carter, and Bush re-election campaigns to understand why these incumbents' electoral bids were unsuccessful.

3 Gerald R. Ford: The Unelected Incumbent

In October 1973 President Nixon nominated House minority leader Gerald Ford to be vice-president after then vice-president Spiro Agnew resigned amid corruption charges. In August 1974, he became president when Nixon resigned the office due to his role in the Watergate controversy. Ford is therefore the only president to not have won the election to the presidency or vice-presidency. Nevertheless, he disposed of and utilized the advantages of incumbency and, therefore, his presidency can be used to explain the failings of a presidential re-election bid.

Only months before the November 1976 election, Ford was down over 30% in opinion polls against his opponent, former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter. However, the president nearly pulled off a successful comeback, losing by only two percentage points (48% to Carter's 50%) in the national vote (Mieczkowski 2008). The Electoral College proved to be even narrower as Carter won by just 57 votes, making the 1976 election the closest electoral vote since 1916. Just four thousand votes to Ford in Ohio and Hawaii would

have given President Ford a second term in office (Melusky 1981). However, the most pertinent question was why was Ford forced to start his campaign with such a disadvantage in the polls and what factors or events led to him to come short of winning a White House term on his own?

In 1976, the American public was still shaken up by the Watergate controversy and Nixon's resignation failed to soothe the public's resentment and mistrust of government (Anslover 2016). Political scientists detect a direct link between Watergate and Jimmy Carter's victory: "Politically, the squalid business of Watergate had significant partisan results, at least in the short run, Democrats scored major triumphs in the 1974 election and sent Jimmy Carter to the White House in 1976" (Patterson 1996, 781). When Ford shocked the nation and issued a full and unconditional pardon for any crimes Nixon may have committed while president, his approval ratings dropped within a day from 66% to 49% (Mieczkowski 2008). While the president may have intended to save the American people from of a lengthy trial in which the US would have been "unable to heal as a nation", the American public disagreed (Anslover 2016, 223). In fact, 61% of Americans disapproved of the pardon, making it the single most important factor which cost Ford the election (Miller 1978). Jimmy Carter capitalized on this and was able to utilize the public's distrust and anger to his advantage. He used "honesty and trust" as his major campaign themes and branded himself as an outsider who would not succumb to the corruption in Washington. Americans bought into Carter's campaign message since they desired a president "whom they could trust and who would make them feel good about themselves and their country" (Anslover 2016, 211).

Due to Ford's unpopularity some Republican Party officials tried to convince him not to run for a second term in office. But when the president decided to run challengers quickly arose. The most formidable was former California Governor Ronald Reagan. Even though Ford won the initial primaries in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Florida, Reagan refused to quit and bounced back with a surprise victory in North Carolina. After all the primaries were held, the president had won 15 states while Rea-

gan triumphed in 12 states and both candidates went into the convention without having secured enough delegates to guarantee the party's nomination. Therefore, the 1976 convention turned into one of the most divided Republican Conventions on record (Mieczkowski 2008). Even though Ford was able to win the nomination at the convention held in Kansas City on the first ballot, he was only able to secure 1187 delegates to Reagan's 1070. Accordingly, as Snyder (2010, 92) notes, "Ford's fight with Reagan badly damaged his prospects, and he began the general election down twenty points in the polls."

In contrast, Democrats united quickly behind Jimmy Carter who ensured his nomination with a convincing victory in Ohio a month before the convention (Williams and Wilson 1977). Therefore, in 1976 the incumbent advantage of guaranteeing the party nomination while the challenger faced a tough and long primary season was reversed. In contrast to Carter, whose party rallied behind him, Ford was unable to lead a unified party into the general election.

In addition, in late 1974 the US economy slipped into the largest recession since the 1930s. As inflation and unemployment skyrocketed, President Ford tried to stimulate the economy by abandoning his anti-inflation initiatives (Miller 1978; Mieczkowski 2008). Carter tried to seize on the detrimental economic situation and in the third and last televised presidential debate personally blamed Ford for the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression (Mieczkowski 2008).² Nevertheless, in months before the election the American economy finally began to recover, as did public optimism regarding their future economic prospects (Miller 1978). Thus, the state of the economy was only a minor issue in the 1976 presidential election and did not by itself lead to Ford's defeat.

Ford's campaign also had to manage the political scandals of previous administration. Even though the secret bombings of Cambodia, the release of the Pentagon Papers, and the shocking news of the My Lai massacre all happened before Ford's presidency, he had to manage the

aftershock which "severely hampered his bid to win in the 1976 election" (Anslover 2016, 215). When Communist North Vietnam overran South Vietnam in April 1975, Ford also ordered the evacuation of all Americans in Saigon. It ended the Vietnam War, but also branded the image of a weak superpower in retreat (Mieczkowski 2008). This turn of events helped change the perception of many voters since "the US public was used to winning, and Ford was in office when they suffered a very real loss" (Anslover 2016, 216).

In addition, Ford's signature of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 was followed by an immediate political backlash making the agreement "a lasting and damaging issue for his presidency" which damaged his electoral chances (Snyder 2010, 87). Not only were the majority of Americans opposed to Ford's continuation of détente and the signing of the agreement, his failure to defend his position also raised serious concerns about his leadership capabilities, particularly regarding foreign policy issues (Snyder 2010). The Helsinki Accords were a prominent issue throughout the election that left Ford vulnerable to attacks from the left and the right as both Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter criticized the agreement (Snyder 2010).

When asked about the Helsinki Accords and the United States relationship with the Soviet Union by New York Times associate editor Max Frankel during the second presidential debate, the president once again came off as inept on international issues. He responded: "Now what has been accomplished by the Helsinki agreement? Number one, we have an agreement where they notify us and we notify them of any military maneuvers that are to be undertaken. They have done it in both cases where they've done so. There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under the Ford administration" (DeFrank 2007, 143). After being provided with an opportunity to clarify, Ford insisted: "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe the Rumanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Poles believe themselves dominated by the Soviet Union" (DeFrank 2007, 143). Ford's comments were controversial and damaging to his campaign and according to pollster George

2. The unemployment in October 1976 was 7.8% (Mieczkowski 2008, 46-47).

Gallup the comments constituted the “most decisive moment in the campaign” (Thomas 2002, 33). Opinion polls after the debate show Catholics of East European ancestry moved towards Carter (Broh 1980) and according to many observers cost him the election (Snyder 2010).

Ford was able to utilize many of the advantages of incumbency during his campaign. For example, he tried using the Rose Garden strategy and realized that as an incumbent president he could campaign without actually campaigning. His campaign team chose to leave him at the White House to act presidential, leaving the ground game of the campaign to his running mate Senator Bob Dole (Mieczkowski 2008). He tried his best to strengthen his image as chief executive but, as Broh (1980, 515) recalls, “the press presented Gerald Ford as a candidate prone to falls and spills, an image supported by a film clip of the president slipping on the stairs of Air Force One.” However, Ford’s campaign strategy was not a key factor in his defeat of the 1976 election. We must remember that he had such a large deficit in the polls at the start of the general election campaign and still only narrowly lost to Carter. Nevertheless, his presidency and campaign did not inspire the public, and therefore most Americans ignored the fact that the economy was improving and the nation was finally disengaged from its military conflict in Southeast Asia (Anslover 2016).

Conclusively, Ford’s untimely pardon of Nixon (which dragged him into the Watergate controversy), his near defeat by Ronald Reagan in the Republican primaries, an economic recession that occurred shortly after he took office, and his public image as a weak foreign policy leader “all worked to undermine Ford’s advantage as incumbent” (Miller 1978, 145). In addition, the odds were stacked against Ford during the 1976 election. Since World War II, no party had yet been successful in holding the White House for longer than eight years. The fact that Gerald Ford the first post-war incumbent president to lose a presidential election highlights that a “political rhythm almost directs voters to turn the party in power out after two terms” (Mieczkowski 2005, 341).

4 Jimmy Carter’s Defeat: The Beginning of a Political Realignment

Despite a campaign in which the two major candidates seemed to run neck and neck, former California Governor Ronald Reagan won the presidential election in 1980 against incumbent President Jimmy Carter in a landslide. Reagan won 51% of the national vote, while Carter won 41%, and Illinois Congressman John Anderson finished with 7%. The electoral win was even more decisive as Reagan won all but six states and the District of Columbia, allocating 489 electoral votes compared to Carter’s 49 (Busch 2016). Carter’s devastating defeat in 1980 raises questions regarding the causes of his electoral collapse, especially as an incumbent. Did international crises and the state of the economy lead to the president’s defeat? Did his campaign strategy fail miserably or was the 1980 election the culmination of a political realignment brought on by a general shift in America towards conservatism as suggested by White and Gill (1981).

To begin with, President Carter did not win the nomination of the Democratic Party as easily as it would be expected for an incumbent president. He was challenged by Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy who forced Carter to spend a significant amount of resources in a long primary campaign. This hard-fought campaign hurt both candidates’ image significantly and revealed an incontestable lack of party unity. Even after Carter won the majority of the delegates required to ensure his nomination for the general election, the 1980 Democratic National Convention became one of the most disputed on record. Kennedy tried to release delegates from their voting commitments and gave speeches against Carter at the beginning of the convention. Ted Kennedy’s campaign strategist Harold Ickes called it a “brutal political fistfight” in which their campaign employed a “win at all cost strategy” to make up President Carter’s 700 delegate lead (D’Aprile 2009). After Carter won the nomination Senator Kennedy endorsed Carter but the damage to the president’s image and campaign was done. In his memoirs, Carter describes Kennedy’s primary run and his reluctance to embrace the president on the closing night of the Convention as “quite damaging to our

campaign” (Carter 1982, 553).

In contrast to Carter’s nomination campaign, Ronald Reagan won the nomination of the Republican Party fairly easily. He gathered the party’s support early in the race and did not receive as many attacks and headwind as Carter. In other words, as Pomper has stated:

The major parties’ nominations reversed past patterns and contemporary expectations. Contests for the presidential designation typically occur in the party out of power, while the party holding the Presidency is expected to confirm its leadership ritualistically. Although they held the White House in 1980, the Democrats engaged in a vigorous contest that continued in one form or another until the convention balloting. For their part, after surveying an initially crowded field, the Republicans gave Reagan the consensual support commonly granted to an incumbent president. (Quoted in Busch 2016, 480)

The disputed nomination process within the Democratic Party is one of the reasons why Jimmy Carter lost a significant amount of the Democratic voter base. He was not only missing the support of elected officials and the party establishment, but also of registered Democratic voters. In the 1976 presidential election against incumbent President Ford, 80% of the registered voters of the Democratic Party and 48% of independent voters cast ballots for Jimmy Carter. These numbers dropped to 67% of Democrats and 31% of independents in 1980 (Roper Center 1980).

The 1980 election was not just a showdown between Carter and Reagan; it also indicated a general shift on the American political landscape. From 1933 to 1980, the United States generally showed a consistent and stabilized Democratic trend. In this time frame spanning nearly five decades, Republican presidents served four terms, and the House of Representatives and the Senate were only held by the Republican Party for four years (1947-1949 and 1953-1955). But in the election of 1980, the Senate went Republican for the first time since 1952 (gaining 12 additional seats), and the GOP won 33 additional seats in the House of Representatives – i.e., while short of a partisan

majority, enough to provide, in concert with conservative Democrats, a working majority (Busch 2016). This data suggests a general political shift towards the Republican Party after the decades of secure reign of the Democratic Party. Therefore, it leads to the assertion that in 1980 the American people might have voted for a general party shift and did not vote primarily against the incumbent president. To run on a Democratic ticket was a general disadvantage in the 1980 election – from the local level all the way up to the presidency.

In addition, the voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election was extremely low. Only 52.6% of the voting age population actually cast their ballots, revealing the lowest voter turnout since 1924. Even the consistent historical trend of a declining voter turnout cannot be used as an explanation since the turnout in five of the eight following presidential elections were higher than in 1980 (The American Presidency Project 2016). A low voter turnout in any US election favors the Republican Party due to the fact that their party members are more reliable to vote and show up on Election Day in greater numbers than their Democratic counterparts. For decades, the Democratic Party has revealed greater difficulty in mobilizing voters because of the demographic make-up of their target groups (youth/ ethnic minorities/ low income families). Considering the party affiliation of eligible voters in 1980, the low voter turnout hurt Carter even more. In general, 43% of Americans identified themselves as Democrats while only 28% identified themselves as Republicans and 23% as independent (Roper Center 1980). Carter lost support from disappointed Democratic Party voters, who stayed home on Election Day causing the drop in voter turnout. However, a significant number of voters affiliated with the Democratic Party actually voted for Ronald Reagan. The so called “Reagan-Democrats” were traditionally Democratic voters, especially white middle class men, who voted for Ronald Reagan in the presidential elections in 1980 and 1984. While not agreeing with many of Reagan’s policies and opinions, this shift of votes in such massive numbers is a phenomenon that political scientists have so far failed to explain. Even if the exact number and influence of the “Reagan-Democrats” can only be estimated, it was an unexpected phe-

nomenon for Carter's campaign and had a major impact on his defeat (Busch 2016).

However, it was President Carter's public image which led to his low approval ratings and which was the major factor contributing to his defeat in the election. Carter had numerous opportunities to demonstrate he possessed the skills and characteristics to be a successful president, but failed to do so. Carter's four-year term was marked by a struggling economy at home and several international crises. During the Carter years, energy prices rose, interest rates soared, inflation increased, and unemployment was high. More precisely, "in 1980, inflation reached 13.5 percent and the economy tumbled into another recession, with unemployment hitting 8.5 percent. The prime interest rate hovered around 20 percent throughout the year" (Busch 2016, 473). Carter appeared to be powerless and unable to fix any of the problems the average US citizen experienced at the time. As most people in 1980 identified the state of the economy as the most important issue in their decision on whom to vote for, odds for a second Carter term were meager come Election Day (Brinkley 1998).

The president also seemed to be helpless and inactive in dealing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran Hostage Crisis. Nevertheless, both events led to a short "rally-round-the-flag" effect, which significantly increase the popularity rating of presidents confronted with extraordinary international events. Within a month of the Iran Hostage Crisis, Carter's popularity rose from 32% to 58% (Callaghan and Virtanen 1993). Yet, because of Carter's inability to resolve the crisis in the long run, the "rally-round-the-flag" effect ceased. Carter was unable to prove himself a strong leader and people started to view him as a weak president who was unworthy of staying in office. In addition, the US strategy of détente with the Soviet Union was perceived to be a naïve failure by most Americans (Busch 2016). Both Ronald Reagan and Ted Kennedy emphasized Carter's weakness and vulnerability on foreign policy issues throughout their campaigns. The attacks from the political right and left damaged the president's image and contributed to a significant decrease of public support for the president. According to a Gallup poll, months before

the election, Carter had an approval rating of 31% (Newport 1998). Consequently, the majority of the American people refused to vote for President Carter on 4 November and elected Reagan as their next president largely because he was not the unpopular incumbent.

As a result, Jimmy Carter became a victim of circumstances over which he had little control and which ultimately led to his defeat in the 1980 presidential election. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran Hostage crisis, and a struggling economy were the major factors decreasing Carter's popularity and leading to the perception of a weak and helpless president. In addition, the missing support of the Democratic voter base and the challenge of Kennedy for the Democratic nomination caused irreparable damage to Carter's re-election campaign. However, the 1980 election was not just a referendum on Jimmy Carter's performance as president. It showed a general political shift of American society towards conservatism. This change of the political landscape occurred due to changes in the political environment which Carter failed to address. But, more importantly, the president failed in delivering the most important and most needed message of his re-election campaign: convincing the American people that despite his unpopularity, he did a good job in the Oval Office.

5 George H. W. Bush: The Unbeatable Incumbent?

The defeat of President Bush in the 1992 presidential election was surprising and shocked observers considering that just a year earlier he looked like an unbeatable incumbent. Following the dispatching of American troops to the Persian Gulf in March 1991, President Bush's approval rating topped 89%, the highest approval rating for an American president on record. But his public support witnessed a record decline in the following year due to an economic recession and broad voter dissatisfaction. In the electoral year his approval rating plunged to 39% in February and 34% in mid-October (Cummings 1996). Due to a campaign which was unable to develop a winning strategy and to effectively address the issues most important to the American public, in

little over a year, President Bush lost his second term in the White House.

On Election Day, 44.9 million people cast their ballots for Clinton, 39.1 million for Bush, and 19.7 million for Perot. President Bush received 168 electoral votes, while Clinton received 370. In 1992, 13 million more Americans voted than in the previous presidential election, indicating the highest voter turnout since 1972 (55.2% of eligible voters). A large turnout often helps the pro change candidate and signals that he was able to mobilize his own partisans as well as independent voters better than the incumbent. This is certainly true in the 1992 election as the Democrats were able to mobilize a higher percentage of their supporters than Republicans for the first time since Lyndon Johnson's 1964 landslide victory over Goldwater. Moreover, the Democratic Party candidate also won the independent vote for the first time since 1964 (Cummings 1996).

For Betty Glad (1995, 17), "at the most basic level Bush's loss was due to changes in the political situation in which he operated and his failure to respond appropriately to those changes." Presidential election outcomes are determined by three factors: the state of the economy, the positions of the candidates and voters on the issues, and the effectiveness of the candidates' campaign (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). None of these factors played in favor of President Bush and are therefore able to explain his defeat.

The single most important issue of the 1992 election was the state of the economy, particularly the voters' perception of the state of the economy (Cummings 1996). In a 1 November poll, just days before election night, 37% perceived the state of the economy as very bad and 40% as fairly bad (Cummings 1996). Unfortunately for Bush, the election fell on the "end of the worst four-year stretch of economic performance in most voters' memories" and became a *de facto* referendum on the performance of the economy under President Bush (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 715). Moreover, the American public also strongly distrusted Bush on economic and fiscal policies after he famously broke his 1988 campaign promise not to raise taxes during the 1990 budget negotiations (Glad 1995). In addition, the public's opinion on the state of the American economy was considerable

different than it was in 1988 (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). A voter who felt the national economy had improved was 35% more likely to vote for Bush than Clinton, but was 25% more likely to vote for Clinton than Bush if he/she felt the economy had worsened. Clinton won the battle for the economically dissatisfied and estimates indicate that economic change from 1988 to 1992 cost Bush an electoral share of 8.5% relative to Clinton. Projections suggest that under 1988 economic conditions Bush should have won 51.8% to 48.2% in 1992 (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). However, Bush won the 1988 presidential election against Michael Dukakis with an even bigger margin (53.8% to 46.2%) which indicates that there are additional components that led to the 1992 election outcome. Even though the state of the economy might have been the most important component in the election, it does not by itself explain Bush's defeat.

Bush was unable to recognize the fact that the American people suffered due to an underperforming economy and that this issue would decide the election. Instead of focusing on domestic policy and the state of the economy he ran on a record of military victories in Panama and Iraq and the end of the Cold War. More precisely, Bush ran on his reputation as a foreign policy leader, but chose to ignore the economy as much as possible (Glad 1995). For decades, voters had greater confidence in Republican candidates on the "maintenance of a strong national defense, and the provision of competent leadership in foreign policy" (Cummings 1996, 82). Even in 1992, voters for whom foreign policy mattered the most in deciding how to vote picked Bush over Clinton 87% to 8%. Nevertheless, only 8% of voters in 1992 cited foreign policy and national defense as the most prominent issue, compared to 23% in 1988 (Cummings 1996). President Bush did not realize the impact that the end of the Cold War had on the voting behavior of Americans and that his foreign policy efforts would not guarantee him a second term in the White House. In the end, Bush's fate resembled that of Winston Churchill – i.e., both lost power when voters turned from war to peace (Popkin 2012).

Complicating things even more, Bush did not have the advantage of leading a unified party. An unexpected challenge within his own party arose

as Pat Buchanan decided to run for the Republican presidential ticket. While Buchanan did not win any of the primary or caucus elections, his presence weakened the president. Buchanan's criticism of the president damaged Bush's image compelling Bush to allocate greater resources towards his nomination campaign (Cummings 1996). Even though Bush was not the incumbent in 1988, he had an easier time securing the Republican nomination. While all five candidates in 1988 suspended their campaign early in the primaries, Buchanan maintained his candidacy to the end, drawing over 26% of the vote in the 2 June California contest (Cummings 1996). Buchanan was never a serious contender but rather offered a protest vote against the president. In the Georgia Republican primary 81% of Buchanan's voters said they had voted for him to send a message to Bush, whereas only 15% thought he would make a good president (Glad 1995). Consequently, the 1992 nomination process hurt Bush and he was unable to lead a unified party into the general election (Popkin 2012).

In contrast, Clinton was able to establish himself as the Democratic presidential nominee fairly early in the primaries, making it easier for the Democrats to unify their party and to begin preparing for the upcoming fall campaign (Cummings 1996). In addition, Clinton was a strong candidate who presented Bush with problems to which the Bush campaign was never able to respond effectively. Bill Clinton led a smart campaign, which recognized the issues important to the public, was affective in damage control, and "always stayed on the safe side of the insult line" (Glad 1995, 18). Clinton and his running mate were southern conservative Democrats and the "first all-southern presidential and vice presidential major party ticket since Andrew Jackson ran with John C. Calhoun in 1828" (Cummings 1996, 85). Therefore, Bush's campaign could not smear them as liberals as they did Dukakis in 1988 and had to expend significant resources defending their southern base (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Cummings 1996). Nevertheless, in the 1992 election, Clinton carried Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee and came close in North Carolina and Florida, taking several southern states Bush had won with double digits four years

earlier.

Ross Perot's 19.7 million votes (18.9%) was the largest percentage received by a minor party or independent candidate since Theodore Roosevelt ran for the Progressive party in 1912. It was also the largest percentage ever received by a third party or independent candidate who had not previously served as president (Cummings 1996). His criticism of the economy and the status quo were more harmful to Bush than Clinton and helped to focus extensive media attention on the state of the economy (Cummings 1996). Perot's presence in the election cycle damaged Bush's image and benefited Clinton's campaign. In particular, his announcement, which he backtracked on 1 October, to withdraw from the presidential race on the last day of the July Democratic convention provided the Clinton campaign with a renewed impetus (Glad 1995). On Election Day, Perot drew more deeply from Bush's voters than from Clinton's. Overall, 18% of voters identifying as Republicans cast their ballot for him while only 13% of Democrats voted for Perot (Cummings 1996). Nevertheless, estimates show that Clinton would have beaten president Bush in a two-candidate race as well as "Perot's presence inflated Clinton's margin over Bush by 4%", not enough to overcome the 6% margin of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 738).

Ultimately, President Bush lost in 1992 due to a failing campaign which had no effective strategy and in which the president lacked the will to prepare for a long and harsh campaign. According to Glad (1995, 21-22), "He was slow in getting out of the White House and onto the campaign trail and slow and low-key in describing what he would do during a second term in office." No efforts were made to prepare for the reelection campaign until December 1991 (Glad 1995) and, even then, Bush never developed a vision for his next term that could unify his party and create a contrast to his opponents that would justify four more years (Popkin 2012). Since 1980 the Republican Party relied on the message of "maintaining a strong national defense and lowering taxes" but Bush's campaign failed to recognize that the issues in the 1992 election were domestic policy and the economy (Popkin 2012, 163-164). The presidential election was "a battle between

competing economic programs ... and Bush had none" (Popkin 2012, 184). That is just one reason why Clinton and Gore often dominated the terms of the campaign dialogue. It seemed that the Bush campaign was reacting to, rather than managing political events throughout the campaign (Cummings 1996).

In addition, Bush's campaign was sabotaged by leaks within the White House and unresolved internal conflicts. More precisely, his chief of staff was criticized for "spending more time on his own survival than the president's" (Popkin 2012, 173). Thus, the Bush campaign lacked someone in the White House to concentrate full-time on political strategy and with a sophisticated understanding of public opinion. It also failed to coordinate legislative politics and political communications (Popkin 2012). Bush's re-election bid failed to capitalize on the advantages offered by the Rose Garden strategy because it "failed to distinguish the way a campaign in the White House differs from a campaign for the White House" (Popkin 2012, 189).

Ultimately, President Bush lost the 1992 presidential election due to three reasons: the state of the economy and his failure to respond to changes in the political situation, the circumstances of a presidential election featuring a three-candidate race (as well as a southern conservative Democrat), and a failed election campaign resulting from a lack of strategy and a candidate who was too tired and unwilling to campaign. Like an athlete still wanting to compete but having lost the desire to train for it, "Bush had lost the hunger and drive to prepare. He believed he was entitled to remain president on the basis of his international efforts" (Popkin 2012, 188).

6 Final Considerations

The failed re-election campaigns of incumbent presidents in post-war American presidential elections reveal several similarities, but also highlight some features which are unique to each respective election. All three election bids analyzed were highlighted by a combination of a hard-fought primary campaign, a struggling US economy, an unusually strong challenger in the general election, and a president weary of campaigning.

None of the post-war incumbent presidents were guaranteed their party's nomination as it is expected for a sitting president. Ford had to go through a contested convention in which he narrowly won, Carter was challenged by one of the most prominent Democrats of his generation, and Bush's nomination was never seriously contested but his public image suffered irreparable damage during the primary campaign. The level of resistance the presidents faced within their own party differs, but nevertheless their campaigns were significantly tarnished during the nomination process and they were never fully capable of uniting their respective parties behind their candidacies. In addition, in all three cases, the challenger facing the president in the general election had an easier time winning his party's nomination and was able to lead a unified party into the general election. This reversed pattern of the contemporary expectation that consensual support within the party is commonly granted to an incumbent is one of the main reasons that can explain the failing of an incumbent presidential bid. An analysis of the postwar primary electoral results for incumbents clearly attests to this fact. More precisely, all the successful incumbents won their party's nomination with at least a 30% advantage over their adversaries.

A presidential election is often a referendum on the performance of the economy. If the state of the economy is not promising, it is expected that the voters will punish the party in power. This is especially true for an election containing an incumbent president who can be personally blamed for a struggling economy. In 1976, 1980, and 1992 unemployment was particularly high, interest rates soared, and high inflation had an unnerving effect on the American people. The degree to which the economy struggled in these years might have differed, especially in 1976 when the economy was already recovering in the months before the election. Nevertheless, voters perceived the state of the economy equally negative in all three presidential elections and voted the presidents out of office due to the perception of a struggling US economy.

However, while the study seems to identify a correlation between the state of the economy and the defeat of the incumbent candidates, some

caution is recommended. As Campbell (2013, 20) has pointed out, in 2012 “President Obama had an economic record during his term and into the election year that appeared to make him unelectable.” Nevertheless, Obama was able to secure his re-election bid with over 51% of the popular vote and 332 electoral votes. In a similar vein, George W. Bush was able to win his 2004 re-election bid and improve his electoral score (obtaining more than 10 million popular votes and 15 more electoral votes than in the 2000 election) despite the less than robust economic situation facing the nation. According to Abramowitz (2004, 745), “the estimated 3.75% growth rate of the US economy during the first half of 2004 is below the average of 4.5% for all presidential election years since World War II.” Even though economic performance improved somewhat in months preceding the election, public perceptions of the economy favored John Kerry in multiple polls on the verge of the election (Campbell 2005). This attests to Vavreck’s (2009, 159) assertion that while the nation’s economic performance is important, a “candidates’ discourse about the economy matters, too.” Therefore, while public economic perception is an unquestionable and important factor in presidential elections, incumbent candidates who can successfully define and manage the issues and the messaging that dominate the campaign are more likely to triumph.

When incumbent presidents were defeated they often faced atypical presidential contenders who became surprisingly strong candidates due to unique circumstances. Jimmy Carter was not considered a particularly strong contender for the presidency. However, he was able to use the unique context of 1976 to his advantage. More precisely, he branded himself as a Washington outsider, understood the public mood, and exploited Ford’s pardon of Nixon and the public’s anger following Watergate. In 1980, Ronald Reagan became one of the strongest presidential candidates in history. Leading an unprecedented conservative movement and shaping America’s political landscape for at least a decade, Reagan hammered Carter for a sick economy and the mismanagement of a plethora of international crises. Carter did not find any means to cope with Reagan’s campaign and, even though he was the in-

cumbent, did not stand a chance on Election Day. Equally effective, Clinton’s campaign showed its strength by winning several Southern states and proved to have a superior campaign strategy than Bush. Bill Clinton set the agenda and the pace for the 1992 election, forcing the incumbent Bush to react rather than to dictate the agenda as would be expected from an incumbent president.

All three incumbents tried to implement a presidential campaign focused on acting presidential rather than campaigning. Nevertheless, using the Rose Garden strategy to attract voters only works if the American people approve of their president and are receptive of his initiatives and policies. The Ford, Carter, and Bush presidencies were all plagued by low approval rating in the months leading up to the election. Their campaigns failed to acknowledge that fact and missed the opportunity to change their strategies accordingly. Moreover, they failed to understand how a campaign for the White House differs from a campaign from inside the White House. After four years (with the exception of Ford) the incumbent presidents seemed tired and unmotivated, believing they were entitled to a second term in office. Their unwillingness to get back on the campaign trail can therefore explain their defeat to some extent. After being defeated in the 1980 presidential election Jimmy Carter confessed: “At least it was a relief that the political campaign was over” (Busch 2016, 477).

As we increasingly focus our attention on the 2020 presidential race we can begin to anticipate the prospect of President Trump’s electoral success. As with every incumbent, Trump will have at his disposal a wide array of assets which can propel him to a second term. In other words, he will have the incumbency advantage over his challengers and will not even be hindered by partisanship dynamics. More precisely, first party-term incumbent candidates – i.e., candidates that succeed a president of the opposite party – have a greater probability of winning their re-election bids. As Campbell has suggested:

First party-term presidents are in the enviable position of being able to credibly campaign either advocating stability if things are going

well or advocating change if things are going poorly. Having been in office for just four years, these incumbents can still plausibly blame their predecessor for persisting problems. They are credited for their successes, but can evade a good deal of the blame for their failures. (Campbell 2014, 302)

Almost two years into his presidency, Trump boasts a vigorous economy and an unorthodox style that contrasts with traditional establishment politicians. The US economy grew at 2.3% in 2017 and, despite the threats of an imminent trade war, unemployment was at 4% in mid-2018. Trump has also maintained an active campaign, consistently driving his message to the electorate and touting his achievements – regardless of their validity. He has been able to determine the political agenda by barraging the public with multiple issues and proposals. As a result, a year and a half into his presidency, Trump has been able to surpass the 40% approval rating – which he was unable to do throughout most of his first year in office (Gallup 2018). Hence, he is so far unencumbered by many of the limitations faced by the three defeated incumbents analyzed above.

If Trump can successfully guarantee his party's nomination by creating a unified party base and if he can use the political experience he acquires in the coming years to efficiently manage the government's resources to his electoral advantage the odds are in his favor. Much will depend on the 2018 midterm elections. If the Republican party can weather the recent Democratic upsurge in the state and special elections and maintain its congressional majority in November 2018, internal adversaries might be blocked. However, the loss of any of the legislative chambers might embolden some of the president's most vocal critics and create an opportunity for them to challenge him for the Republican nomination (see Cillizza 2018). This will be the most pressing challenge facing his reelection bid. Only time will tell if the self-proclaimed "master negotiator" follows his own advice and dedicates the necessary resources to prepare what will unquestionably be a fabled electoral bout (Trump 2007, 52).

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Vietnam Syndrome and its Effects on the Gulf War Strategy

Síndrome do Vietname e os seus Efeitos na Estratégia da Guerra do Golfo

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Abstract—The Vietnam War left a great number of dead and wounded behind itself. US foreign policy began to shift, and included discussions on the level of power which might be used for future wars or conflicts, at a time when the US was experiencing the anxiety of the failure in Vietnam - the so-called Vietnam Syndrome by the media and by various political science literature. The Gulf War, as a first serious foreign attempt of conflict after the Vietnam War, began with the discussions of to what extent the use of force is suitable and how the Vietnam War Syndrome could be overcome.

This study will briefly explain the effects and consequences of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, as well as analysing US foreign policy discussions between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. While analyzing US foreign policy and US intervention in the Gulf War, this research will mainly focus on Shultz doctrine, and Weinberger doctrine, and later evaluate the Vietnam War and the Gulf War in the framework of constructivism.

Keywords—Vietnam Syndrome, Gulf War, Vietnam War, Weinberger, Shultz.

Resumo—A Guerra do Vietname resultou num grande número de mortos e feridos. A política externa dos EUA iniciou assim um processo de mudança, que incluiu discussões sobre o nível de poder que pode ser utilizado em futuras guerras ou conflitos, num momento em que os EUA sofriam a ansiedade causada pelo fracasso no Vietname - apelidado Síndrome do Vietname pela comunicação social e por várias publicações científicas políticas. A Guerra do Golfo, enquanto primeira tentativa séria de conflito dos EUA após a Guerra do Vietname, deu início a discussões sobre até que ponto o uso da força é adequado e de que forma a Síndrome da Guerra do Vietname poderia ser superada.

Este estudo explicará os efeitos e conseqüências da Guerra do Vietname e da Guerra do Golfo, além de analisar as discussões de política externa dos EUA que ocorreram entre a Guerra do Vietname e a Guerra do Golfo. Ao analisar a política externa dos EUA e a intervenção dos EUA na Guerra do Golfo, esta investigação irá concentrar-se sobretudo na doutrina de Shultz e na doutrina de Weinberger, e, de seguida, avaliará a Guerra do Vietname e a Guerra do Golfo no contexto do construtivismo.

Palavras-Chave—Síndrome do Vietname, Guerra do Golfo, Guerra do Vietname, Weinberger, Shultz.

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1 Introduction

THE Gulf War was the first US major military action to take place since the 1970s. It followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,

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which, as the invasion of a sovereign state, broke international law. However, the Gulf War was also significant for the US in terms of overcoming previous issues arising from the Vietnam War. Thus, the experience of Vietnam was highly influential on US military strategy during the Gulf War in terms of the use of force and the military strategy that followed, and also led to discussions related to US mistakes during the Vietnam War.

This essay will argue that the phenomenon of 'Vietnam Syndrome' had considerable influence on the conduct of the Gulf War. It will also argue how the US learnt from the strategic and tactical lessons of the Vietnam War, which led to a successful conclusion of the Gulf War. This essay will be divided into four parts. Firstly, Vietnam War and its effects will be evaluated. Secondly, the Gulf War will be on focus by explaining its causes and effects in the world structure including US, Iraq, Kuwait as well as China and Russia. Thirdly, the effects of Vietnam, the so-called Vietnam Syndrome, will be analysed as a strategic influence before and during the Gulf War. While the US foreign policy on the Gulf War is evaluated, doctrines of both Shultz (1984) and Weinberger (1984) are discussed to establish the Gulf War strategy. Finally, the Vietnam War will be evaluated in the framework of the constructivist theory.

2 Methodology

This research has as its basis a qualitative methodology. Literature on political science and sociology are the main fields taken into consideration for this research. Secondary-sources such as books, journals and scientific articles were analysed for the study of the Vietnam and the Gulf War. This research is mainly based on library-analysis and includes comprehensive interpretation and comparison of existing resources.

3 Vietnam War

The Vietnam War is frequently called "lost war", "a nationally divisive war", or "a shameful war" in the history and most of the literature (Janette 2002: 784), due to its decisive consequence. Firstly, in order to understand the Gulf War strategy, it is needed to take a careful consideration of

the Vietnam War by looking at its aftermath as well. In this section, the effects and consequences of the Vietnam War will be analysed by briefly evaluating the main discussions around it.

First of all, it should be mentioned that, US intervention into Vietnam caused the emerge of two important issues: 1) the ending of colonialism in general caused by the beginning of the Cold War, 2) the increasing power of nationalism (Herring 1991: 105). Vietnam was not very politically and socially stable at the time and there were some revolutionary movements such as the Vietminh. Vietminh, known as a revolutionary movement in Vietnam, was created around the ideas of communism (Herring 1991: 105) and Ho Chi Min was the leader of this revolutionary group. At the time, communism was a great threat for the US. Therefore, Vietnam was seen as an important region in which Americans could fight communism (Herring 1991: 106). At the time, the threat of communist China and U.S.S.R should were taken into consideration the by US as well. US had a fear of the expansion of communism in the world.

At this stage, to understand the "spirit of the time", domino theory might be benefited clearly. Domino theory is defined as "a theory that if one nation becomes Communist-controlled the neighbouring nations will also become Communist-controlled" (Merriam-Webster's "domino theory"). By considering this theory, if Vietnam had become a failure for the US, the communist threat could have expanded through Indochina and South Asia easily (Herring 1991: 107). If communism began to spread over other regions, the US would face many disadvantages. The most important issue for the US was the potential difficulties in supplying raw materials. In this case, US raw materials could not be supplied and it became difficult to control strategic waterways (Herring 1991: 107).

The US had other threats under consideration. One of these threats was China due to the possible intervention in Vietnam. If China became involved in the Vietnam War, the war would have to be conducted in different regions against different enemies. This could complicate the US' situation, since it was already far away from Vietnam geographically, which made difficult any military help to its forces. At this stage,

the escalation of war could be enhanced and even nuclear confrontations could occur (Herring 1991: 110). American leaders also feared other kinds of intervention by China into Vietnam, which led to many discussions around the use of force in the Vietnam War.

China was not in favour of a strong and unified Vietnam under Hanoi leadership, who was trying to unify Vietnam under his rule (Zhang 1996: 731). Therefore, China would prefer two Vietnams divided as North and South, rather than a unified one. There was also a fear of potential China-US war that could occur due to the Vietnam War. Even though there were some escalations during the war, Sino-American conflict did not occur, because China had a weak economy and lack of modernized military, making it impossible to compete with the US at the time. However, China had an important role in the US failure in Vietnam, by trying to deter US involvement in Vietnam (Zhang 1996: 762). The involvement of China would create crucial problems for the US, by escalating war and violence. During the Rolling Thunder operation, which took place in April of 1965, the US bombed railroads, highways and bridges of North Vietnam, in order to be able to deter North Vietnam forces (Zhang 1996: 754).

The geography and climate of Vietnam made the US involvement in Vietnam very difficult, as well as the jungles and swamps (Herring 1991: 112). There are many theories that try to explain the US failure in Vietnam. According to Summers (in Zhang 1996: 732), there was a lack of appreciation of the American leaders regarding military strategy and national policy, which caused the defeat of the US in the war.

Vietnam was frequently associated with unsuccessful judgement of political leaders at the time, and it created anti-war movements also influenced by the media, that were against US involvement of Vietnam War. However, the most important issue raised by the Vietnam War was the US' underestimation of the determination and strength of its enemies (Herring 1991: 113)

As a consequence, the US was damaged economically, politically, as well as socially. The Vietnam War became one of the most costly wars in the history, with an estimated 167 billion dollars of damages (Herring 1991: 116). Herring (1991:

104) mentions that: "It left America's foreign policy at least temporarily in disarray, discrediting the post-war policy containment and undermining the consensus that supported it. It divided the American people as no other event since their own Civil War a century earlier. It battered their collective soul"

4 The Gulf War

The end of the cold war created a new international panorama with discussions around the world system and its unipolar (or multipolar in some sense) character. In this framework, the Gulf War took began in 1991 and it paved the way for new structural changes, affecting especially the Middle East and other regions of the world. It should be mentioned that the Gulf War was very decisive and overwhelming in terms of military strategy (Freedman and Karsh 1991: 5).

The Gulf War occurred after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. To understand the Gulf War clearly, Iran-Iraq war should also be considered carefully. Iran began to be armed during the 1970s in order to be able to create the hegemony of Iran. After Iran-Iraq war, the threat of Iran ended, however, the Iraq threat began to emerge.

In the summer of 1990, Kuwait was accused by Iraq of issues regarding the oil market and it was followed by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces (Regan 2013: 177). This invasion received great reactions from other countries, as well as from the UN Security Council.

After the invasion of Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush sent aircrafts to the region (Regan 2013: 178), but Iraqi forces were not willing to withdraw from Kuwait, even though a lot of mediation attempts were put in place, including the Soviet Union's proposal as a last mediation (Regan 2013: 179). In addition to mediation attempts during the war, many international condemnations occurred by Western countries, such as the UK, US and France (Freedman and Karsh 1991: 6).

Iraq did not agree with the peace proposals and mediation attempts and offered different claims to be able to legitimise itself in the Gulf War process. According to Iraq, Kuwait did not follow the OPEC agreements and increased its oil

production in different regions. Another allegation was that Kuwait began to expand its borders against the benefit of Iraq. It should also be mentioned that these allegations were rejected by Kuwait.

Operation Desert Storm was the most decisive part of the Gulf War. The Operation Desert Storm was successfully ended by the US and George Bush ceased fire in February 27 of 1991. Afterwards the UN Security Council began to implement this ceasefire under its Article 686, by which Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait by ending its military actions there.

The Gulf War changed America's perception of itself and, at the same time, affected other states' perceptions of the US (Garofano and Steel 2001: 5). The US regained confidence in its military and political influence, and it strengthened its hegemonic power over other countries. During the Desert Storm, a divergence of opinions between Shultz and Powell began to emerge, resulting in vital issues for the future of the Gulf War, as well as of the US itself. Superior technology made the military operation more effective, but politics and the political conditions were also of considerable importance. The goal of the US was to make decisions that favoured the US, but without repeating the mistakes similar to those made in Vietnam.

5 Vietnam Syndrome and the Gulf War Strategy

After the failure of the Vietnam War, huge anxiety and stress began to emerge for the foreign policies of US. There was a question mark in terms of use of power in future conflicts caused by a fear of experiencing failure again. The discussions on the degree of the use of force became a central focus for the US, and the last stages of the discussions began to emerge before the beginning of the Gulf War, which also included the US intervention in Kuwait. The Iraqi strategy was threatening to the US since it could create a "second Vietnam" (Freedman and Karsh 1991: 5).

Therefore, there is a need to analyse the discussions that emerged in the US to understand the Gulf War and its causes. US foreign policy and potential solutions to be able to overcome

the Vietnam syndrome should be analysed carefully. Herring (1981: 594) states that 'Vietnam syndrome' had a considerable influence over the US foreign policy and its strategy during the Gulf War. Following the Vietnam War, the reasons for the failure began to be examined from a number of different perspectives. A number of questions began to emerge, including: (1) if the US had made serious mistakes during the war; (2) if the US could have won the war in the absence of serious military mistakes; and (3) if the US is now unable to intervene in other regions in an attempt to control them as a foreign power. Following the Vietnam War, US military leaders began to consider that a war in distant regions inevitably leads to high levels of military expenses, combined with uncertain results, resulting in a greater reluctance to use force. Campbell (1998: 358) states that "The principle cause of the military's current reluctance to use of force is their organisational disintegration and near-collapse in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the wake of Vietnam". In the Vietnam War, the US could not achieve its political and military goals.

Colonel Summer, neo-Clausewitzian analyst, cites Clausewitz's trinity to identify US mistakes during the Vietnam War (Campbell 1998: 364). According to Summers (Campbell 1998: 364), the failure to establish a national will, and a lack of well-identified political objectives were two important problems in the Vietnam War. Summer believes that these two failures, evaluated in the light of Clausewitz, led to the failure of the Vietnam War, and this led to the potential for identical issues to be experienced in future wars, thus giving rise to the Vietnam Syndrome.

The views of Shultz and Weinberger were important for the main discussion, which was shaped around the Gulf War. In October of 1984, the Secretary of State George Shultz discussed the use of American military force, stating that American forces needed to be more flexible in the use of force (1984: 1). He further emphasises the importance of the relationship between power and diplomacy, and the ways in which this relationship can be facilitated (1984: 1). However, he also believes that "There is not safety in isolationism" (1984: 2). One of Shultz's most important points is that diplomatic alternatives

and military options should not be viewed as two opposing figures, but rather as two important powers that complete each other and proceed together. Shultz (1984: 4) states that the US needs to control the balance between diplomacy and power in an efficient manner, as, following the 1980s, there will no longer be any total wars or total states of peace, but “a spectrum of often ambiguous challenges to US interests”. Shultz believes that clear military aims, the support of people and available resources are important for the achievement of US aims, and during the Vietnam War there was a lack of these elements (1984: 5). Shultz (1983) mentions that:

“We know that we are not omnipotent and that we must set priorities. We cannot pay any price or bear any burden. We must discriminate; we must be prudent and careful; we must respond in ways appropriate to the challenge and engage our power only when very important strategic stakes are involved.”

Shultz (1984) also believes that the international system was centred on Europe before, and this structure began to change day by day. It appears that many changes occurred, such as the diminishing power of the former colonial empire by the effects of decolonization, and the increasing struggle of moderates and radicals (Shultz 1984). Increasing effects of nuclear power should also be considered. Shultz (1984) found abnormal the America’s dependency of these problems due to the increasing danger in the world structure. He says that:

“Certainly the United States is not the world’s policeman. But we are the world’s strongest free nation, and, therefore, the preservation of our values, our principles, and our hopes for a better world rests in great measure, inevitably, on our shoulders.”

In the doctrine of Shultz (1984), it is crucially important to understand why so many Americans think to divide into two different categories power and diplomacy, if diplomacy can be used inside

military alternatives rather than considering them as opponent figures.

According to Shultz (1984), moral issues may emerge as consequences of some military interventions and he frequently connected morality issues to the Vietnam War. In his doctrine, there is an argument that defends that America can use its force to create a better world without being arrogant and immoral (Shultz 1984)

In November of 1984, the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, expressed his opposition to Shultz, believing instead that the US should always be ready for a future war, maintaining an ability to avoid it. He notes the existence of many threats to the US, and that it is not easy to establish an appropriate level of response (Weinberger 1984). Unlike Shultz, he is not in favour of the use of flexible force, but he believes the US needs to be prepared for different insurgencies, terrorist activities and global conflicts (Weinberger 1984). He views the issues arising from the Vietnam War as a result of the use of military force as merely one aspect of diplomatic efforts (Weinberger 1984). He also discusses the difficulties of identifying enemies who might be generally ambiguous or exploit the indirect power of other countries. Weinberger (1984) notes that:

Regardless of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill-defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United States and our allies... and then responding appropriately.

According to Weinberger (1984), there are many threats against the US, such as aggression and terrorism, and these threats make it difficult to determine a suitable level of use of force. Weinberger (1984) also sees the US as a major power in the world, with many responsibilities and interests when insurgencies, crises and global conflicts emerge in different regions. In Weinberger doctrine (1984), there is a strong belief in preparation before any kind of conflicts occur, and any kind of decisions regarding these conflicts should be made as soon as possible. According to Weinberger (1984), the US should do

whatever it has to do in any conflict, insurgency or war in any region of the world. He has more certainty on the level of use of force, while asking the question “Is this conflict in our nationalist interest?” (Weinberger 1984). He implies that if the answer is yes, then the US should take every effort to be able to win that war. Weinberger also emphasizes the importance of gaining support from the popular will before involvement in any war. To be able to have support of the people, threats that the US has to face should be clearly shared with the population (Weinberger 1984).

A number of ambiguities and issues can be identified in Weinberger’s position, such as unclear definitions of ‘vital interests’ and ‘last resorts’. He also mentions the importance of popular support without thinking of its tendency to manipulate. To gain the popular support, media tools could be used actively by misinforming people or directing them into a specific thought which is internalized by government officials or statesmen.

For Shultz (1984), the issues lie in the ‘grey areas’ between total peace and total war. It can be said that while Shultz is less clear about the solution, and frequently refers to diplomacy and military relationships, Weinberger (1984) puts forward more certain solutions without explaining some concepts clearly. While Shultz frequently refers to grey areas between total peace and total war, Weinberger tends to experience total war to be able to have certain victory by using a strict use of force.

Prior to the Operation Desert Storm, which took place during the Gulf War, General Colin Powell wanted to be certain of the US’ ability to identify vital interests, the achievability of objectives and rapid applicability of force (Herring 1981: 366). Herring (1981: 366) also notes that the Operation Desert Storm shows that Weinberger Doctrine, in terms of using proper force, worked successfully.

6 Understanding the Vietnam War in the Framework of Constructivism

Constructivism can be considered as a middle ground between the rationalist and post-structural theories. Epistemologically, it is difficult to find how do we know what we know. Ac-

ording to critical constructivists, such as Fierke, if we have different realities, it can be difficult to study them. So, it might be argued that positivist methodology is inconsistent, because everything is relational and using positivist approach to our studies may be meaningless in the process of creating hypothesis.

In the framework of constructivism, war is constructed by human beings. War could be learned, as Mead has argued (Vasquez 1997: 668), mainly through practices which take place during daily life. As we see in the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, history played an important role in this process. By looking at history, we can experience many different things by practicing and we learn how we should behave in our future lives. Michael Howard studies show that war has been changing since the very early decades of the last century in Europe. It is sometimes associated with annihilation and sometimes with maneuver in the history (Vasquez 1997: 670). Constructivism shows us the possibility of changes in war. If it is possible for any kind of changes, ending wars may also be possible, according to constructivism. Vasquez (1997: 671) asks “If war was invented in a certain period in history, might it also be disinvented in some other period?” In this perspective, it could be argued that the US have taken lessons from Vietnam by “learning with past failures” and tried to overcome its mistakes in the next war.

Constructivism can reinterpret history, however it is not very successful for predictions of future structure of world politics. When the Vietnam War is argued, it is not possible to predict the consequences of the war, as most realist theory argues. “International society”, argument discussed by Bull and Kant, is also considered impossible to apply during the Vietnam War and the Gulf War process. Constructivism might be helpful to understand our mistakes but might not help to achieve certain results in terms of consequences of future wars.

7 Conclusion

The Vietnam War caused many deaths and paved the way to a significant economic crisis, political discussions and social polarization in American

society. Subsequent conflicting situations and potential wars following the Vietnam War began to create a kind of stress on US' foreign policies in terms of discoverable economics, military and political problems, as well as potential polarization of the American society. This anxiety felt in the US' foreign policy showed itself before and during The Gulf War, considered to be the first serious involvement of the US into conflict after the Vietnam War. The consequences and failures following the Vietnam War paved the way to new discussions on level of forces that could be included in a limited war or total war. After the Vietnam War, Shultz and Weinberger brought forward different ideas on the optimum use of force in the Gulf War, and the conflict between their thoughts created a different solution to win the Gulf War without experiencing any kind of syndrome, as experienced in Vietnam before.

Even though there are some unclear points in both Shultz and Weinberger doctrine, it should be mentioned that while Shultz is closer to limited war with limited interests, Weinberger tends more to have a kind of total war in the Gulf War in order to be able to achieve certain results which will be concluded as victory.

In the framework of constructivism, it is possible to take lessons from history, but it still not possible to predict future wars or conflicts. "War and anarchy are socially constructed by the state" argument is still valid for both the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, however it is difficult to understand the relations between these two wars by only taking constructivism into account. There are some question marks in the framework of predicting future conflicts.

In conclusion, following the Vietnam War, there was a need for the US to make appropriate decisions to determine its future foreign policy. The experience of Vietnam has led to considerable concerns in determining the strategy of the Gulf War, however, at the same time, the lessons from Vietnam assisted the US to go through the correct channels in the Gulf War, by: 1) ensuring vital interests; 2) calculating the costs and benefits; and 3) deciding the level of use of force. Moreover, while the Vietnam War had a negative effect on the politics and military of the US, raising great issues regarding Human Rights in terms of inter-

national law and fear of repeating the mistakes of Vietnam, caused the US to develop an improved strategy during the Gulf War.

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Leadership Skills, Style of Power and Influence over Regional Policies of Germany in the Post Crisis Europe (2012-2015)

Capacidades de Liderança, Estilo de Poder e Influência sobre as Políticas Regionais da Alemanha na Europa Pós-crise (2012-2015)

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Abstract—Since the Eurozone crisis, scholars framed different interpretations about the power role of Germany in Europe, pointing at the possible return of the “German question”. Recently, with the “Brexit”, the populist tensions within the EU and the election of Trump as US president, Germany on the contrary, was regarded as the last bastion of the liberal order by Western media. Starting from the premise that with the global economic crisis Germany acquired a supremacy position in Europe “by default”, we proceed by confuting the idea of Germany as a coercive hegemon, without falling into idealistic interpretations. To do so, we define an analytical framework distinguishing leadership and hegemony and insisting on the importance of the context of permanent multi-level crisis in Europe. The argument we advance is that between 2012 and 2015 Germany played a positive power role in Europe, exhibiting appreciable leadership skills, vast regional influence and, first of all, a style of power closer to a benign multilateral leadership than to a coercive unilateral hegemony. The empirical research is based on three case studies from different policy areas, the Banking Union (2012-2013), the European migration crisis (2014-2015) and the Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014-2015).

Keywords—Regional Power, Europe, Leadership, Crisis.

Resumo—Desde a crise da zona do euro, os investigadores elaboraram diferentes interpretações sobre o papel do poder da Alemanha na Europa, apontando para o possível retorno da “questão alemã”. Recentemente, com o “Brexit”, as tensões populistas na UE e a eleição de Trump como presidente dos EUA, a Alemanha seguiu o caminho contrário, sendo considerada o último bastião da ordem liberal pela comunicação social ocidental. Partindo da premissa de que, com a crise económica global, a Alemanha adquiriu uma posição de supremacia na Europa “by default”, prosseguimos confundindo a ideia da Alemanha como um poder hegemónico coercitivo, sem cair em interpretações idealistas. Para isso, definimos uma estrutura analítica que distingue liderança e hegemonia e insistindo na importância do contexto de permanente crise multinível na Europa. O argumento que avançamos é que, entre 2012 e 2015, a Alemanha desempenhou um papel positivo de poder na Europa, exibindo habilidades de liderança apreciáveis, vasta influência regional e, sobretudo, um estilo de poder mais próximo de uma liderança multilateral benigna do que de uma hegemonia unilateral coerciva. A investigação empírica baseia-se em três estudos de caso de diferentes áreas políticas, a União Bancária (2012-2013), a crise migratória europeia (2014-2015) e o conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (2014-2015).

Palavras-Chave—Poder Regional, Europa, Liderança, Crise.

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1 Introduction

THE aim of this paper is to research the regional power role exercised by Germany in the post-crisis Europe, between 2012 and 2015.¹ The article distances itself from both the views of a post-2008 Germany as an authoritarian hegemon in Europe and the idealistic interpretation considering it the last hope of the liberal order worldwide, as appeared on the first pages of numerous renowned international media². Indeed, on one hand Germany was prematurely judged as re-proposing the emergence of a “German question” in Europe; on the other hand, the country was lately considered as the last bastion of the liberal order globally, contrasting rising populisms and opposing a constructive path to isolationist solutions adopted by countries such as the United Kingdom. Far from these over-simplified analyses, the article builds an accurate picture of the regional power role of Germany from 2012 to 2015, defining critically its limits during a complicated historical context.

A key point concerns the leadership skills of Germany, in particular the capacity to lead Member States of the European Union out of the crises that recently plagued the region. We state that Germany should receive more credit in consideration of those historical contingencies, as the post-2008 in Europe can be considered a period of permanent crisis, characterized by uncertainty.

1.1 Review of the literature

The literature concerning the Post-Crisis regional status of Germany includes opposite positions, ranging from iconic “champion of liberal order and multilateral approach” to a “ruling in a despotic way over a de facto German Europe”. The analysis of the literature is useful to outline a map of

the main interpretative lines regarding the post-crisis Germany in Europe and, consequently, understand where our thesis lies. By reviewing the literature on this topic, we counted at least six macro interpretations.

The first interpretative position is the “Zivilmacht” or Civilian Power. The rationale is embedded in the post WW2 order, and considers Germany as a normative actor, founding its foreign policy on non-negotiable values (such as the avoidance the use of military force, the induced ultra-pacifism, pro-regional integration attitude), and a multilateral approach to crises and disputes via international fora³. According to the scholars supporting this view, the post-2008 regional role of Germany is basically based on the approach of Western Germany and the post-reunification, however in a historically and geo-political different context, displaying a substantial continuity in the European politics of Germany (Manners 2002, 2006; Telò 2015)⁴. The second interpretative line considers Germany as de facto the hegemon in Europe, as a consequence of the global economic crisis. We identify two main sub-trends within this interpretation, defining different priorities: authors, such as Habermas (2010, 2011), focus on the intentional and structural nature of the new role of Germany; on the other hand, authors such as Beck (2014) highlight the importance of contingency issues (the asymmetric impact of the economic crisis) which contributed to the origin of Germany as the unrivaled hegemon over the region⁵. The third interpretation or of the “leadership by default”, agrees with the aforementioned consideration of a de facto leadership role of Germany in Europe after the global economic crisis. However, the new power role of Germany would be the mere result of a change of regional context, denying any intentional plan to hegemony over the continent. According to Janning and Möller (2015) Germany’s elites have the possibility to

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1. The article is partially based on the researches made by Dr. Valerio Alfonso Bruno for his doctoral thesis.

2. Smale and Erlanger 2016; Noack 2016; Oltermann 2016

3. In this direction, we could mention the interesting thesis of Maull, considering Germany and Japan as the prototypes of a new typology of powers. See in particular Maull 1990.

4. The studies of Manners are fundamental on the topic. See in particular: Manners 2002, 2006). The article of Telò (2015) on the topic is also important. For a critic of the notion of “civilian power” see Bull (1982).

5. Among the articles and interviews of Habermas, see at least the following: Habermas 2010, 2011; Beck 2014.

use the favorable momentum to exercise an active leadership role; other authors (Streeck 2015) believe the “leadership by default” not convenient to both Germany and other EU countries, and advocate for a consensual separation, beneficial to both sides on the long run⁶. The “false power” interpretation insists on the weaknesses of Germany and denies it any possibility to exercise a leadership role in Europe. One reason concerns economics: Germany’s would be too dependent on its exports, lacking public investments, plagued by small jobs and ageing population (Legrain 2014; Gros 2015). A different declination sees the weakness in the fading bilateral leadership with France. A third reason is the relative military weakness of Germany in terms of manpower and equipment (Speck 2012). A last reason is historical, considering the reluctance of Germany to act as regional leader a sign of the difficulty to overcome its past, making the country *sui generis* (Rusconi 2015; Guerot 2013)⁷. The “geo-economic power” interpretation explains the apparent paradox of Germany (economic giant and military dwarf) by defining Berlin as merely interested in geo-economic power rather than military and geo-political, the country preference for investing in its Chambers of Commerce abroad and trade diplomacy missions, rather than increase its military budget. However, although Germany represent the paradigm of this new logic of power, it should not be overlooked, as some key issues are still open, as evidence by authors such as Kundnani (2011, 2015) and Youngs (2014). Finally, the interpretation considering Germany Post-Crisis status and its European politics as the last step towards “normality”. Germany, in the immediate post-reunification, continued to play a sort of *sui generis* civilian power role, but with the global crisis, it completely finalized the return to normality, pursuing its national interest (Ash 1993, 2010a, 2010b)⁸ In the post-2008, Germany should be considered, under every aspects, a normal country

6. The study of Streeck is a lucid analyses of the current impasse of the EU.

7. Among the many studies pointing at the role of Germany’s past on its current European power role, see at least the following works: Rusconi 2015; Guérot 2013.

8. Ash has been portraying Germany as a country on the pattern of normalization since Germany reunification.

such as the United Kingdom or France⁹.

1.2 Analytical approach of the research

This article follows the analytical framework proposed by Destradi (2008, 2010) and Nolte (2010) distinguishing between several types of regional style of power. In particular, “leadership” strictly conceived (multilateral, common objective, liberal) and hegemony (unilateral, egoistic objective, authoritarian) are placed on a *continuum* ranging from Empire to benevolent leadership. Our approach also includes the analytical contributes of Schild (2013) on the “followership” and Mattli (1999) and the way it contributes to successful regional leadership and the distinction between intentional and unintentional forms of power proposed, among others, by Stoppino (2015).

1.3 Methodology and design of the research

In our paper, we consider three main variables (leadership skills, style of power and overall influence over policies outcomes) and develop an independent set of indicators for each variable¹⁰. The indicators are used into the empirical part of the research, consisting of three case studies in order to test the thesis. These cases are drawn from different policies areas of the EU: economic affairs, internal affairs and external affairs. The first case study regards the development of the so-called “European Banking Union” (2012-2013), the second concerns the sharp increase of the “European migrant crisis” (2014-2015) and the last case deals with the complex “Russia-Ukraine conflict” (2014-2015)¹¹. The empirical analysis is conducted through the analysis of: (i) reports from international organizations and agencies; (ii) articles of international news/press agencies; (iii) well-renowned journals providing key public

9. We may affirm most scholars recognized the evolution of the regional power status of Germany following the economic crisis of 2008, nevertheless important differences of opinion persist. Our argument, although with some *distinguo*, is close to the interpretative line of the “leadership by default”, as the most adapt to understand the European stance of Germany following the global economic crisis the *terminus a quo* of the research.

10. In the operation of selection of the indicators, some of the considerations of Sandra Destradi have been fundamental: “Empire, hegemony, and leadership” (2008).

11. The crises analysed in the case studies cannot be considered completely over in 2017.

statements of decision-makers; (iv) researches and reports by think-tanks from different political perspective on recent events; (v) and scholarly papers by authoritative policy experts.

2 Analytical Framework

To support empirically our thesis, we first address the problem of accurately defining the analytical approach adopted, by introducing the building blocks of our argument. The main building blocks required by our analysis are:

2.1 Distinction between leadership, hegemony and supremacy

As mentioned in the introduction, we believe useful to differentiate between “Leadership” and “Hegemony” from “Supremacy”. The first two concepts define somehow an activity of leading, which may substantially be characterized by willingness, awareness and planning. On the other hand, to our view, supremacy identifies an asymmetrical distribution of resources defining a hierarchical order concerning a given context. We adopted the conceptual framework developed by Destradi (2008, 2011) and the suggestions proposed by Nolte (2010) in order to compare regional powers. The main conceptual dimension discriminating between Hegemony and Leadership is the pursuit of an egoistic or common objective by the Leader. On this point, the contributions of Schirm (2012) on “followership”, insisting on the relevance of including aims and ideals of followers into the strategic plan of the Leader to succeed, is interesting:

“I argue that it is essentially the lack of support by neighboring countries which precluded emerging powers from successfully pursuing their goals in several instances. In order to perform successfully their leadership must be accepted by followers, especially by neighboring countries since gains in power affect the respective region directly. Followership by neighboring countries is a necessary condition to give these countries the power base for both regional and global power projection.”

Schirm 2012, 199

The distinction hegemony-leadership brings some critical elements: both concepts are used as synonymous, describing the action by a State/actor of temporarily leading one or more followers, in virtue of a more or less pro-active submission. However, leadership recalls, in a more pronounced way, the action of leading followers in moment of crises, with followers more voluntarily submitting. On the other hand, hegemony brings with it the idea of followers into a less spontaneous way.

2.2 Crisis management and leadership

The conceptual analysis regarding the variable x (leadership skills) is closely connected with the style of power mentioned above. Some dimensions as consensus and coalition building, acting as focal point in international fora, working towards the promotion of a common agenda and the leadership by example are elements defining the leadership style of power. Other conceptual dimensions such as crisis management, strategic planning and proactivity define both the action of the hegemony power than the one of the leadership strictly conceived. As stated by Nolte: “Regional powers [...] have to bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the maintenance of order in the region.” (Nolte 2010, 890).

2.3 Intentional and un-intentional conceptual dimensions of power

In our paper, we consider a different analytical perspective, based on the overall influence over regional policies outcomes. In particular, some scholars (Russett 1985; Schirm 2012) focus not merely on the material or military resources at disposal of the Leader State, but on the effective capacity to influence the outcomes at the regional level as a *conditio sine qua non* to define a regional power. Therefore, we decided to integrate some classical theories and concepts from International Relations, such as agenda setting and veto power with more subtle items. In particular, the normative persuasion (Ikenberry 2009) involving the capacity to change norms (and politics) of the Follower States without involving sanctions,

political pressure, material benefits and side payments, and the emulation and non-decision effect (Stoppino 2015)¹².

2.4 The role of the Regions

In the International Relations debates, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire seemed to introduce a new era, characterized by the US hegemony. IR scholars argued that the end of bipolarism inaugurated the unipolar moment with the triumph of the capitalist economy and with the dissemination of liberal democratic systems (Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*). Other scholars (Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*) assumed the unipolar moment as a transitional era towards a new multipolar order, which instead of being dominated by military power only, would be characterized by cultural (tribal, religious, linguistic etc.) identity and consequent confrontations. Huntington stated the origin of the clash of civilizations: while rejecting some of the theoretical and conceptual premises of the Huntington research, we acknowledge his intuition over the shape of a regional-bloc order. In fact, the 21th Century confirmed the precariousness of unipolarism and the creation of a multipolar order, dominated by regional powers and regional blocs, whose most important example is the origin of the BRICS countries, which openly challenged the US power, by promoting alternative decision-making processes. The 2008 financial crisis seemed to benefit the rising powers, while the traditional powers had an important retreat. We here state the significance of the roots of alter-hegemonic powers, which tried to change the *games rules* into the International arena, recognizing the new balancing mechanisms, by determining implicit regional spheres of influence and power. At the same time, we assumed the deepening of integration processes (political and economics, geopolitical) into the regional blocs (i.e. Asia's ascending powers, Latin American integration processes, Gulf powers in the Middle East) imposed by the global system to the key-actors. It is important here to state that regional

power approach tries to combine IR realist and neorealist theories with constructivist and liberal perspectives, by 'conceptualizing regional powers combined elements of different IR approaches; they include the internal power base (liberal), the power resources (realist) and their application (realist), role definitions and strategies (constructivist), and interaction patterns in the region with a special emphasis on the role of regional institutions' (Nolte 2010). In Latin America, the ascending role of Brazil made of it an indispensable key actor, as a regional power (a new sub-imperial power?) (Marini 1977; Zibechi 2012). A similar approach could be applied also to other regional blocs, including European Union in order to have a different perspective to International Relations Theories.

3 Methodology and Research Design

Defined the analytical approach of the work and aspects related to the distinction of concepts such as supremacy, hegemony and leadership, we focus on the methodological and design aspects of the research.

We define three variables: *leadership skills (x)*, *style of power (y)* and *overall influence over policies outcomes (z)*, as the combination of those three substantially covers all the major aspects regarding the dynamic of regional power. The transition from abstract concepts such as leadership, hegemony or influence to indicators capable to grasp empirical reality is complex. The step adopted was to conceive some conceptual dimensions, operating as a "bridge" between abstract concepts and empirical reality. Thus, each of the three abstract concepts behind the variables was structured into empirical indicators; consequently, we developed one independent sets of indicators for each variable, with multiple conceptual dimensions¹³. The working definitions of the conceptual dimensions are the following: Variable

12. The works of Ikenberry are fundamental to understand the relations existing between hegemon/leader and institutional frameworks. In particular see at least Ikenberry (2009).

13. The indicators are on a 0-4 points scale (0= minimal, 4= maximum). The dimensions *crisis management* and *common agenda promotion* were weighted with a higher overall impact (25% each), while the remaining four dimensions of variable x have an impact of 12,5% each. The four dimensions of the variable y were given different weightings. The dimension *goal/objective* assigned weight is of 50% of the overall score, while the remaining four dimensions are assigned 12,5% each.

x – leadership skills (as it is exposed in detail in Table 1):

- 1) *Consensus and coalition building*: Bridging different perspective of Followers on collective action and forming coalition of followers;
- 2) *Focal point in international fora*: Representing the interest of the region in international fora;
- 3) *Crisis management*: Managing successfully critical and extra-ordinary situations;
- 4) *Common agenda promotion*: Fostering a regional common agenda;
- 5) *Strategic planning*: Acting following a strategy, without sudden turns and constant reconsideration;
- 6) *Leadership by example*: Inducing followers to act following its example;
- 7) *Proactivity*: Dealing in anticipation with expected difficulty.

Table 1: Dimensions and indicators of leadership skills (variable x)

Dimension	Explanation	Indicators	Index leadership skills
Consensus and coalition building (10% impact)	<i>Bridging different perspective of followers on collective action</i>	A. Majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier B. Majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	0. Minimal (G) 1. Weak (E, F) 2. Medium (D, E) 3. Solid (B, C) 4. Strong (A)
	<i>Forming coalition of followers</i>	C. Majority of States and minority of dossier D. Majority of States and minority of dossier E. Minority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier F. Minority of States (incl. competitors) and minority of dossier G. Minority of States and most of dossier H. Minority of States and minority of dossier	
Focal point in international fora (10% impact)	<i>Representing the interest of the region in international fora</i>	A. All the international fora with efficacy B. All the international fora C. Most international fora D. Few international fora E. No international fora	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)
Crisis management (25% impact)	<i>Managing successfully critical and extra-ordinary situations</i>	A. Every critical situation, with promptness and resilience B. Every critical situation C. Most of the critical situations D. Few critical situations E. No critical situations	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)
Common agenda promotion (25% impact)	<i>Fostering the regional common agenda</i>	A. Every aspect of the agenda B. Most of the aspects of the agenda (including major economic aspects) C. Most of the aspects of the agenda (excluding major economic aspects) D. Few aspects of the agenda E. No aspects of the agenda	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)
Strategic planning (10% impact)	<i>Acting following a strategy, without sudden turns and constant reconsideration</i>	A. Strategic planning independently of international and domestic pressure B. Simple strategic planning C. Minor shifts and reconsiderations D. Major shifts and reconsiderations E. No evidence of strategic planning	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)
Leadership by example (10% impact)	<i>Inducing followers to act following its example</i>	A. In all the situations B. In most situations C. In few situations D. In no situations E. Deterring action	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)
Proactivity (10% impact)	<i>Dealing in anticipation with expected difficulty</i>	A. Fully proactive B. Mostly proactive C. Partially proactive D. Minimal E. Reactive	0. Minimal (E) 1. Weak (D) 2. Medium (C) 3. Solid (B) 4. Strong (A)

Variable y – style of power (as it is exposed in detail in Table 2)¹⁴.

14. As concerns variable y (style of power), indicators are on a scale 0-4 with 0 being hegemonic style of power and 4 being liberal leadership style.

- 8) *Goals/objectives*: Aim pursued by the leader (common vs egoistic);
- 9) *Multilateral approach*: Working in concert with two or more Follower States;
- 10) *Follower States attitude*: Attitude of the Follower States towards the action of the leader;
- 11) *Follower States status*: The Follower States' status are substantially improved by the action of the leader.

Table 2: Dimensions and indicators of style of power (variable y)

Dimension	Explanation	Indicators	Index style
Goals/objective (50% impact)	<i>Goals or objectives pursued by the leader</i>	A. Egoistic B. Prevalently egoistic C. No net distinction D. Prevalently common E. Common	0. Hegemony (A) 1. Prevalently hegemonic (B) 2. No net prevalence (C) 3. Prevalently leadership (D) 4. Leadership (E)
Multilateral approach (12,5% impact)	<i>Working in concert with two or more follower States</i>	A. Absent B. False multilateralism (facade) C. Bilateralism with a "junior" partner D. With minority of followers E. With majority of followers	0. Hegemony (A) 1. Prevalently hegemonic (B) 2. No net prevalence (C) 3. Prevalently leadership (D) 4. Leadership (E)
Follower States Attitude (12,5% impact)	<i>Attitude of the follower States towards the action of the leader</i>	A. Open and firm resistance B. Initial/soft resistance C. Subordination D. Non-decision E. Mutual bargain F. Voluntary followership G. Follower-initiated	0. Hegemony (A) 1. Prevalently hegemonic (B,C) 2. No net prevalence (D) 3. Prevalently leadership (E) 4. Leadership (F, G)
Follower States status (12,5% impact)	<i>The followers States' status are improved by action of the leader</i>	A. Harmful or negative impact B. No improvement C. Minimal-improvement D. Partial improvement E. Real improvement	0. Hegemony (A) 1. Prevalently hegemonic (B) 2. No net prevalence (C) 3. Prevalently leadership (D) 4. Leadership (E)

Variable z – overall influence on policies outcomes (as it is exposed in detail in Table 3)¹⁵:

- 12) *Agenda setting*: Power of setting the agenda;
- 13) *Veto power*: Veto capacity over Follower States;
- 14) *Normative persuasion*: Changing norms (and politics) of the Follower States without involving sanctions, political pressure, material benefits and side payments;
- 15) *Emulation effect*: Un-intentional influence observable by emulation behaviors of Followers States in order to trigger pos-

15. The first three indicators of variable z take into account intentional forms of influence, while emulation effect and non-decision effect try to grasp empirically unintentional influence.

itive reaction/avoid negative ones from the leader;

- 16) *Non-decision effect*: Un-intentional influence observable by non-decision of Follower States aiming at avoiding negative reactions of the leader.

Table 3: Dimensions and indicators of power over outcomes (variable z)

Dimension	Explanation	Indicators	Index influence
Agenda setting	<i>Power of establishing the agenda</i>	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier B. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and minority of dossier	0. Minimal (H) 1. Light (F, G) 2. Medium (D, E) 3. Valuable (B, C) 4. Strong (A)
Veto power	<i>Veto capacity</i>	C. On majority of States and most of dossier D. On majority of States and minority of dossier	0. Minimal (H) 1. Light (F, G) 2. Medium (D, E) 3. Valuable (B, C) 4. Strong (A)
Normative persuasion	<i>Changing norms (and politics) of the Follower States without involving sanctions, political pressure, material benefits and side payments</i>	E. On minority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier F. On minority of States (incl. competitors) and minority of dossier	0. Minimal (H) 1. Light (F, G) 2. Medium (D, E) 3. Valuable (B, C) 4. Strong (A)
Emulation effect	<i>Un-intentional influence observable by emulation behaviors of Follower States in order to trigger positive reaction or avoid negative ones from the leader</i>	G. On minority of States and most of dossier H. On minority of States and minority of dossier	0. Minimal (H) 1. Light (F, G) 2. Medium (D, E) 3. Valuable (B, C) 4. Strong (A)
Non-decision effect	<i>Un-intentional influence observable by non-decision of Follower States aiming at avoiding negative reactions of the leader</i>		

As defined in tables 1, 2 and 3, multiple indicators were built from the conceptual dimensions of the three variables. In order to summarize the main evidences derived from the empirical analysis, we developed three comprehensive indexes for the variables, by weighting some indicators, corresponding to higher impact for critical indicators, such as crisis management, agenda promotion and nature of the goals (please refer to tables 1, 2 and 3 for an extensive analysis).

The design of the research considers three case studies in order to find empirical support for our thesis. The cases are: (1) the “European Banking Union” (2012-2013), (2) the “European migrant crisis” (2014-2015) and (3) Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014-2015); drawn from different policies areas of the EU: economic affairs, internal affairs and external affairs. Following the single empirical analysis of each case study, we operate an overall analysis by combining the data and the elements emerged by the three cases. The empirical section is conducted through the analysis (i) of reports from international organizations (such NATO, UN Agencies, Eurostat), (ii) articles of inter-

national news/press agencies, (iii) well-renowned journals from different political and ideological orientation (*The Financial Times, The New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, The Washington Post, Le Monde*, etc.) providing key public statements of decision-makers, (iv) researches and reports by think-tanks from different political perspective on recent events (Brugel, Carnegie, European Council on Foreign Relations, Social Europe, Project Syndicate, etc.), and (v) scholarly papers by authoritative policy experts. The data emerging from the empirical analysis, divided by sample sources, are used to elaborate indexes related to the three different variables, which are object of the analysis. Each index assigns a numerical parameter to the empirical analysis on a scale: in particular, the variable leadership skills ranges from “minimal leadership skills” (value of 0), to “strong leadership skills” (value of 4); the variable style of power assigns a value of 0 to “hegemony” and a value of 4 to “leadership”; the variable power over outcomes assigns a value of 0 “minimal power” to 4 “strong power”

4 Empirical Section

The paper develops the empirical part of the research by testing the thesis in the selected case studies, using the indicators described in the precedent paragraph, with three sets of indicators (one for each variable) and overall sixteen conceptual dimensions.

4.1 The European Banking Union (2012-2013)¹⁶

The “Eurozone crisis” erupted in 2010, highlighting the necessity for Member of the Eurozone of deeper economic integration to protect themselves from the instability of financial markets over possible default risks (Zaharia 2012; Aloisi 2012). The idea of an European Banking Union was originally conceived as made up of three “pillars” (Beck 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2013): (1) a shift of banking supervision from the national to the EU level under a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); (2) a Single Resolution Mechanism (or

16. This case study was kindly suggested by Prof. Paul H. Dembinski of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

SRM) at the Eurozone level on bank reconstructing and resolution, with a related Single Resolution Fund (SRF); (3) a common bank deposit guarantee scheme. Germany opposed by proposing a Banking Union: (1) led by a network of national resolution agencies of the Member States instead of the EC and the ECB, (2) leaving out minor cooperative banks and credit institutions under national supervisions and focusing only on larger banks, (3) agreeing only in general terms to a common bank deposit guarantee scheme (O'Donnell 2012). The Banking Union required months of intensive talks and negotiation, eventually resulting in two "pillars" only: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).

Leadership skills (x)

As it is possible to argue from Table 4, in the establishment of the Banking Union Germany displaying relatively modest leadership skills, particularly in relation to (1) consensus building and (2) leadership by example, performing relatively better in relation to (3) common agenda promotion and (4) crisis management. German policy has been criticized by EU politicians for focusing excessively on intergovernmental approach (Spiegel 2013). Some scholars (Hennessy 2013) pointed out the desire of Germany to grant assistance to troubled banks of Member States only at the condition of immediate clarity in relation to the kind of institutional legal framework envisaged, avoiding any risks to German taxpayers and possible moral hazards in the Eurozone, resulting in (5) an effective "detering action" against the claims of "European solidarity" (Hennessy 2014).

Table 4: Banking Union and leadership skills

Dimension	Indicators	Index leadership skills
Consensus and coalition building	H. On minority of States (excl. competitors) and minority of dossier	0. Minimal
Focal point in international fora	N/a	N/a
Strategic planning	D. Major shifts and reconsiderations	1. Weak
Crisis management	D. In few critical situations	1. Weak
Common agenda promotion	D. Few aspects of the agenda	1. Weak
Leadership by example	E. Detering action	0. Minimal
Proactivity	D. Minimally proactive	1. Weak

Style of power (y)

As it understandable from Table 5, the style of regional power of Germany can be considered

prevalently hegemonic. If it is true that Germany granted some relative, albeit limited, gains to the Eurozone as a whole, the main driver of its action was egoistic (1). This approach triggered on the side of EU Member States (2) an initial resistance, frustrated by solid veto power. Therefore, Germany focused on the protection of its small banks, while only as secondary aim to structure a comprehensive plan to protect the Eurozone, through (3) a unilateral approach only occasionally supported by bilateral efforts. The goal achieved can be considered prevalently egoistic, as only large European banks (120-130) received direct supervision from the ECB of over 6000 credit institutions remaining under national supervision, following Germany view. Most of the Member States had no choice than conforming to Germany's preferences¹⁷.

Table 5: Banking Union and style of power

Dimension	Indicators	Index style of power
Goals/objectives	B. Prevalently egoistic	1. Prevalently hegemonic
Multilateral approach	C. Bilateralism with a "junior" partner D. With minority of followers	2. No net prevalence 3. Prevalently leadership
Follower States attitude	B. Initial/soft resistance C. Subordination D. Non-decision	1. Prevalently hegemonic 2. No net prevalence
Follower States status	C. Minimal-improvement D. Partial improvement	2. No net prevalence 3. Prevalently leadership

Power over outcomes (z)


The European Banking Union is a perfect example of (1) the veto power at disposal of Germany and of its unintentional capacity to influence regional policy outcomes through what we have been calling (2) emulation effect and (3) non-decision effect (please refer to Table 5). We observed how Germany was able to counterbalance the coordinated efforts of France, Spain and Italy (supported by the European Commission) for the mutualization of risk and liabilities in the Euro area in name of "European solidarity" or the common deposit scheme (Strupczewski 2015).

17. However, Germany acted following a clear institutional project, preferred to an immediate unregulated assistance, with the Banking Union giving relative gains to other Member States, resulting in granting enhanced pre-crisis status of EU Member States.

Table 6: Banking Union and power over outcomes

Dimension	Indicators	Index regional influence
Agenda setting	C. On majority of States and most of dossier	3. Valuable
Veto power	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong
Normative persuasion	H. On minority of States and minority of dossier	1. Minimal
Emulation effect	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong
Non-decision effect	C. On majority of States and most of dossier	3. Valuable

Graphic 1: The European Banking Union (2012-2013)



Sample sources: Journal Articles and Reports: Beck 2012, Dullien and Guérot 2012, Henessy 2014, Howarth and Quaglia 2013, Moloney 2014. Newspaper Articles: Aloisi 2012, Fairless 2013, Le Monde 2013, O'Donnell 2012, Spiegel 2013, Strupczewski 2015, Zaharia 2012.

4.2 The European migrant crisis (2014-2015)

A peculiar set of conditions in the neighborhood of the European Union such as the wars in Libya (2011) and Syria (2011) concurred in triggering dramatic flows of migrants and asylum seekers towards Europe. Data compiled by Eurostat show that a record 1.2 million asylum seekers registered in the EU in 2015, from 562,680 in 2014 (Eurostat Newsrelease 2014). The number of refugees crossing the sea from Turkey to Greece increased 20 times from 2014 to 2015 [...]. Germany and Sweden received over half of all applications, with Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Bulgaria accounting for another 30% (Merler 2016). Germany was the 4th Member State of the EU for number of asylum requests in relation to

population during 2011-2015 (following Sweden, Hungary and Austria) and the first in absolute terms with 707.000 refugees. More than a third of asylum applications were made in Germany, which accepted the most as part of Chancellor Merkel's refugee policy.

Leadership skills (x)

Germany scored higher in relation to leadership skills than in the case study of the Banking Union, in reason of (1) a good crisis management and (2) a good activity as focal point in international fora and (3) a strong leadership by example, as can be inferred by Table 7. This was a sensitive case, with possible links between migrants and security policies, with leadership by example being of crucial importance. Rachman (2016) recognized Germany's refugee policy was considered too liberal, both internally that at the EU level, by German politicians and by European leaders, highlighting relatively low capacity of (4) consensus building and (2) common agenda promotion (Reuters Staff 2015). If it is true indeed that Merkel's popularity suffered both domestically and at the EU level because of the policy pursued, Germany gained at the international level much popularity as liberal regional leader (Oltermann and Wintour 2016).

Table 7: European migrant crisis and leadership skills

Dimension	Indicators	Index leadership skills
Consensus and coalition building	G. On minority of States (excl. competitors) and most of dossier	1. Weak
Focal point in international fora	B. All the international fora	3. Solid
Strategic planning	C. Minor shifts and reconsiderations	2. Medium
Crisis management	C. Most of the critical situations	2. Medium
Common agenda promotion	B. In relation to few aspects of the agenda	1. Weak
Leadership by example	A. All the situations	4. Strong
Proactivity	A. Partially proactive	3. Medium

Style of power (y)

As can be argued by Table 8, the style of power exhibited during the refugee crisis an overall by neither net prevalence of liberal leadership nor hegemonic style. In fact, on one hand Germany (1) acted towards prevalently common objective whilst (2) on the other, the German policy related to the migrants and refugees was perceived by the majority of the EU Member States as excessively liberal, given that it was unsustainable on the long run, and dangerous for a variety of reasons, such as possible links to terrorism, incidence on

social policies and especially encouraging illegal migration. This is true particularly in relation to (3) a mostly unilateral approach and (4) the follower States attitude, characterized by initial resistance and means adopted.

Table 8: European migrant crisis and power style

Dimension	Indicators	Index style of power
Goals/objectives	D. Prevalently common	3. Prevalently leadership
Multilateralism	B. False multilateralism (facade)	1. Prevalently hegemonic
Follower States attitude	B. Initial/soft resistance/pseudo legitimacy status C. Subordination/pseudo legitimacy status	1. Prevalently hegemonic
Follower States status	A. Harmful or negative authority D. Partial authority	0. Hegemony 3. Prevalently leadership


Power over outcomes (z)

Table 9 shows the level of power over regional outcomes expressed by Germany during the refugee crisis of 2014-2015 was overall limited. A part from its veto power, (1) agenda setting and (2) normative persuasion performed rather poorly, with (3) emulation effect completely absent. Lehne (2016) was among the scholars highlighting the rather uncommon role of Germany as “demandeur” of EU solidarity, differently from the Greece bailout or confrontation with Russia, where Germany “was an essential part of any solution and thus capable of a leading role in shaping the EU’s response”.

Table 9: European migrant crisis and power over outcomes

Dimension	Indicators	Index influence
Agenda setting	G. On minority of States (excl. competitors) and most of dossier	1. Light
Veto power	C. On majority of States (excl. competitors) and most of dossier	3. Valuable
Normative persuasion	F. On minority of States (incl. competitors) and minority of dossier	1. Light
Emulation effect	H. On minority of States (excl. competitors) and minority of dossier	0. Minimal
Non-decision effect	F. On minority of States (incl. competitors) and minority of dossier	1. Light

Graphic 2: The European migrant crisis (2014-2015)



Sample sources: Journal Articles and Reports: Lehne 2016; Merler 2016). Newspaper Articles: Copley 2015; Eurostat Newsrelease 2016; Oltermann and Wintour 2016; Rachman 2016; Reuters Staff 2015a, 2015b.

4.3 The Russia-Ukraine military intervention in Crimea (2014-2015)

The last case study belongs to the field of the EU external affairs and regards the Russia-Ukraine military confrontation taking place in 2014 and 2015, triggered by the civil unrest of pro-EU citizens (Euromaidan) started in Kiev on November 2013 against the government Janukovic. When Janukovic was forced to resign (February 22, 2014), in Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk, public demonstration took place in favor of Russia. A first agreement (Minsk I) to halt the war in Ukraine was reached in September 2014 but failed to stop fighting in Donbass, collapsing in January 2015. A second agreement (Minsk II) was signed in February 2015 by Russia, Ukraine and the representative of the separatists forces, under a strategic plan conceived by the joint diplomatic efforts of Germany and France in order to broke an immediate ceasefire. In addition, the European Union produced a comprehensive package of diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions against Russia (July 2014), linking the duration of those to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, while US-led plans to involve

NATO in arming Ukraine with lethal weapons was rejected by the EU under the German-French bilateral leadership.

Leadership skills (x)

Germany performed positively in terms of leadership skills during the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014-2015, with all the dimensions indicating strong leadership, as it can be inferred from Table 10. This is particularly evident for (1) strategic planning and (2) leadership by example. The strategic plan behind German leadership was successful, regardless domestic and international pressure. At the regional and international level, Germany’s government faced strong criticism over the refusal of arming Ukraine with lethal weapons, still it exhibited perseverance and solidity (Reuters 2016). Germany was able to manage a complex international crisis without jeopardizing the interests of any particular Member States of the EU, sharing fairly the overall burden of the sanctions¹⁸.

Table 10: Russia-Ukraine conflict and leadership skills

Dimension	Indicators	Index leadership skills
Consensus and coalition building	C. On majority of States (excl. competitors) and most of dossier	3. Solid
Focal point in international fora	A. All the international fora with efficacy	4. Strong
Strategic planning	A. Strong strategic planning independently of domestic pressure	4. Strong
Crisis management	B. Most of the critical situations	3. Solid
Common agenda promotion	B. Most of the aspects of the agenda (including economic aspects)	3. Solid
Leadership by example	A. All the situations	4. Strong
Proactivity	B. Mostly proactive	3. Solid

Style of power (y)

Table 11 shows the style of power of Germany during the Russia-Ukraine confrontation can be described as a full-fledged liberal leadership, as (1) the goal pursued was common to the majority of the Member States of the European Union and it (2) acted by using diplomatic tools, prevalently on (3) follower States’ request. Following Schirm’s methodological approach, we can say Germany was able to mostly integrate ideals and projects of the majority of the EU countries in its own

18. A study conducted by NATO’s defense economist Hunter Christie (2015) showed the cost in terms of EU exports to Russia, being for Germany 2,566 millions of euro, or 29,6% of the whole EU exports towards Russia between the first quarter of 2014 and the same period in 2015, while only partially affecting other EU countries (Hunter 2015)

leadership strategy, resulting in a solid common opposition front to Russia.

Table 11: Russia-Ukraine conflict and style of power

Dimension	Indicators	Index style of power
Goals/objectives	E. Common	4. Leadership
Multilateralism	E. With majority of followers	4. Leadership
Follower States attitude	D. Non-decision	2. No net prevalence
Follower States status	D. Partial leadership	3. Prevalently leadership


Power over outcomes (z)

By referring to Table 12, it is possible to understand the regional influence displayed by Germany during the conflict was extremely vast with (1) an effective agenda setting; therefore the sanctions successfully supported against Russia and (2) a veto power equally powerful exhibited by the modality Germany firmly vetoed the US-backed NATO’s proposal of arming Ukraine with lethal military weapons, or the strong contrast at the level of consensus with some Member States.

Table 12: Russia-Ukraine conflict and power over outcomes

Dimension	Indicators	Index influence
Agenda setting	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong
Veto power	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong
Normative persuasion	C. On majority of States and most of dossier	3. Valuable
Emulation effect	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong
Non-decision effect	A. On majority of States (incl. competitors) and most of dossier	4. Strong


Graphic 3: The Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014-2015)



Sample sources: Journal Articles and Reports: Hunter 2015; Janning and Möller 2016; Möller 2016; Speck 2016. Newspaper Articles: Carrel and Rinke 2016; Kirschbaum 2016; Emmott and Baczynska 2016; Gordon, Smale, and

Erlanger 2015.

Graphic 4: Conclusive evidences



Germany, between 2012-2015, was not the prototype of the liberal and constructive leader (the “last champion of the liberal world order” portrayed by many media), nor displayed optimal leadership skills; however, it is completely false to describe Germany’s post-crisis regional power role with negative attributes such coercive, hegemonic or its leadership skills as inexistent. Regarding the first aspect (leadership style), when judging Germany, we should consider its approaches into a global context characterized by rising populisms and isolationism, also in countries of long democratic tradition, such as the USA, and the revival of authoritarian attitude in countries such Russia, China, Turkey or deadly plagued by corruption and economic crisis (Brazil, India)¹⁹. At the regional level, we assisted in Europe to a dramatic revival of populism, in reason of growing dissatisfaction of citizens of Western Europe towards the perceived technocratic institutions of the European Union or triggered by xenophobic ghosts in the Eastern Europe (Bruno 2018). Moreover, we should not forget to mention the isolationist solution of the United Kingdom. As concerns leadership skills, the post-crisis represented, both globally and regionally, an extremely difficult

test for powers. In Europe, the global crisis took quickly the features of a sovereign debts crisis, and mixed with a complex series of crises in its neighborhoods, such as the refugee and migrant crisis, the Arabic spring, the Syrian conflict, the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the emergence of terrorist threat.

To conclude, it is important to highlight the aim of this work was not to find “alibis” to Germany’s leadership, rather to define a balanced picture of its action. True, the leadership of Germany may evoke the feature of a “minimal leadership”, in the sense of providing the minimum necessary to survive in critical situations or keeping alive the regional integration process. Also true, Germany rarely showed spirit of “European solidarity”, as it is not easy to find domestically a viable political compromise between internal expectations (the “tax payers” and “moral hazard” rhetorical) and commitment to the European cause. However, in relation to the mentioned historical context and the peculiar set of conjunctures, the leadership and the skills provided by Germany proved, according to the analysis, positive. To our view, there are some cases in which progress is not possible: in such situations, not going backward is already a big victory.

5 Conclusion

Our research considered the regional role of Germany in the Post-Crisis as substantially a constructive liberal leadership, based on positive leadership skills and vast influence over regional outcomes. We tested our thesis empirically against three case studies, receiving overall some mixed evidences, confirming partially the thesis. It is possible to sum here the main empirical findings: 1- In the Banking Union case, Germany expressed poor leadership skills but valuable power over outcomes, declined as strong intentional veto power against several efforts by different actors (France and Spain, the European Commission and ECB) and un-intentional emulation effect, with many EU Member States emulating Germany’s policy. The style of regional leadership was prevalently hegemonic, with the country acting to achieve the preferences of its banking system; although Germany gained most in relative terms,

19. For instance, the recent removal of the two-term limit rule for presidency in China. See on the topic Buckley and Bradsher(2018).

the EU as a whole received in absolute some important gains.

2- In the second case study Germany struggled in terms of power over regional outcomes, as the “open the door” policy sponsored by Merkel was criticized by many EU Member States over sustainability, placing Berlin in the unusual role of “*demandeur*” of European solidarity and exhibiting lack of strategic planning. As regards leadership skills, limits emerged, in particular on: consensus and coalition building, strategic planning and common agenda promotion, while leadership by example and proactivity performed well.

3- In the last case study opposing Russia and Ukraine, Germany displayed solid leadership, leading the EU through an international crisis without military engagement. Germany controlled almost every policy outcome, such as nature and length of the EU sanctions. The style of power was “leadership”, as Germany acted pursuing common interest of the EU and mainly via bilateral cooperation with France, never really missed representing the interests of the whole EU.

By integrating the data gathered from the different indexes and relative scores, the style of regional power (variable y) resulted in a median score of 2,38/4, closer to liberal leadership (4) than to hegemony (0). The leadership skills (variable x) resulted in a median score of 2,03/4, perfectly in the middle between minimal skills (0) and strong (4). Lastly, power over regional outcomes (variable z), scored 2,66/4, closer to strong influence (4) than minimal influence (0). In sum, according to the empirical evidences derived, we can say the regional power role of Germany following the crisis up to 2015 was (1) substantially characterized by fair leadership skills, (2) valuable influence over regional outcomes and (3) a typology of power resulting in a slightly prevalence of liberal leadership over hegemony. From the empirical analysis, Germany’s regional power role between 2012 and 2015 emerges somehow distant from both the ideas of Germany as coercive hegemon and the idealistic interpretation of the country as supporter, at any cost, of a foreign policy based upon normative values, multilateral approach to international politics. On the contrary, the regional influence and the power over policy outcomes expressed by Germany was

mostly strong and broad, with some new issues emerging, as seen, during the migration crisis. The ultimate contribution of this work is a different portrait of Germany: a very powerful regional leader, yet somewhat contrasted and “grey” in its action, in the sense that the country was interested in providing limited “leadership supply”, to use Mattli words, only to keep the inertia of the European integration going, and to avoid major setbacks. However, if during the 2012-2015 the minimal leadership supply revealed to be sufficient for Germany to keep the EU together, this does not mean it may necessarily be the same in the future.

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Book Review

Turkey's Relations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring

Garik Poghosyan, Political Analyst

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Isiksal, Huseyin and Goksel, Oguzhan (Editors): Turkey's Relations with the Middle East; Political Encounters after the Arab Spring; September 18, 2017: 220.

"TURKEY'S Relations With the Middle East: Political Encounters After the Arab Spring", edited by Hüseyin İşıksal and Oğuzhan Göksel, is an excellent contribution to the study of foreign relations of Turkey and the international relations in the Middle East. It is a valuable narrative of the internal political discourse of the region in addition to being a critical evaluation of the geopolitical jockeying in recent years. The thorough discussion of the Arab Spring, criticism of Eurocentrism in conjunction with the critique of the Orientalist approach, the discussion of the limitations of the Westphalian system in the Middle East are among the leading concerns. Further, Turkey's policy of "zero problems" with neighbors, the ambitions of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Kurdish factor as well as the exposure of sectarian issues of geostrategic significance augment the analytical scope and depth of the collection.

Each of the fourteen chapters presents a distinct analytical piece rather than a mere continuation of the preceding one. By contrast, the three parts are seamlessly woven into a meaningful whole in part due to the exposure of a variety of ideological and analytical perspectives. While the diversity of views and a myriad of analyses-geopolitical, value-based, economic, ideological-sectarian-enrich the collection immensely, the disquisition could be strengthened through a more exhaustive investigation of alternative views. Firstly, the book would benefit from the inclusion of what we call the "flip side" of the issues. Secondly, the cyclical analysis of events would add an important dimension to the examination of the issues. Lastly, the addition of quantifiable data would generate knowledge about attitudes concerning the Turkish model (all of the suggestions discussed later in detail).

Part One mainly discusses the intricacies of neoliberal policies, popular uprisings and the Turkish model in light of the "political, economic, and social interactions between Turkey and the post-2011 Middle East" (p. 2). It sheds light on the so called "orientalist discourse" in the study of the region which "has tended to ignore the negative implications of the state formation and artificial boundaries in the Middle East along with the role of external powers" (p.16). Further, Part One emphasizes the Sunni-Shia divide and draws attention to the fact that it "needs to be replaced with more flexible frameworks" (p.34). Finally, the "rise and fall of the Turkish model"

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(p.53) is discussed followed by the interpretation of the impact of neoliberalism with a focus on the Turkish and Egyptian cases (p.68)

Part Two is centered on the rise and implications of the Arab Spring, the chaotic developments in the Levant and turbulence in Turkish-Iranian relations (p.105). Moreover, it refers to the "Westphalian delusion" to argue, albeit somewhat controversially, that "among all the Westphalian principles, secularity is the most conflicting for the Middle East" (p.86). Further, it concentrates on geopolitical rivalries of regional powers, intra-sectarian disagreements and concludes that "the intra-Gulf divide between Riyadh and Doha is apparent in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine and has severe repercussions for Ankara's regional policies" (p.128). Finally, an important aspect of AKP's foreign aspirations is revealed through the reference to the issue of Cyprus as "the AKP's divergence from the traditional state policy on Cyprus had multiple dimensions and it marked the first notable clash with the Kemalist establishment" (p.137)

Part Three elevates the discussion of interstate relations in the region to the notion of soft power. It powerfully argues that "the political, economic, and information interconnectedness that characterizes the globalized world of our time has made the use of conventional military forces costly for states and, in certain conditions, even damaging to their interests" (p. 152) In addition, it elaborates on the Kurdish issue leading the discussion to the rebirth of securitization of Turkish policy and the emergence of "economic penetration" into Northern Iraq (p.185).

The book employs the strategy of the comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy in relation to the Middle East considering the ongoing geopolitical reshuffles, internal divisions as well as the strategic assessment of political values and systems across the region. The study is methodologically rigorous as it applies a combination of critical approaches and research tools: comparative historical analysis (Eurocentrism, the Westphalian system), comparative political analysis (Turkish model, geopolitical rivalry) and comparative-cultural analysis along religious-sectarian (Shia-Sunni) or ideological (Muslim Brotherhood, AKP etc.) lines.

The scholarly rigor of the work is further enhanced through economic case studies (Turkish and Egyptian economic growth scrutinized comparatively in the context of neo-liberal policies).

In general terms, specific views regarding the Shia-Sunni divide, the Westphalian system as well as the oppressive policies of al-Maliki's Shia government tend to express ideologically predetermined positions. In other words, they tend to ignore, albeit to various degrees depending on the perspective, the cyclical nature and the political culture dimension of the subject matter. More specific, the suggested incompatibility of Westphalian secularism with Islamic values as well as the criticism of the oppression of Sunnis at the hands of al-Maliki's government do not envisage the flip side of the issues.

A more detailed look reveals that the above-mentioned facets of the book could have been addressed within the methodological confines of the work if certain aspects were considered to strengthen argumentation more holistically. Most important, a reference to the secular traditions of the Republic of Turkey (laicism; "Six Arrows") and its interpretation in the context of the changing ideological countenance of Turkish politics would either strengthen or objectivize the research. Alternatively, it could have served as a limitation to the discussion of the proposed incompatibility of secularism with Islamic values.

Another significant addition could be the cyclical analysis of the regime change and subsequently employed domestic policies in Iraq. The criticism of the oppression of Sunnis on the part of al-Maliki's government does not address the previous grievances of the Shia majority at the hands of Saddam Hussein's regime. Thus, lacking a cyclical-historical analysis of Iraqi political culture and without addressing the roots of tendency of mutual political oppression between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq the book lacks a coherent strategy to address the "flip side" of the phenomenon.


Furthermore, Iranian aspirations are hailed as having a tendency to be hegemonic either explicitly or covertly. In other words, while the regional objectives of Turkey are explained and interpreted through the lens of both legitimately acquired roles (Turkish soft power, economic penetration in Northern Iraq, the attractiveness of the

Turkish model) and ideologically driven ambitions (reversal of non-intervention, emergence of "Neo-Ottomanism" and the resultant "zero-problems" strategy), Iranian aspirations are not 'legitimized' in any way leaving the reader to make assumptions regarding the broader strategy of Iran (Shia Crescent, regional hegemon, Hamas, Hezbollah) in that regard. Further, the role of Saudi Arabia in regional affairs is mainly confined to a neutral assessment as opposed to the tactics of its rivals which are principally defined in sectarian or ideological contours (Turkey, Iran). Thus, an addition of a "Shia perspective" would further strengthen the arguments exposing the nature of geostrategic rivalry in the region and would equally "legitimize" the aspirations of Iran.

Another aspect of the work worth revisiting is a dimension that, we believe, might be called a major flaw. More specifically, the "Neo-Ottomanism" is examined in the light of the recent Turkish foreign policy of "zero problems with neighbors". However, this approach completely ignores the perceptions of "Neo-Ottomanism" and, by extension, the Ottoman legacy, in neighboring countries. Hence, the concept of "Neo-Ottomanism" in relation to 'zero problems with neighbors' is rendered profoundly controversial. Finally, the appeal of the Turkish model for the Arab World is called into questions in the context of the Arab Uprisings which might not reflect popular views and attitudes. The discussion of Turkish soft power capabilities and the current extent of the appeal of the Turkish model would benefit greatly from the availability of quantifiable data (polls and survey results) measuring the dimensions of the influence of the Turkish model in the public eye.

Overall, the work is a vital contribution to the field of international relations and geopolitics in the Middle East as well as Turkish foreign policy after the Arab Uprisings. While certain works exploring the Turkish foreign and security policy in the Middle East emphasize a certain dimension of the subject matter, such as Syrian conflict and the Kurdish issue (Başaran 2017), the Arab Spring and geopolitics (Fuller 2014), specific bilateral relationships (Başkan 2016; Bengio 2004) or ideological-regional issues (Bein 2017), the volume under scrutiny connects the dots through a

holistic approach to analysis. The examination of an amalgamation of issues in the light of recent developments is most enlightening and addresses both complex issues and their specific dimensions. However, further expansion into the domain of alternative views (flip side, cyclical nature) and the inclusion of quantifiable data to evaluate public perceptions could have enhanced the work in important ways. This sharply focused and highly analytical treatise can be a genuine and highly valuable guide into Turkish foreign policy and the geopolitics of the Middle East.



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offered bilingual commentary and opinion articles for local newspapers and news websites regarding political and geopolitical developments in and around Armenia.

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Se um revisor descobrir um conflito de interesses num manuscrito (resultante de relações ou conexões competitivas, colaborativas ou outras com qualquer um dos autores, empresas ou instituições), deverão notificar de imediato o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

Qualquer revisor que não se sinta qualificado para rever um manuscrito ou incapaz de fornecer uma revisão imediata deve notificar o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

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Os autores de manuscritos de investigações originais devem apresentar um relato preciso do trabalho realizado, assim como uma discussão objetiva de seu significado. Os dados subjacentes devem ser representados com precisão no manuscrito. Um manuscrito deve conter detalhes e referências suficientes para permitir que outros possam replicar o trabalho. Declarações fraudulentas ou conscientemente imprecisas constituem comportamento anti-ético e são inaceitáveis.

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A inclusão de citações num manuscrito enviado com o objetivo principal de aumentar o número de citações no trabalho de um determinado autor ou em artigos publicados numa determinada revista constitui um comportamento anti-ético.

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A autoria deve ser limitada àqueles que fizeram uma contribuição significativa para a concepção, design, execução ou interpretação do estudo relatado. Todos aqueles que fizeram contribuições significativas devem ser integrados como coautores. Quando existirem terceiros que tenham participado em certos aspetos substantivos do projeto de investigação, deverão ser reconhecidos ou integrados como colaboradores.

É da responsabilidade do autor notificar imediatamente o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores se um erro significativo ou imprecisão for descoberto num trabalho publicado, para que a revista possa retrainir ou corrigir o trabalho com a maior brevidade possível.

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