PJPS

PERSPECTIVAS
Journal of Political Science

#20
Junho | June 2019

ISSN: 2184-3902
Semestral | Biannual

PERSPECTIVAS
Journal of Political Science

#20
Junho | June 2019

Publisher: Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política
Affiliation: University of Minho
University of Évora
Year: 2019
Online ISSN: 2184-3902
Journal's Director: Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves Araújo
URL: `http://www.perspectivasjournal.com`
Email: info@perspectivasjournal.com
Headquarters: Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política
University of Minho
4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Annotation: ERC - Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social
Funding Entity: Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia
Project ID: CPO/00758/2019
Indexation: LATINDEX

Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science

Advisory Board

Headquarters

Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política
Escola de Economia e Gestão
Universidade do Minho, Pólo de Gualtar
4710-057 Braga, Portugal

Indexing

Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science, is indexed in Latindex: Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal:

latindex

CONTENTS

Research Papers

Editorial

As manifestações dos "coletes amarelos" em Paris (com pequenas réplicas noutros países) fizeram ressuscitar o imaginário de outros movimentos de contestação, como o encetado pelos estudantes, na mesma cidade francesa e que passou à história como o "maio de 68". O fenómeno dos movimentos sociais é uma das áreas de estudo da Ciência Política e o assunto é um dos temas tratados neste número da Perspectivas, no artigo "Story-Building for Revolution: Post-Marxist and Neo-Nationalist Perspectives on the Yellow Vests Movement".

O comportamento dos eleitores no processo democrático é influenciando por diversos fatores que têm merecido a atenção dos politólogos. Com o apagamento das ideologias tradicionais e o enfraquecimento dos "partidos de massas" que as ostentavam, a disputa política é cada vez mais personalizada e o comportamento dos eleitores tende a julgar os protagonistas e a transformar os atos eleitorais em plebiscito aos governantes, em prejuízo das alternativas oferecidas. Esta problemática é analisada no artigo "On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent: Can voters do it?"

A descentralização do poder nos Estados é também um assunto recorrente nos estudos de politologia. O caso português é analisado neste número da Perspetivas, mediante um exame ao período pós-2015, intitulado "Decentralization and (De)politization in Portugal". Recorde-se que na sequência de um referendo realizado em 1998 foi rejeitada a criação de regiões administrativas no continente, processo que poderá ser reaberto num próximo quadro legislativo.

O funcionamento da justiça é outro domínio fundamental tanto no plano dos direitos dos cidadãos como da competitividade dos Estados, por exemplo na atração de investimento estrangeiro. O tema é aqui tratado numa perspetiva muito específica, com o autor a efetuar "Considerações sobre gestão, eficiência e mobilidade de oficiais de justiça".

É este leque de assuntos que o leitor pode desfrutar no número 20 da Perspectivas que se apresenta com um novo visual, na sua capa, com um propósito de modernidade que procuramos seja consentâneo com os conteúdos que são abordados pelos seus articulistas.

The editorial team.

Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves Araújo is the Editor-in-Chief of *Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science*. He is an Full Professor of Public Administration at the School of Economics and Management of University of Minho, Potugal. He is an integrated member of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP). He has a Ph.D. in Public Administration by the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. His research focuses on Public Management at central and local level, working within the intersection of the literature of administrative sciences, public management and organizational studies. His current research projects in this area examine how recent crisis is influencing public service delivery. In addition, he has an ongoing interest on open government and transparency with a focus at local government.

Irene Viparelli is an Editor of *Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science*. She has a Ph.D. in Ethics and Political and Legal Philosophy from the University of Salerno and is a Specialist in Political Theory, Political Science and Political Philosophy. Between 2010 and 2017 she has developed a post-doctoral project in Political Science, founded by FCT. Presently she is an assistant professor at University of Évora, an integrated member of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP) and a collaborator of Labcom/IFP of University of Beira Interior.

José Palmeira is an Editor of *Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science*. He is an Assistant Professor at the University of Minho, with Ph.D in Political Science and International Relations and is an integrated member of the Research Center in Political Science. The main focus of his research is in the field of Comparative Politics, with application in the areas of Political Science (political systems) and International Relations (political actors), having as main analytical tool Geopolitics and Strategy and as study areas the Atlantic and the Lusophone space. He is member of the direction of the European Studies Section of the Portuguese Association of Political Science.

Miguel Rocha de Sousa is an Editor of *Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science*. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Évora, Portugal and a BSc and MSc in Economics from Nova School of Business and Economics, Lisbon, Portugal. Presently he is an assistant professor and department head of Economics at Évora (tenured), after having also taught at Nova, and having been a visiting professor at University of Dili, East Timor, and Methodist University, Luanda, Angola. He is an integrated researcher at the Research Center in Political Science (CICP) and a collaborator of the Center for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics of the University of Évora. His areas of specialization are political economy, economic growth and development, land reform, international organizations, with both a theoretical and applied focus on Europe and Latin America, and has also done some work on econophysics and mathematical methods in economics. He is an associate of SEDES, AEA-American Economic Association, IPSA-International Political Science Association and its RC35 of Tech and Development, and also of SASE, Society for Advancement of Socio-Economics.

Story-Building for Revolution: Post-Marxist and Neo-Nationalist Perspectives on the Yellow Vests Movement

O 'Story Building' de uma Revolução: Perspetivas Pós-Marxistas e Neonacionalistas sobre o Movimento Coletes Amarelos

Rodrigo Almeida Sousa
CITCEM, University of Porto

Abstract—On 17 November 2018, hundreds of thousands of French joined in protest against the ecological tax rise on hydrocarbons announced by Emmanuel Macron. The Yellow Vests phenomenon had been born. Since then, it has been active for several months and there seems to be no end in sight. As the movement began to get organized, it created websites and pages on social media, producing a challenging storytelling based on more than 40 demands and 25 proposals for the crisis. Thus it gave voice to the middle and middle-lower classes, which are deeply dissatisfied with their present socioeconomic conditions. Naturally, this narrative appealed to the extremist parties, from Mélenchon's radical left to Marine Le Pen's neo-nationalist right, as they immediately declared their support for the cause. Shortly afterwards, it was time for the intellectuals to manifest their views. On one hand, post-Marxists such as Slavoj Žižek and Antonio Negri wrote their articles on the subject. On the other, Russian nationalists, from leftist Boris Kagarlitsky to traditionalist Aleksandr Dugin, did not hide their enthusiasm about the movement either. For, in fact, all these intellectuals have something in common: they all are story-building for revolution.

Keywords—Mass protests, Far-left, Far-right, Post-Marxism, Neo-nationalism.

Resumo—A 17 Novembro 2018, centenas de milhares de franceses aderiram ao protesto contra a subida da taxa ecológica sobre os hidrocarbonetos anunciada por Emmanuel Macron. Nascia, assim, o fenómeno dos coletes amarelos, o qual tem perdurado ao longo de vários meses e parece não ter fim à vista. À medida que o movimento se foi organizando, criou websites e páginas em redes sociais, produzindo um 'storytelling' de carácter reivindicativo com base em mais de 40 exigências e 25 propostas para a crise; o qual dava voz a um clima de profunda insatisfação quanto à situação socioeconómica em que vivem as classes média e média-baixa. Claro está que esta narrativa agradou aos partidos extremistas, desde a esquerda radical de Mélenchon à direita neonacionalista de Marine Le Pen, que imediatamente declararam o seu apoio à causa. Pouco depois, era a vez dos intelectuais se manifestarem. De um lado, destacaram-se os artigos dos pós-marxistas Slavoj Žižek e Antonio Negri. Do outro, os nacionalistas russos, desde o esquerdista Boris Kagarlitsky ao tradicionalista Aleksandr Dugin, tampouco esconderam o seu entusiasmo quanto ao movimento. Com efeito, todos estes intelectuais têm algo em comum, já que todos contribuem para um 'story-building' de cariz revolucionário.

Palavras-Chave—Protestos em massa, Extrema-esquerda, Extrema-direita, Pós-marxismo, Neonacionalismo.

Submitted—28-12-2018. **Accepted**—21-04-2019.

1 Introduction

HAVING emerged in November 2018, the Yellow Vests movement has been one of the major sociocultural phenomena of recent decades, to the point of being compared to the events of May 1968 by many authors (Žižek 2018a; Negri 2018a). Lasting for several months and with no apparent end in sight, it has spread throughout France and could potentially disseminate across Europe; for, even though we cannot yet fully understand its political consequences, we can see how the movement has been organizing itself as an autonomous social agent, which seems to effectively promote a politically attractive cross-media narrative (on TV, blogs, digital newspapers, websites and social networks), based on anti-establishment claims. The Yellow Vests have, therefore, represented with relative success the feeling of dissatisfaction shared by a great many French citizens, which, of course, has earned them the enthusiastic support of both far-left and far-right parties, politicians and intellectuals. In this context, particularly regarding the latter, some questions arise: Who are these intellectuals, what do they openly think about the Yellow Vests, and for what reasons do they support them? In which discursive currents do they fit and how have they been contributing to the narrative body of this phenomenon? In other words, from their point of view, what is the conceptual and dialectical nature behind the whole yellow vest cross-media storytelling and subsequent story-building?

2 Methodology

In order to address these questions, we have used a hermeneutical, critical and comparative approach on the narrative body produced around the Yellow Vests, according to the following steps:

After a brief review of the situation, and considering that this movement has been encouraged by the most radical political-ideological spectra, we start by critically analyzing two emblematic far-left post-Marxist intellectuals who reacted promptly to the phenomenon when it first emerged, immediately declaring themselves as yellow vest supporters: Antonio Negri and Slavoj Žižek. Hence, we have primarily focused on their recent articles, and then related them with some of their most representative works – in the case of Negri, *Empire* (2001) and *Multitude* (2004), both co-authored with Michael Hardt. As for Žižek, we looked at *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce* (2009) and *Violence* (2008). We then established a comparative balance between the two authors, since they diverge in their prospects and proposed resolutions;

As far as the comparative approach is concerned, it has mainly been applied to alternative sociopolitical narratives, particularly considering their background and present context, from neo-nationalism to the far-right/alt-right movements. In this way, we sought to bring to light a heuristic exercise common to Kagarlitsky, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen and traditionalists such as Aleksandr Dugin: the apparent rejection of the left–right spectrum accompanied by the paradoxical adoption of its most extreme elements and values. In this case, our comparative analysis was not limited to intellectuals, since both Kagarlitsky and Dugin are not mere scientific observers, for they take an active part in the political dynamics of Putin's regime.

Finally, as a hermeneutic object in the context of cross-media, we designate by 'storytelling' all the discursive action (stories, news, posts, tweets, memes, etc.), whose storyline directs the receiver from one medium to another (Antikainen et al. 2004, 7). Thus, we might call storytellers not only the original content producers/narrators (in this case, the Yellow Vests themselves), but also all interactive co-producers/co-narrators (e.g. intellectuals, political agents, journalists, common citizens/internet users), who contribute to such action. As for the term 'story-building', it signifies the narrative body of the phenomenon as a whole, which results from a potentially infinite discursive activity/interactivity and is always under construction.

• ***Rodrigo Almeida Sousa**, Integrated Researcher of Transdisciplinary Research Centre 'Culture, Space and Memory' (CITCEM), of University of Porto.*
E-mail: mail_rodrigo@hotmail.com

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.329

3 Origin and status of the Yellow Vests phenomenon

On 17 November 2018, approximately 280,000 people gathered in protest against the rise of fuel prices all over France, from the most distant provinces to the Élysée Palace in Paris (BBC 2018). The Yellow Vests movement was born. The impact was immediate and conclusive, with one dead, 227 injured and 52 arrests (ibid.). The country was blocked, came to a standstill and the whole of Europe stopped to watch. However, given the size of the crowd, we can consider the demonstrations to have been relatively peaceful, having occurred almost without incident in most areas (ibid.).

During the 12 months prior to the demonstrations, the price of diesel, the most commonly used fuel in France, rose by 23%, to an average of 1.51 per liter, the highest it had been since the beginning of the 21st century. Even though there was a slight fall in international oil prices at the end of the year, Macron decided to increase the rate on hydrocarbons by 7.6 cents/liter on diesel and 3.9 on gasoline. With the polls showing levels of public discontent reaching 70% (ibid.), this measure provoked a chain reaction on social media, and it was the last straw for outraged citizens, who put on their yellow vests and took over the streets. Indeed, it was consensual in the media coverage that this movement was born spontaneously, standing out as a protest of multitudes, without political or partisan intermediation (Negri 2018a).

However, the reaction from the parties did not take long. From the Republicans, Laurent Wauqiez appealed to Macron to postpone the controversial tax. As for the Socialists, after the humiliating results in the 2017 election, their new leader found himself in a delicate position, so he was subtle and ambiguous. On the one hand, Olivier Faure had to react with the appropriate moderation of a Social Democrat. On the other, he could not counteract such a multitude, whose discontent represented more than two-thirds of the French people. In a remarkable gesture of rhetoric juggling, Faure was able to simultaneously emphasize the non-partisanship of the movement, point to the need for the political class to listen to the people, and recognize the protesters' right to fight for the improvement of their purchasing power and tax justice (BBC 2018) – all without committing to anything or anyone.

The explicit support for the Yellow Vests came from the extreme political spectra. The President of the National Rally, Marine Le Pen, was one of the most outspoken personalities, not only approving but also encouraging the protesters to express their anger in a peaceful way. However, without a doubt, the most effusive support came from the left. The day after the protests, Jean-Luc Mélenchon (2018), gave an enthusiastic speech about the new France that was emerging; and since then, via his blog (L'Ère du Peuple), the leader of Unsubmissive France has been following the protesters step by step and is full of praise for them. Indeed, the agreement shown by the more extreme political factions in relation to the Yellow Vests is a sign that citizens' discontent goes far beyond a mere disagreement over the price of fuel or the ecological tax that has caused it. For what really is at stake is the distancing of the dominant political class, which Macron represents, to the real problems that the middle and lower classes face daily, particularly in rural France (BBC 2018). In fact, this is why the 'yellow vest' has become a symbol for the movement, since it is precisely this prop that the common driver uses to draw attention in case of emergency or road accident.

Meanwhile, it has been a few months since the movement began and, naturally, its narrative has gained consistency, mobilizing the citizens and arousing in them the will to fight for their interests (not only bureaucratic rights), and completely change the society they live in. The issues have multiplied. Today, the Yellow Vests are struggling for over 40 issues accompanied by 25 proposals (Bleu 2018). Moreover, they have clearly improved their coordination and strategic communication. Based on a very appealing concept ('by the people and for the people'), and inspired by the principles of participatory democracy, the movement has been successfully spreading its message through a network of online platforms (websites, applications, podcasts), combined with a well-designed and articulated structure of influence, both nationally and internationally (Gilets Jaunes 2019).

What we may call the yellow vest cross-media storytelling has been developing notoriously well, generating a remarkable involvement of their inner circle, political supporters and a significant part of the French people – all this without altering the basic structure of their primary narrative, essence and authenticity. Hence, it becomes inevitable to ask: what really constitutes this essence? On one hand, since the movement remains true to its origins, it is only by answering this question that we can actually understand it. On the other, however, this implies broadening our focus of analysis, projecting it beyond the subjective narrative provided by the Yellow Vests' institutional storytelling. That is to say, we have to take into account the whole story-building that, since November 2018, has been constructed around this phenomenon, in order to select the most defining characteristics. Therefore, we will focus particularly on what has been said and written by the intellectuals, from both extreme political spectra, who expressed their explicit support for the movement; beginning with the post-Marxists, Antonio Negri and Slavoj Žižek.

4 Antonio Negri and the 'dual power' of the 'multitude'

In his article published on the Euronomade website, on 4 December 2018, Antonio Negri begins his reasoning by bringing us into the social context leading up to the protests. Contrary to what socialist leader Olivier Faure had suggested, the Yellow Vests are not merely a movement of dissatisfied citizens complaining about bourgeois whims, such as lack of purchasing power or tax injustice (BBC 2018). If this were so, far from being superficial, the proposal of Republican Laurent Wauqiez would have made perfect sense to them. Consequently, simply postponing the new hydrocarbons tax (ibid.) would have been more than enough for all those demonstrators to immediately put away their vests and return to their homes. But the early reactions of the French moderate parties only confirmed the criticism and blame they share with Macron for the gap between the rhetoric of the political classes and citizens' real problems. After all, one can only find 70% discontent in a society whose lower middle class is already learning what misery, precarity and desperation are about when paying the bills at the end of the month:

> *Certainly, in France there is now a multitude that violently arises against the new misery (. . .) the reduction of the labor force to precarity (. . .) insufficient public services (...) savage taxation of social services (. . .) the coming attacks on the retirement regime and the financing of national education. In France, therefore, there is something that violently arises against this misery, and which is followed by the cry 'Macron, démission'* (Negri 2018a)

There is a clear difference between the Yellow Vests' protests and those of May 1968. What was at stake in 1968 was a global transformation of culture, as well as the position of a generation regarding its place in history and the role it intended to play in the contemporary world. According to Alex Callinicos, this resulted in a social-democratic synthesis, that is to say the tacit agreement between the revolutionary intellectuals and the ruling class (Callinicos 1989). In fact, this was the generation which gave rise to the new class of white-collar workers with increasingly specialized formal education (Drucker 2001), which has prospered both in financial terms and in quality of life, although it has not ceased to be subjected to global capitalism and consumer alienation (Callinicos 1989, 162-171). As for the Yellow Vests, they are in the opposite situation, precisely because they are losing everything that their predecessors had conquered, to the point where they now find themselves struggling against labor shortages and a kind of instability that for decades would have been unthinkable in the West. From Negri's perspective, there is something very peculiar about this movement's struggle, which not only differentiates it from May 1968 but also from any other precedent: 'It has a desperate face... it resembles a prison uprising rather than the mass workers' joy in sabotaging (the system).' (Negri 2018a).

As for the main target, it is Macron, of course. From the protesters' point of view, the French president symbolizes banking, global capitalism and the international financial system, which, together with the parties of the regime, constitute what we may call the 'establishment'. And it has been precisely this establishment that the French have been trying most to get rid of, election after election, as long as they do not yield to the temptation of extremism. Nonetheless, their struggle has been inglorious and exhausting, especially after the Francois Hollande fiasco, whom in the final stage of his presidency could not even surpass 4% of popularity (Berdah 2016). The Yellow Vests are driven by a deep discontent with the system itself, as a whole. This peculiarly brings them very close to Antonio Negri's thoughts, for they are similar to what the author designates as a 'multitude', i.e. the living alternative that grows within the 'empire', against which it stands (Negri and Hardt 2001, xiii).

According to Negri we have, on the one hand, the empire of global capitalism, which diffuses its network of hierarchies and divisions, maintaining order through new mechanisms of control and constant conflicts (ibid.). Note, for example, the interminable military action ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan, which is only comprehensible in the light of the strategic, economic and political interests of a ruling class that stands above and acts transversally to the nation-states. In other words, a power superstructure composed of financial leaders, the military and energy oligopolies, among others, exercising its dominance through a web of political movements and circles, which interconnect on a global level. In effect, to some extent we all participate in the indomitable dynamics of this empire through our consumption, savings and investments (Savitz 2011). But of course, it is simply a statement of fact that wealth, economic and financial power have been concentrated in recent decades around a select group of multinationals and investment funds (Upbin 2011, Coffey 2011).

On the other hand, we have the 'multitude' which, according to the post-Marxist thinking of Negri and Hardt, transcends the 'working class' itself, and includes the poor in the widest sense, i.e. all those who do not belong to the ruling class, which is the reason why they are progressively becoming impoverished and losing their rights. Fortunately, in the West, we do not have millions of famine victims or 'damnés de la terre' (as the International Anthem says). But there are certainly too many victims of globalization, several million poor whose socioeconomic condition has worsened day by day while they see their democratic power fleeing from their hands. Since power has increasingly been centralized in international decision-making poles, far from popular scrutiny and under the dominance of political-financial circles which lack transparency. As a result of this widespread discontent, spontaneous transnational movements emerge, assembling 'new circuits of cooperation and collaboration that extend across nations and continents and allow an unlimited number of encounters' (Negri and Hardt 2004, xiii). The protests of the multitude are thus the only current expression of authentic democracy, since it comes from the 'common' – the morphological and effective root of communism (Negri 2012), which peculiarly contrasts with the manipulative usage of the term 'democracy', adopted by the dominant classes as a rhetorical means to achieve their political and strategic ends (ibid.).

Notwithstanding, Negri tries to avoid excessive or premature optimism for the Yellow Vests, for there is something in this movement that still remains indecipherable (Negri 2018a). It lacks more coordination, more uniformity in its discourse and action. If the democratic expression of the multitude is not to be fragmented, or to become an instrument of the establishment itself, it must necessarily transform itself into an organization (ibid.). Preferably without forming a party, for the more independent the movement is, the more it can function as the organized dynamic of the multitude which, instead of holding power, imposes itself as counter power. In this manner, the Italian thinker particularly emphasizes what some post-Marxist theorists (Tronti, Hardt and Negri himself) designate as 'Autonomism' – a political-philosophical current that analyzes precisely how self-organized social forces emerge and how they struggle against the ruling class. However, to effectively become an autonomous movement the Yellow Vests cannot limit their struggle to the demand for labor rights and purchasing power, as that would result once again in the same social-democratic synthesis which only perpetuates the existing system. For Negri, it is only when the immense diversity of the excluded converge in the self-organized movement of the 'common' that it can truly constitute itself as 'multitude', consequently transforming the existing system by imposing itself as an active structural dynamic that we would call 'dual power' or 'power against power' (Negri 2018a, Negri 2018b). According to the author, the Yellow Vests movement is precisely at this stage, still indecipherable. For the time being, no paradigm revolution can be expected in the Western system, only the possibility of transforming its dialectical process through the emergence, structuring and consolidation of an effective counter-power made up of the multitude of the common.

5 Slavoj Žižek and the paradigm revolution

The way the Yellow Vests should organize themselves is a fundamental issue both for Negri and Žižek. If they line up with any of the political parties that support them, they will lose their independence (Negri 2018a) and the autonomy indispensable to self-organization – these qualities were actually emphasized by Mélanchon (2018) in his reaction to November 17. After all, the idea of a multitude that stands by itself against the whole system is typical of revolutionary glamour, both in its symbolic and psychosocial dimension, especially in France, the country of May 1968. Nonetheless, according to Slavoj Žižek (2018a), not only are the Yellow Vests indecipherable but they are still too inconsistent and contradictory to achieve effective self-organization, as is particularly evident in their proposals:

> *They offer an exemplary case of the leftist populism, of the explosion of people's wrath in all its inconsistency: lower taxes and more money for education and health care, cheaper petrol and ecological struggle...* (Žižek 2018a)

More specifically, the movement proposes, on the one hand, to establish a maximum constitutional limit of 25% on tax collection and other contributions. But, on the other hand, it calls for a 40% increase in basic pensions and social benefits, a significant increase in public employment and the massive construction of 5 million homes for the homeless, as well as severe punishments for municipalities where there are people sleeping on the streets (Bleu 2018). As for the environment, the Yellow Vests demand pollution control and at the same time the reinforcement of reindustrialization. Moreover, in terms of international politics and defense, they propose nothing less than the exit from NATO and the FREXIT, beginning with the renunciation of the Treaty of Lisbon (ibid.):

> *The demands of the protesters aren't possible to implement within the current capitalist system – and they aren't ambitious enough to provoke a change to a more egalitarian, ecologically sustainable system either.* (Žižek 2018a)

As might be expected, the contradictory and unrealistic nature of the Yellow Vests' demands, just as in most mass movements, mainly expresses tensions intrinsic to the multitude itself. But what can be stronger than all these differing tensions, to the point of aggregating the masses and leading them onto the streets, knowing that they will face police repression? Only a tremendous discontent, of course, accompanied with a sense of saturation with the current system as well as its cultural and socio-political patterns. In this manner, it is significant for Žižek that the protests have risen against the government's most politically correct measure – the ecological tax on hydrocarbons, i.e., a measure against global warming and climate change (Žižek 2018a). In other words, we are witnessing a profound dissatisfaction among the deep France, shared by 70% of the population, and which is leading peasants, rural workers and people from all over the provinces to invade the big cities.

Interestingly, Žižek has drawn attention to the inevitable emergence of phenomena such as these for many years. From the philosopher's point of view, at least since the crisis of 2007-2008, the flagrant irrationality of global capitalism (Žižek 2009, 81) can no longer disguise its ideological and illusory character (ibid. 9-77). The concentration of economic and financial power in the highest social spheres has created extremely serious and insurmountable divisions, especially between those who still have the capacity to enter (or remain) in the cycle of wealth and those who have simply been excluded from it and stand hardly any chance of being part of it again. This gap between the dominant minority on the one hand and the excluded multitude on the other has given rise to new forms of apartheid (ibid. 91), which are not restricted to the lower classes but are increasingly extending to the middle class itself (often designated as the white working class). Given this context, Žižek also shares Negri and Hardt's view on the current role of the 'common' (ibid. 86-94) as he calls for a new radical notion of the proletarian subject (ibid. 92). In addition, the 'rage potential' (ibid. 89) of these protesters should not be disregarded either, for they could feel justified to respond with subjective violence to the objective violence (Žižek 2008) perpetrated against them by a corrupt establishment that is constantly deceiving them with false rhetoric and failing them with fake solutions. After Hollande's resounding failure, the political banker Macron apparently symbolizes the last resource of this obsolete system and probably the best it has to give (Žižek 2018a, 2018b) – but of course, when the best seems not to be enough, the only true solution has to be radical, it must imply a paradigm shift. In effect, it is exactly at this point that the Slovenian philosopher diverges from Negri, for not only does he believe in the radicalism of this change but he is also firmly convinced that we already live in favourable circumstances to start implementing it. In this way, Žižek adds new possibilities to the ongoing story-building produced around the Yellow Vests phenomenon. More specifically, he provides us with two possible scenarios. In the first, the agents and structures of established power would be forced to negotiate. In the second and most unlikely set of events, the Yellow Vests themselves would take power.

As regards the first scenario, let us imagine that the EU would establish a historic agreement with a movement of this nature, that is, an efficient self-organized entity representing the multitude. In this case, the demands of the movement would have to be so radical that they would by themselves imply a paradigm revolution. To that end, they should focus exclusively on the effective resolution of 'primary contradictions' – exactly in the sense in which Mao Tse-tung (1990, 154-229) used this expression – and simply put aside our 'secondary' divergences (ibid.). This is the heuristic exercise that Žižek (2018a, 2018b) suggests by recurring to the well-known Maoist distinction (primary vs secondary contradictions), for it is crucial to give up our contingent goals in exchange for surgical measures which are so substantial in nature that, at the instant they are implemented, will subvert the foundations of the system as we know it:

> *(Examples) What about the overhaul of our entire financial system, which would affect the rules of how credit and investments work? What about imposing new regulations which would prevent the exploitation of the third world countries from which refugees come?* (Žižek 2018a)

As for the second scenario, the day a mass movement came to power, how could we deal with the chaos that would ensue? Faced with this possibility, Žižek reaffirms its radicalism once again. He argues that he is not afraid to give us a solution that is perhaps too similar to what we saw in the last century: the rise of an enlightened and regulating elite, implementing a kind of bureaucratic socialism (Kagarlitsky 2018) – the philosopher does not clarify whether this solution would be temporary or indefinite.

6 The other side: Alternative narratives on the Yellow Vests

Both Negri and Žižek view the issue of organization as central, for the success of the Yellow Vests depends on how capable they are of organizing themselves. On the one hand, it is only through self-organization that they can reach the levels of autonomy and independence that are necessary to attract multitudes of discontented people, so as to convert their 'secondary contradictions' into a single 'primary' goal (generic): change the status quo. On the other, however, self-organization can also have its disadvantages. If a self-organized movement is not solid enough, with regard to its strategy and pragmatics, as well as to its national and international dynamics and networks, it may become impotent (Negri 2018a) and be easily neutralized and/or absorbed by the established political system. There is, nonetheless, a question that Negri and Žižek seem to be avoiding: To what extent can we consider the Yellow Vests to be truly independent or politically disconnected (to the point of fearing their neutralization), if they have the explicit support of such relevant parties and personalities in French politics?

Based on the 2017 electoral results (Ministère de l'Intérieur), Le Pen's votes (21.3%), added to those of Mélenchon (19.5%), amount to no less than a 41% impact on the French electorate. These figures show us the huge influence of both far-right and far-left parties, cultures and networks in today's France, as well as the potential impact they might convey to any social-political movement once they publicly endorse it. In effect, whenever a political current explicitly supports a given cause, all those who sympathize or are somehow affiliated with that current (philosophers, academics, artists, journalists, opinion makers, influencers, associations, lobbies, NGOs, etc.), tend to directly or indirectly promote that cause and contribute to its political success.

In this way, the case of Portugal is particularly interesting, for it could serve as a hypothetical reference, in the near future, regarding the possible correlation between explicit party support and subsequent vitality of movements such as the Yellow Vests. Indeed, in Portugal we have, on the one hand, an almost irrelevant far-right and, on the other hand, a mildly influential Communist Party, which is supporting the parliamentary majority of the current Government. Can this be part of the reason why the Portuguese Yellow Vests have been a real failure (Pena et al. 2018) so far? What would happen if a populist or extreme right party, such as the CHEGA or the PNR, achieved an excellent result in the 2019 legislative elections? Or, perhaps a more realistic scenario, what could happen if the PCP were left out of the next majority? The Yellow Vests' struggle is ready and waiting to be used as a political instrument. In other words, should any of these scenarios happen, could this movement finally gain the explicit support of a relevant anti-establishment party in Portugal? And would this support then coincide with a sudden and supposedly unexpected rise of the Portuguese Yellow Vests?

The fact that French extremist parties are taking the protesters' side should not, therefore, be ignored or devalued. In addition to organized means and resources, political parties and currents are mainly sustained by a wider social and cultural discourse, which, of course, cannot be fully controlled by any particular institution or organization. Notwithstanding, there is an objective storyline to every sociopolitical phenomenon which can be deduced by analyzing its ongoing cross-media story-building. In this way, having already analyzed the contribution of Western post-Marxists such as Negri and Žižek, we will now focus on the other side of the narrative. That is, on other intellectual agents who also support the Yellow Vests, not only including European far-right populists but also Russian post-Marxists, neo-nationalists and traditionalists who allegedly maintain a privileged connection with Putin's regime, namely Boris Kagarlitsky and Aleksandr Dugin.

6.1 Kagarlitsky's critical review on Slavoj Žižek

Beginning with Boris Kagarlitsky (2018), his article on the spontaneous politics of the masses is, first of all, a criticism of Slavoj Žižek. In his perspective, the Slovenian philosopher is a paradigmatic example of European leftist intellectuals who were apparently astonished by the shocking emergence of the Yellow Vests phenomenon (ibid). In addition, the Russian author contradicts Žižek's (2018a) main argument by stating that the Yellow Vests' demands could actually be met within the present system; for most of these claims fall perfectly within the history of Western capitalism, especially in the European social model, and have already been fulfilled in the past (Kagarlitsky 2018). The problem is that all these social advances were abolished with the victory of neoliberalism (ibid.). Thus, only with the pressure of the masses on the dominant elites, who will repeatedly have to make concessions to popular discontent, can any social progress be achieved (ibid.), though always within the existing system and without the need to abolish capitalism (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is precisely at the heart of Kagarlitsky's critique of Žižek that we can recognize a curious detail: He seems to agree with the need for a constant and structural pressure on the elites by the discontent masses, assigning them a relatively similar role to what Negri (2018a, 2018b) designates as 'dual power' or 'power against power'.

However, the aforementioned agreement with Negri turns out to be only apparent, since, unlike the Italian philosopher, Kagarlitsky (2018) believes that we are dealing with what Leon Trotsky called a 'transition program'. In this respect, Žižek would be correct in stating that the Western economic and socio-political system has reached a critical point, although the solutions would not have to be so incisive or radical:

> *One can create effective state enterprises and use the profits for social needs. One can increase taxes on large corporations, or at least take away some of the tax benefits the transnationals enjoyed in almost all countries in the last decade. (. . .) One can stimulate economic growth and increase the wages (. . .) One may even finance social programs at the expense of budget deficit.* (Kagarlitsky 2018)

In words other than those of the Russian author, we could therefore maintain certain capitalist pragmatics, as long as we altered the whole logic of prevailing Western capitalism and instead, perhaps, adopt some measures of the Russian model (e.g. large companies under state control). Now, what is this but a paradigm shift and an authentic revolution in the system? Kagarlitsky appears to be in complete disagreement with Žižek only to propose another radical transfiguration of the Western model - and precisely in accordance with a 'transition program', which seems not to be very different from the resolution of 'primary contradictions' – as opposed to 'secondary' ones (Tsé-Tung 1990, 154-229) – proposed by the Slovenian philosopher (Žižek 2018a, 2018b).

Let us not, however, discard the figure of Kagarlitsky, the 'Red Putinist' (Zadyraka 2015). Though his article turns out to be somehow incoherent and might cause some perplexity in Western left-wing philosophers, it engages in a kind of dialectic thinking which is quite characteristic of many present-day Russian intellectuals. Having a theoretical Marxist basis, Kagarlitsky integrates the dynamics and components of Marxism into the idiosyncratic capitalism of Putin's regime. In this way, he conciliates elements which, ideologically, can be situated both on the far-right and the far-left. And this, of course, is a very peculiar heuristic exercise to which we must give careful attention.

6.2 From Le Pen to Dugin: Beyond left and right but against the center

The combination of far-right and far-left elements is not new, neither in Russia nor in France, as far as political thinking and subsequent pragmatics are concerned. Since its beginning, this trend has been grounded in the profound rejection of both ideological spectra in its moderate version. More precisely, it started in the French sociopolitical context of the 1990s with the National Front's slogan 'Ni droite, ni gauche - Francais', inspired by a book with the same title written by Samuel Maréchal (1996), a prominent member of the party and Jean-Marie Le Pen's son-in-law. At the time when all those old guard nationalistic fantasies artificially constructed by European fascist and para-fascist regimes had become obsolete, new figures such as Le Pen began to re-clothe national sentiment in a more up-to-date and appealing way to discontented citizens. By the end of the decade, the National Front narrative was already well adapted to the growing process of the implementation of worldwide information technologies and what would become the global capitalism of the 21st century. Thus, just as multiple radical left movements began to rebel against the emerging global capitalism, so right-wing radicals saw this same phenomenon as an opportunity to reconquer their electorate, or perhaps, even expand their influence by persuading undecided voters and taking advantage of high abstention levels (IDEA 2019). In this way, they focused on capturing the interest of those dissatisfied with the status quo and, in particular, the working class, who, in the circumstances (e.g. lack of purchasing power or unstable employment), usually tends to fear immigration, openness to global markets and competition from countries with cheaper labor. The new far-right narrative was therefore addressed to all those who might be drawn to the idea that national sovereignties need to be vigorously defended and felt they could benefit from such policies, irrespective of their ideological spectrum. In the words of Maréchal, 'Instead of the interests of the left or the right, we prefer to fight for the interests of the French' (1996, 37). In the 21st century, it was Marine Le Pen who followed up on this strategy, developing it further and introducing the question of patriotism versus globalism:

> *We have entered a new bipartisanism. Bipartisanism between two mutually exclusive concepts that, from now on, will structure our political life. The cleavage no longer separates left and right, but globalists and patriots.* (Le Pen 2015)

Nevertheless, among right-wing yellow vest supporters, Marine Le Pen is no longer the only party leader adopting this narrative. Today, as we are witnessing a rise of European neo-nationalism, many other populist leaders and related personalities are also calling for the rejection of right and left, while simultaneously appropriating the most extreme features of both political spectra. Thus, if on the one hand we have Negri and Žižek's post-Marxist left trying to capture the hope of the multitude, on the other hand, we are faced with an alternative sociopolitical culture which is far less known to the Western mainstream, but is equally emblematic of the times we are living in. As we gather together all the extremist narrative one can find, it becomes apparent that this very peculiar culture and political network has been mobilizing, since the early 2000's, adherents to all kinds of doctrines and ideologies, with a view to conquering those who are profoundly discontent with the current European ideals, society and political system:

> *New Resistance is an international network founded in North America, of National Revolutionaries, Patriotic Socialists, Populist Nationalists, National Bolsheviks, Left-Nationalists, Right-Wing Anti-Capitalists, Eurasianists, Fourth Political Theorists (. . .). We are a nascent radical movement, a revolutionary nucleus. We look to Europe as the fount of our particular culture while respecting at the same time other nations, cultures and civilizations.*
> ((Open Revolt n.d.)

In this way, all the mentioned narratives – from the Le Pen of the 1990s to Marine Le Pen, European populists, and the radical alternative movements – have a specific parameter in common, which we can express in the following proposition: 'Beyond left and right but against the center '(4pt). And where does this sentence come from? It is nothing less than the signature of The Fourth Political Theory official website (4pt), dedicated to the philosophical and political thinking of Aleksandr Dugin – the controversial Russian nationalist intellectual, former professor at Moscow State University and a former adviser to the Kremlin for more than 10 years. Often known as Putin's brain or Putin's Rasputin (Steinmann 2018), his real influence over the President of Russia is disputed by some analysts, including radical nationalists such as Anatoly Karlin (2017). However, what really matters in this case is not whether Dugin's influence has increased or diminished as far as institutional politics is concerned, but the actual effects that his philosophical thinking and cultural pragmatics have on European populism and worldwide far-right/far-left neo-nationalist sociopolitical networks. Together with Eduard Limonov, Dugin was one of the creators of National Bolshevism, an ideology with a distinctive mark of its own, and which is typical of the new alternative nationalist culture he also helped creating, as it synthesizes the two major references for political extremism: Bolshevik communism and national-socialism.

Nowadays, Aleksandr Dugin (2013) is best known for his work, The Fourth Political Theory, and as a major figure of the Eurasian movement. As far as this theory is concerned, Dugin intends to implement nationalism against what he calls globalism, that is, the liberal democratic world order led and imposed by the United States. He defends a new order based on racial realism, for although no human race is superior to another, they all have fundamental and objective differences. As a geopolitical alternative to Western Unipolarism, he then proposes Multipolarism – a world organized in large spaces (Eurasia, China, North America, Europe, etc.), each one united by racial and cultural affinities. Moreover, Dugin professes freedom as an expression intrinsically linked to the collectivity, opposing it to individualism or mere individual freedom, for true freedom must be in part a collective phenomenon. With respect to our perception of time, he suggests going back to the cyclical timeframe or the eternal return, rather than perpetuating human submission to modern chronology and its ideology of progress. Finally, the pillars of this new world would be grounded in national sovereignty, traditional values and social justice.

Based on The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin's Eurasian movement is, therefore, the pragmatic extension of these radical ideals and one of the most relevant intellectual and sociopolitical networks behind the new alternative neo-nationalist culture of the 21st century. In short, this is the revolution that Putin's former advisor wants to carry out around the globe. And to do so, one must seize all radical doctrines, all the discontentment with globalization, and recruit all extremist right/left cultures and sociopolitical forces so as to destroy the center, that is, the western axiological, political and ideological modern consensus (human rights, democratic liberalism and individual freedoms). In this way, Dugin's (2018) fervent support for the Yellow Vests' cause does not come as a surprise. Once again, we are faced with the same recurrent paradigm: Both far-left post-Marxists and far-right neo-nationalist/populist intellectuals, together with all the affiliated ideological, cultural and sociopolitical networks on which they have an impact, have been contributing to the whole yellow vest story-building with a kind of narrative which is intrinsically and explicitly revolutionary.

7 Conclusions

Considering our analysis of the narratives produced by both post-Marxist and neo-nationalist intellectuals regarding the Yellow Vests phenomenon, we can draw the following conclusions:

Beginning with the contributions of post-Marxists who support the movement, Antonio Negri's perspective clearly fits into the works he wrote with Michael Hardt and their notions of 'empire' and 'multitude'. The Italian philosopher sustains that if the Yellow Vests turn out to be an efficient self-organization, they might become a revolutionary structure, which he designates as 'dual power' or 'power against power'. Although the movement has not yet been structurally organized as such, it is in a good position to do so, and thus gather the multitude with a view to radically transforming the existing dialectic of power. In other words, by replacing the current pseudo-revolutionary dynamics (based on the negotiation of mutual bourgeois interests through social concertation), with an active, solid and effective counter-structure, a movement such as the Yellow Vests could, sometime in the future, make way for an unprecedented synthesis: The overthrow of the present 'empire' by the 'multitude', followed by the institutionalization of the 'common'. Not unexpectedly, though, this new synthesis does somehow resemble the old Marxist one, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat with a view to utopia – which, of course, would certainly change the system as we know it;

Still within the post-Marxist writers, Žižek diverges from Negri insofar as the Slovenian believes in the almost immediate possibility and feasibility of radically transforming the socio-economic and political paradigm in which we live, for capitalism is coming to an end. Žižek provides us with two possible scenarios. In the first, an organized movement such as the Yellow Vests could succeed if it were able to nullify all the secondary contradictions inherent in the multitude, in the status quo and in the dialectic of power itself, and instead focus exclusively on surgical primary changes (e.g. changing the financial system). This, of course, would subvert and bring down the Western capitalist paradigm as we know it. In the second scenario, if a mass movement of this kind simply took over power (for instance, in a country such as France, and with systemic effects on the entire West), chaos would probably ensue. However, the Slovenian philosopher seems not to be too concerned about this possible context, since this same chaos could be solved by implementing a bureaucratic socialism – we do not know whether provisionally or definitively. In this way, despite criticizing inconsistencies in the Yellow Vests' institutional narrative, Žižek suggests that by the social impact and corresponding media storytelling they generate, movements such as the Yellow Vests may eventually result in a radical, systemic and imminent transformation of Western societies. In fact, from Žižek's perspective, global capitalism is already provoking a generalized socio-economic collapse – e.g., the emergence of new forms of apartheid (2009, 91), the increasing of 'rage potential' and subjective violence as a reaction to the system's objective violence (2008)– which favors the sudden outbreak of movements with the eventual ability to, at any moment, fulfill a paradigmatic revolution.

With respect to the leftist nationalist Kagarlitsky, his criticism seems to contradict the radical tendency of his fellow post-Marxists, Negri and Žižek (particularly the latter). However, in an effort to reconcile the Yellow Vests' demands with the capitalist system, the Russian author proposes a 'transition program' that ends up having some affinity with the resolution of 'primary contradictions' suggested by the Slovenian philosopher. After all, Kagarlitsky is by no means a herald of liberal capitalism. Instead, he suggests a fusion of socialist and capitalist characteristics under a kind of state intervention clearly more compatible with the Putin regime than with the West. Indeed, the implementation of anything like this in the West would also be the equivalent of a paradigmatic revolution, certainly as drastic as the first scenario proposed by Žižek. Notwithstanding, the attempt to reconcile opposing ideological elements (e.g. left/right, socialism/capitalism), is not exclusive to this particular neo-nationalist and post-Marxist Russian author, but is part of a broader alternative political culture.

As far as the far-right support for the Yellow Vests, it is mainly an extension of a narrative already used by the National Front in the 1990s. Rejecting both left and right, Jean-Marie Le Pen's rhetoric brought together extreme characteristics of both political spectra, turning them into political and ideological instruments at the service of nationalism. Following her father's steps, Marine Le Pen also puts French patriotism above any other ideological or political value, opposing it to globalism. Finally, among the most fervent supporters of the Yellow Vests, we come across Russian neo-nationalist intellectuals such as Aleksandr Dugin. As the basis of an entire alternative culture in vogue in Europe and the United States, the ideological project of Putin's former advisor is so radical that it involves nothing less than the end of the world as we know it. It is the most profound geopolitical revolution of our times, which seeks the global implementation of *The Fourth Political Theory*, based on the principles of national sovereignty and axiological traditionalism. Should the Yellow Vests suddenly begin to promote anti-emigration measures or to defend any kind of racial supremacy, this could mean that at least one or more of these neo-nationalist political currents and socio-cultural networks have a greater influence on them than one might think.

Thus, we may finally conclude that all the above-mentioned intellectuals, as well as the ideological, socio-cultural and political currents to which they are affiliated, highlight and praise the revolutionary potential of the Yellow Vests. In effect, these same intellectuals and political actors also play a major role in contributing to the story that is being told and is being built around the movement, precisely reinforcing its radical, insurrectionary and potentially transformative character. In other words, all those who prominently develop or narratively interact with this phenomenon appear to be story-building for a revolution, or for what they believe to be a better world. This is exactly why, even if this specific movement disappears, another can fill its place, providing once again a voice to all the extremist currents and subversive cultural networks that aspire to the transfiguration of the West.

References

[1] 4pt. n.d. "The Fourth Political Theory: Beyond left and right but against the center." Last accessed March 9, 2019. http://www.4pt.su/en.

[2] Antikainen, Hannele, Sonja Kangas, and Sari Vainikainen. Antikainen. 2004. "Three Views on Mobile Cross Media Entertainment (Report)." *VTT Information Technology*. https://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/muut/2004/crossmedia_entertainment.pdf

[3] Berdah, Arthur. 2016. "Popularité: à 4% de bonnes opinions, Hollande touche le fond." *Le Figaro*, October 25. http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2016/10/25/25001-20161025ARTFIG00143-popularite-a-4-de-bonnes-opinions-hollande-touche-le-fond.php.

[4] Bleu, France. 2018. "Demands of France's yellow vests as uploaded by France Bleu, November 29." *OpenDemocracy*, December 7. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/france-bleu/demands-of-frances-yellow-vests-as-uploaded-by-france-bleu-november-29.

[5] Callinicos, Alex. 1989. *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[6] Coffey, Brendan. 2011. "The Four Companies That Control the 147 Companies That Own Everything." *Forbes*, October 26. https://www.forbes.com/sites/brendancoffey/

2011/10/26/the-four-companies-that-control-the-147-companies-that-own-everything/#7e0a3c93685b.
[7] Drucker, Peter F. 2001. *The Essential Drucker*. New York: Harper Collings Publishers.
[8] Dugin, Alexander. 2013. *La Cuarta Teoría Política*. Barcelona: Ediciones Nueva República.
[9] Dugin, Alexandr. 2018. "Uprising in France – The Anatomy of Populism and Challenging the Matrix." *Fort Russ News*, December 4. https://www.fort-russ.com/2018/12/dugin-uprising-in-france-the-anatomy-of-populism-and-challenging-the-matrix/.
[10] Gilets Jaunes. 2019. "Gilets Jaunes - Coordination Nationale des Régions." Last accessed March 9, 2019. https://www.giletsjaunes-coordination.fr/.
[11] IDEA. 2019. "Voter Turnout. France." *International IDEA – Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*. Last accessed March 9, 2019. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/522/86/ctr.
[12] Kagarlitsky, Boris. 2018. "The Spontaneous Politics of the Masses: Slavoj Žižek and the Yellow Vests." *CounterPunch*, January 7. https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/01/07/the-spontaneous-politics-of-the-masses-slavoj-zizek-and-the-yellow-vests/.
[13] Karlin, Anatoly. 2017. "Dugin, Putin's 39th Brain." *The Unz Review*, January 21. http://www.unz.com/akarlin/dugin-putins-39th-brain/.
[14] Le Pen, Marie. 2015. "Régionales 2015: pour Marine Le Pen, «le clivage politique sépare désormais mondialistes et patriotes»" [Video]. *Le Monde* December 13. https://www.lemonde.fr/elections-regionales-2015/video/2015/12/13/marine-le-pen-le-clivage-n-est-plus-gauche-et-droite-mais-mondialistes-et-patriotes_4831014_4640869.html.
[15] Maréchal, Samuel. 1996. *Ni Droite, ni Gauche - Français!: Contre la Pensée Unique, L'autre Politique*. Paris: Premiere Ligne.
[16] Mélenchon, Jean-Luc. 2018. "«Voici la nouvelle France» – Discours de Jean-Luc Mélenchon à Épinay-sur-Seine" [VIDEO]. *L'Ére du Peuple*, November 18. https://melenchon.fr/2018/11/18/video-voici-la-nouvelle-france-discours-de-jean-luc-melenchon-a-epinay-sur-seine/.
[17] Ministère de l'intérieur. 2017. "Résultats de l'élection présidentielle 2017." *Ministère de l'interieur*, May 7. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html.
[18] Negri, Toni. 2018a. "L'insurrezione Francese." *Euronomade*, December 4, http://www.euronomade.info/?p=11351.
[19] Negri, Toni. 2018b. "Gilets jaunes: un contropotere?" *Euronomade*, December 21. http://www.euronomade.info/?p=11461.
[20] Negri, Antonio, and Michael Hardt. 2001. *Império*. São Paulo: Editora Record.
[21] Negri, Antonio, and Michael Hardt. 2004. *Multitud: Guerra y democracia en la era del Imperio*. Barcelona: Debate.
[22] Negri, Antonio, and Cesare Casarino. 2012. *Elogio de lo Común: Conversaciones sobre Filosofía y Política*. Barcelona: Paidós.
[23] Open Revolt. n.d. "About OR – Open Revolt!" Last accessed March 9, 2019. https://openrevolt.info/about/.
[24] Pena, Paulo, David Mandim, and Paula Sofia Luz. 2018. "Porque falharam (desta vez) os 'coletes amarelos' em Portugal." *Diário de Notícias*, December 21. https://www.dn.pt/pais/interior/porque-falharam-desta-vez-os-coletes-amarelos-em-portugal-10352887.html.
[25] Savitz, Eric. 2011. "Retort: The 147 Companies That Run The World? They're You." *Forbes*, October 24. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2011/10/24/retort-the-147-companies-that-run-the-world-theyre-you/#75cda7d47ebf.
[26] Steinmann, Luca. 2018. "Alexander Dugin, il 'Rasputin' di Putin, arriva in Italia." *Huffington Post – Italia*, June 22. https://www.huffingtonpost.it/2018/06/22/alexander-dugin-il-rasputin-di-putin-arriva-in-italia_a_23464868/.
[27] Tsé-Tung, Mao. 1990. "The Law of the Unity of Contradictions [On Contradiction]". In *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, edited by Nick Knight, 154-229. New York: N.E. Sharpe, Inc.
[28] Upbin, Bruce. 2011. "The 147 Companies That Control Everything." *Forbes*, October 22. https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2011/10/22/the-147-companies-that-control-everything/#693d8eb75105.
[29] Zadyraka, Volodymyr. 2015. "A critique of the Boris Kagarlitsky, the 'Red Putinist'." *Worker's Liberty*, May 5. https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2017-07-26/critique-boris-kagarlitsky-red-putinist.
[30] Žižek, Slavoj. 2009. *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce*. New York: Verso.
[31] Žižek, S Slavoj. 2018a. "The yellow vest protesters revolting against centrism mean well – but their left wing populism won't change French politics." *The Independent*, December 17. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yellow-vest-protests-france-paris-gilets-jaunes-macron-fuel-tax-minimum-wage-populism-a8686586.html.
[32] Žižek, Slavoj. 2018b. "How Mao would have evaluated the Yellow Vests." *RT*, December 21. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/447155-zizek-yellow-vests-france/.
[33] Žižek, Slavoj. 2008c. *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*. New York: Picador

Rodrigo Almeida Sousa born in Johannesburg (1975), R. A. Sousa is a writer and academic researcher at CITCEM (University of Porto) with an interdisciplinary background: Philosophy (BA/Catholic University of Portugal), Literary Theory (MA/University of Lisbon) and Audiovisual Communication (PhD/Complutense University of Madrid - Outstanding Doctorate Award 2015-2016). In his research, he usually relates cultural dynamics, trends, historical-social events with media supports and communicational paradigms, with a view to examining contemporary dilemmas, particularly regarding creativity, communication and social discourses. Lately, he has been focusing on digital cultures, sub-cultures and movements, generated and/or fostered within the post-truth environment and their reflection on audiovisual narratives (news, opinion, entertainment, film, TV, arts). As a writer/screenwriter, he has authored two successful children's books (*My School Would Make a Movie*, 2011; *Louie The Cootie*, 2013) and award-winning short and full-length movie scripts (e.g. *Gesto*, A. B. Correia, 2011; *Cova*, L. Alves, 2011)

On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent: Can voters do it?

Sobre a punição/recompensa eleitoral do incumbente: Podem os eleitores fazê-lo?

António Bento Caleiro
University of Évora

Abstract—The article analyzes the possibility of voters penalizing or rewarding the incumbent (economic) performance at the polls. For this, it is considered that voters have limited rationality. This does not prevent them from performing this task without bias, which should serve as an obligation to use the elections to effectively penalize or reward the incumbent and/or not elect those who do not deserve it.

Keywords—Bounded rationality, Elections, Voters.

Resumo—O artigo analisa a possibilidade de os eleitores penalizarem, ou recompensarem, nas urnas, o desempenho (económico) do governo. Para tal, considera-se que os eleitores dispõem de racionalidade limitada. Tal não os impede de desempenharem aquela tarefa sem enviesamento, o que deveria servir de obrigação de utilização das eleições para, efectivamente, penalizar, ou recompensar, o governo e/ou não elegerem quem não o merece.

Palavras-Chave—Racionalidade Limitada, Eleições, Eleitores.

Submitted—28-09-2018. **Accepted**—06-02-2019.

1 Introduction

The electoral business cycles literature generally concludes that the short-run electorally-induced fluctuations are harmful to the social welfare (in the long-run).[1] As a matter of fact, because the electoral results depend on voters' evaluation, it can be said that the electorate is also responsible for existence of electoral business cycles as, through ignorance or for some other

• ***António Bento Caleiro**, Professor at the Department of Economy, University of Évora, Portugal.*
E-mail: caleiro@uevora.pt
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1205-4404

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.335

1. In spite of the eminently theoretical content of the article, it is fair to refer to the vast amount of empirical studies that dealt with the verification of empirical support for the various models of electoral cycles: political or partisan; retrospective or rational. With regard to Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2004) and Veiga and Veiga (2007) are two references of obvious interest. Eventually, Caleiro and Guerreiro (2004) is another, which shows that, in these matters, the use of spatial econometrics techniques is generally recommended.

reason, allow them to exist.

A possible debate is then the one about the voters' rationality. What characteristics would distinguish rational from non-rational voters? These two types of voters should possess differing sets of knowledge and information concerning the workings of the economy. As their knowledge grows through learning, voters may approach full rationality. Consequently, the learning process voters go through should be of great importance. Given that, even with rational voters, electoral cycles can still exist, one should study the circumstances under which it would be desirable for a government to be facing fast-learning sophisticated voters, i.e. those voters who understand the constraints under which the government operates and thus will form their opinion on the basis of how closely actual performance adheres to the best within the possible. A competent but unfortunate government facing a particularly unpleasant evolution of exogenous conditions, for example, would be glad if voters learn quickly enough to distinguish between policy errors and simple bad luck.

Being even more impressive, in fact, an incumbent can be electorally punished by voters if it adopts socially optimal economic policies (Caleiro 2001). In this sense, if the objective is to remain in power to play the role of social welfare maximizer, the incumbent may face a dilemma: either it implements measures that are socially optimal and risk losing elections, or implements opportunist policies that are ultimately electorally awarded. Of course, this dilemma is sometimes exploited by incumbents whose (unique) aim is indeed to remain in power only to achieve private objectives. It is precisely these, and only these, incumbents who should be prevented from creating business cycles for electoral purposes (Caleiro 2018b).

This point introduces a well-known problem of electorally-induced behavior punishment.[2] In fact, since McRae (1977) the possibility of a strategic voting on the part of the electorate was admitted, which would be to change, appropriately, the electoral preferences so that the incumbent is forced to implement the socially optimal economic policies, being rewarded, electorally by such. In other words, elections can in fact turn voters into the principal who has all the incentives to motivate the government, as the agent, to use the socially optimal policies (Caleiro 2004).

Elections are thus the appropriate mechanism (or moment in time) to punish or to reward the past behavior of the incumbent. That being true, it still remains the problem of being possible by the electorate to distinguish an opportunistic behavior from a benevolent one. This possibility, in turn, depends upon the information that is available and how it is processed by voters.

As is well-known, the first strand of electoral cycles models, considered adaptive expectations and retrospective voters (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 1977). The second generation of those models considered rational expectations as well as rational voters (Alesina 1987, 1988; Rogoff and Sibert 1988).[3] Assuming this perspective, Minford (1995) is of relevance in the determination of those electoral punishment strategies.

Assuming rational expectations, in a situation where there are some stochastic shocks, it is optimal to let the government react to those shocks. But the allowance to use some discretion may not be used to try to exploit the Phillips curve, as (even the government should know) this attempt only results in unnecessary inflation. As Minford (1995) shows, there is the possibility of considering a discretionary electoral punishment large enough (that is an electoral defeat) to deter any attempt to exploit the Phillips curve, but no punishment at all for the correct response to shocks.

This absolute need to react only to shocks constitutes then a constraint in the government's optimization programme. This is so because it is in the government's own interest that the precommitment policy is shown to be computed in that way. Only in that circumstances the precommitment policies will be expected and effectively chosen because they are optimal. In this way, the government, by truly punishing itself if required to do so, will achieve a better outcome.

2. Somehow related is the practice of monitoring the behavior of the incumbent throughout the mandate by the electorate. In reality, it seems that a constant monitoring of the incumbent seems not to be considered a crucial practice by the electorate.

3. For an up-to-date review of the most recent developments in the electoral cycle literature, one may see Caleiro (2018a).

See also Minford (1990).

As it is apparent that voters have good reasons for motivating the incumbent government, is it rational to expect that, despite the initial problems of making the punishment promises acquire credibility, these punishment strategies make sense? The infinite repetition of the gains from those strategies will plausibly overcome the costs. This is true in a rational expectations world, but we conjecture that it may be extrapolated to a bounded rationality world where, despite their limitations, voters that engage in a classification task, as illustrated in this chapter, can (may be not in a so fast or secure way than in the case just discussed) also motivate governments to act as a benevolent social-planner.[4]

In reality, it seems that voters often cannot truly judge/classify if an observed state/policy is the result of a self-interested/opportunistic government or, on the contrary, results as a social-planner outcome, simply because voters do not know the structure/model/transmission mechanism connecting policy values to state values. In other words, it may be considered that voters are characterized by a bounded rationality.

The existence of bounded rationality in political matters, in general, and in electoral matters in particular, seems, in fact, to form the basis of a third generation of models. To prove this fact, Ashworth et al. (2018), Bendor (2010), Lee et al. (2016), Ogaki and Tanaka (2017) and Reed et al. (2018), are (quite) recent references of undeniable interest, which support this.

Bounded rationality voters were already considered in Caleiro (2001, 2013), performing a classification task by the use of a neural network.[5] As was clear, neural networks performed the classification task, i.e. made the 'division' between opportunistic and benevolent policies, learning the relationships between the relevant variables in a model-free way.[6]

4. As is well known, the bounded rationality approach is immediately associated with the works of Herbert Simon. See, for instance, Simon (1982). See also Wall (1993).

5. See for a general approach on how neural networks can be applied see Swingler (1996).

6. This model-free approach gives enough flexibility to obtain good performances at finding relationships in an input-output space even, if the space is complex and the patterns between inputs and outputs are ill defined.

A possible shortcoming of Caleiro (2001, 2013) is, indeed, the lack of uncertainty that is considered when the classification task is being performed. Naturally, when some 'noise' is present, the classification task becomes more difficult. In this article we thus want to extend the previous analysis by the consideration of uncertainty.

That being said, the remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 offers a general discussion of bounded rationality (voters); Section 3 considers this kind of voters whose objective is to compute the benevolent component in the economic policy of the incumbent (in order to punish or reward, at the elections the incumbent); Section 4 concludes.

2 On Bounded Rationality Voters

"In the spirit of the bounded rationality research program, which is really to put the economist and the agents in his model on an equal behavioral footing, we expect that, in searching these literatures for ways to model our agents, we shall find ways to improve ourselves." in Sargent (1993, 33)

2.1 A technical note

In methodological terms, this section considers a bounded rationality approach, where the differences between different types of learning (for instance, adaptive or procedural) must be taken into account.

Generally speaking, learning models have been developed as a reasonable alternative to the unrealistic informational assumption of rational expectations models. Moreover, through learning models it is possible to study the dynamics of adjustment between equilibria which, in most rational expectations models, is ignored. In fact, rational expectations hypotheses are, in some sense and with some exceptions, a limiting property of a dynamic system which evolves from one equilibrium to another, this being possible because it is assumed that agents know the true model of the economy and use it to form their expectations which, in turn, implies that agents are also able to solve the model.

Interestingly, learning models also deal with another difficulty of rational expectations models, namely the existence of multiple equilibria.[7] It is well known that for linear models, where only expectations of current variables are considered, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. On the other hand, when expectations about the future endogenous variables are required, multiple rational expectations equilibria can occur. Moreover, this is also a common feature of stochastic control/decision problems. In this case, the lack of equilibrium uniqueness arises from an imperfectly specified intertemporal decision problem under uncertainty.

The analysis of learning processes can, in fact, provide a way of selecting the 'reasonable' equilibrium or sub-set of equilibria. On the one hand, if the learning mechanism is chosen optimally, then a desirable rational equilibrium is selected from the set of the rational expectations equilibria; see Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989a, 1989b). On the other hand, if the learning mechanism is viewed under an adaptive approach, in particular in expectational stability models, it can also act as a selection criterion in multiple equilibria models involving 'bubbles' and 'sunspots'; see Evans (1986), Evans and Guesnerie (1992), Evans and Honkapohja (1990, 1992, 1999). To sum up, learning mechanisms, whether optimally or adaptively chosen, 'select' the particular steady state as, in some sense, terminal conditions do (Minford et al. 1979).

Through this last point, one can already anticipate the usual distinction between learning mechanisms. Although a number of different studies modelling learning have been presented, two main classes of models can be distinguished: rational learning and boundedly rational learning models.[8] In rational learning models, it is assumed that agents know the true structural form of the model generating the economy, but not some of the parameters of that model. In boundedly rational learning models, it is assumed that agents, while learning is taking place, use a 'reasonable' rule, for instance, by considering the reduced form of the model.

Rational learning, which some authors identify with Bayesian learning, thus assumes that the model structure is known by the agents while the learning process is taking place. Given the difficulties that arise in modelling this kind of learning, the bounded rationality approach has the appealing advantage of being (at least) more tractable. Moreover, the assumption that agents use a mis-specified model during the learning process makes the bounded rationality approach less controversial.

Obviously, the use of a mis-specified model during learning has its consequences on the formation of expectations. In fact, under the bounded rationality approach, agents are modelled as using an 'incorrect' rule, derived from backward-looking reduced form equations, to generate expectations while they are learning about the true structural form.

In the bounded rationality approach, various notions of expectational stability and of econometric learning procedures have been the main formulations. Interestingly, the distinction between these two main procedures has to do with the 'notion' of time where learning takes place. While the expectational stability principle assumes that learning takes place in 'notional', 'virtual' or meta-time, econometric learning procedures assume real-time learning.

The expectational stability approach considers the influence of – and thus the distinction between – perceived laws on actual laws of motion of the economic system. The actual law of motion results from the substitution of the perceived law of motion in the structural equations of the true model. It is then possible to obtain a mapping $L(\Theta)$ from the perceived to the actual law of motion, where Θ denotes the set of parameters. Rational expectations solutions $\bar{\Theta}$ are then the fixed points of $L(\Theta)$.

7. For a seminal approach on sunspots and multiple equilibria see Farmer (1999).

8. Westaway (1992) prefers to distinguish closed-loop learning, where agents learn about the parameters of the decision rule, from open-loop learning, where agents form an expectation of the path for a particular variable which they sequentially update. As is pointed out, closed-loop learning will be virtually identical to the parameter updating scheme using Kalman filtering.

Finally, a given rational expectations solution $\bar{\Theta}$ is said to be expectationally-stable if the differential equation

$$\frac{d\theta}{d\tau} = L(\theta) - \theta \tag{0}$$

is locally asymptotically stable at $\bar{\Theta}$, where τ denotes meta-time.

In adaptive real-time learning, agents are assumed to use an econometric procedure for estimating the perceived law of motion. Least-squares learning is widely used in this formulation in spite of its apparent drawbacks; see Salmon (1995) for a criticism of this issue. A more sophisticated application of these econometric procedures is the consideration of the Kalman filter which, as is well known, nests least squares learning and recursive least squares.[9]

2.2 On learning voters

The biggest lesson to be drawn from the previous subsection is that whatever the form of learning (on the part of the voters), their behavior will always be different from that assumed, whether they be retrospective or rational. This difference is fundamental and must be taken into account by the incumbent, who may naturally wish to be electorally rewarded or, in other words, not to be electorally penalized. In addition, voter learning is also critical to the incumbent's acquisition of credibility or reputation throughout the mandate.

Although the analysis of credibility and reputation does not relate directly to the idea of electorally-induced policy decisions, there are close associations to the implications of a bounded rationality electorate. If voters do have rational expectations, then they will be aware of the time-inconsistency problem and 'punish' the government by withdrawing belief in policy announcements and/or electoral support for a government who is trying to obtain short-run benefits from time inconsistent announcements.

To clarify the connection between these last two issues, one should refer to Barro and Gordon (1983). These authors identify two particular problems with the analysis of time consistent policies and reputational equilibria. Firstly, that the equilibrium is not unique. The second problem is that policy-makers are assumed to have an infinite time horizon. It is obviously hard to accept an infinite horizon assumption when policy-makers are periodically subject to elections.[10] A method of tackling this problem was introduced by authors like Backus and Driffill (1985a,1985b), i.e, to suppose that economic agents are unsure of what the actual objectives of the policy-maker are. The introduction of uncertainty about policy-makers' objectives leads to some confusion about what policymakers are trying to achieve, and hence agents (voters) have to learn about policy-makers' intentions.

Given the above discussion we can then question, as Westaway (1992) clearly and naturally points out: "How do policymakers react to the fact that the private sector is learning?".

Paradoxically, this pertinent question has been almost ignored. In fact, the analysis of the implications of learning mechanisms in policy-making is far from being complete, still nowadays. Some exceptions are Barrell et al. (1992), Basar and Salmon (1990a, 1990b), Cripps (1991), Evans and Honkapohja (1993), Fuhrer and Hooker (1993), Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994), Salmon (1995) and Westaway (1992).

Salmon (1995) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only reference where an innovative bounded rationality approach such as neural networks learning has been applied in a policy-making problem.[11] We propose to use this approach within an electoral business cycles context.[12]

9. If agents never discount past information, then Kalman filtering can be seen as a rolling least-squares regression with an increasing sample. On the contrary, if past information becomes less important, then a 'forgetting factor' can be included which gives a rolling window, or more precisely a form of weighted least squares.

10. However, as Persson and Tabellini (1990, 42) argue, an infinite horizon is acceptable when the final period of the game is random and/or players are viewed as collective bodies of overlapping generations' individuals.

11. See White (1989) for an analysis of some asymptotic results for learning in single hidden-layer feedforward network models

12. In Caleiro (2001, 2013) it was already considered that bounded rationality voters have to (crisply) classify economic policies as coming from opportunistic or benevolent government behavior.

That said, the following section will consider that bounded rationality voters have to (crisply) classify economic policies as coming from opportunistic or benevolent government behavior.

2.3 An Approximation of Economic Policies Example

This section will consider a signal extraction problem faced by the public. Others have treated this problem before; see, in particular, Basar and Salmon (1990b) and Cripps (1991) following the initial study of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).[13]. The novelty considered in our case is, naturally, the use of neural networks.

Most of the electoral cycle literature on these matters discusses the situation where there is absolutely no uncertainty. If this is the case, then in some sense, the strategic voting, as described for instance in MacRae (1977), can be more safely or more fairly performed. To be clearer, this is to say that, because there are no stochastic elements 'contaminating' the effects of economic policies on economic outcomes, then punishing 'wrong' outcomes should be as easy, or as fair, as punishing 'wrong' policies. Alternatively, the motivation needed to obtain 'good' outcomes may be as well be done at the economic policy level. Obviously, when the results of the economic policies also depend upon the realization of, say, stochastic shocks, a sophisticated electorate may want to consider it safer or fairer to punish or monitor policies rather than outcomes.

Let us then consider that the incumbent uses some policy instrument, χ, to influence the behavior of some state variable, y, which voters consider to be decisive for their voting decisions.[14] Furthermore, the state variable y is also influenced by some random shocks, s as follows:

$$y = x + \theta s \tag{1}$$

where Θ is some distortion factor and s $N(\bar{s}, \sigma_s^2)$.

The information that y is influenced by x and s is assumed to be available to both incumbent and voters, but an asymmetry of information is considered in the sense that, while the incumbent knows the value of the distortion factor Θ, this does not happen with voters. Moreover, it is assumed that shocks are observed, by voters and by the incumbent, only after the policy has been implemented.

The programme for the incumbent is, then, to determine its policy in order to

$$\min_x E[(y - \tilde{y})^2], \tag{2}$$

where $\tilde{y}$ is the first-best value for voters.

The solution of (2) subject to (1) is, as the certainty equivalence principle would prescribe:

$$\tilde{x} = \tilde{y} - \theta s. \tag{3}$$

Voters face a different problem. They consider it important to know in what proportion the evolution of relevant variables can be attributed to the incumbent's economic policy itself. In fact, and for instance, a 'negative' evolution of the economy can be 'excused' by voters if they perceive this evolution as being essentially the result of a bad conjugation of shocks. In this case, the incumbent would certainly benefit from sophisticated voters, i.e. those who try, through a learning process, to understand the constraints under which incumbent acts.[15]

To sum up, the electorate will judge incumbent's performance after taking into account, i.e., subtracting the effect of shocks, s, on the state variable y. Because voters do not know the way shocks affect the state variable, that is, ignore the

13. In these papers it is considered that the government has a noisy control of the money supply growth given that the planned money supply growth, m_t^p, in the role of policy instrument, is affected by a (normally distributed) random shock ε_t, such that the actual rate of money supply growth, m_t, is given by $m_t = m_t^p + \varepsilon_t$

14. To keep the approach as general as possible, we prefer not to restrict ourselves to a specific control variable χ and/or a specific state variable y. In this sense, the model considered in Caleiro (2001) can, after some simple transformations, be viewed as a particular case of this general model.

15. On the other hand, (incompetent) incumbents can, of course, take benefit from the ignorance of voters.

value of Θ, they cannot themselves determine the solution (3).

For the above problem, a special kind of neural network is appropriated. These are usually known as adaptive neural networks. This kind of neural network contrasts with that considered in Caleiro (2001), because while perceptron training mechanism adjusts weights and bias in each epoch,[16] based on all training elements at once, in adaptive neural networks, learning is done on a continuous basis of time, which agrees more with this particular problem that has to be solved by voters.[17]

To recapitulate, voters observe the input s and the output y and have to extract from y the contribution that is due to the economic policy, that is, x. This can be done by the analysis of the error committed by the adaptive network. Because the neural network output signal will match y as best as it can, then, considering s as the only input, the neural network will determine the optimal prediction $y^{pr} = \Theta^{pr} s$. The neural network error will then be y - y^{pr}, that being exactly the estimated value of x.

Let us consider a simple example.[18] From (3) we obtain that, for an optimal state value $\tilde{y} = 0.75$, a distortion factor of $\theta = 1.5$ and the mean value of shocks $\bar{s} = 0.1$, the optimal policy will be $\tilde{x} = 0.6$. Considering a random sample for the shocks, as the input, and the mentioned value for x, we can then obtain the actual output y from (1). The adaptive neural network estimates, from these inputs and outputs, the contribution of the policy to be as depicted in Figure 1.

16. An epoch is the unit of time where learning takes place. Hence, a new epoch corresponds to an update of the parameters.

17. This means that we can consider that both dimensions of time can be present and therefore both kind of learning can be considered.

18. This task was performed using the neural networks toolbox in MATLAB.



Figure 1: A constant policy

From an inspection to Figure 1, it is clear that, after some adjustment period, the optimal performance of the network gives us a perfect match between actual and estimated outputs. As explained before, this result will mean that the constant policy $x = 0.6$ effect is totally ‘absorbed’ by an over-estimation of the distortion factor θ. To sum up, voters would consider that incumbent did not contribute at all to the actual evolution of the state variable.[19]

What if the incumbent follows the policy rule (3), but the actual policy is disturbed by some random shock such that $x = x^p + \varepsilon$ where x^p is given by (3) and ε is a (normally distributed) random shock, as is considered in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Basar and Salmon (1990b) and Cripps (1991)? The results change as Figure 2 illustrates.

The network still makes an error as concerns the contribution of the economic policy, but it no longer assumes a zero contribution of policy – after the adjustment period – although on average this is true. As Figure 2 shows, on average the error concerning the contribution of policy is 0.6, exactly the value that the incumbent is implementing. Hence, in some sense, when the policy is disturbed by some shock, that provides information allowing a different judgement to be made of its contribution to the evolution of y.

To end up, one can be curious about the performance of the network when the incumbent implements a completely random policy.

19. A neural network without the additive bias was also considered. The results did not change in a significant way.



Figure 2: A disturbed policy

At first sight, this seems to be the most difficult/challenging situation to be handled by voters. In fact, it is not. The variation in x provides enough information to better estimate the contribution of the economic policy, and the absence of constant behavior invalidates its absorption by the contribution of shocks. Consider, then that x is just a drawing of a normal distribution. The results are shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3: A random policy

Plainly, although not in a perfect way, voters would, on average, approximate the economic policy x contribution to the evolution of their relevant state variable y.

3 Conclusion

The question of an electoral cycle created by the incumbents is often associated with democracy. This debate motivates an interest in the relationship between economic policy and political or electoral issues. In particular, the following conjectures have been central to the debate:

1) Greater evidence of an electoral cycle is usually drawn from observing stable governments which 'benefit' from ruling throughout sufficiently long mandates;
2) The commitment implicit in the coordination of policies which results from economic integration creates substantial difficulties for the manipulation of economic policy for electoral purposes;
3) The more information that is available to the electorate the harder it becomes to manipulate economic policy for electoral purposes.

Since the very first studies on electoral cycles, some authors offered suggestions as to what should be done against this electorally-induced instability. In fact, a good alternative to the proposal to increase the electoral period length[20] is to consider that voters stop being passively naive and, instead, are willing to learn about incumbent's intentions. This is the suggestion of some authors such as Nordhaus (1975), Frey (1978), Neck (1991), and Detken and Gärtner (1992).

Plainly, to verify the robustness of this presumption is of relevance. In fact, the economics literature has so far not paid the deserved attention to the importance of voters' behavior at the polls in what concerns punishment/rewarding strategies, and, to the best of my knowledge, almost no research has been done on boundedly rational voters.

Therefore in this article it was called attention to the importance that voters have in the possibility of creating a business cycle intended (only) to make the party in power win the forthcoming election. A priori, one may think as Rogoff and Sibert (1988, 1), pointed out that:

20. There is, in fact, some empirical evidence showing that the longer the electoral term, the less likely it is for the political business cycle to occur; see Soh (1986). Yet, Paldam (1979)'s results are, in a sense, contrary to this empirical evidence.

"As long as private agents (such as wage setters) understand the government's incentives, one would not expect to observe any systematic rise in employment prior to the elections. But the objections to conventional political business cycle models go beyond their Phillips curve formulation, and apply to any model in which the government takes artificial measures to make itself look good."

It is then apparent that it remains in the hands of voters to prevent governments having incentives to take those kinds of artificial measures. To put it differently, voters indeed should motivate the government to choose policies that are optimal from the society's point of view instead of those that simply maximize popularity or that, for example, try to exploit the Phillips curve. That objective seems difficult to achieve when voters do not engage in a constant monitoring of government actions. If so, voters can signal their discontentment on the election day. An eventual punishment is then only given on that day. In fact, as Minford (1995) points out, the elections are an excellent mechanism to punish any attempt to, using the same example, exploit the Phillips curve. Rational voters can in this way motivate the government to choose the right policies.

Given the obvious importance of electoral punishment/rewarding strategies for the inexistence (existence) of electoral cycles, the article explored the implications of these strategies as sensible motivation for incumbents to choose the optimal (social) economic policies. To do this, the usual assumption of totally rational voters was abandoned and substituted by bounded rationality voters, which seems to be more reasonable. In particular, these voters were supposed to use a neural network reasoning to decide whether to reward or to punish the economic policies of the incumbent. As it was shown, being bounded in its rationality, that does not prevent the electorate from performing this task without bias, which should serve as an obligation to use the elections to effectively penalize or reward the incumbent and/or not elect those who do not deserve it.

Admittedly, the neural network application was not the result of camouflaging difficulties. Although the performance of neural networks as a bounded rationality way of learning was not completely satisfactory, this must be viewed as an incentive to continue and not to give up. As previously pointed out, although it seems important or crucial to consider the effects of learning on voters' behavior, the fact is that this issue has been largely ignored in the literature.

The great flexibility of neural networks sometimes poses the problem of their being used as 'black-boxes'. In fact, one might be interested in conditioning how neural network decisions/results are derived and, in particular, interested in being able to 'interfere' in those results. An alternative is provided by fuzzy logic, because it allows for the inclusion of rules provided by agents and is capable of explaining the decisions obtained.

Interestingly, one can consider that agents using fuzzy logic reasoning also see their rationality bounded. In this sense, there are close relations between neural networks and fuzzy logic; see, among others, Deboeck (1994) and/or Chen (1996). From a formal point of view, this close connection is supposed to be a promising basis for future research.

Other avenues for further research may as well be to: a) consider heterogeneous agents (with bounded rationality), following the approach of Rios-Rull (1997), by generalizing the, so called Harmington aggregator procedure; b) consider ergodicity across time, allowing for the determination of fixed points with homogenous and heterogeneous agents with and without bounded rationality; c) bridging the approach to irrational behavior and herding in finance (Shiller 2003).

References

[1] Alesina, Alberto. 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* CII: 651-678.

[2] Alesina, Alberto. 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters." *The American Economic Review* 78(4): 796-805.

[3] Ashworth, Scott, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Amanda Friedenberg. 2018. "Learning about voter rationality." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1): 37-54.

[4] Backus, David, and John Driffill. 1985a. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime." *The Review of Economic Studies* 52(2): 211-222.

[5] Backus, David, and John Driffill. 1985b. "Inflation and Reputation." *The American Economic Review* 75: 530-538.

[6] Barrell, Ray, Guglielmo Maria Caporal, Stephen Hall, and Anthony Garratt. 1992. "Learning about Monetary Union: An Analysis of Boundedly Rational Learning in European Labour Markets." Discussion Paper No. 22, August, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

[7] Barro, Robert J., and David B. Gordon. 1983. "Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 12: 101-122.

[8] Basar, Tamer, and Mark H. Salmon. 1990a. "Inflation and the Evolution of the Credibility with Disparate Beliefs". In *Dynamic Modelling and Control of National Economies 1989: Selected papers from the 6th IFAC Symposium*, edited by Nikos M. Christodoulakis, 75-81. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

[9] Basar, Tamer, and Mark H. Salmon. 1990b. "Credibility and the Value of Information Transmission in a Model of Monetary Policy and Inflation." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 14: 97-116.

[10] Bendor, Jonathan. 2010. *Bounded Rationality and Politics*. Oakland (CA): University of California Press.

[11] Chen, C.H. (ed.). 1996. *Fuzzy Logic and Neural Network Handbook*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

[12] Caleiro, António. 2001. "Essays on Election Dates, Economic Policies and Voters." PhD. diss., European University Institute.

[13] Caleiro, António. 2004. "Economic Policies and Elections: A principal-agent point of view." *Notas Económicas* 20: 89-101.

[14] Caleiro, António, and Gertrudes Guerreiro. 2005. "Understanding the Election Results in Portugal: A spatial econometrics point of view." *Portuguese Economic Journal* 4(3): 207-228.

[15] Caleiro, António. 2013. "How to Classify a Government: Can a perceptron do it?" *International Journal of Latest Trends in Finance and Economic Sciences* 3(3): 523-529.

[16] Caleiro, António. 2018a. "From Specific to General in Electoral Cycle Models." *Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science* 19: 51-63.

[17] Caleiro, António. 2018b. *Should electoral cycles disappear?* Research Proposal. (available at: http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27086.10561)

[18] Cripps, Martin. 1991. "Learning Rational Expectations in a Policy Game." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 15: 297-315.

[19] Cukierman, Alex, and Allan H. Meltzer. 1986. "A theory of ambiguity, credibility, and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information." *Econometrica* 54(5): 1099-1128.

[20] Deboeck, Guido J. 1994. *Trading on the Edge: Neural, Genetic, and Fuzzy Systems for Chaotic Financial Markets*. New York: John Wiley Sons.

[21] Detken, Carsten, and Manfred Gärtner. 1992. "Governments, trade unions and the macroeconomy: An expository analysis of the political business cycle." *Public Choice* 73: 37-53.

[22] Evans, George. 1986. "Selection Criteria for Models with Non-uniqueness." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 18: 147-157.

[23] Evans, George W., and Roger Guesnerie. 1992. *Rationalizability, Strong Rationality and Expectational Stability.* Discussion Paper No. TE/92/237. London School of Economics.

[24] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. 1990. *Learning, Convergence, and Stability with Multiple Rational Expectations Equilibria.* Discussion Paper No. TE/90/212. London School of Economics.

[25] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. 1992. *Adaptive Learning and Expectational Stability: An Introduction.* Discussion Paper No. TE/92/248. London School of Economics.

[26] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. 1993. "Learning and Economic Fluctuations: Using Fiscal Policy to Steer Expectations." *European Economic Review* 37: 595-602.

[27] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. 1999. "Learning Dynamics". In *Handbook of Macroeconomics*, edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, 449-542. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

[28] Farmer, R. E. (1999). *The macroeconomics of self-fulfilling prophecies.* MIT Press.

[29] Fuhrer, Jeffrey C., and Mark A. Hooker. 1993. "Learning about Monetary Regime Shifts in an Overlapping Wage Contract Model." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 17(4): 531-553.

[30] Hibbs Jr., Douglas. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 71: 1467-1487.

[31] Lee, I-Ching, Eva E. Chen, Chia-Hung Tsai, Nai-Shing Yen, Arbee L. P. Chen, and Wei-Chieh Lin. 2016. "Voting intention and choices: Are voters always rational and deliberative?" *PloS one* 11(2).

[32] MacRae, C. Duncan. 1977. "A Political Model of the Business Cycle." *The Journal of Political Economy* 85(2): 239-263.

[33] Marcet, Albert, and Thomas J. Sargent. 1988. "The Fate of Systems with 'Adaptive' Expectations." *The American Economic Review* 78(2): 168-172.

[34] Marcet, Albert, and Thomas J. Sargent. 1989a. "Convergence of Least Squares Learning Mechanisms in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models." *Journal of Economic Theory* 48(2): 337-368.

[35] Marcet, Albert, and Thomas J. Sargent. 1989b. "Convergence of Least-Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information." *Journal of Political Economy* 97(6): 1306-1322.

[36] Marimon, Ramon, and Shyam Sunder. 1993. "Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence." *Econometrica* 61(5): 1073-1108.

[37] Marimon, Ramon, and Shyam Sunder. 1994. "Expectations and Learning under Alternative Monetary Regimes: An Experimental Approach." *Economic Theory* 4: 131-162.

[38] Minford, Patrick, Kent Matthews, and Satwant Marwaha (1979). "Terminal Conditions as a Means of Ensuring Unique Solutions for Rational Expectations Models with Forward Expectations." *Economics Letters* 4(2): 117-120.

[39] Minford, Patrick. 1990. "Ulysses and the Sirens: A Political Model of Credibility in an Open Economy". In *Private Behaviour and Government Policy in Interdependent Economies*, edited by Anthony S. Courakis and Mark P. Taylor, 337-355. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[40] Minford, Patrick. 1995. "Time-Inconsistency, Democracy, and Optimal Contingent Rules." *Oxford Economic Papers* 47(2): 195-210.

[41] Nordhaus, William. 1975. "The Political Business Cycle." *The Review of Economic Studies* 42(2): 169-190.

[42] Ogaki, Masao, and Saori Tanaka. 2017. "Bounded Rationality." In *Behavioral Economics*, edited by Masao Ogaki and Saori Tanaka, 71-82. Singapore: Springer.

[43] Paldam, Martin. 1979. "Is There an Electional Cycle? A Comparative Study of National Accounts." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 81(2): 323-342.

[44] Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. *Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics.* London: Harwood Academic Publishers.

[45] Reed, Ryan, Craig Curtis, and Nicholas P. Lovrich Jr. 2018. "Does Democracy Entail an Obligation to Make Rational Policy Decisions? The Muddling Through vs.

Bounded Rationality Debate Through a Lockean and Madisonian Lens." *Public Integrity*: 1-14.
[46] Rios-Rull, José-Victor. (1997). *Computation of equilibria in heterogeneous agent models*. Staff Report 231, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[47] Rogoff, Kenneth, and Anne Sibert. 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles." *The Review of Economic Studies* 55(1): 1-16.
[48] Salmon, Mark. 1995. “Bounded Rationality and Learning: Procedural Learning”. In *Learning and Rationality in Economics*, edited by Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, 236-275. Oxford UK Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
[49] Sargent, Thomas. 1993. *Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[50] Shiller, Robert J. 2003. "From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(1): 83-104.
[51] Simon, Herbert. 1982. *Models of Bounded Rationality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[52] Soh, Byung Hee. 1986. "Political Business Cycles in Industrialized Democratic Countries." *Kyklos* 39(1): 31-46.
[53] Swingler, Kevin. 1996. *Applying Neural Networks: A Practical Guide*. London: Academic Press Limited.
[54] Veiga, Francisco José, and Linda Gonçalves Veiga. 2004. "The Determinants of Vote Intentions in Portugal." *Public Choice* 118(3-4): 341-364.
[55] Veiga, Linda Gonçalves, and Francisco José Veiga. 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level." *Public Choice* 131(1-2): 45–64.
[56] Wall, Kent. 1993. A Model of Decision Making Under Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 20: 331-352.
[57] Westaway, Peter. 1992. "A Forward-Looking Approach to Learning in Macroeconomic Models." *National Institute Economic Review* 2: 86-97.
[58] White, Halbert. 1989. "Some Asymptotic Results for Learning in Single Hidden-Layer Feedforward Network Models." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 84(408) 1003-1013.

António Bento Caleiro holds a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of Évora, a master's degree in applied mathematics for economics and management by the *Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão* (Lisbon) and a doctorate in economics from the European University Institute (Florence). Since May 2001, he has been an Assistant Professor at the University of Évora, having taken part in the Economics Unit at the University of Évora in March 2011. His research interests are (evidently) of a multidisciplinary nature, as the present work illustrates.

Decentralization and (De)Politization in Portugal

Descentralização e (Des)Politização em Portugal

Ruben Abrantes
Nova University of Lisbon

Abstract—The decentralization is one of the most common features in the contemporary political world. It seems that the idea of centralizing the power in the state apparatus is out of fashion and the new idea is to transfer some competences of the state for the local power. In a globalized world where the state is losing its ground in the political arena, international organizations in the last decades are pushing towards a New Public Management where the state has delegated great part of his competences. Tactics like that are being analyzed by many scholars who give different responses to the matter. This paper develops an analysis of what is happening in Portugal since 2015 in terms of decentralization, adopting a government strategy position and Foucault's theory of governmentality.

Keywords—Decentralization, Portugal, Reform, Relations of Power.

Resumo—A descentralização é uma das características mais comuns no mundo político contemporâneo. É aparente que a ideia de centralizar o poder no aparato estatal encontra-se fora de moda e a nova ideia é a transferência de algumas competências do Estado para o poder local. Num mundo globalizado em que o Estado perde terreno na arena política, as organizações internacionais nas últimas décadas estão a avançar em direção a uma nova gestão pública, na qual o Estado delegou grande parte de suas competências. Táticas como esta estão em análise por vários investigadores que dão respostas diferentes ao assunto. Este artigo desenvolve uma análise do que está a ocorrer em Portugal desde 2015 em termos de descentralização, adotando uma posição estratégica do governo e a teoria da governamentalidade de Foucault.

Palavras-Chave—Descentralização, Portugal, Reforma, Relações de Poder.

Submitted—12-02-2019. **Accepted**—03-06-2019.

1 Introduction

Many were the philosophers through the Modern Age who defended a centralized state apparatus. This can be seen in the work of Thomas Hobbes with is classical "Leviathan", Jean Bodin's "The Six books of the Republic" or even Jean Jacques Rousseau's "Social Contract". On the other hand, there were those who stood for a less hegemonic state power, whether in powers divided institutionally as Montesquieu wrote in "The Spirit of Laws", or in the figure of the people, the true sovereigns, as in the work of John Locke's "Second Treatise of Government".

During the historical process of state formation, the centralism of competences in the state accompanied and shaped it. The social community started as being the family and, in the course of time, because of their great number, they evolved its organization into a local community vested with hierarchies and power. Later on, as a consequence of feudalism and war, the state power arises and the Leviathan awakens. The political

• ***Ruben Duarte Abrantes**, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Nova University of Lisbon.*
E-mail: rubenabrantes97@gmail.com

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.336

entities increased their power and progressively, in a matter of time and circumstances, concentrate the powers that were scattered in the society: military, economic, cultural, political and social power. In the same sense of proliferation of political entities - States and Nations - the international institutions began to emerge in the nineteenth and twentieth century. The state ceases to be the only actor in international relations and begins to share his place with institutions and organizations from multiple fields. Progressively the state loses its hegemonic power status in the internal context and globalization penetrates its borders. From then on, the holders of international power in a global era begin to define the traits that the world will follow: economic interdependence, supranational institutions that control the national entities, and territorial decentralization at the local level that enables the governance of populations. New types of governance arise. In the aftermath of the 1960s, states began a process of political decentralization, that is, they entrusted their local governments with some responsibilities that had previously been concentrated in central power. These new powers come as a measure of greater efficiency of the state, in a more rational way, throughout the national territory, however, aside from this normative interpretation of a "good" thing, decentralization has also been discussed in the academic field as a tactic of depoliticization (Chrisgtensen and Laegrid 2006; Buller et al. 2019) in a contemporary society dominated by governmentality (Foucalt 1979).

Portugal is one of the most centralized countries in Europe. Nevertheless, the portuguese government has, in recent years, carried out decentralization of competences to local authorities, gradually delegating responsibilities that were previously responsibility of the state, through a rule-based depolitization (Christensen and Laegrid 2006).

Especially since 1974, as the first wave of decentralization, and more recently since 2015 with the minister Miguel Poiares Maduro (XIX Constitutional Government), and later with minister Pedro Siza Vieira (XXI Constitutional Government), the country has followed the lines of political-territorial management that are recommended by the major international institutions (World Bank and United Nations). However, it is only from 2018, with the law nº50/2018, that in the national territory begins to transfer competences, trying to reach the international parameters of other european countries. What happened then was the transition of many of these competences into the jurisdiction of the local power but with the fiscal power in the hands of the state, which raises many questions that are tried to be answered in this article. Questions like these: Why has the State decided to decentralize power? Does this decentralization of competences for municipalities in Portugal also entail attributes of political responsibility? Is the Government decentralizing to depoliticize on some public policy issues?

The Portugal government is doing a political-territorial transition common to all countries in the world, with some unique features. With no democratic administrative regions, and with local power concentrated in the municipalities, Portugal has progressively increased the competencies of the municipalities, however, without transferring the necessary financial and fiscal resources that remain concentrated on state power. What I argue is that Portugal is not doing a “true decentralization” because did not entail a mixture of three features: democratic, fiscal and administrative decentralization. I also argue in this paper for a double blame-shifting that affects the behavior of government with all political entities: European Union, External donors, local power and the citizens. A double blame-shifting focus on removing the image of a politically responsible central political power. A strategy made by blaming external actors and at the same time blaming the local powers that has the competences to do so.

2 Decentralization and (De)Politization

After six years of war (1939-45) which came to encompass, directly or indirectly, all countries in the world, the governments went through a period of reconstruction of their societies and economies. Since 1945, the states took upon themselves the responsibility of a variety of industries, nationalizing them. With these actions, the governments performed a movement of politization, broadening their political, social and economic responsibilities (Burnham 2001). Progressively the "New World Order" transformed the international politics into a neoliberal system. What in the beginning started to be a utopian ideology, soon became the dominant ideology for globalization and state reform (Perk and Tickel 2002), penetrating in all aspects of society and politics (Buller et al. 2019). People started to care less "how things are done" and more about the "results", in other words, giving more importance to outputs rather than in inputs, and this transformed how politics are done. The post-political moment we live in can be defined as a time were the citizens prefer the apolitical and the "experts" rather than political decisions, and, due to this, countries all over the world observed a phenomenon: loss of partisan affiliates, loss of political trust and the retreat of the political (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1995; Putnam and Pharr 2000; Buller et al. 2019), the consequence was a progressive deconstruction of the state in an action of "integration" and "decentralization" (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007; Bartling and Fischbacher 2012; World Bank 2000). In the words of Escobar-Lemmon (2006, 255) these actions were "driven by an elite realization that the political system was in danger of collapse".

The movement of "integration" refers to the actions of international players (international institutions and transnational companies) on imposition of policies through the most varied mechanisms (especially legal) in the governments of the most economically advanced countries, hollowing out the state (Bourdie 2002; Stoker 2007; Samoff 1990). In the other hand, the "decentralization" refers to the movement towards a devolution of power and responsibilities over policies to the local governments (Escobar-Lemmon 2006; Michiel 2000). Thus, states assign competencies in two ways: by assigning functions to an international regime that defines rules, trying to build "automacity" in the system and thereby formally limiting the action of governments but also, by assigning functions to a national body to whom is given a defined role in a statute, and, therefore, greater independence from the government. These are actions that depoliticize policy-making and therefore act as a shield for governments in terms of political consequences (Bieler et al. 2006), bringing with it "a new hierarchy of spaces" (Frey 2000), a change in power relations and a "dominant tendency towards the depolitization of governance in the modern era" (Buller et al. 2019). These new forms of politics reformulate their conception and the way they are perceived by citizens. Governance is therefore different today, showing a metamorphosis of the state and a different relation between governors and governed. The citizens are a mere plaything in the hands of the politicians in the process of ensuring the stability of the society and the continuation of the neoliberal project. For this, World Bank (2000) and the United Nations have endeavored to carry forward their dominant depoliticized narratives as a "central aspect of building state capacity and market confidence" (Christensen and Laegrid 2006). A strategy of government that until today is being successful. Politicians are achieving this by turning the process of accountability a confused and unclear one, and, by telling that the "fault lies elsewhere with impersonal (invisible) structural forces beyond anyone's control" (Buller et al. 2019; Christensen and Laegrid 2006). In this line of thought Michel Foucault is an author to consider:

> *"At every moment are the tactics of government that allow us to define what is the competence of the state and what remains outside it, what is public and what is private, what is state and what is non-state. Thus (...) it is only possible to understand the survival and limits of the state taking into account the general tactics of governmentality"* (Foucalt 1979, 112)

In this sense Foucault (1979) defined this as an era that surpassed the sovereign and disciplinary power, the era of Governmentality. This modern power that, according to Foucault, emerged in the eighteenth century, is an "ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target (. . .)" (Foucault 2009, 285). According to Foucault (1979), one of the purposes of governmentality is to manage the population, not only in general but manage them in "depth, minutely, in detail". The neoliberal governmentality created individualized citizens and apolitical consumers, "easily controlled and manipulated by the dominant depoliticized narratives" (Buller et al. 2019, 28). But what is depoliticization? This can be described as a government strategy in which public officials or state managers "remove the political character of decision-making" (Burnham 2001; Vries 2000). More and more countries are doing it, and nowadays "it's widely accepted that depoliticization has become a popular mode of governance in the twenty-first century" uniting "left and right, east and west, north and south" (Buller et al. 2019, 237). Alongside with the idea of democracy, free markets and rule of law, "decentralized governments have come to be seen as a cure for a remarkable range of political and social ills" (Buller et al. 2019, 237). This (re)politization of the local governments challenges the exclusionary monopolization of state power and presents with it an alternative way of conducting (Buller et al. 2019), a government strategy proven to be a pendular movement between decentralization and centralization (Fresler 1965) in which "trends and taking sides in discussion succeed one another continuously" (Vries 2000, 194). The contemporary thought on the matter advocate a gain of importance of cities around the globe in such a way that urban politics are being shaped by the depoliticization effects of global change (Buller et al. 2019).

Decentralization tendency was initiated in the recent decades, more precisely, in the 60's and 70's with the emergence of a mixed style of governance supported by a neoliberal ideology and the globalized movement of reform of the state, the New Public Management. According to Khan (2008, 509) "(. . .) the system of local government has been radically reformed both structurally and functionally and substantial resources transferred to local councils in almost all the developing and developed countries". This characterizes a new type of hierarchical command and mechanism of power emerged as a new governance strategy (Stoker 2007). Some academics (see, for example, Burki et al. 1999, Ballesteros et al. 2013; Rodriguez-Pose and Vassilis 2019) believe that these new powers come as a measure of greater efficiency of the state, more rational and close choices of local needs and greater democratization and citizen participation, however, aside from this normative interpretation of a "positive thing", decentralization has also been discussed in the academic field as a tactic of depoliticization (Christensen and Laegrid 2006; Buller et al. 2019; Stoker 2007; Samoff 1990, Escobar-Lemmon 2006). Besides this, if a state pursues the maximization of power, how can it freely give up power and undo the centralist tradition? The answer seems to be a government strategy that aims to appear that it is no longer being responsible for outcomes (Buller et al. 2019) and uses other (political) actors to deflect blame (Mortensen 2013). We have to take into account that politicians are driven by ideological motives and that the state is nowadays structurally dependent of capital and so this can be "seen as a strategy to maintain political [and economic] stability" (World Bank 2000; see also Burnham 2001). So, what seemed to be a simple process of decentralization is more than that. The depoliticization of policies to the local governments do not represent a retreat form the political, in fact, it remains highly political. Depoliticization denies politics, don't remove it, in other words, depoliticization "remakes politics rather than annihilating" (Buller et al. 2019, 134). Acting this way "politicians (. . .) benefit from the appearance of no longer being responsible for outcomes, while (. . .) maintain[ing] influence covertly behind the scenes" (Buller et al. 2019, 10). It is important not to forget that the government has not yet lost its greatest power: to have the "competence of the competences" and to determine the power it delegates to other actors (Zippelius 1997, 77) and so it has the "right to reverse such delegation and to overrule decisions its agents make" (Treisman 2007, 23).

3 Decentralization in Portugal

Since the formation of Portugal as an independent political entity, the monarchy was always "very keen to centralize political authority" (Magone 2010, 2; Schewinowitz 1993), however, this was only possible in the 15th and 16th century, on the age of maritime expansion, when all the powers have been concentrated in Lisbon, the future capital of the empire. The political centralization was exacerbated with the Napoleonic wars and its influence in the administrative management of the state. Despite this centralization, the state had central government representatives running national provinces (Entre-Douro-e-Minho; Trás-os-Montes; Beira; Estremadura; Alentejo e Algarve) and municipalities. This type of territorial organization continued until the implantation of the Republic, on October 5, 1910, which gave rise to a new territorial structure divided into: districts (distritos); municipalities (concelhos) and parishes (freguesias) (Magone 2010). Nevertheless, the state continued to have the centralization of power concentrated in itself [1]. This reality reached its peak with the authoritarian regime: Estado Novo (Scheinowitz 1993, 353). During the Estado Novo, the political-administrative powers were concentrated in the central government. Laws and decisions were emanated directly from the national decision-making center, and municipalities became "administrative bodies completely dependent on the central government (...)" either politically or financially (Almeida 2013, 25).

From 1974, with the introduction of the democratic regime, a process of administrative decentralization and local empowerment began, which became part of the general trend of Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s. With this new regime the local power establishes itself as fundamental. This fact is proven by the presence of this power in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, in title VIII and composed by 19 articles (from article 235 to 354), dividing the local government with three tiers: administrative regions (Azores and Madeira), which has not been implemented yet in mainland Portugal, "municipalities (308) and parishes (4208) – all of them with directly elected bodies and with politico-administrative and financial autonomy" (Silva 2017, 10). This decentralization of power represents a diversification of the centers of national power. According to Maria Almeida (2007, 5) "the goal of the new legislators was to create a safety net of several layers of government in order to protect the citizens from the return of another potentially authoritarian regime" and because of it "[t]he decision to decentralise and strengthen local government at the municipal level was quite easily accepted by all political forces at the time". Nevertheless, there was no radical change in the political-territorial governance, and centralism remained dominant. What dominated during the post-April 25 revolutionary process was *deconcentration*, in the Regional Planning Committees (*Comissões Regionais de Planeamento*), later Regional Coordination Committees (*Comissões de Coordenação Regionais*), being these organs directly dependent on the state. So, decentralization programs acted in the opposite direction (Scheinowitz 1993; Barreto 1984). This can be explained as Barreto (1984, 212) argues that the continuing centralization was due to, on the one hand, "the strength of traditions and the socio-economic system", and on the other hand, "the political circumstances of the revolution and the genetic characteristics of the parties and the new political system".

In the 1980s, the membership of the European Economic Community (now called European Union) was crucial for decentralization in Portugal. European Structural Funds as well as European Urban Pilot Projects and Community Inniciatives were "privileged tools for diffusing this model [of decentralization] across Europe (. . .), representing a privileged instrument for the introduction of institutional innovations" (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2012, 92) and regional development. During this decade, local governance, centered primarily on municipal power, had built government capacity and institutional and popular trust as a result of local development from European funds. Even with the successive broadening of competences and greater autonomy, the lack of technical, human and financial resources made it impossible for local authorities to act as a truly decentralized power (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2012).

In the 1990s, the Portuguese government, led by Anibal Cavaco Silva, undertook "important and continuous" programs of privatization of public sectors (Ballesteros, Sánchez, and Lorenzo 2013), while other countries in the european con-

1. According to Barreto (1984, 194) Centralism in Portugal has five factors: "cultural and geographical order; historical tradition; political and social nature; economic order and cultural and ideological nature."

text continued its institutional reform of the state, progressively decentralizing it. However, after 10 years of neoliberal governance and privatization of the public sectors (1985-1995), a socialist executive led by António Guterres starts a new attempt on decentralization and initiates a referendum on the creation of administrative regions, approved by a 1991 framework law. A commission (*Comissão de Apoio à Reestruturação do Equipamento e da Administração do Território*) dedicated to this issue publishes in 1998 a paper on decentralization, regionalization and state reform in which it advocates that a european democracy requires a reform of the public administration, which makes public policies more efficient, and abandon the excessive political-territorial centralism. This reform was to be embodied in a three-level governance: central, regional and local. For the commission, this represents an "unavoidable challenge at this turn of the century" (See Comissão de Apoio à Reestruturação do Equipamento e da Administração do Território 1998). Besides what was written and said, the fact is that the political power lacked political will to carry out regional decentralization, and due to criticism exploited mainly by the political power, resulted in the rejection by referendum. The narrative that continued to predominate was a decentralization centered on the municipalities.

After the decentralization proposal was rejected Portugal ceased to do it until it reaches the 21st century as "the most centralized country in Europe" (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2012; Carrapato 1979; Fernandes 2006; Direcção-Geral do Ordenamento do Território 1990).

In the recent decades, "Portuguese territorial governance has been subject to considerable pressure for change" (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2011), the truth is that in other southern european countries there has been "considerable changes", but, however, in Portugal it occurred "only to a limited extent" (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2011). Thus, the Portuguese territory remained "deeply centralized and put[ting] strong emphasis on formal procedures [and] the use of abstract rules (. . .)" (Oliveira and Breda-Vásquez 2011) and for this reason remained a system strongly hierarchical. Besides this, since the 70's government institutions in many western countries "have been changing their structures, systems of operation, political practice and modes of service delivery" (Stoker 2007, 1). In this sense, in an era of multi-level governance (Stoker 2007), despite the limited reforms done by Portugal, there was a greater movement towards decentralization everywhere (World Bank 2000, 107; Sorens 2009). In the European context Portugal is a country of exceptionality, as its local power is concentrated in the municipalities and has no administrative regions, which accentuates the state's territorial exercise of its powers, revealing the strong centralism and a lack of spatial coordination. In the beginning of the new century, in 2003, the Secretary of State Miguel Relvas implemented a new idea for decentralizing governance. He created the model of Great Urban Areas (in Lisbon and Porto), Urban Communities, and Intermunicipal Communities (Silva 2017) to address the lack of intermediate levels of governance. Despite the intentions of these measures they generated a poor result and the Prime Minister José Sócrates, in response, promised a new referendum on regionalization which it did not meet as it had more urgent challenges to respond with the beginning of the Portuguese economic recession period. Overall, the government of Sócrates interrupted a process that was already starting to have some dynamism (See RTP 2011). The economic crisis begins in Portugal and Pedro Passos Coelho takes office as Prime Minister, but, unlike the previous government, it addresses the issue of local government. Passos Coelho had to implement measures negotiated with the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and as a result the parishes saw their number decrease from 4259 to 3091 in the 2013 parish merger reform. Later, in 2015, The Deputy Minister of Regional Development, Miguel Poiares Maduro, said in a parliamentary debate that "the weight of local government in total public spending is 10 points below the European average." (Sol 2015) justifying the law-decree 30/2015 approved by the government that establishes the system "of power delegation in municipalities and inter-municipal entities in the field of social functions" through "inter-administrative contracts" (Sol 2015)[2]. During this executive (2011-2015) according to Silva and Teles (2019, 78) "On the one hand, local governments experienced a significant expansion and diversification of municipal functions, and power has been devolved to intermediate governance arrangements, through intermunicipal associations. On the other hand, local authorities' activities were kept tightly under the radar of central government. As such, the political discourse favouring the decentralization and reinforcement of local autonomy was detached from the concrete outcomes of the multiple reforms made in the local government system". So, it was not a true decentralization because it did not increase the powers of local authorities, what it did was increase the responsibilities of local governments, yet, depriving them of financial transfers from the central government. Thus, the Prime Minister of Portugal "undermined local governments' achievements of previous decades." (Silva and Teles 2019).

The 2015 elections were marked by a new political cycle that united all leftist parties in a governing solution led by the Socialist Party, but also highlighted a new stimulus for political office holders in the face of decentralization. In a new governmental offensive, a set of new responsibilities were transferred from the central state to the municipalities. In the words of the office of the secretary of state of local authorities this decentralization "consists on a transfer of competences that until now have always been exercised by the central administration and which now are exercised or ensured by the local administration". Negotiated at the Palace of Queluz, the Sintra Summit (Cimeira de Sintra) was initiated to discuss and analyze about the decentralization and the realities of the municipalities, with the main objective of collecting proposals and contributions to improve the policy and respond more closely to the intentions of the mayors and the government. According to some interviews to the portuguese press (Diário de Notícias 2018) the "intention was to reform the state", others said that this would allow "the recognition of local power as a full partner in the management of public services"; a "greater responsibility of local politicians"; or even that this would bring "a greater responsibility for the intervention of citizens and communities, strengthening democratic participation".

Later, in April 2018, the Government and the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (*Associação Nacional de Municipios Portugueses*) have consensualised the framework law of decentralization, and at the same time the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*) and the Social Democrat Party (*Partido Social Democrata*) reached an agreement on the guidelines for this process. In the parliament vote, this agreement did not count with the parties that support António Costa and his government. Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*), the Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português*), and the Greens (*Os Verdes*) voted against this bill, and PAN (People-Animals-Nature – *Pessoas-Animais-Natureza*) did so too. Social and Democrat Center – People's Party (*Partido Popular*), the fourth force in parliament, abstained. With the votes of the two major parties (Social and Democrat Party – PSD – and Socialist Party - PS) the law 50/2018 was approved, creating the necessary conditions for a progressive decentralization and an independent commission which mission is to "carry out a thorough independent evaluation of the organization and functions of the State" and "it should also evaluate and propose a program to deconcentrate the location of public entities and services, ensuring consistency in the presence of the State in the territory." The areas of governance to be locally administrated are: education (art. 11º); social action (art. 12º); health (art. 13º); civil protection (art. 14º); culture (art. 15º); heritage (art. 16º); housing (art. 17º); port areas, touristic and economic urban development areas non-related to port activity (art. 18º); Sea, river and lake beaches (art. 19º); Cadastral information, forest management and protected areas (art. 20º); Transport and communication (art. 21º); structures for citizen service (art. 22º); proximity policing (art. 23º); animal protection and health (art. 24º); food security (art. 25º); public parking (art. 27) and games of fortune and chance (art. 28º). The process was initiated in 2019 and it will be accomplished progressively, "implying the transfer of "human, patrimonial and financial

2. Back in the time the communist party accused the government of reconfigure the role of the State and to intend an action of depoliticization.

resources" (Observador 2018). The municipalities who do not want these responsibilities have to communicate the information to the government, but, until 2021 every municipality must accept the new rules of local governance as presented in the law decree, under article 3. According to the Prime Minister António Costa, this government legislature "should be marked by the significant advance in the decentralization of competencies" for the local power, in a "major decentralization process that has taken place since 1976" (República Portuguesa 2019a). This accomplishes the Washington Consensus translating into a policy of "inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of state restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local context" (Perk and Tickell 2002, 380).

As said in an interview by the secretary of state of the local municipalities "the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party reached an agreement on the guidelines for the whole process." The objective was "to make the public administration of the State (...) less central and more local", thus, "a public administration more efficient, more agile and more scrutinized". However, "the decision to decentralize a polity (. . .) is inherently political, commonly involving such diverse interests as national leaders, rival national politicians, central bureaucrats, local leaders, and external donors" (Hutchcroft 2001, 42). The interest in decentralizing in Portugal seems to be a policy that interests much to the Socialist Party and the Social and Democratic Party, the "rival national politicians" that Hutchcroft approached. This rival national politicians are the parties that since 1974 usually occupy power in Portugal and seems that this process could be a means of "masking less altruistic objectives; politicians and their parties might use decentralization processes to their own benefit" (Ballesteros, Sánchez, and Lorenzo 2013).

In the interview with an autarch of Almada, belonging to the Socialist Party, it is stated that "there is here, from the point of view of the current cabinet executive, the idea that a power of proximity administrates better than a distant power" and therefore "we welcome the decentralization of competencies for local authorities (...)". The autarch says too that "has an ideological view on these matters" and "does not see decentralization as a blame shifting". On the other hand, the Oporto's Mayor, Rui Moreira (elected as an independent) claims in some interviews that "the political parties live in the interdependence with the upper management of public administration" (ECO 2019) and also that "what the government intends to do is not a reform of the public administration" (Porto Canal 2019; RTP 2018), he believes, "but to make municipalities "regional directorates" (Câmara Municipal do Porto 2017) or even pieceworkers of functions that should be the central state responsibility (Porto Canal 2019). In the words of Baguenard:

> *"[L]a décentralisation du pouvoir suppose l'existence d'une pluralité de centres autonomes de décision. Elle exige que des organes locaux aient la maîtrise juridique de leur activité, c'est-à-dire qu'ils soient libres de prendre, dans le respect des lois et règlement, la décision qu'ils veulent. Telle est la véritable décentralisation"* (Baguenard 1980, 10)

In the case of Portugal this is not what's happening. The Government is decentralizing a set of services and it is not a true (political) decentralization. This action consists in the transfer of responsibilities to local governments, politicizing them, and this transfer of responsibilities is only administrative. Political and financial control remains in the central government, allowing it to "retain control over how subnational governments provided the services" (Escobar-Lemmon 2006, 247). I identify the type of decentralization occurring in Portugal in the last years as a "fictional decentralization" as theorized by João Ferrão (Silveira 1997, 21). The fictional decentralization consists in:

> *"(. . .) discourses that advocate decentralization processes based on the direct transfer of functions from the central level to the lower local levels. Marked by the refusal to institutionalize intermediate levels of regulation and decision, and often by the lack of awareness of the transferred functions and the necessary resources to execute them, these discourses stimulate, in practice, the consolidation of situations centered at the*

top and atomized at the bottom. This perspective, which defends a misleading vision of subsidiarity insofar as it invokes not to decentralize but rather to atomize, to better reign (...)".

I also argue that this process of decentralization in Portugal entails a process of double blame shifting, in one hand, blaming external impositions through narratives that justify action as inevitable but at the same time a long-desired government action (See Moury and Standring 2017), and, in other hand, transferring more competences (and with this accountability) to lower tiers of government not giving them resources to realize them and like this, they defect blame. So, with this, by decentralizing and retaining the power resources the governments creates the perception of not being responsible and with this avoiding and deflecting the blame. Thus, the process of accountability shifts from the central government to local constituents (World Bank 2000). Political power lies in multiple tiers of governance, and, for that reason, "political actors have incentives to deflect blame to actors at other levels" (Mortensen 2013, 164). Political power lies in multiple tiers of governance, and, for that reason, "political actors have incentives to deflect blame to actors at other levels" (Mortensen 2013, 164). This process that has less altruistic objectives does not seem to have great opposition on the part of the municipalities, being certain that the majority is controlled by the parties that negotiated the diploma of decentralization. According to the government (República Portuguesa 2019b), two-thirds (2/3) of the municipalities have already joined this reform. This allows me to conclude that in Portugal the process evidenced here follows what other countries are doing, which in the near future will change the governance relationship between governors and governed, but also the way we understand who has political responsibilities.

4 Conclusion

This era of neoliberal governmentality (Foucault 1979) transformed the state into a materialized Leviathan. With many powers and technics at its disposal, the government control his people by an ideologic state apparatus and the market ideology that today shapes the "hearts and minds" of the citizens.

So many powers in the state gives it the possibility to decide the fate of the people, and so, with an ideologic support of the international institutions, governments all over the world are placing is power in an international regime (supranational) and in its lower tiers of jurisdiction (subnational), however, keeping the "competence of competencies" (Zippelius 1997, 77). These actions create a complex governance system in which lines of accountability become confused, at the same time politicians claim that decisions are no longer their responsibility (Christensen and Laegrid 2006). "As the work of Mouffe, Bogggs, Rancière and Habermas (. . .) emphasize, the adoption of a tactic or tactics that seeks to downplay or diminish the role and responsibilities of elected politicians clearly raises far reaching questions about the utility and traditional frameworks of representative democracy" (Christensen and Laegrid 2006, 70). It is clear that a new relation between govern and governed are emerging progressively.

There is academic literature that sees the transfer of competencies as a positive action, but, nevertheless remains some literature that analyses the theme as a strategy of government in blame shifting. The fact is that "issues once politized have since been variously parlayed into technocratic structures and routinized conventions, absorbed by transnational agencies and metaregulatory frameworks" (Perk 2002, 391) and more recently into the local power. In Portugal, since the end of Estado Novo the country is delivering power to supranational institutions, however, was always sceptic and reluctant doing the decentralization. The present government "should be marked by the significant advance in the decentralization of competencies", said the prime minister (República Portuguesa 2019a), a fact that is happening more dramatically since 2015. "The decision to decentralize a polity (. . .) is inherently political, commonly involving such diverse interests as national leaders, rival national politicians, central bureaucrats, local leaders, and external donors" (Hutchcroft 2001, 42). The interest in decentralizing in Portugal seems to be a policy that interests much to the Socialist Party and the

Social and Democratic Party, the “rival national politicians” that Hutchcroft approached. This rival national politicians are the parties that since 1974 usually occupy power in Portugal and seems that this process could be a means of “masking less altruistic objectives; politicians and their parties might use decentralization processes to their own benefit” (Ballesteros, Sánchez, and Lorenzo 2013).

Until 2021 the municipalities have, mandatorily, to accept the new competences that were previously responsibility of the central state. What is happening in Portugal is not a true decentralization (Baguenard 1980) because the government maintains the political, economic and financial instruments that does not permit the local powers to act as they want or need to, and so, the government continues to have the (true) decisional power in its hands. By decentralizing and retaining the power resources the governments creates the perception of not being responsible and with this avoiding and deflecting the blame.

It seems to be a government movement of reform that is happening all over the world, and so in a middle of a dynamic of change that has not come to a conclusion. Like said by Gerry Stoker (Stoker 2007, 193): “We are in an era of governance without government”.

References

[1] Almeida, Maria Antónia Pires de. 2007. *Party politics in Portugal: municipalities and central government*. Centro de Investigação de estudos de sociologia, ISCTE. https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6f2d30d4-fd1c-4fd8-b0f5-4f35706ef0ec.pdf (last accessed May 2019)

[2] Almeida, Maria Antónia Pires de. 2013. *O Poder Local do Estado Novo à Democracia: Presidentes de câmara e governadores civis, 1936-2012*. Lisbon: ebook.

[3] Almeida, Pedro Tavares de, and Rui Miguel C. Branco. 2007. *Burocracia, Estado e Território: Portugal e Espannha (séculos XIX-XX)*. Lisbon : Livros Horizonte.

[4] Baguenard, Jacques. 1980. *La Décentralisation territoriale*. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France.

[5] Ballesteros, Beatriz Cuadrado, Isabel M. García Sánchez, and José M. Prado Lorenzo. 2013. "The Impact of Political Factors on Local Government Decentralisation." *International Public Management Journal* 16(1): 53–84.

[6] Barreto, António. 1984. "Estado central e descentralização: antecedentes e evolução (1974-1984) - Classe e Estado, Sindicatos na reforma agrária." *Análise Social* XX: 121-217

[7] Bartling, Björn, and Urs Fischbacher. 2011. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility." *Review of Economic Studies* 79(1): 67–87.

[8] Bieler, Andreas, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burham, and Adam David Burnham. 2006. *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[9] Bourdieu, Pierre. 2002. "Against the Policy of Depoliticization." *Studies in Political Economy* 69(1): 31-41.

[10] Buller, Jim, Pinar E. Dönmez, Adam Standring, and Matthew Wood. 2019. *Comparing Strategies of (De)Politicisation in Europe: Governance, Resistance and Anti-politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[11] Burki, Shahid Javed., Guillermo Perry, and William R. Dillinger. 1999. *Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

[12] Burnham, Peter. 2000. "Globalisation, Depoliticisation and ‘Modern’ Economic Management." In *The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique*, edited by Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis. London: Palgrave.

[13] Burnham, Peter. 2001. "New Labour and the politics of depoliticization." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3(2): 127–149.

[14] Câmara Municipal do Porto. 2017. "Rui Moreira antecipa debate da descentralização e lança avisos ao Governo", last accessed March 15, 2019. http://www.cm-porto.pt/noticias/rui-moreira-antecipa-debate-da-descentralizacao-e-lanca-avisos-ao-governo

[15] Carrapato, Júlio Filipe de Almeida. 1979. *Descentralização e regionalização*. Vila Real de Santo António: Litográfica do Sul.

[16] Christensen, Tom, and Per Laegrid. 2006. *Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State (Comparative Studies of Organizations in the Public Sector)*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

[17] Comissão de Apoio à Reestruturação do Equipamento e da Administração do Território. 1998. *Descentralização, Regionalização e Reforma Democrática do Estado*. Lisbon: MEPAT, CAREAT.

[18] Conyers, Diana. 1984. "Decentralization and development: a review of the literature." *Public Administration and Development* 4(2): 187-197.

[19] Conyers, Diana. 1983. "Decentralization: the latest fashion in development administration?" *Public Administration and Development* 3(2): 97-109.

[20] Crozier, Michel, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.

[21] Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. USA: Oxford University Press.

[22] Diário de Notícias. 2018. "Descentralização debatida em cimeira de áreas metropolitanas de Lisboa e do Porto", *Diário de Notícias*, March 19. https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/descentralizacao-debatida-em-cimeira-de-areas-metropolitanas-de-lisboa-e-do-porto-9198739.html.

[23] Dillinger, William, and Marianne Fay. 1999. "From Centralized to Decentralized Governance." *Finance and Development* 36(4): 19.

[24] Duarte, Bruna A. Marques. 2016. "Descentralização Administrativa: Novos Caminhos, Novas Realidades." Master’s diss., University of Lisbon, Portugal.

[25] ECO. 2019. "Rui Moreira defende «regionalização política» para descentralizar", *ECO*, January. https://eco.sapo.pt/2019/01/29/rui-moreira-defende-regionalizacao-politica-para-descentralizar/.

[26] Escobar-Lemmon. Maria. 2006. "Executives, Legislatures, and Decentralization." *Policy Studies Journal* 34(2): 245–63.

[27] Fernandes, José Alberto Rio. 2006. "Reestruturação da administração territorial portuguesa: o duplo centralismo em busca de escalas intermédias." *Xeográfica, Revista de Xeografía, Território e Medio Ambiente* 6: 95-113.

[28] Fesler, James. 1965. "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization." *The Journal of Politics* 27(3): 536-566.

[29] Foucalt, Michel. 1979. *Microfísica do Poder.* Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal:277-292.

[30] Foucalt, Michel. 2009. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977–78.* UK: Palgrave Macmillan United Kingdom.

[31] Frey, Klaus. 2000. "Descentralização: Lições atuais de Tocqueville." *Lua nova* 51: 77-118

[32] Hutchcroft, Paul D. 2001. "Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 14(1).

[33] John, Peter. 2001. *Local Governance in Western Europe.* SAGE Publications.

[34] Kettl, Donald F. 2005. *The Global Public Management Revolution.* Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

[35] Khan, Shadiullah. 2008. "Local Governments and Local Elites." *Local Government Studies* 34(4): 509–28.

[36] Lefèvre, Christian. 2010. "The Improbable Metropolis: Decentralization, Local Democracy and Metropolitan Areas in the Western World." *Análise Social* 45(197): 623-637.

[37] Machado, J. Baptista. 1982. *Participação e Descentralização: Democratização e Neutralidade na Constituição de 76.* Lisbon: Alemedina.

[38] Magone, José M. 2010. "Portugal: local democracy in a small centralized Republic." In *The Oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe.* UK: Oxford Handbooks Online.

[39] Manor, James. 1999. *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization.* World Bank.

[40] Mortensen, Peter B. 2013. "(De-)Centralisation and Attribution of Blame and Credit." *Local Government Studies* 39(2): 163–81.

[41] Moury, Catherine, and Adam Standring. 2017. "'Going beyond the Troika': Power and discourse in Portuguese austerity politics." *European Journal of Political Research* 56(3): 660-679.

[42] Nanetti, Raffaella Y., Helena Rato, and Miguel Rodrigues. 2004. "Institutional capacity and reluctant decentralization in Portugal: the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region." *Regional Federal Studies* 14(3): 405-429.

[43] Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government.* Osford: Oxford University Press.

[44] O'Neill, Kathleen. 2003. "Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(9): 1068-1091.

[45] Observador. 2018. "Parlamento aprovou lei-quadro que descentraliza competências para os municípios", July 28. https://observador.pt/2018/07/18/parlamento-aprovou-lei-quadro-que-descentraliza-competencias-para-os-municipios/

[46] Oliveira, Carlos, and Isabel Breda-Vázquez. 2012. "Europeanisation of territorial policies in Portugal and Italy: a cross-national comparison." *Policy Politics, The Policy Press* 40(1): 89-105.

[47] Oliveira, Carlos, and Isabel Breda-Vázquez, 2011. "Territorial Governance in Portugal: Institutional Change or Institutional Resilience?" *disP - The Planning Review* 47(186): 64–76.

[48] Perk, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. 2002. *Neoliberalizing Space.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

[49] Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1163-1202.

[50] Porto Canal. 2019. "Aquilo que foi proposto não é descentralização", *Porto Canal*, January 25. http://www.porto.pt/noticias/rui-moreira-no-porto-canal-aquilo-que-foi-proposto-nao-e-descentralizacao

[51] Putnam, Robert, and Susan Pharr. 2000. "Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?" *Foreign Affairs, Capsule Review.* https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2000-07-01/disaffecteddemocracies-whats-troubling-trilateral-countries

[52] República Portuguesa. 2019a. "Há uma clara correlação entre a maior centralização e o menor desenvolvimento", February 12. https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc21/comunicacao/noticia?i=ha-uma-clara-correlacao-entre-a-maior-centralizacao-e-o-menor-desenvolvimento (last accessed March 2019.)

[53] República Portuguesa. 2019b. "Cerca de dois terços dos municípios aderem à Descentralização", February 1. https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc21/comunicacao/noticia?i=cerca-de-dois-tercos-dos-municipios-aderem-a-descentralizacao (last accessed March 2019.)

[54] Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, and Tselios Vassilis. 2019. "Well-Being, Political Decentralisation and Governance Quality in Europe." *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities* 20(1): 69–93.

[55] RTP, 2018. "Rui Moreira diz que não há qualquer descentralização de competências para as autarquias", *RTP* July 13. https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/rui-moreira-diz-que-nao-ha-qualquer-descentralizacao-de-competencias-para-as-autarquias_v1087385 (last accessed March 2019.)

[56] Ruano, José Manuel, and Marius Profiroiu. 2017. *The Palgrave Handbook of decentralization in Europe.* Palgrave Macmillan.

[57] Samoff, Joel. 1990. "Decentralization: The Politics of Interventionism." *Development and Change* 21(3): 513–30.

[58] Scheinowitz, Abraham S. 1993. *A Descentralização do Estado: Bélgica, França, Itália, Espanha, Portugal, Dinamarca, Brasil, Estados Unidos.* Brasília: Editora Brasilia Juridica.

[59] Silva, Carlos Nunes. 2017. "Political and administrative descentralization in Portugal: Four decades of democratic local government." In *Local Government and Urban Governance in Europe*, edited by Carlos Nunes Silva and Ján Buček. Springer International Publishing.

[60] Silva, Patrícia, and Filipe Teles. 2019. "The Biggest Loser? Local public services under austerity measures in Portugal." In *Local Public services in times of austerity across Mediterranean Europe*, edited by Andrea Lippi and Theodore N. Tsekos. Palgrave Macmillan.

[61] Silveira, Luís Nuno Espinha da. 1997. *Poder Central, Poder Regional, Poder Local: uma perspectiva histórica.* Edições Cosmos.

[62] Sorens, Jason. 2009. "The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe." *Regional and Federal Studies* 19(2): 255–72.

[63] Sorens, Jason. 2009. "The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe." *Regional Federal Studies* 19(2): 255-272.

[64] Stoker, Gerry. 2003. *Public Policy and Administration Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour.* Macmillan International Higher Education.

[65] Tommasi, Mariano, and Frederico Weinschelbaum. 2007. "Centralization vs. Decentralization: A principal-agent analysis." *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 9(2): 369-389.
[66] Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[67] Vieira, Alberto. 1998. *O Município no Mundo Português: Seminário Internacional*. Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlântico.
[68] Vries, Michiel S. de. 2000. "The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis of Arguments and Practices in European Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 38(2): 193–224.
[69] World Bank. 2000. *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[70] Zippelius, Reinhold. 1997. *Teoria Geral do Estado*. Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.

.

.

Ruben Duarte Abrantes is 22 years old, holds a bachelor's degree in International Relations from the University of Lisbon and is currently pursuing a master's degree in Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences (FCSH) of the Nova University of Lisbon (Portugal). His research focuses mainly on the themes of Marxism, the New Left and Political Parties.

Management and Mobility Considerations for Bailifs

Considerações sobre Gestão e Mobilidade de Oficiais de Justiça

Carlos Farinha, Superior Council of the Judiciary
Miguel Rodrigues, University of Minho

Resumo—The management model implemented in September 2014 in the justice department, favours the mobility of bailiffs, highlighting its potential of this factor in the flexible management intended for the entire judicial system. This article performs a brief reflexion about the association between the organizational management and the imperious human resources' flexibility and mobility, through mobility instruments' analyzes, of which the bailiffs are bounded, in the justice department. Analysing the legislation that supports the mobility and flexible management of bailiffs inherent to the new management model, we relate the concepts of management and mobility, which are essential for improved performance of the judicial organisation.

Keywords—Management, Flexibility, Mobility, Bailiffs.

Resumo—O modelo de gestão implementado em Portugal no sector da justiça, em Setembro de 2014, privilegia a mobilidade dos oficiais de justiça, realçando as potencialidades deste factor na gestão flexível que se pretende para todo o sistema judicial. Este artigo efectua uma breve reflexão entre a associação existente entre gestão organizacional e a premente flexibilidade e mobilidade dos recursos humanos, analisando no sector da justiça os instrumentos de mobilidade a que estão sujeitos os oficiais de justiça. Examinando a legislação que suporta a mobilidade dos oficiais de justiça e a gestão flexível destes inerente ao novo modelo de gestão, relacionam-se os conceitos de gestão e mobilidade como essenciais para um melhor desempenho da organização judiciária.

Palavras-Chave—Gestão, Flexibilidade, Mobilidade, Oficiais Justiça.

Submitted—23-11-2018. **Accepted**—21-05-2019.

1 Introdução

O sistema judicial não tem disponibilizado ao cidadão a extensão, a capacidade e a mensuração do seu desempenho. Recursos humanos (RH), resultados e gestão necessitam de uma análise e estudo holístico, de forma a se perceber se estas dimensões potenciam a máxima eficiência organizacional. A relação entre os resultados alcançados e os oficiais de justiça (OJ) em exercício de funções no sector judicial permite entender a capacidade gestionária das entidades responsáveis. O fundamento para a utilização de instrumentos de gestão, como a flexibilidade e a mobilidade de RH, está na concretização e na apresentação de resultados que traduzirão uma melhor eficiência da organização.

A reorganização judiciária de Setembro/2014 assume-se como a reforma de fundo na área da

- ***Carlos Farinha***, *Secretary of Judicial Inspections at the Superior Council of the Judiciary, Master in Public Administration, University of Minho.* ***Miguel Rodrigues***, *Professor at the Department of International Relations and Public Administration, University of Minho.*
E-mail: carlos9246@hotmail.com

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.403

justiça, inserindo novas formas de controlo autonómico nas comarcas e assentando em três pilares: na especialização processual, numa nova estrutura organizacional e, principalmente, num novo modelo de gestão – a Nova Gestão Pública (NGP). Este relaciona-se com o paradigma da gestão empresarial, tendo sido, paulatinamente, introduzido e implementado no sector público, impondo aos gestores públicos métodos e instrumentos de gestão privada. Pettigrew (1997) assume que a NGP promove, como uma das suas características importantes, a mobilidade e a flexibilidade no mercado de trabalho, defendendo organizações públicas mais flexíveis, com uma estrutura de pessoal aligeirada e com novas formas de organização e de autonomia. Hood (1991) acrescenta que as estruturas organizacionais públicas só conseguem reduzir os seus custos se a sua dimensão e padronização diminuir, se achatar a sua composição e se apresentar índices de maior flexibilidade dos seus recursos. Garoupa (2014) afirma que a reforma do sistema judiciário - na sua organização, estrutura, modelo de gestão e responsabilização - é essencial e fundamental para a justiça portuguesa. A questão numérica e funcional dos RH no seio das organizações bem como os custos que estas têm com aqueles, são temas que, no âmbito das reformas e/ou mudanças que se pretendam implementar, andam sempre acompanhados, dada a sua complexidade (Pollitt e Bouckaert 2000). Para enfrentar ambientes complexos e dinâmicos as organizações necessitam de agilidade e flexibilidade, principalmente de RH e de coordenação desses recursos, para se adaptarem a mudanças constantes (Snell, Shadur, e Wright 2000).

Este artigo reflecte sobre o relacionamento existente entre a gestão da organização judiciária e a mobilidade dos OJ. Efectua uma análise documental, nomeadamente aos diplomas legais que definem a responsabilidade sobre a gestão dos OJ e os critérios que balizam a mobilidade destes. Começa por explorar a flexibilidade e mobilidade dos RH em ambiente organizacional, como um dos segmentos importantes na concretização e sedimentação da NGP no interior das organizações. Clarifica, de seguida, a responsabilidade da direcção-geral da administração da justiça (DGAJ) e do administrador judiciário (AJ) sobre a flexibilidade a que estão sujeitos os OJ, pondo em evidência a adequabilidade da gestão dos instrumentos de mobilidade actualmente existentes nos tribunais judiciais de primeira instância. Conclui-se esta reflexão com a necessidade premente de se perceber se a utilização dos mecanismos de agilidade, flexibilidade e mobilidade dos OJ beneficiaram o sistema judicial, melhorando o desempenho e a eficiência deste.

2 Nova Gestão Pública

2.1 Potencialidades e Dificuldades

A NGP surge como um modelo de gestão profissional impulsionador da reforma da AP, direccionado para as mudanças nos valores e práticas do serviço público, encerrando aquelas uma racionalização de meios e de processos, que influenciam e afectam o funcionamento da organização (Guimarães et al. 2011). A NGP alicerça-se, por um lado, em temas como a dimensão e a despesa do Estado, os constrangimentos financeiros dos governos, o elevado nível de gasto público, os cortes orçamentais, o nível de investimento público, o funcionamento dos próprios serviços e a relação entre gestão eficiente e economia nacional (Hughes 2003; Denhardt e Denhardt 2000). Por outro lado, constatando que o *Welfare State* transformou a administração pública (AP) numa estrutura gigante, ineficiente, ineficaz, burocratizada e que uma sociedade em constante mudança requer uma administração moderna, flexível, dinâmica e com uma gestão profissional acompanhada de elevados padrões de desempenho (Pollitt e Bouckaert 2000; Peters e Pierre 1998; Hughes 2003). Hood (1995) e Hughes (2003) referem que a NGP assenta em três pilares: i) na organização do Estado e da AP, definindo as funções que o Estado deve exercer, ii) em liderança e responsabilização, através da implementação da gestão por objectivos com o enfoque especial nos resultados alcançados e iii) no mérito e na qualificação, com a imposição de uma nova cultura organizacional nos serviços públicos. Pettigrew (1997) resume que a NGP defende para o sector público uma estrutura de pessoal aligeirada, tanto na base como no topo, além de uma maior standardização e flexibilidade, oferecendo, dessa forma, uma maior variedade. Concluindo Hood (1991) que a NGP representa uma mudança drástica relativamente à administração tradicional e deve-se guiar pelas seguintes premissas: responsabilização dos gestores; tornar a organização, os RH e o emprego mais flexível; gerir por objectivos individuais e organizacionais; e ter uma preocupação permanente com os três E's: economia, eficiência e eficácia.

As orientações estratégicas da NGP baseadas em mecanismos de mercado, nos *stakeholders*, em clientes, na eficiência e nos custos, sendo projectadas através de conceitos como a medição de desempenho e a responsabilização, mudaram definitivamente a própria compreensão dos serviços públicos (Diefenbach 2009). Embora seja inequívoco que a aplicação deste modelo de gestão trouxe importantes melhorias ao nível dos serviços públicos, importa, contudo, reconhecer que nem tudo foi positivo, sendo, eventualmente, justificadas algumas alterações e/ou correcções. Pollitt (2001) afirma que as reformas gestionárias da NGP têm sido frequentemente perseguidas pela ausência de qualquer evidência real de análise sobre ganhos de eficiência. Mudança de governo implica novas políticas assente no mesmo paradigma de gestão sem se ter percebido o alcance das transformações anteriores, redundando, assim, numa falta de avaliação séria aos resultados obtidos (Carneiro e Menicucci 2013; Pollitt e Bouckaert 2002). Carneiro e Menicucci (2013) e Broucker, DeWit e Verhoeven (2018) enfatizam que a reforma apresenta défices democráticos e de *accountability* e que não se produziram os resultados que se apregoavam relacionados com a eficiência, flexibilidade ou qualidade dos serviços públicos. Diefenbach (2009) refere que a gestão é estabelecida como uma forte ideologia e que a orientação para custos se resume à redução de custos, serviços, RH e na qualidade do próprio serviço público. Este autor e Pollitt e Bouckaert (2000) concluem realçando as incongruências, contradições, dilemas, paradoxos e *trade-offs* que a NGP apresenta na sua dinâmica de se enraizar e desenvolver no serviço público, alertando e destacando as seguintes: i) a institucionalização da ideia de mudança através da capacidade organizacional em contraponto com a padronização e a formalização dos processos estratégicos e operacionais da gestão; ii) promove a flexibilidade e a inovação, por um lado, e pretende aumentar a confiança dos cidadãos e, dessa forma, a legitimidade governamental, por outro lado; e iii) motiva os colaboradores e promove a mudança da cultura organizacional em contraponto com o enfraquecimento da estabilidade no emprego, a redução da estrutura organizacional e a consequente diminuição de postos de trabalho.

2.2 Gestão e Mobilidade

A AP procura efectuar reformas gestionárias baseadas nos procedimentos de mercado. As reformas conducentes à modernização do sector público focam-se na transformação estrutural das suas organizações (Hammerschmid et al. 2019). O fio condutor dessas reformas está alicerçado numa abordagem de *public value* e de responsabilidade pública. Essa abordagem inclui eficiência, desempenho, concretização de objectivos - sustentados nos mecanismos de mercado - e o cumprimento dos valores democráticos - como equidade e transparência -, enquadrados no espírito e na forma da lei. Segundo Christensen, Goerdel e Nicholson-Crotty (2011) existe uma tensão entre gestão[1] e administração[2] e essa tensão foi crescendo à medida que a NGP foi favorecendo a eficiência e o desempenho em desfavor dos processos legais e democráticos. Moe e Gilmour (1995) defendem, assim, uma abordagem integrativa entre administração e gestão que, sendo o esvaziar das tensões existentes, poderá acomodar e desenvolver uma visão mais expansiva que possa legitimar de forma evidente e clara toda a AP.

Valores essenciais de serviço público[3] marcam presença quando se pretende abordar a mudança, promovendo a adaptabilidade e mobilidade do mercado de trabalho a uma maior flexibilidade do emprego, tendo em vista objectivos de desempenho pessoal e organizacional (Wilthagen e Tros 2004). Gorg, Hornock, Montagna e Onword (2018) constatam que políticas de flexibilidade no emprego e de mobilidade de RH são relevantes na dinâmica económica dos países. Farazmand (1999)

1. Baseada na inovação de processos, procedimentos e tecnologia e na eficiência e eficácia, para a concretização dos objectivos planeados e assumidos pela organização, sustentada na produtividade e no desempenho de todos os colaboradores da instituição.

2. Balizada por conceitos como, entre outros, legalidade, responsabilidade, igualdade e transparência.

3. Como a integridade, legalidade, transparência, eficiência, igualdade, responsabilidade e justiça.

refere que a globalização teve consequências significativas para toda a sociedade e, por extensão, para o Estado e para a sua AP. Esta foi forçada a fazer mais com o mesmo ou o mesmo com menos. Cox (1989) refere que o conceito de flexibilidade é, talvez, a mais importante medida de eficiência e em qualquer processo de produção, mudança, inovação ou alteração será implementada. Segundo Gerwin (1993), flexibilidade traduz-se em objectivos de desempenho e na medição dos resultados obtidos, que corresponderão assertivamente aos métodos utilizados. A motivação dos trabalhadores, aquisição de novos conhecimentos e a partilha destes são alguns dos atributos que uma adequada e equilibrada gestão da flexibilidade dos RH poderá trazer para as organizações públicas (Tuan 2019). Sanchez (1995) define flexibilidade como um conjunto de procedimentos, práticas e competências da organização, para dar resposta a novas situações surgidas pela dinâmica de ambientes competitivos. Wright e Snell (1998) defendem a adequação[4] dos RH às necessidades estratégicas organizacionais, de modo a permitir uma resposta flexível a uma variedade de requisitos e competências ao longo do tempo. A estratégia de gestão de RH e a integração estratégica de capital humano nas organizações, além de se complementarem, tornam estas mais robustas e capazes de responder com maior eficiência e eficácia aos desafios actuais das sociedades (Boon, Eckardt, Lepak, e Boselie 2018). Ou, nas palavras de Olian e Rynes (1984, 171), "(. . .) estratégias diferentes exigem tipos diferentes de pessoas (...) para um desempenho eficaz". As práticas de gestão de RH que induzem a novos desempenhos, por exemplo, através da gestão por objectivos, influenciam o comportamento no recurso a práticas de flexibilidade organizacional. A flexibilidade do comportamento do capital humano fornece um fortíssimo indicador da flexibilidade da instituição (Wright e Snell 1998).

Como refere Madureira (2011), desde a década de 90 do século XX que várias organizações internacionais alertam para a necessidade do sector público desenvolver-se, fundamentalmente, em quatro vectores: as competências de dirigentes e funcionários; a descentralização das cadeias de comando; a simplificação de regras e procedimentos; e a flexibilização na atitude e no comportamento de todos os agentes administrativos. Na estratégia da NGP, no que respeita aos RH, destaca-se, segundo Rocha (2001), a reforma da cultura organizacional, através da modificação das referências ideológicas, substituindo-se valores como serviço público e interesse geral por eficiência e eficácia e importando-se práticas e processos de gestão empresarial como, por exemplo, a flexibilização nas relações de trabalho. Desafios futuros, como o envelhecimento da população, as mudanças demográficas, as tendências migratórias ou a escassez de RH em determinados sectores, são opções estratégicas de longo prazo assumidas pelos governos e acompanhadas de uma visão de evolução do mercado de trabalho. Implementação de abordagens flexíveis no sector público como, por exemplo, a *flexisegurança*[5], são desafios mais complexos do que no sector privado, devido às estruturas, sistemas e valores em que ambos os sectores se baseiam (Kuperus e Rode 2010; Wilthagen e Tros, 2004; Kathuria e Partovi 1999). Marinescu (2018) verifica que é essencial um equilíbrio nas políticas sustentadas em *flexisegurança*, que será alcançado através da interacção de vários factores que influenciam, de forma diferenciada, o mercado de trabalho, realçando a redução das discrepâncias relativas à protecção dos trabalhadores; a legislação laboral adequada acompanhada de um maior diálogo social; e mecanismos adequados de gestão organizacional. Bredgaard e Madsen (2018) salientam, contudo, que a complementariedade institucional entre flexibilidade e segurança pode ser frágil e, eventualmente, desintegrar-se se as organizações que promovem políticas baseadas em *flexigurança* não tiverem capacidade de as manter e de as suportar através do equilíbrio entre aqueles dois conceitos. Na opinião de Kuperus e Rode (2010), uma estratégia consistente e abrangente de formação, aprendizagem e conhecimento permanentes garantem a adaptabilidade e empregabilidade contínuas dos trabalhadores. Gerven e Ossewaarde (2018) subscrevendo esta ideia re-

4. Isto é, o meio através do qual a instituição procura adequar práticas, competências e comportamentos dos colaboradores às carências competitivas imediatas.

5. Conceito que traduz um nexo de flexibilidade e segurança, enfatizando e aliando uma maior flexibilidade do mercado de trabalho a mais segurança para o funcionário, que não se restringe somente ao emprego.

conhecem, contudo, que estas políticas baseadas em aprendizagem e formação contínua sendo essenciais têm de ser acompanhadas duma maior agilização na integração de novos trabalhadores nas organizações, contribuindo para uma maior competitividade das mesmas, salvaguardo o equilíbrio financeiro delas, principalmente as do sector público. A flexibilidade a implementar na AP será mais profícua quanto melhor for acompanhada da modernização e melhoria das condições de trabalho e de emprego, não podendo uma maior flexibilidade para a entidade patronal resultar numa maior insegurança para os trabalhadores[6]. McGaughey (2018) sublinha que uma maior segurança no emprego aliada a uma igualdade de tratamento e a uma permanente audição dos trabalhadores sobre os objectivos traçados para a organização traduzir-se-á num aumento dos índices motivacionais e numa maior eficiência e eficácia organizacional. Espera-se, de acordo com o pensamento de Rodrigues (2005), que a flexibilidade a introduzir no sector público torne este mais ágil, com maior capacidade de interagir com o ambiente que o rodeia, que apreenda as oportunidades que aquele lhe oferece e que as suas organizações se tornem mais eficientes. Bilhim (2004) defende a ideia de que a criação de objectivos, a sua medição através de indicadores, as vias para os atingir, bem como a avaliação, satisfação, remuneração, formação e qualificação dos funcionários públicos, são factores importantes para a motivação e o empenho constante, tendo em vista alcançar o essencial: a prossecução do interesse público.

3 Contexto dos Tribunais

A reorganização judiciária e o modelo de gestão implementado em Setembro/2014, no sistema judicial português, trouxeram a mudança e a inovação ao sector da justiça, constituindo uma emblemática e importante política pública nesta área. Nos tribunais coexistem várias sub-estruturas, o que torna complexa a organização sistematizada em termos de gestão transversal de todos os sectores. A nível da estrutura da organização judiciária a alteração havida reflectiu-se, sobretudo, nos tribunais de primeira instância[7], com modificações substantivas na área das competências, quer material, quer territorial - lei nº. 62/13, de 26/8[8]. Essa alteração, ao nível do novo modelo de gestão, está consubstanciada no preâmbulo do decreto-lei[9] que regulamenta a LOSJ, bem explícito no objectivo que visa atingir com a implementação da NGP nas respectivas comarcas. Efectivamente, o legislador assume que, com a introdução deste modelo de gestão no judiciário, pretende-se realçar e aproveitar as potencialidades de uma gestão integrada e flexível dos RH, autonomizando as estruturas de gestão dos tribunais. A criação de um mapa de pessoal único por secretaria e comarca permitirá a adequação dessas práticas gestionárias, simplificando-se a afectação e mobilidade dos OJ. A flexibilidade e a adequabilidade das medidas gestionárias aliadas a uma mobilidade dos OJ são essenciais na mudança de processos, instrumentos e procedimentos que se desejam executar na administração da justiça. A portaria nº. 161/14, de 21/8[10] realça as potencialidades dessa gestão flexível e integrada de OJ na comarca, para o cumprimento dos objectivos que se pretendem para o sistema de justiça. Os OJ integram uma carreira de regime especial, regendo-se por um estatuto próprio dada a natureza e a especificidade das funções que asseguram e desenvolvem (artºs. 18, nº1 e 19 da LOSJ). O preâmbulo do estatuto dos funcionários de justiça[11] (EFJ) refere a relevância dos requisitos humanos e profissionais para o desempenho daquelas funções, pois que cabe aos OJ a execução dos actos dos magistrados, a prática de um conjunto alargado de actos processuais por competência própria, e são eles que, ao estabelecer o contacto inicial com o cidadão, transmitem a imagem do serviço judicial. Como exemplo das competências funcionais dos OJ, podemos referir a orientação, coordenação, supervisão e execução das actividades desenvolvi-

6. Principalmente após a crise económica de 2007/2008, o conceito de *flexigurança* foi revitalizado dando maior ênfase ao trabalhador, tentando abranger mais preocupações sociais (Bekker 2018; Bekker e Mailand 2018).

7. Em regra, o tribunal judicial da comarca corresponde ao distrito, sendo composto por núcleos judiciais, correspondendo estes aos concelhos e as instâncias judiciais/juízos processuais estão integrados nos núcleos judiciais.

8. Lei de organização do sistema judiciário (LOSJ).

9. Decreto-lei nº. 49/14, de 27/3

10. Portaria que aprova o mapa de pessoal das secretarias dos tribunais judiciais de primeira instância.

11. Decreto-Lei nº. 343/99, de 26/8.

das nos juízos processuais, em conformidade com as respectivas atribuições (mapa I anexo ao EFJ).

Podemos dividir a gestão dos RH, ao nível dos OJ, em dois patamares decisórios, de entidades diferenciadas, relativamente aos instrumentos de mobilidade a que estes estão sujeitos: um macro, onde se administram os RH ao nível das comarcas, da responsabilidade da DGAJ; e um micro, onde se coordenam os RH entre as várias unidades orgânicas que compõem a comarca, da responsabilidade do AJ. A estes dois escalões podemos acrescentar uma responsabilidade partilhada entre aquelas duas entidades, ao nível dos núcleos judiciais, entre quem coloca (DGAJ) e, eventualmente, quem recoloca (AJ).

3.1 Direcção-Geral da Administração da Justiça

A DGAJ tem por missão assegurar o apoio ao funcionamento dos tribunais e prossegue, entre outras, as seguintes atribuições: apoiar a definição das políticas de organização e gestão dos tribunais; programar e executar as acções relativas à gestão e administração dos OJ; e dirigir a actividade dos AJ (artº. 2 do decreto-lei nº. 165/12, de 31/7[12]). Além disto, compete igualmente à DGAJ a admissão, a colocação, a transferência e o provimento dos OJ, nos termos do artº. 20 da LOSJ. De acordo com o EFJ, os instrumentos de mobilidade específicos na sua aplicação aos OJ e da responsabilidade da DGAJ, são, todos eles à excepção da afectação, originados por uma vontade individual do OJ ou por uma concordância/anuência à respectiva mobilidade por parte do próprio. Estes instrumentos de mobilidade podem-se dividir em três grupos. Um inicial, integrando os que são requeridos pelos OJ e que são considerados no respectivo movimento anual, ou seja, a promoção/acesso, a transferência e a transição. Um segundo, com os que são requeridos pelos OJ e que não são considerados no respectivo movimento anual, isto é, a permuta. Finalmente, aqueles que não são requeridos pelos OJ e que também não são considerados no respectivo movimento anual, ou seja, a afectação, a comissão de serviço, o destacamento e o destacamento excepcional. Relativamente ao primeiro grupo, o movimento ordinário de OJ é realizado pela DGAJ anualmente, em Junho, visando o preenchimento de lugares que se encontrem vagos ou que venham a vagar no decurso do movimento, sendo publicitado no website da DGAJ e posteriormente publicado em diário da república (DR) - artº. 18 do EFJ. As vagas existentes nas comarcas são publicitadas no website da DGAJ, por categoria e núcleo judicial. Os OJ que pretendam apresentar candidatura aos movimentos, devem-no fazer discriminando a(s) categoria(s) e os núcleos judiciais em que estão interessados e para os quais se pretendem candidatar (artº. 19 do EFJ). Os OJ que se queiram candidatar devem reunir os respectivos requisitos de admissão ao movimento e às categorias para que concorrem, em consonância com os requisitos gerais e os factores atendíveis para a concretização das candidaturas, nos termos dos artºs. 9, 13, 14 e 41 do EFJ. Cabe à DGAJ definir os critérios segundo os quais se realiza o movimento ordinário. Considerando as diversas medidas de consolidação orçamental introduzidas pelos diversos Orçamentos de Estado (OE), nomeadamente aquelas que proíbem as valorizações remuneratórias, e que o quadro legal de OJ[13] não se encontra preenchido, os critérios gerais[14] que balizam o movimento dos oficiais de justiça e, consequentemente, a respectiva mobilidade assentam em dois pilares. Primeiro, na não efectuação de promoções e para estas serem possíveis é necessário parecer favorável da secretaria de estado da administração e emprego público, recorrendo-se, então, ao regime excepcional previsto na lei que aprova o OE, desde que não haja aumento de encargos e reunidos os requisitos estatutários exigidos. Segundo, apenas serão preenchidas as vagas das secretarias dos tribunais judiciais que apresentem um maior défice de OJ, sempre superior a 15%. As mobilidades deste primeiro grupo só poderão ser concretizadas de acordo com a vontade do OJ. Sempre que se justificar, a DGAJ pode realizar movimentos extraordinários que devem ser publicitados em DR (nºs. 3 e 4 do artº. 18 do EFJ).

Relativamente ao segundo grupo, é composto pela mobilidade da permuta, que se traduz numa

12. Lei orgânica da DGAJ.

13. Fixado pela portaria nº. 161/14, de 21/8.

14. Critérios gerais consultados em 01.08.2018, acessíveis a partir dos ofícios circulares da DGAJ e disponíveis em http://www.dgaj.mj.pt/sections/ofcirc

"troca" de OJ da mesma categoria ou de categoria para a qual possam transitar. Não havendo, regra geral, qualquer oposição por parte do AJ, a DGAJ valida essa vontade expressa por requerimento conjunto dos dois OJ. O único requisito exigido legalmente é que os dois candidatos à permuta se encontrem a mais de três anos do limite mínimo de idade para a aposentação. Os candidatos à permuta só podem voltar a ter a faculdade de se socorrer desta mobilidade decorridos, pelo menos, dois anos sobre a data da aceitação do lugar (artº.15 do EFJ). Tal como o grupo anterior, também para este tipo de mobilidade a DGAJ só a poderá concretizar se for essa a intenção expressa dos OJ.

Quanto ao terceiro grupo, é composto por instrumentos de mobilidade onde, ao contrário dos anteriores, a DGAJ não se mostra condicionada e/ou limitada para os utilizar. Dos três em que tem de haver a anuência do OJ para se poder concretizar a mobilidade[15], o destacamento excepcional raras vezes é utilizado. E não o é, por duas razões: a utilização só é possível se se mostrar inadequado o recurso ao destacamento "normal"; e porque onera o orçamento da DGAJ, pois, de acordo com o artº. 56 do EFJ, têm de ser abonadas ajudas de custo aos OJ abrangidos por este instrumento de mobilidade. A mobilidade em comissão de serviço dos OJ não pode ser utilizada "em favor"das secretarias dos tribunais judiciais de primeira instância. Nos termos do artº. 54 do EFJ, este instrumento retira-lhe OJ para outras instituições da área da justiça e outros departamentos do Estado, nomeadamente, o conselho superior da magistratura, a procuradoria-geral da república, o instituto de gestão financeira e equipamentos da justiça, a própria DGAJ e outros organismos do ministério da justiça (MJ). O destacamento, nos termos do artº. 55 do EFJ, é o verdadeiro instrumento de mobilidade que a DGAJ tem utilizado para tentar efectuar uma gestão de maior proximidade dos OJ. Através do destacamento, a DGAJ coloca os OJ nos núcleos onde se sente mais a sua necessidade ou cria equipas especiais de recuperação, com espaço de trabalho na DGAJ, actuando em diversos núcleos espalhados por todo o país. Tendo de ter a anuência dos próprios, o procedimento seguido pela DGAJ consiste na publicitação da intenção de destacar um determinado número de OJ, para uma série de tribunais judiciais, disponibilizando-se os OJ, que pretendam ser destacados, em requerimento expresso para tal[16]. Finalmente, a mobilidade de afectação é utilizada quando um OJ se encontra em situação de disponibilidade ou de supranumerário, respectivamente por ter findado a comissão de serviço onde se encontrava ou porque o lugar onde estava colocado foi extinto. Para efectivar esta mobilidade, a DGAJ não necessita de requerimento nem de autorização do OJ tem, contudo, de cumprir um requisito: a colocação não pode implicar uma deslocação superior a noventa minutos entre o lugar de residência do OJ e o local de trabalho, em transporte público regular (artºs. 51 e 52 do EFJ).

3.2 Administrador Judiciário

O MJ, através do despacho nº. 2486/12, de 6/2 que planificava temporalmente os procedimentos necessários à implementação da reforma referia que os projectos de alteração aos estatutos dos três operadores judiciários[17] deviam estar concluídos em 31.07.12[18], subentendendo-se do mesmo que a reforma devia entrar em vigor com as necessárias alterações aos estatutos dos respectivos operadores judiciários. Efectivamente, o não alinhamento do EFJ com a nova LOSJ tem trazido algumas condicionantes ao desenvolvimento efectivo das competências do AJ, principalmente, no recurso aos seus instrumentos de mobilidade. A rigidez das competências atribuídas aos OJ[19] e o direito ao lugar que estes possuem[20], têm-se mostrado factores de bloqueio, de dificuldade

15. Ou seja, a comissão de serviço, o destacamento e o destacamento excepcional.

16. Esta acção da DGAJ apresenta um risco gestionário a ter em consideração, pela própria organização, na altura de se concretizar a mobilidade, que é o seguinte: se o OJ destacado não estava colocado numa comarca também ela exposta a um défice considerável de OJ. Ou seja, na tradução em linguagem popular num *"puxar a manta para a cabeça destapando os pés"*.

17. Os operadores judiciários a que se refere o despacho mencionado são os magistrados judiciais, os magistrados do ministério público e os oficiais de justiça.

18. As alterações ao EFJ continuam sem serem efectuadas, mantendo-se os mesmos "desactualizados" com o que se pretende com a reforma judicial e, principalmente, com o novo modelo de gestão.

19. Constantes do Mapa I anexo ao EFJ.

20. Consignado no artº. 58 do EFJ.

acrescida e, em alguns casos, de confronto jurídico entre realidades legislativas antagónicas[21]. As competências do AJ ao nível da mobilidade dos OJ consubstanciam-se, nos termos do artº. 2º da portaria nº. 164/14, de 21/8, em dois grandes instrumentos: a distribuição e a recolocação transitória.

Uma vez colocados os OJ[22], cabe ao AJ, numa primeira linha de decisão, proceder à sua distribuição por todas as unidades orgânicas[23]. Essa distribuição, de acordo com o artº. 48, nº. 2 do decreto-lei 49/14, de 27/3, é efectuada, após audição dos OJ em questão, numa lógica de correcção de desequilíbrios decorrentes da escassez de OJ ou que possam resultar da concentração, volume ou complexidade processual. Acrescenta o nº. 3 daquele normativo legal que aquela decisão de distribuição de OJ é sempre fundamentada, de acordo com critérios objectivos, quantitativos, gerais e específicos, definidos pela portaria nº. 164/14, de 21/8. Destes critérios, salienta-se em primeiro lugar o equilíbrio na distribuição de RH por todas as unidades orgânicas, atendendo aos factores de antiguidade e experiência. De seguida, a probabilidade de integração na equipa de destino, consideradas as características dessa equipa e as do OJ, nomeadamente as respectivas competências, afinidades e a recíproca complementariedade. E finalmente, a experiência profissional anterior, na perspectiva de afinidade com as funções a serem cometidas no lugar de destino.

Numa segunda linha decisória, se se mostrar necessário[24], o AJ pode proceder à recolocação transitória dos OJ dentro da mesma comarca, isto é, este instrumento de mobilidade só pode ser utilizado entre núcleos municipais da mesma comarca e nunca entre núcleos de comarcas diferentes. Contudo, importa esclarecer que o recurso a este tipo de mobilidade só poderá acontecer em situações temporalmente delimitadas, quando se mostre inviável o recurso a OJ em situações de disponibilidade[25] e nos limites legalmente definidos[26]. A decisão fundamentada do AJ para utilizar este instrumento gestionário, além de precedida de audição dos próprios, não altera a titularidade do lugar do OJ no mapa de pessoal a que pertence[27] e terá de atender aos critérios referidos atrás.

Tendo em conta o não preenchimento do quadro legal dos OJ em praticamente todas as comarcas, o AJ tem utilizado com regularidade os "seus" instrumentos de mobilidade, implementando, reactiva e temporalmente, algumas medidas[28], como sejam a colocação, pontualmente, de OJ a dividirem e/ou acumularem o tempo de trabalho entre diferentes núcleos e, dentro do mesmo núcleo, em diferentes juízos processuais; a colocação de OJ da carreira judicial a desempenhar funções nos serviços do ministério público e vice-versa; com o acordo prévio dos OJ, adiar as suas transferências e efectuar recolocações provisórias; nomear OJ em lugares de chefia, em regime de substituição; a criação de uma "bolsa" de OJ, com a anuência destes, para colmatarem as necessidades prementes e urgentes sentidas em todos os núcleos da comarca; e a concretização, porque aceite e deferida pela DGAJ, da criação de equipas de OJ incumbidas de recuperar atrasos, em regime de trabalho suplementar, nos termos do disposto nos artºs. 162 e 163 da lei 35/14, de 20/6. Importa, contudo, sublinhar as dificuldades e as limitações com que se depara o AJ para se socorrer deste tipo de mobilidades, as quais podem-se dividir em dois grupos: por um lado, na inexistência de uma rede de transportes públicos eficaz que aliada a uma grande amplitude de algumas comarcas, não permitem recolocar transitóriamente os OJ, por violação do disposto nos artºs. 51 e 52 do EFJ; por outro lado, os destacamentos promovidos pela DGAJ, com conhecimento intermitente

21. Na realidade, têm obstaculizado a gestão flexível e por objectivos do AJ.

22. A seu pedido ou com a sua anuência, num determinado núcleo da comarca pela DGAJ.

23. Unidades centrais e processuais (juízos centrais e locais, tribunais de competência alargada instalados em determinados núcleos, banco nacional de arrendamento e banco nacional de injunções).

24. Na prossecução de uma gestão de RH coerente e eficaz, visando uma promoção da simplificação da afectação e mobilidade dos OJ e uma autonomia da gestão de topo dos tribunais.

25. Preâmbulo da portaria nº.164/14, de 21/8.

26. A mobilidade não pode implicar para o OJ uma deslocação superior a noventa minutos entre a residência e o local de trabalho, em transporte público regular – artºs. 51 e 52 do EFJ.

27. O artº. 58 do EFJ refere que a perda de titularidade do lugar só pode acontecer a pedido do próprio, por motivo disciplinar ou extinção do lugar.

28. Que são transversais a todos os tribunais judiciais de primeira instância e relatadas em quase todos os relatórios da comarca.

por parte dos AJ, dificultam e criam barreiras, quer no planeamento estratégico elaborado pela gestão de topo do tribunal, quer na concretização dos objectivos previamente definidos.

4 Conclusão

O pilar mais importante da reorganização judiciária de Setembro/2014 é o novo modelo de gestão que foi introduzido no sector judicial português. Uma das características relevantes da NGP é a mobilidade e flexibilidade dos RH como factor essencial duma boa gestão e como instrumento primordial para um melhor desempenho da organização, sendo a mobilidade dos OJ elemento importante para a melhoria desse desempenho. A dimensão e a eventual limitação da complementariedade associada à responsabilidade e às competências pela colocação de OJ, por parte da DGAJ e do AJ, reflecte-se no desempenho da organização, sendo que a boa gestão e a mobilidade dos OJ aliada a esta é essencial para a melhoria daquele desempenho.

Em trabalhos futuros é importante perceber a dimensão, extensão e quantificação de putativos benefícios que a introdução da NGP no sector judicial, através dos seus mecanismos de agilidade, flexibilidade e mobilidade dos OJ, trouxe a este, nomeadamente, ajudando a diminuir a pendência processual, melhorando a produtividade e a eficiência organizacional. Em última análise se visou concretizar o propósito central da política pública em causa: através de um melhor desempenho judicial, alcançar-se uma prestação de justiça de qualidade, proporcionando uma resposta judicial mais flexível, célere e próxima dos cidadãos.

Abreviaturas e Siglas

AJ – Administrador Judiciário
AP – Administração Pública
DGAJ – Direcção-Geral da Administração da Justiça
DR – Diário da República
EFJ – Estatuto dos Funcionários de Justiça
LOSJ – Lei de Organização do Sistema Judiciário
MJ – Ministério da Justiça
NGP – Nova Gestão Pública
OE – Orçamento do Estado
OJ – Oficiais de Justiça
RH – Recursos Humanos

Nota dos Autores

O presente trabalho foi elaborado de acordo com a antiga grafia.

Referências

[1] Bekker, Sonja. 2018. "Flexicurity in the European Semester: Still a Relevant Policy Concept?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(2): 175-192.

[2] Bekker, Sonja, e Mikkel Mailand. 2018. "The European Flexicurity Concept and the Dutch and Danish Flexicurity Models: How Have They Managed the Great Recession?" *Social Policy Administration* 53: 142-155.

[3] Bilhim, João. 2004. *Qualificação e Valorização de Competências*. Porto: Sociedade Portuguesa de Inovação.

[4] Boon, Corine, Rory Eckardt, David Lepak, e Paul Boselie. 2018. "Integrating Strategie Human Capital and Strategic Human Resource Management." *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 29(1): 34-67.

[5] Bredgaard, Thomas, e Per Madsen. 2018. "Farewell Flexicurity? Danish Flexicurity and the Crisis." *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 24(4): 375-386.

[6] Broucker, Bruno, Kurt DeWit, e Jef Verhoeven. 2018. "Higher Education for Public Value: Taking the Debate Beyond New Public Management." *Higher Education Research Development* 37(2): 227-240

[7] Carneiro, Roberto, e Telma Menicucci. 2013. "Gestão Pública no Século XXI: as Reformas Pendentes". In *A Saúde no Brasil em 2030 – Prospecção Estratégica do Sistema de Saúde Brasileiro: Desenvolvimento, Estado e Políticas de Saúde*, 134-194. Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz/Ipea/Ministério da Saúde/Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República.

[8] Christensen, Robert, Holly Goerdel, and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. 2011. "Management, Law and the Pursuit of the Public Good in Public Administration." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21: i125-i140.

[9] Cox, Taylor. 1989. "Towards the Measurement of Manufacturing Flexibility." *Productivity and Inventory Management* 30(1): 68-72

[10] Denhardt, Robert, e Janet Denhardt. 2000. "The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering." *Public Administration Review* 60(6): 549-559.

[11] Diefenbach, Thomas. 2009. "New Public Management in Public Sector Organizations: the Dark Side of Managerialistic 'Enlightenment'." *Public Administration* 87(4): 892-909.

[12] Farazmand, Ali. 1999. "Globalization and Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 59(6): 509-522.

[13] Garoupa, Nuno. 2014. "A Governação da Justiça e a Celeridade Processual." In *Gulbenkian Conference "Afirmar o futuro – políticas públicas para Portugal"*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pClmquXSnw.

[14] Gerven, Minna, e Marinus Ossewaarde. 2018. "Beyond the Neoliberal Paradigm? Images of Social Europe in Open Method of Coordination Employment Peer Reviews." *Social Policy Administration* 52: 1354-1366.

[15] Gerwin, Donald. 1993. "Manufacturing Flexibility; a Strategic Perspective." *Management Science* 39(4): 395-410.

[16] Gorg, Holger, Cecília Hornock, Cátia Montagna, e George Onword. 2018. "Employment Output Elasticites Reforms Toward Flexicurity: Evidence from OECD Countries". In *IZA Discussion Papers 1204*. Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

[17] Guimarães, Tomás, Catarina Odelius, Jannan Medeiros, e João Santana. 2011. "Management Innovation of the Brazilian Superior Tribunal of Justice." *The American Review of Public Administration* 41(3): 297-312.

[18] Hammerschmid, Gerard, Steven Van de Walle, Rhys Andrews, e Ahmed Mostafa. 2019. "New Public Management Reforms in Europe and Their Effects: Findings from a 20 Country Top Executive Survey." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 85(3): 399-418.

[19] Hood, Christopher. 1991. "A Public Management for All Seasons." *Public Management* 69: 3-19.

[20] Hood, Christopher. 1995. "Contemporary Public Management: a New Global Paradigm." *Public Policy and Administration* 10(2): 104-117.

[21] Hughes, Owen. 2003. *Public Management and Administration*. USA: Palgrave MacMillan.

[22] Kathuria, Ravi, e Fariborz Partovi. 1999. "Work Force Management Practices for Manufacturing Flexibility." *Journal of Operations Management* (18): 21-39.

[23] Kuperus, Herma, e Anita Rode. 2010. "More Efficient Civil Services in Times of Economic Recession and Beyond: Can a Flexicurity Approach help?" *European Institute of Public Administration* (1): 15-22

[24] Madureira, César. 2011. *Profissionalização e Avaliação dos Dirigentes de Topo na Administração Pública: o Caso de Portugal*. Instituto Nacional de Administração: 38–50.

[25] Marinescu, Cristian. 2018. "Flexicurity of the Labor Market through the Formal/Informal Duality, in the Context of Globalization." *Review of International Comparative Management* 19(4): 372-380.

[26] McGaughey, Ewan. 2018. "A Human is Not Resource." *King's College London Law School Research Paper* 8.

[27] Moe, Ronald, e Robert Gilmour. 1995. "Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: the Neglected Foundation of Public Law." *Public Administration Review* 55(2): 135-146.

[28] Olian, Judy, e Sara Rynes. 1984. "Organizational Staffing: Integrating Practice with Strategy." *Industrial Relations* 23(2): 170-183.

[29] Peters, Guy, e John Pierre. 1998. "Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Teory* 8(2): 223-243.

[30] Pettigrew, Andrew. 1997. "Le New Public Management Conduit à un Nouveau Módele Hybride Public-Privé." *Revue Française de Gestion* 115: 113-120.

[31] Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. "Clarifying Convergence: Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public Management Reform." *Public Management Review* 3(4): 471-492.

[32] Pollitt, Christopher, e Geert Bouckaert. 2000. *Public Management Reform: a Comparative Analysis*. USA: Oxford University Press.

[33] Pollitt, Christopher, e Geert Bouckaert. 2002. "Avaliando Reformas da Gestão Pública: Uma Perspectiva Internacional." *Revista dos Serviços Públicos* 53(3): 7-31.

[34] Rocha, José. 2001. "As Relações Entre Poder Político e Funcionários". In *Comunicação no Colóquio sobre o estatuto dos funcionários municipais*. Lisbon: CEDREL.

[35] Rodrigues, Miguel. 2005. "A Nova Gestão Pública na Governação Local: o Caso dos Municípios dos Distritos de Vila Real e Bragança." Master's diss., University of Minho, Portugal.

[36] Sanchez, Ron. 1995. "Strategic Flexibility in Product Competition." *Strategic Management Journal* 16: 135-159.

[37] Snell, Scott, Mark Shadur, e Patrick Wright. 2000. "Human Resources Strategy: The Era of Our Ways." In *Working Paper Series 00-17*: 2-39. Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.

[38] Tuan, Luu. 2019. "HR Flexibility and Job Crafting in Public Organizations: the Roles of Knowledge Sharing and Public Service Motivation." *Group Organization Management* 44(3): 549-577.

[39] Wilthagen, Ton, e Frank Tros. 2004. "The Concept of Flexicurity: a New Approach to Regulating Employment and Labour Markets."*European Review of Labour and Research* 10(2): 166-186.
[40] Wright, Patrick, e Scott Snell. 1998. "Toward a Unifying Framework for Exploring Fit and Flexibility in Strategic Human Resource Management."*Academy of Management Review* 23(4): 756-772.

Referências

[1] Decreto-Lei 343/99, de 26 de Agosto. 1999. Estatuto dos funcionários de justiça.
[2] Decreto-Lei 165/12, de 31 de Julho. 2012. Fixa a organização, missão, atribuição e competências da Direcção Geral da Administração da Justiça.
[3] Decreto-Lei 49/14, de 27/3. 2014. Regulamenta o regime aplicável à organização e funcionamento dos tribunais judiciais.
[4] Despacho 2486/12, de 6/2. 2012. Planificação temporal dos procedimentos necessários á implementação da reforma judiciária.
[5] Lei 62/13, de 26/8. 2013. Lei da organização do sistema judiciário.
[6] Lei 35/14, de 20/6. 2014. Lei geral do trabalho em funções públicas.
[7] Portaria 161/14, de 21/8. 2014. Aprova e fixa o mapa de pessoal das secretarias dos tribunais judiciais de primeira instância.
[8] Portaria 164/14, de 21/8. 2014. Fixa os critérios objectivos e quantitativos para a distribuição do pessoal oficial de justiça.

Carlos José Farinha is a Secretary of Judicial Inspections at the Superior Council of the Judiciary since 2010, and has been involved in the Portuguese Judicial System throughout all of his professional life, since 1987. Carlos Farinha holds a Bachelor Degree in Public Management from Cávado and Ave Polytechnic Institute, and a Master's Degree in Public Administration from University of Minho.

Miguel Ângelo Rodrigues is a Professor of Public Administration at the School of Economics and Management of University of Minho and is the Director of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP). His research work focuses on the different aspects of Local Government, from public management to the political science perspective. His most recent research works are focused on the role played by transactions cost in the choice between alternative modes of governance. He studied how market mechanism and collaborative networks could be an alternative to the traditional hierarchic model. More recently, he has been working on the trend of reverse contracting for service delivery.

EDITORIAL POLICIES

Focus and Scope

Perspectivas is an online peer reviewed journal published by CICP - Research Center in Political Science (University of Minho and University of Évora, Portugal). The journal invites submissions from established academics as well as early career researchers whose work may bring unpublished, innovative and significant theoretical, conceptual, methodological and empirical contributions to the fields of Political Science, International Relations and Public Administration and Policy.

Policy for non-original articles

As norm, the Journal does not accept for publication as originals, articles that have been published elsewhere in languages different from that of submission. However, articles published elsewhere (regardless of original language) may be exceptionally considered by the Journal, provided that the authors state clearly in the submission form that the article is not an original and prove to have permission to reproduce copyright material.

Special issues

Journal welcomes proposals for Special Issues. Proposals for organising special issues should be sent directly to `info@perspectivasjournal.com`

Book reviews

Book reviews may be submitted at any time. They may be up to 1000 words, and follow the journal's editorial style.

POLÍTICAS EDITORIAIS

Foco e Âmbito

A Perspectivas é uma revista científica de revisão anónima por pares publicada pelo CICP - Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política (Universidade do Minho e Universidade de Évora, Portugal). A Revista convida à submissão de manuscritos por académicos já estabelecidos assim com de investigadores em início de carreira, cujo o trabalho tenha potencial para trazer contribuições teóricas, concetuais, metodológicas e empíricas não publicadas, inovadoras e significativas para as áreas de Ciência Política, Relações Internacionais e Administração e Políticas Públicas.

Política para Artigos não-originais

Como é norma, a Revista não aceita para publicação como originais artigos publicados em outras publicações ou em idiomas diferentes dos da submissão original. No entanto, artigos publicados em outras publicações (independentemente do idioma original) poderão ser considerados excecionalmente pela Perspectivas, desde que os autores declarem claramente no formulário de submissão que o artigo não é original e comprovem ter permissão para reproduzir material protegido por direitos de autor.

Special issues

A Equipa Editorial da Perspectivas está disponível para aceitar propostas para Special Issues. As propostas para a organização de Special Issues deverão ser enviadas para o endereço email `info@perspectivasjournal.com`.

Book reviews

Book reviews poderão ser submetidas a qualquer altura. Deverão ser compostas por um máximo de 1.000 palavras e estar em conformidade com o estilo editorial da revista.

Submission Requirements

Guidelines for Submissions

Authors must submit their manuscripts online at Perspectivas' webpage (www.perspectivasjournal.com). All manuscripts must be submitted in Portuguese or in English, however, manuscripts submitted in Portuguese must provide its abstract in English as well. The Journal does not provide translation services, but it may exceptionally translate abstracts at authors' request.

All articles must include an abstract not exceeding 250 words, followed by a maximum of five keywords. Articles can not exceed 8000 words in length, including footnotes, bibliographic references, tables, graphics and figures.

Book reviews do not require an abstract and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

All manuscripts should be provided in editable formats (not PDF) and must be free from jargon, biased and offensive language. Authors are responsible for ensuring that their manuscripts are in accordance to the Journal style.

Details about the author(s) and/or academic/professional affiliations must be provided only where requested during the on-line submission process as to ensure the anonymity of the submission.

Revised articles

When submitting revised articles, authors must signal directly in the text all revisions made. Authors may also send a file with a direct response to the reviewers comments, with no reference to contacts, names or institutional affiliations. This file will be sent to reviewers, hence the importance of keeping anonymity. Answers and revisions should always be as neat and detailed as possible as to avoid any misinterpretations. The revised articles and any other files should be sent to the Journal using the author's login area, and following the articles's identification provided by the Journal.

Copyright Notice

Authors must be sure that they have permission to reproduce copyright material, prior to submitting their articles to this Journal. Authors must secure permission if they have permission to reproduce figures, tables, or any extract from the text of another source. This applies to direct reproduction as well as to any derivative reproduction.

In assigning copyright, authors retain their right to use their own material elsewhere, provided that the Journal is acknowledged as the original place of publication, and the Editorial Team is notified in writing in advance.

Further information on copyright policy please visit Perspectivas' website.

Requisitos para Submissão de Manuscritos

Orientações para Submissão de Manuscritos

Os autores devem submeter os seus manuscritos online através da página da Perspectivas em www.perspectivasjournal.com. Todos os manuscritos devem ser submetidos em português ou em inglês, no entanto, os manuscritos submetidos em português devem também fornecer uma tradução do resumo em em inglês. A Revista não fornece serviços de tradução, mas poderá excecionalmente traduzir resumos a pedido dos autores.

Todos os artigos devem incluir um resumo com no máximo 250 palavras, seguido de um máximo de cinco palavras-chave. Os artigos não podem exceder as 8000 palavras, incluindo notas de rodapé, referências bibliográficas, tabelas, gráficos e figuras.

Book Reviews não requerem um resumo e não devem exceder 1000 palavras.

Todos os manuscritos devem ser submetidos em formatos editáveis (não em PDF) e devem estar livres de jargões, linguagem tendenciosa e ofensiva. Os autores são responsáveis por garantir que os seus manuscritos estão de acordo com o estilo da revista.

Detalhes sobre o/a(s) autor(e/as) e/ou afiliações académicas/profissionais devem ser fornecidos somente quando solicitados durante o processo de submissão online, a fim de garantir o anonimato do envio.

Submissão de Manuscritos Revistos

Ao submeter manuscritos revistos, os autores devem sinalizar diretamente no texto todas as revisões feitas. Os autores podem também submeter um arquivo de resposta direta aos comentários dos revisores, sem referência a contatos, nomes ou afiliações institucionais. Este arquivo será enviado aos revisores. As respostas e as revisões devem sempre ser o mais precisas e detalhadas possível, para evitar interpretações errôneas. Os artigos revistos e quaisquer outros arquivos devem ser enviados através da plataforma da Revista.

Direitos de Autor

Os autores devem certificar-se que possuem permissão para reproduzir material protegido por direitos de autor antes de submeterem os seus manuscritos a esta Revista. Os autores devem garantir que possuem permissão para reproduzir figuras, tabelas ou extratos de texto originais de outras fontes. Isto é aplicável à reprodução direta e a qualquer reprodução indireta.

Ao atribuir direitos de autor, os autores mantêm o direito de usar seu próprio material em outras publicações, desde que a Revista seja reconhecida como a publicação original e a Equipa Editorial seja notificada por escrito com antecedência.

Mais informações sobre a política de Direitos de Autor estão disponíveis no website da Perspectivas.

GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

Perspectivas Ethics and Malpractice Statement

Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The journal is committed to guaranteeing ethics in publication and quality of articles. Conformance to standards of ethical behavior is therefore expected from Authors, Editors, Reviewers, and the Publisher.

All parties involved in publishing an article in this journal (editors, peer reviewers, authors, and publisher) must follow appropriate guidelines for ethical behavior. Editors and reviewers must maintain objectivity and confidentiality and manage potential conflicts of interest. Authors must be honest and disclose their sources and funders. More precisely, to assure high-quality publications, public trust in scientific findings, and proper credit for ideas and results, ethical standards for publication in Perspectivas-Journal of Political Science include but are not limited to the following:

Editorial Team

The Editor-in-chief is appointed by the Scientific Committee of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP). Any concerns regarding conduct of the Editor-in-chief should be directed to the Director of CICP. Editors serve at the will of the editor-in-chief, and any concerns regarding their conduct should be directed to the editor-in-chief.

Duties of the Editors

Based on the double-blind peer review of a manuscript, the Editor-in-chief and the Editorial Team are responsible for determining which manuscripts are best suited for publication.

The Editors should evaluate manuscripts on the basis of their scientific merit, without regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy of the authors.

The reviews should be supported by objective and clear arguments that help the author to improve the article. The reviewers cannot in any circumstances take advantage of privileged informations or ideas obtained through peer review for personal advantage.

Policies, Procedures and Integrity

The Editor-in-chief and the Editorial Team are guided by the policies of the journal's editorial board regarding libel, copyright infringement, and plagiarism. The Editor-in-chief will continually assess the effects of journal policies on author and reviewer behaviour, revising policies as required, encouraging responsible behaviour and discouraging misconduct.

Decisions to accept or reject a manuscript for publication are based on importance, originality, clarity, and the study's validity and relevance to the journal's Editorial Statement. Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science will never consider an author's race, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy.

Identifying information will be removed from submitted manuscripts so that reviewers cannot access any information about authors, and vice versa. Reviewer comments to the editors are strictly confidential, and reviewer comments to authors will be made anonymous. The names of the reviewers will be known only to the Editor-in-chief, Editors, and Editorial staff and will remain strictly confidential to authors and other reviewers. The names of the authors will be known only to the Editor-in-chief, Editors, and Editorial staff and will remain strictly confidential to reviewers.

The Editor-in-chief, editors, and any editorial staff will not disclose any information about a submitted manuscript to anyone other than the authors, reviewers, potential reviewers, other editorial advisers, and the publisher.

Conflict of Interests and Errors in Published Works

To ensure accountability and transparency, the Editor-in-chief will establish systems for managing conflicts of interest for him - or herself, staff, authors, reviewers, and editorial team members.

It is the editor-in-chief's responsibility to promptly investigate accusations of errors in published work and to ensure that corrections and retractions are published in an accurate and timely manner.

Duties of Reviewers

The reviewers should respect the confidentiality of the revision process. The reviews should be supported by objective and clear arguments that help the author to improve manuscripts. The reviewers cannot in any circumstances take advantage of privileged information or ideas obtained through peer review for personal advantage.

Private information or ideas obtained through double-blind peer review must be kept confidential and not used for personal advantage. Manuscripts received for review must be treated as confidential documents. Information contained in a submitted manuscript must not be shown to or discussed with others without written permission of the Editor-in-chief or Editors.

Reviews shall contain no personal criticism of authors. Reviewers should clearly express their views with supporting arguments, and reviews should be conducted objectively and constructively.

Reviewers should identify relevant published work that has not been cited by the authors. If a reviewer finds any substantial similarity or overlap between the submitted manuscript and any other published works, the Editor-in-chief or Editors must be notified promptly. Editors will refer to policies and procedures regarding plagiarism to identify and react to accusations of plagiarism.

If a reviewer discovers a conflict of interest with an assigned manuscript (resulting from competitive, collaborative, or other relationships or connections with any of the authors, companies, or institutions) the Editor-in-chief or Editors must be notified promptly to be excused from the review process.

Any reviewer who feels unqualified to review an assigned manuscript or unable to provide a prompt review should notify the Editor-in-chief or Editors to be excused from the review process.

Duties of Authors

Authors of manuscripts of original research should present an accurate account of the work performed as well as an objective discussion of its significance. Underlying data should be represented accurately in the manuscript. A manuscript should contain sufficient detail and references to permit others to replicate the work. Fraudulent or knowingly inaccurate statements constitute unethical behaviour and are unacceptable.

Peer review is the foundation of the journal publication process. By submitting a manuscript, an author agrees to be an active and responsive participant in by responding timely and appropriately to reviewer comments.

Authors may be asked to provide the raw data in connection with a manuscript for editorial review, should be prepared to provide access to such data, and should retain such data for a reasonable time after publication.

It is essential that editors and reviewers be told by the authors when any portion of a manuscript is based heavily on previous work, even if this work has been written by one or more of the authors. It is the responsibility of the author not only to cite the previous work, including his or her own, but to provide an indication of the extent to which a manuscript depends on this work. The editor-in-chief will refer to policies and procedures regarding plagiarism to identify and react to accusations of plagiarism.

Proper acknowledgment of the work of others must always be given. Authors should cite publications that have been influential in determining the nature of the reported work.

Inclusion of citations in a submitted manuscript with the primary purpose of increasing the number of citations to a given author's work or to articles published in a particular journal constitutes unethical behaviour.

Falsifying or fabricating numerical or experimental data or results in a submitted manuscript constitutes unethical behaviour.

Authorship must be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the reported study. All those who have made significant contributions should be listed as co-authors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the research project, they should be acknowledged or listed as contributors.

It is the author's responsibility to promptly notify the editor-in-chief or associate editor if a significant error or inaccuracy is discovered in a published work so that the journal can retract or correct the paper as quickly as possible.

An author should not publish manuscripts describing essentially the same research in more than one journal or primary publication. If authors have used their own previously published work, or work that is currently under review, as the basis for a submitted manuscript, they are required to cite the previous work and indicate how their submitted manuscript offers novel contributions beyond those of the previous work. Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal concurrently constitutes unethical behaviour. Redundant publications involve the inappropriate division of study outcomes into several articles. Manuscripts that are found to have been published elsewhere, to be under review elsewhere, or to have been published or submitted with undisclosed redundant data will be subject to the procedures and penalties.

Corresponding Author

The name, address, and valid email address of the corresponding author must be provided. The corresponding author is the author responsible for communicating with the journal for publication. The corresponding author is responsible for ensuring that all appropriate co-authors and no inappropriate co-authors are included on the manuscript and that all co-authors have seen and approved the final version of the manuscript and have agreed to its submission for publication.

Funding Sources

Funding sources for the research reported in the manuscript should be duly acknowledged. It is the responsibility of the authors to follow any publishing mandates outlined by their funding organizations.

All sources of financial support for the project or any substantive conflict of interest that might be interpreted to influence the results must be disclosed.

Sanctions

In the event of documented violations of any of these ethical guidelines, the editor-in-chief of the Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science (acting independently or in consultation with the Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science Editorial Team) may:

1. Immediately reject the infringing manuscript.

2. Immediately reject every other manuscript submitted to Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science by any of the authors of the infringing manuscript.

3. Prohibit all the authors from submitting new manuscripts to Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science, either individually or in combination with other authors of the infringing manuscript, as well as in combination with any other authors.

4. Prohibit all authors from serving on the editorial board of Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science.

5. In cases where the violations of the ethical guidelines are deemed particularly outrageous, Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science reserves the right to impose additional sanctions.

ORIENTAÇÕES PARA COMPORTAMENTO ÉTICO

Declaração de Ética e de Más-práticas da Perspectivas

Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science é uma revista científica de revisão anónima por pares. A revista Perspectivas assume o compromisso de garantir ética na publicação e qualidade dos artigos. Portanto, espera-se que os autores, editores, revisores e o editor cumpram os padrões de comportamento ético.

Todas as partes envolvidas na publicação de um artigo nesta revista (editores, revisores, autores) devem seguir as orientações de comportamento ético. Editores e revisores devem manter objetividade e confidencialidade e gerir possíveis conflitos de interesse. Os autores devem ser íntegros e divulgar as suas fontes e financiadores. Mais precisamente, para garantir publicações de alta qualidade, confiança do público nas descobertas científicas e assegurar que o devido crédito é atribuído aos titulares das ideias e resultados científicos, os padrões éticos para publicação na Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science incluem, mas não se limitam ao seguinte:

Equipa Editorial

O Editor-in-Chief é nomeado pelo Conselho Científico do Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política (CICP). Quaisquer preocupações relativas à conduta do Editor-in-Chief devem ser encaminhadas ao Diretor do CICP. Os Editores seguem as indicações do Editor-in-Chief, e quaisquer preocupações relativas à conduta dos Editores devem ser direcionadas ao Editor-in-chief.

Obrigações dos Editores

Com base nas revisões anónimas por pares, o Editor-in-Chief e a Equipa Editorial são responsáveis por determinar quais os manuscritos são os mais adequados para publicação.

Os Editores devem avaliar os manuscritos com base em seu mérito científico, sem considerar raça, género, orientação sexual, crença religiosa, origem étnica, cidadania ou filosofia política dos autores.

As revisões devem ser apoiadas por argumentos objetivos e claros que apoiam o autor a melhorar o artigo. Os revisores não podem, em circunstância alguma, tirar proveito de informações ou ideias privilegiadas obtidas por meio de revisão por pares para obter vantagens pessoais.

Políticas, Procedimentos e Integridade

O Editor-in-Chief e a Equipa Editorial são orientados pelas políticas do Editorial Board da revista sobre difamação, violação de direitos de autor e plágio. O Editor-in-Chief avaliará continuamente os efeitos das políticas da revista no comportamento dos autores e revisores, revendo as políticas conforme necessário, incentivando o comportamento responsável e desencorajando a má conduta.

As decisões de aceitar ou rejeitar um manuscrito para publicação são baseadas na importância, originalidade, clareza e validade e relevância do estudo para a Revista. textit Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science nunca considerará a raça, género, orientação sexual, crenças religiosas, origem étnica, cidadania ou filosofia política de um autor.

As informações de identificação serão removidas dos manuscritos para que os revisores não tenham acesso a qualquer informação sobre os autores e vice-versa. Os comentários dos revisores aos editores são estritamente confidenciais, e os comentários dos revisores aos autores serão anónimos. Os nomes dos revisores serão conhecidos apenas pelo Editor-in-Chief, Editores e Equipa Editorial e permanecerão estritamente confidenciais para os autores e outros revisores. Os nomes dos autores serão conhecidos apenas pelo Redator, Editor-in-Chief, Editores e Equipa editorial e permanecerão estritamente confidenciais para os revisores.

O Editor-in-Chief, os Editores e a Equipa Editorial não divulgarão qualquer informação sobre um manuscrito para além dos autores, revisores, potenciais revisores, outros consultores editoriais e o redator.

Conflito de Interesses e Erros em Trabalhos Publicados

Para garantir responsabilidade e transparência, o Editor-in-Chief estabelecerá meios para gerir conflitos de interesse para o próprio, para o staff, autores, revisores e membros da Equipa Editorial.

É da responsabilidade do Editor-in-Chief investigar imediatamente as acusações de erros no trabalho publicado e garantir que as correções e retratações sejam publicadas de maneira precisa e oportuna.

Obrigações dos Revisores

Os revisores devem respeitar a confidencialidade do processo de revisão. As revisões devem ser baseadas em argumentos objetivos e claros que ajudam o autor a melhorar os manuscritos. Os revisores não podem, em circunstância alguma, tirar proveito das informações privilegiadas ou das ideias obtidas por meio da revisão por pares para obter vantagens pessoais.

Informações ou ideias particulares obtidas por meio da revisão por pares devem ser mantidas em sigilo e não usadas para vantagem pessoal. Os manuscritos recebidos para revisão devem ser tratados como documentos confidenciais. As informações contidas num manuscrito enviado não devem ser mostradas ou discutidas com outras pessoas sem a permissão por escrito do Editor-in-Chief ou dos Editores.

As revisões não devem conter críticas pessoais aos autores. Os revisores devem expressar claramente suas opiniões com argumentos de apoio, e as revisões devem ser conduzidas de forma objetiva e construtiva.

Os revisores devem identificar trabalhos publicados relevantes que não tenham sido citados pelos autores. Se um revisor encontrar alguma semelhança ou sobreposição substancial entre o manuscrito enviado e quaisquer outros trabalhos publicados, o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores deverão ser notificados imediatamente. Os Editores irão basear-se nas políticas e procedimentos previstos para situações de plágio para identificar e reagir às acusações de plágio.

Se um revisor descobrir um conflito de interesses num manuscrito (resultante de relações ou conexões competitivas, colaborativas ou outras com qualquer um dos autores, empresas ou instituições), deverão notificar de imediato o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

Qualquer revisor que não se sinta qualificado para rever um manuscrito ou incapaz de fornecer uma revisão imediata deve notificar o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

.

Obrigações dos Autores

Os autores de manuscritos de investigações originais devem apresentar um relato preciso do trabalho realizado, assim como uma discussão objetiva de seu significado. Os dados subjacentes devem ser representados com precisão no manuscrito. Um manuscrito deve conter detalhes e referências suficientes para permitir que outros possam replicar o trabalho. Declarações fraudulentas ou conscientemente imprecisas constituem comportamento anti-ético e são inaceitáveis.

A revisão por pares é a base do processo de publicação da revista. Ao enviar um manuscrito, o autor concorda ser um participante ativo e responsivo, respondendo oportuna e adequadamente aos comentários dos revisores.

Os autores podem ser solicitados a fornecer os dados brutos em conexão com um manuscrito para revisão editorial, devem estar preparados para fornecer acesso a esses dados e devem retê-los por um tempo razoável após a publicação.

É essencial que os Editores e revisores sejam informados pelos autores quando qualquer parte de um manuscrito se baseia fortemente em trabalhos anteriores, mesmo que este trabalho tenha sido escrito por um ou mais autores. É da responsabilidade do autor não apenas citar o trabalho anterior, incluindo o seu, mas fornecer uma indicação da extensão em que um manuscrito depende desse trabalho. O Editor-in-Chief fará referência a políticas e procedimentos relativos ao plágio para identificar e reagir às acusações de plágio.

O reconhecimento adequado do trabalho de outros deve sempre ser atribuído. Os autores devem citar publicações que influenciaram na determinação da natureza do trabalho relatado.

A inclusão de citações num manuscrito enviado com o objetivo principal de aumentar o número de citações no trabalho de um determinado autor ou em artigos publicados numa determinada revista constitui um comportamento anti-ético.

A falsificação ou fabricação de dados ou resultados numéricos ou experimentais num manuscrito enviado constitui um comportamento anti-ético.

A autoria deve ser limitada àqueles que fizeram uma contribuição significativa para a conceção, design, execução ou interpretação do estudo relatado. Todos aqueles que fizeram contribuições significativas devem ser integrados como coautores. Quando existirem terceiros que tenham participado em certos aspetos substantivos do projeto de investigação, deverão ser reconhecidos ou integrados como colaboradores.

É da responsabilidade do autor notificar imediatamente o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores se um erro significativo ou imprecisão for descoberto num trabalho publicado, para que a revista possa retrair ou corrigir o trabalho com a maior brevidade possível.

Um autor não deve publicar manuscritos que descrevam essencialmente a mesma investigação em mais de uma revista ou a publicação principal. Se os autores tiverem usado seu próprio trabalho publicado anteriormente, ou trabalho atualmente em revisão, como base para um manuscrito enviado, deverão citar o trabalho anterior e indicar como o manuscrito enviado oferece novas contribuições para além das do trabalho anterior. Submeter o mesmo manuscrito a mais de uma revista constitui simultaneamente um comportamento anti-ético. Publicações redundantes envolvem a divisão inadequada dos resultados do estudo em vários artigos. Os manuscritos que foram publicados em outros lugares, que se encontram em revisão em outros lugares ou que foram publicados ou enviados com dados redundantes não divulgados estarão sujeitos aos procedimentos e sanções.

Autor Correspondente

O nome e o endereço de email válido do autor correspondente são dados a ser fornecidos. O autor correspondente é o autor responsável pela comunicação com a revista para publicação. O autor correspondente é responsável por garantir que todos os coautores sejam incluídos no manuscrito e que todos os coautores tenham visto e aprovado a versão final do manuscrito e concordado com sua submissão para publicação.

Fontes de Financiamento

As fontes de financiamento da investigação do manuscrito devem ser devidamente reconhecidas. É da responsabilidade dos autores seguir quaisquer obrigações de publicação descritos pelas suas entidades financiadoras.

Todas as fontes de apoio financeiro ao projeto ou qualquer conflito de interesses substantivo que possa ser interpretado para influenciar os resultados devem ser divulgadas.

Sanções

No caso de serem encontradas violações documentadas de qualquer uma das orientações éticas, o Editor-in-Chief da Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science (agindo de forma independente ou em conjunto com a Equipa Editorial da Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science) pode:

1. Rejeitar imediatamente o manuscrito infrator.

2. Rejeitar imediatamente qualquer outro manuscrito enviado à Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science por qualquer um dos autores do manuscrito infrator.

3. Proibir todos os autores de submeter novos manuscritos para a Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science, individualmente ou em combinação com outros autores do manuscrito infrator, bem como em combinação com outros autores.

4. Proibir todos os autores de fazer parte do Conselho Editorial da Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science.

5. Nos casos em que as violações das orientações éticas são consideradas particularmente malicioso, a Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science reserva o direito de impor sanções adicionais.

Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science is a peer reviewed journal edited by the Research Center in Political Science (University of Minho and University of Évora).

A Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science é uma revista com arbitragem científica editada pelo Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política (Universidade do Minho e Universidade de Évora).

CICP/Editor

cicp Research Center in Political Science

Universidade do Minho

UNIVERSIDADE DE ÉVORA

FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia