



# PERSPECTIVAS

Journal of Political Science

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## #21

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# Editorial

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**W**ELCOME to the Volume 21 of *Perspectivas*, the journal of the Research Center in Political Science.

This issue contains one article from the field of Political Science, the first one, two articles from the field of International Relations, following two articles and the last from the Public Administration field. The first article addresses the political determinants of populism in Italy comparing Mário Contes (Conte I) governments with the cabinets in Germany (Merkel I to IV). The topic of populism is clearly in the research agenda as leaders across the world tackle and deal with this issue, in such different realities such as Bolsonaro in Brazil and Trump in the USA.

This issue presents two International Relations topics, first, the Arctic continent management and mismanagement, and the last article on the inter-disciplinarily on political science and International Relations. The article on the Arctic continent management is also of widespread interest and fully fledged for Global Governance approaches: How can the UN and the International System cope with a Global Arctic continent? The question of common global resources and goods, which is subject to common resource curse (Hardin, 1968) is also in the research agenda of various fields, including economics, IR and political science. This article provides clues to deal with mismanagement and proposes the discussion

of the topic. Second a discussion between the boundaries of scientific research (epistemology of science) in political science and IR with other sciences. How can we know and research on the political domains? How can political science benefit and export approaches in multidisciplinary and inter-disciplinary frameworks? The boundaries of science are known as we deal within the current science and normal science paradigm (à la Khun 1962), but can we cope with scientific revolutions and social change within the same frameworks? All of these questions are left open to research. However, if here is a will, there is a way! Finally, last but not the least, the fourth article analyses the inter-organizational cooperation among local actors, based on a network approach to local governance. Good reading and feedback to our editorial office.

*The editorial team.*


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# Do Populists Govern Differently? The Management of the Italian M5S-League Coalition in Comparative Perspective

## Populistas governam de forma diferente? A administração da coligação italiana Liga e M5S numa perspectiva comparativa

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**Abstract**—In West European context, the first fully-fledged populist government that entered office in Italy in 2018 (Conte I) has been presented as a peculiar case. After discussing party dilemmas within coalitions, the article analyses – in comparative perspective – the way in which the two partners M5S and League managed inter-party relations despite their divergent policy preferences. The work focuses on both structural and dynamic mechanisms of coalition governance. Particular attention is paid to the coalition agreement, which is compared to the benchmark case of the German Merkel IV cabinet. Findings show that the Conte I cabinet diverged from the Italian tradition, but approached other European models, despite its rhetoric of exceptionality. Yet, poor definition of policy goals and ambiguous governance mechanisms are observed.

**Keywords**—Coalition governance, Populism, Italian Government, Five Star Movement, League.

**Resumo**—No contexto da Europa Ocidental, o primeiro governo populista de pleno direito que entrou em funções na Itália em 2018 (Conte I) foi apresentado como um caso peculiar. Após discutir os dilemas partidários dentro das coligações, o artigo analisa - em perspectiva comparativa - como os dois parceiros M5S e Liga geriram as relações interpartidárias apesar das suas preferências políticas divergentes. O trabalho centra-se tanto nos mecanismos estruturais como dinâmicos de governação da coligação. É dada especial atenção ao acordo da coligação, que é comparado com o caso de referência do gabinete alemão Merkel IV. Os resultados mostram que o gabinete de Conte I divergiu da tradição italiana, mas abordou outros modelos europeus, apesar da sua retórica de excecionalidade. No entanto, observa-se uma má definição dos objetivos políticos e mecanismos ambíguos de governança.

**Palavras-Chave**—Governança, Populismo, Governo Italiano, Movimento Cinco Estrelas, Liga.

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## Introduction: The Yellow-Green Government and Research Rationale

THIS article investigates the mechanisms of coalition governance in the Italian Conte I government,<sup>1</sup> which entered office in June 2018 and fell in August 2019 as a result of inter-party conflict and consequent prime ministerial resignation.<sup>2</sup>

Although during the electoral campaign the larger (Five Star Movement – *Movimento Cinque Stelle*, M5S) and the junior (*Lega* - League)<sup>3</sup> coalition partners had shown ideological proximity on issues such as EU-integration and immigration, the Conte I government formation was mostly driven by office-seeking motivations rather than congruent policy goals (Gianfreda and Carlotti 2018; Giannetti *et al.* 2018). The yellow-green government (after the colours of the two parties' traditional symbols, M5S and League respectively) is an insightful case for the study of coalition governance for several reasons: to begin with, its ideological heterogeneity. Second, the Conte I government has been the first Western European executive entirely formed by parties that do not belong to any traditional European party family. Third, it has been the first West European executive made up of only fully-fledged populist parties (D'Alimonte 2019). Finally, the internal organization is worthwhile to mention: the leaders of the two coalition parties (Luigi Di Maio for the M5S and Matteo Salvini for the League) entered the cabinet as deputy prime ministers and were the main drivers of the executive action. The Private Law professor Giuseppe Conte, on his turn, was selected as prime minister by the two party leaders only at the end of the formation

process, to be an independent figure (although closer to the M5S) and a simple 'guarantor' of the coalitional pact (Vercesi 2019), "representing the power-sharing agreement between the leaders of the governing parties" (Valbruzzi 2018, 474). It is interesting to observe that – when chosen – Giuseppe Conte was politically unknown<sup>4</sup> and, as pointed out by Pedrazzani (2018, 2), "[was...] neither a high-ranking bureaucrat nor a renowned economist. His primary task seem [ed...] to be that of ensuring coordination [...] in the course of day-to-day policymaking". From this viewpoint, the author observes that the appointment of Conte was different compared to former Italian technocratic prime ministers, such as Ciampi (1993-94), Dini (1995-96), and Monti (2011-13). However, the Conte I government is similar to other European cases and different from previous Italian experiences because of the adoption of a post-electoral coalition agreement; the participation of the two party leaders in its definition; and the mention – in this document – of a coalition committee to manage intra-coalitional conflicts.

It is worth also noting that – even before being sworn in on 1 June 2018 and for the whole duration in office – the government sought to legitimize itself as a harbinger of 'novelty'. After being designated as *formateur* by the President of the Republic, Giuseppe Conte claimed to be the *formateur* for 'the government of change' (*governo del cambiamento*) and the 'advocate of the Italian people' (*avvocato difensore del popolo italiano*).<sup>5</sup> In this regard, it might be promising to investigate whether this rhetoric of novelty resulted in a different way of organizing the work of the new cabinet, in comparison to other experiences.

All these reasons prompt investigating coalition governance in the Conti I government in a comparative perspective. This article aims to understand whether and how the Conte I government is comparable to other European cases, which have been characterized by internal ideological heterogeneity, or if it is an exceptional

1. 'Government' is used as a synonymous of 'executive', although the denotative field of the two terms does not perfectly overlap (Barbieri, and Vercesi 2013).

2. See "Il discorso di Conte al Senato: 'Qui si arresta l'azione del governo, Salvini irresponsabile, chiarisca sulla Russia'. Poi le dimissioni" *Corriere della Sera*, 20 August 2019. See Marangoni and Verzichelli (2019) for a review of the governmental activity in its first months. The government remained in office as a caretaker government until September 2019. This period is not here taken into account.

3. Henceforth, only parties represented in the full cabinet are considered as parts of the coalition. In the case of the Conte I government, M5S and League respect this criterion, while the Associational Movement of the Italians Abroad (*Movimento associativo italiani all'estero*, MAIE) was represented only by a junior minister.

4. Prior to entering office, Conte had been selected to be one of the names for a list of possible future ministers, which had been announced by the M5S in the electoral campaign.

5. "Conte, discorsi a confronto: dal governo del cambiamento al nuovo umanesimo" *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 29 August 2019.

case as often argued by political observers and media. The investigation answers two analytical-descriptive questions: (1) how did the M5S and League – which had been electoral competitors with divergent preferences on salient issues – manage inter-party relations in government?; (2) how was coalition governance organized in comparative perspective?

Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the coalition agreement, which is usually considered as the device *par excellence* when it comes to facilitating decision-making within heterogeneous coalitions (Moury and Timmermans 2013; Bowler *et al.* 2016). In the context of Italian politics, the study of coalition agreements is even more urgent, given the paucity of executives that have adopted it (Moury and Timmermans 2008). For the sake of cross-country comparison, Germany is chosen as a benchmark case. Indeed, Germany is a textbook example of country ruled by grand coalitions (*große Koalitionen*) formed by opposite parties; moreover, Germany has a long tradition of detailed coalition agreements (Miller and Müller 2010; Saalfeld *et al.* 2019).

In the next section, the article discusses party strategic dilemmas within coalitions from a theoretical viewpoint, especially in context of dissimilar policy preferences; second, a list of possible mechanisms of coalition governance and their underlying logic are presented. This introduces the systematic investigation of coalition governance between the M5S and the League. In a further step, the Italian coalition agreement is compared to the German *Koalitionsvertrag* (Coalition contract), which was signed by the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU), the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*, CSU), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) after 2017 general election. Conclusions suggest interpretations and research outlooks.

## 1 The Dilemma of Coalition Governments and the Mechanisms of Inter-Party Control

Coalition governments face other challenges than single-party governments, because of different internal power distribution and division of tasks. For example, in coalitions parties can only select the ‘own’ ministers, having at most a veto power on the names proposed by the allies. Moreover, coalitions limit the chances for parties to produce the desired policy outputs, since policy-making is based on inter-party compromise. In contrast, single-party cabinets are more likely to implement coherent public policy, since the party in government controls the majority in the parliament and – often – the party leader and the prime minister are the same person (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993; Müller-Rommel and Vercesi 2020, 768). *Mutatis mutandis*, a similar logic can be applied to the distinction between majority and minority coalitions. In terms of ease of reaching final policy agreements, majority coalitions are subjected to pressures other than those of minority coalitions, in that the former do not need to negotiate each policy with parties that are external to the cabinet (Bergman *et al.* 2013). In this article, only majority coalitions are taken into consideration. Assuming that parties are internally more united<sup>6</sup> than coalitions (Krehbiel 1993; Müller and Strøm 2000), one can claim that inherent centrifugal drives undermine the durability of coalition governments. By definition, a coalition includes parties with (partially) conflicting objectives; these parties make a provisional pact of cooperation to pursue shared goals. The reason is that parties could not achieve the shared goals by themselves or, however, it would be too costly (Vercesi 2013, 84). In government, parties seek office and policy and ‘offer’ their bargaining power to get them. This bargaining power is a function of the respective number of parliamentary seats and the party “position relative to the other parliamentary parties in policy space” (Müller and Strøm 2000, 7).

6. Party unity does not mean party cohesion (e.g., Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Ceron 2019). Rather, the assumption here is that single party members and factions are induced to behave coherently and follow party discipline because of specific contextual incentives (Laver and Shepsle 1999).

Coalition parties face a dilemma: on the one hand, they need to please their actual and potential voters; on the other hand, they have to make and preserve agreements with their electoral competitors (Lupia and Strøm 2008). This means that coalition governments combine necessary cooperation and potential conflict. Several factors exacerbate the trade-off between centripetal and centrifugal drives. Within the coalition, for example, a high number of veto players and heterogeneous party preferences make cooperation harder. Divergent preferences can foster conflicts about portfolio allocation and policy jurisdiction (Budge and Keman 1992; Tsebelis 2002; Zucchini 2013). To overcome these problems, coalition parties can rely on a (formalized) coalition agreement. However, compliance remains voluntary: within the constitutional limits, political parties are always free to follow the (perceived as) most fruitful strategy for their mid and long-term goals.

It is not surprising that smaller and homogeneous majority coalitions are more likely to form and to last (Laver and Schofield 1990; Warwick 1994). However, specific party system attributes, critical events, and institutional factors can lead to the formation of minority governments, ‘grand coalitions’, and heterogeneous cabinets (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008). Ecker and Meyer (2019) have also stressed the potential part played by a complex bargaining environment in determining the nature of the government formation process. In particular, “in high uncertainty settings (i.e., after legislative elections) each additional (effective) parliamentary party is associated with a [...] decrease in the hazard of finalizing coalition negotiations”, although this holds in Western Europe and not in Central-Eastern Europe (Ecker and Meyer 2015, 7). In this regard, Ecker and Meyer (2015, 8) have concluded that “factors such as ideological conflict, the number of bargaining parties, and elite turnover” can be good indicators of complexity and uncertainty.

Divergent party policy goals favour early cabinet terminations (Luebbert 1986; Saalfeld 2008). Moreover, the ‘fatigue’ due to joint government can be a further reason of government instability. For example, authors such as Warwick and Easton (1992) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) have observed that the likelihood of early cabinet ter-

mination increases over time. What can political parties do to mitigate such jeopardizing effects?

In this regard, parties have different coalition governance’s options. In comparative scholarship, ‘coalition governance’ indicates a set of institutional mechanisms and party behavioural practices aiming to produce government stability, effective policies, and conflict resolution (Strøm *et al.* 2008; Bergman *et al.* 2020). Coalition governance is a process of bargaining and mutual control between partners, who are in competition in the electoral arena. Especially in the European Union context, this process is intertwined with supra-national decision-making. Several policy guidelines that are relevant for member States’ domestic politics are defined at the EU level in international summits, and this produces a two-level bargaining game between parties in national and supra-national political arenas (McDonnell and Werner 2018).

Parties can choose among a range of mechanisms to implement coalition governance. This selection depends on the nature of the coalition itself and its organization. For instance, coalition agreements are more likely to be implemented when parliamentary committees make an effective oversight of the government. Coalition agreements are also more likely to be drafted when the policy distance between parties increases, because they reduce uncertainty in the decision-making. Following a similar logic, coalitions tend to combine a senior minister from a party and a junior minister from another party in the same department: in this case, junior ministers are selected to screen colleagues when parties anticipate lower inter-party interaction. Furthermore, some governance mechanisms are likely to be adopted if parties already know how they work and their effects. This especially applies to coalitions made up of parties that have already been in government together (Müller and Meyer 2010, 116-22; Falcó-Gimeno 2012). It is also worth noting that ministers are both cabinet agents and principals of civil servants within their respective departments. When government interests (as defined by coalition partners) are at odds with departmental interests, the minister’s identification with the latter can be a substantial source of agency loss for coalition parties. To prevent this delegation problem, the

screening and the selection of reliable (according to coalition's preferences) and politically experienced ministers can help parties avoid that ministers 'go native' in their department (Andeweg 2000).

Depending on their timing, the literature distinguishes between *ex ante* (adopted when government forms) and *ex-post* mechanisms (adopted during the life of government). As pointed out by Strøm *et al.* (2010), both *ex-ante* and *ex-post* mechanisms can be implemented in three types of arenas: executive, legislative, and extra-parliamentary. Table 1 shows the main coalition governance devices available for parties.<sup>7</sup>

**Table 1:** Mechanisms of coalition governance

	Executive arena	Legislative arena	Extra-parliamentary arena
<i>Ex-ante</i> mechanisms	1. Portfolio allocation	4. Investiture vote	7. Coalition agreements
<i>Ex-post</i> mechanisms	2. Mutual control in cabinet 3. Watchdog junior minister	5. Parliamentary questions 6. Parliamentary committees	8. Coalition committees

Source: Strøm *et al.* (2010, 522), revised.

The main *ex-ante* executive mechanism is portfolio allocation. Heading a department provides agenda setting power in the relevant policy sector and the party in charge can thus get policy decisions closer to its ideal policy point (Laver and Shepsle 1996). In this regard, empirical evidence tells that the allocation of portfolios tends to follow proportional criteria based on the parties' number of parliamentary seats; however, smaller parties are usually slightly overrepresented (Warwick and Druckman 2006). Watchdog junior ministers are instead an *ex-post* mechanism (Thies 2001; Verzichelli 2008). Third, cabinet ministers keep an eye on colleagues' actions through collective meetings and joint decision-making (Vercesi 2020).

With regard to the legislative arena, the inaugural vote of confidence is an important tool to

screen the prospective cabinet. Absent in cases of negative parliamentarism, in countries based on positive parliamentarism the inaugural vote can be directed towards either the whole cabinet (e.g., in Italy) or prime minister (e.g., Germany and Spain) (Strøm *et al.* 2003). After entering office, the oversight of government can be conducted through parliamentary questions; in this case, MPs ask the government to report about given issues (Höhmman and Sieberer 2020). A third legislative (*ex-post*) control mechanism is the appointment in parliamentary committees of chairs from a coalition partner other than the party of the competent minister in that specific policy sector (Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin and Vanberg 2011). Potentially, parliamentary committees are indeed strategic arenas to modify ministerial decisions; whose members' selection is a prime concern for coalition parties (Curini and Zucchini 2014; Pansardi and Vercesi 2017).

Coalition agreements are the main *ex-ante* extra-parliamentary control mechanism. These pacts do not prevent conflicts, but they enhance intra-coalitional coordination and work as agenda-setter (Timmermans 2006). Finally, coalition committees are used as arenas for conflict resolution. Usually, they include a couple of both government members and party prominents, who are not part of the executive (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008; Vercesi 2016).

Did the Italian yellow-green coalition resort to any of these mechanisms? How and to what extent?

## 2 Coalition Governance in the M5S-League Government

### 2.1 Executive arena

First, I check for portfolio allocation, by focusing on both ministers with portfolio and ministers without portfolio in the council of ministers (*Consiglio dei Ministri*) when the cabinet entered

7. Following in the steps of the international comparative literature on coalition politics, this article focuses on the mechanisms as isolated from other institutions. However, one should not forget that coalition politics interacts with other institutional actors, such as the head of state. Even in parliamentary systems, the head of state can play a relatively incisive part in shaping the relationship between parties. In the Italian case, this has happened especially when the party system was in crisis or inter-party stalemates occurred (Pasquino 2015).



office.<sup>8</sup> Table 2 summarizes ministerial responsibilities and ministers' party affiliation.

**Table 2:** Ministerial portfolio allocation in the M5S-League government (at the time of inauguration).

Portfolio	Minister	Party affiliation
1. President of the Council of Minister (prime minister)	Giuseppe Conte	Independent (M5S)
2. Deputy prime minister	Matteo Salvini	League
3. Deputy prime minister	Luigi Di Maio	M5S
4. <i>Relationships with the parliament</i>	Riccardo Fraccaro	M5S
5. <i>Public Administration</i>	Giulia Bongiorno	League
6. <i>Regional affairs and Autonomies</i>	Erika Stefani	League
7. <i>South</i>	Barbara Lezzi	M5S
8. <i>Disability and Family</i>	Lorenzo Fontana	League
9. <i>European Affairs</i>	Paolo Savona	Technocratic
10. Foreign affairs and International Cooperation	Enzo Moavero Milanesi	Technocratic
11. Interior	Matteo Salvini	League
12. Justice	Alfonso Bonafede	M5S
13. Defence	Elisabetta Trenta	M5S
14. Economy and Finance	Giovanni Tria	Technocratic
15. Economic development	Luigi Di Maio	M5S
16. Agricultural, food, forestry policies and Tourism	Gian Marco Centinaio	League
17. Environment and Safeguard of territory and sea	Sergio Costa	Independent (M5S)
18. Infrastructures and Transportations	Daniilo Toninelli	M5S
19. Labour and Social policy	Luigi Di Maio	M5S
20. Education, University and Research	Marco Bussetti	Independent (League)
21. Cultural heritage and activities	Alberto Bonisoli	M5S
22. Health	Giulia Grillo	M5S

Note: 'technocratic' indicates a non-partisan minister; 'independent' means that the minister is non-partisan, but publicly close to the positions of one of the coalition partners (between brackets). Ministries without portfolios are in italics. Source: [www.governo.it](http://www.governo.it) and own elaboration.

The cabinet was made up of 18 ministers. Only the two deputy prime ministers Luigi Di Maio and Matteo Salvini received more than one ministerial position: the former was also minister for Economic development, Labour and Social policy; the latter was minister for the Interior. Overall, 22 portfolios were allocated. With regard to the criterion of proportional distribution, at a first glance the Conte I cabinet is a deviating case. The M5S received 45.4% of portfolios against 64% of coalition's parliamentary seats in the first chamber (222). Moreover, the League occupied the same percentage of portfolios that went to non-partisan ministers (27.3%) against 36% of seats (125).<sup>9</sup> However, disproportionality can be due indeed to non-partisan ministers, whose appointment was in part the result of a proactive role, during the formation process, of the president of the republic as well as of the need to show Italy's will to respect

8. The minister for European Affairs Paolo Savona resigned to become the president of the National Commission for Companies and Exchange (*Commissione nazionale per le società e la Borsa*, CONSOB) and was temporary replaced by the prime minister from 8 March 2019 to 10 July 2019. On this day, Lorenzo Fontana became the new minister after being the minister for Disabilities and Family (whose control moved to the League's minister Alessandra Locatelli).

9. Own elaboration from Chamber of Deputies' data ([www.camera.it/leg18/1](http://www.camera.it/leg18/1)).

European agreements (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2019, 269; Pasquino 2019).<sup>10</sup> If this 'distortion' is cancelled, one finds that the law of proportionality (Gamson 1961) is respected, including the overrepresentation of the junior partner: in this case, the M5S reaches 62.5% of portfolios and the League 37.5%. Some scholars have argued that not all portfolios have the same 'clout' and one should consider also this aspect in our investigation. I refer here to Druckman and Warwick's (2005, 39-40) measurement of portfolio salience in Italy, based on an expert survey: excluding the premiership and non-partisan ministers from the calculation, one finds that the average weight of the portfolios controlled by the M5S is 1.00 (while the prime ministership's value is the highest, with a score of 2.48); the League scores 0.86.<sup>11</sup> It can be argued that the just mentioned quantitative 'bonus' for the League was counterbalanced from a qualitative viewpoint.

A second aspect to be investigated is how the Conte I cabinet organized the internal day-to-day workflow. The yellow-green government approached the type of the "ministerial cabinet with acephalous oligarchy" (Vercesi 2012, 17), characterized by a loose adherence to the collective ministerial responsibility; fragmented decision-making; and lack of coordination. Ministerial autonomy was large and the final say about governmental policies was in the hands of the two deputy prime ministers rather than the

10. The guiding role of the president of the republic is especially proved by the episode of the selection of the minister Paolo Savona, a retired professor of Economics. During the formation process, the president Mattarella rejected the proposal of Savona as minister for the Economy (later appointed for European Affairs) made by Conte on behalf of the two coalition partners. The main concern related to Savona was his radical anti-EU position, which had been frequently expressed in written form; based on these anti-EU stances, Savona had also conceived of strategies to make Italy leave the Euro currency. Against this background, Mattarella suggested the League MP Giancarlo Giorgetti as an alternative name. However, the proposal was refused by the two parties, which prompted Conte to step back from being *formateur*, leading to a temporary inter-institutional conflict (Valbruzzi 2018, 474).

11. If two or more portfolios of the list of Druckman and Warwick's (2005) were unified, I have considered the most salient ones. If one assigned the independent ministers (see Table 1) to the respective parties of reference, the M5S would score 1.10 and the League 0.90.

prime minister (Vercesi 2019, 235).<sup>12</sup> Following a well-known categorization of cabinet studies, during the yellow-green government Conte was an arbitrator rather than an activist (cf. Barbieri 2001). His room for maneuver was narrow and he could at most mediate between ministers, using a consensual style and refraining from particularly forcing actions.

Within departments, inter-party control was transferred to watchdog junior ministers (see Table 3). In this regard, I do not count those departments led by technocratic ministers.

**Table 3:** Distribution of watchdog junior ministers in the Conte I government

Department	Minister's party	Watchdog vice minister	Watchdog junior minister
President of the Council of Ministers	M5S	Yes	Yes
Relationships with the parliament	M5S	-	Yes
Public administration	League	-	Yes
Regional affairs and Autonomies	League	-	Yes
South	M5S	-	Yes
Disability and Family	League	-	Yes
Interior	League	No	Yes
Justice	M5S	No	Yes
Defence	M5S	No	Yes
Economic development	M5S	Yes	No
Agricultural, food, and forestry policies and Tourism	League	No	Yes
Environment and Safeguard of Territory and Sea	M5S	No	Yes
Infrastructures and Transportations	M5S	Yes	Yes
Labour and Social policy	M5S	No	Yes
Education, University, and Research	League	Yes	Yes
Cultural Heritage and Activities	M5S	No	Yes
Health	M5S	No	Yes

Note: vice ministers are in between senior and classic junior ministers. They can participate in the full cabinet, but only by invitation and without the right to vote (Barbieri and Vercesi 2013: 540-1). Source: see Table 2.

Findings confirm international trends. All senior ministers cohabitated with at least a watchdog junior minister. This applies to 33% of appointments of vice ministers (upper level junior ministers) and even 94% of cases of *sottosegretari di stato* (common junior ministers). In some cases, one can observe both a watchdog vice minister and a watchdog *sottosegretario di stato* in the same department. Often, the cohabitation of ministers with different party loyalties and ministerial approaches led to inter-departmental conflicts. In this regard, it has been observed that – in the first phase of the government life – departments' representatives entered conflicts with colleagues where “disagreement was less about the substantive merits of the positions taken than it was about their consistency with the ministers “agreed

12. But see also “Conte rassegna le dimissioni al Colle dopo un attacco a tutto campo a Salvini,” *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 20 agosto 2019.

agenda and about the parties' own priorities” (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2019, 276).

## 2.2 Legislative arena

I first look at the use and outcome of the inaugural vote of investiture. In Italy, the confidence to the cabinet must be expressed by both parliamentary chambers (Art. 94 of the Constitution). In the first chamber (Chamber of Deputies), the Conte I cabinet was supported by 350 MPs (621 MPs attended, 586 voted, whereas the required majority was 294 votes), 236 MPs voted against and 35 abstained.<sup>13</sup> The second chamber (Senate) displays a similar pattern: against a required majority of 145 votes, 171 MPs voted positively, 117 against the government, and 25 abstained (overall, 314 MPs attended the voting process). This numbers tell that the cabinet enjoyed the support of a larger majority, beyond the sum of seats of M5S and League. A positive vote of investiture was casted also by other tiny parliamentary groups: MAIE (later entering the executive with a junior minister in the ministry for Foreign affairs and International Cooperation); Italian Liberal Party; Sardinian Action Party; and National Movement for Sovereignty. Abstention came from Brothers of Italy and the South Tyrolean People's Party (*Südtiroler Volkspartei*).<sup>14</sup>

It is interesting to observe that these inaugural votes were based on a written motion, where it was stated the confidence was given to the government whose action had to be “founded on the ‘Contract for the Government of Change’ [*Contratto per il Governo del cambiamento*], in compliance with its content and coherently with its programmatic profile” (confidence motion No. 1-00014 [Crimi, Candiani]). In other words, parliamentary confidence was formally given based on the content of the coalition agreement.

Parliamentary questions are further mechanisms for legislative control. To investigate the extent to which the M5S and League used this mechanism for the time in office, I rely on data

13. Data from <https://www.camera.it/leg18/557?fiducia=16>. The speaker of the Chamber from the M5S did not vote, according to a behavioral praxis.

14. “Il governo Conte incassa la fiducia anche alla Camera: 350 “sì”, 236 contrari e 35 astenuti” *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 6 giugno 2018.

issued by the online Data Bank of the Inspective Syndicate of the Chamber of Deputies (*Banca dati del sindacato ispettivo della Camera dei Deputati*).<sup>15</sup> In this regard, this source of information distinguishes between two types of parliamentary questions: parliamentary interrogations (*interrogazioni parlamentari*) and parliamentary interpellations (*interpellanze parlamentari*).<sup>16</sup> For this article's purpose, I have focused on both and I have looked for those questions that were issued by one of the two coalition partners from 1 June 2018 to 20 August 2019, irrespective of the relevant minister who was the target of the question. Data shows that the M5S was more active in screening the government: this party, indeed, proposed 31 interrogations and 10 interpellations. In contrast, the League presented 14 interrogations and just 1 interpellation.

A further (*ex-post*) mechanism of parliamentary control is the selection of 'watchdog' committee chairs. Table 4 provides an overview.

**Table 4:** Distribution of the watchdog committee chairs in the Conte I cabinet

Standing committee	Party of the relevant minister	'Watchdog' committee chair (Chamber)	'Watchdog' committee chair (Senate)
Constitutional affairs*	M5S	No	Yes
Justice	M5S	No	Yes
Foreign affairs	Technocratic	-	-
Defence	M5S	No	Yes
Budget	Technocratic	-	-
Finance	Technocratic	-	-
Culture	M5S	No	Yes
Environment	Independent M5S	Yes	No
Transportations	M5S	Yes	No
Productive activities*	M5S	Yes	No
Labour	M5S	Yes	No
Social affairs	M5S	No	(together with Labour)
Hygiene and Health	M5S	(only in the Senate)	No
Agriculture	League	Yes	No
EU policies	Technocratic	-	-

\* *Constitutional affairs has been equated to the prime ministership; Productive activities to the Economic development. Note: data refers only to the standing committees at the beginning of the life of government. Committees are labelled according to their names in the Chamber of Deputies. Source: <https://www.camera.it/leg18/1>, <https://www.senato.it/1095> and own elaboration.*

Because of the equal role of both chambers (Vercesi 2017), I consider the parliamentary committees of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. If one looks at the chambers as separated

institutions, the expectation that (most of) the committee chairs are members of the party that does not hold the respective ministerial portfolio is not matched. In the Chamber of Deputies only 50% of the chairships were assigned to a 'watchdog' chair, whereas the percentage decreases to 40% in the Senate. However, the combined analysis of the two chambers shows that 'watchdog' committee chairs were appointed – either in the Chamber or the Senate – in all but two cases (Social affairs and Hygiene and Health). In particular, the general pattern tells that – for each policy sector – a 'watchdog' committee chair was appointed in one chamber, but not in the other branch. In this regard, it is worth noting that the only two cases where a 'watchdog' committee chair was not present refer to two policy sectors, for which a parliamentary committee was established in only one of the parliamentary houses. This means that, in these cases, in the face of the missing appointment of the 'watchdog' committee chair in one chamber, there was no possibility to compensate for this absence by appointing such figure in the other one.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.3 Extra-parliamentary arena

As a third step, I investigate those coalition mechanisms that involve the whole coalition, including party members outside the executive (Vercesi 2016). In our case, the coalition agreement ('Contract for the Government of Change') is a post-electoral pact drafted (among others) by party leaders who became ministers. This is an innovation for Italian executives, but not in the European context (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000; Müller and Strøm 2008).<sup>18</sup> Coalition agreements are effective constraining devices against ministerial drifts and promote the fulfillment of coalitional pledges (Moury 2013; Naurin *et al.* 2019). These documents inform voters, clarify party goals, and help solve conflicts (Strøm and Müller 2000; Eichorst 2014).

17. Although it is out of this article's scope, it would be interesting to understand why, when parties were confronted with a single option, they chose not to appoint any 'watchdog' committee chair.

18. Even in the few cases of coalition agreements in Italy, these documents were pre-electoral (Moury *et al.* 2019).

15. See <https://www.camera.it/leg/170>.

16. In the Italian law system, the *interrogazioni* are questions for the executive, which MPs can use to have information on specific facts or news. The *interpellanze*, on their turn, are questions used to ask the executive to clarify the reason of its actions (e.g., <https://www.camera.it/leg18/205>).

The Italian agreement will be analysed in detail and in comparative perspective in the next section. Here, I summarize the main characteristics *vis-à-vis* previous Italian experiences. As Santana Pereira and Moury's (2018, 100-1) observe, the 'Government Contract' is relative long (58 pages, 18500 words) and thorough in terms of themes, although imprecise when one looks at the goals. "Indeed, most pledges are presented in a very general fashion, lacking precision, which will make pledge fulfilment assessments –by experts and the citizenry –rather tricky" (Santana Pereira and Moury 2018, 99).<sup>19</sup> The agreements' pledges suggest that the M5S (when assessed against its party manifesto) moved from progressive to relative conservative positions on several issues, approaching the League. Compared to the former coalition agreements of the centre-right and centre-left, this contract is longer and shorter respectively. Santana Pereira and Moury (2018, 101) also find that "the M5S-League agreement lacks precision, which gives a great deal of room for manoeuvre to cabinet members and makes conflict resolution slightly trickier".

In this regard, the 'Government Contract' followed in the steps of other European agreements and referred to a coalition committee as an arena for conflict resolution. The committee was called *Comitato di conciliazione* (Conciliation Committee). According to the agreement's text, it had to be used both to solve conflicts and define common policies, when the pact was silent on certain issues. No mention to its composition was made, transferring its definition to subsequent inter-party decisions. However, clues can be found in a preliminary draft (later modified) of 14 May 2018. According to this, the members of the committee would have been (at least) the prime minister, the two party leaders, the leaders of the parliamentary groups, the minister whose jurisdiction was involved, and the minister in charge of the implementation of the governmental programme. However, one should notice that the coalition committee was never gathered, thus leaving the use of this *ex-post* control mechanism on paper

19. Notwithstanding this vagueness, it has been calculated that the Conte I government fulfilled only a small minority of pledges (see "Il discorso di Conte in Senato: il fact-checking" *Pagella politica*, 21 August 2019.

(Cavino 2019, 231-232).

### 3 Comparison between the *Contratto* and the 2018 German *Koalitionsvertrag*

#### 3.1 Why the German case?

I compare the coalition agreement of the Conte I government with the contract of the Merkel IV government – which entered office in March 2018 – for several reasons.<sup>20</sup>

First, Germany is overall a good parameter because of its tradition of coalition agreements, which became established in the 1970s in terms of both frequency and length (Saalfeld et al. 2019, 376). Second, Germany has a relatively good scoring of translation of pledges into actual policies; it suffices to say that the heterogeneous grand coalition of the Merkel III government fulfilled 80% of the promises (Wehrkamp and Matthieß 2018; Thomson et al. 2017, 535). Third, Germany has an established tradition in the formation of grand coalitions between the two main party competitors (Miller and Müller 2010).

20. Italy and Germany differ in features such as the internal state organization (being Germany a federal country), party system stability, party institutionalization, and record of government stability. Nevertheless, the two countries share several institutional traits and aspects of party government, which make the comparison reasonable. Both systems are parts of those West European democracies emerged after the Second World War and can be classified as consensus parliamentary democracies, with an indirectly elected head of state. The respective party systems are multi-party and coalitions are the most common outcomes of the government formation process. Moreover, both systems rely on positive parliamentarism, in that an explicit vote of confidence is needed for the executive to enter in office (although the vote is directed towards the whole cabinet in Italy and the head of government in Germany). Fourth, the two respective parliaments have a bicameral structure; even if Italy is characterized by co-equal bicameralism and Germany by asymmetric bicameralism, both the Italian Senate and the German *Bundesrat* play an important role in the policy-making process, thus prompting cabinets to look for majorities in both chambers (at least for specific policy fields in the German case). Finally, with regard to the general election that led to the formation of the two coalitions under investigation, both countries relied on a mixed electoral system, prevalently proportional in terms of seat distribution. All these factors make the institutional structure of opportunities and constraints similar on a general basis, at least compared to majoritarian political systems, to other smaller European parliamentary democracies, or to countries with other forms of government. For a general overview of the institutional facet of the Italian and German political systems in comparative perspective, see – for example – Kubicek (2017). On the Italian electoral law used in 2018 and its effects, see Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte (2018).

I compare the Conte I cabinet with a simultaneous case of government formed by party competitors ‘forced’ to govern together by the political context. Both the Conte I and Merkel IV cabinets were the result of a long and complex formation process, started after failed attempts to form alternative governments. Moreover, in both cases, the president of the republic pushed in the direction of the formation of the government (in the German case, he persuaded the junior partner SPD to coalescence with Christian-Democrats, in spite of the initial refusal of the social-democratic leadership) (Bolgherini and D’Ottavio 2019, 123-9). Finally, the M5S (online), the League (in gazebos), and the SPD consulted their grass-root members for the final approval of the coalition agreement.<sup>21</sup> To sum up, one has two cases that share the ‘unnatural’ nature of the coalitions and, on the other hand, the chance to compare the innovative post-electoral agreement in the Italian context with an example of agreement rooted in a more established tradition.

### 3.2 The comparison

Is the Italian contract special? To what extent does the German agreement differ? Building on the literature, it is possible to investigate four aspects.

The first is length: I expect longer documents when party preferences are divergent (Falcó-Gimeno 2014; Bowler *et al.* 2016); this is the case in both Italy and Germany (Giannetti *et al.* 2018; Bräuniger *et al.* 2019). The Italian contract was 58 pages long. Even discounting variations due to the font and the layout, the German document is significantly longer, reaching 175 pages.<sup>22</sup>

A second and related aspect to be investigated is *depth*. In this regard, the Italian agreement performs poorly and presents non-verifiable statements that outnumber precise pledges.<sup>23</sup> I

use a rough yet significant indicator to measure depth: the number of pages for each thematic area (e.g., a policy field). The assumption is that fewer pages mean less detail. In this regard, the average length of a single chapter in the Italian coalition agreement is 1.69 pages, precisely 11 pages less than the *Koalitionsvertrag* (12.69). If one controls for the more pronounced tendency of the German document to cluster different themes into broader thematic sections (see Appendix), the gap does not significantly change.

Third, I look at the *scope* of the document. I operationalize the scope as the coverage of different policy areas. A higher thematic coverage is likely to increase the agenda-setting potential of the agreement, since it reduces the room of manoeuvre of ministers (Indriðason e Kam 2008). In both documents, the coverage is wide. As pointed out by Santana Pereira and Moury (2018, 99), in the Italian agreement the themes are not listed in order of salience. Rather, they follow the alphabetical order (from *Acqua pubblica* – Public Water – to *Università e ricerca* – University and Research). In contrast, the German document adopts a thematic criterion. Table 5 compares the explicit mentions to specific policy areas in the two documents’ table of contents. The areas are those covered by the Italian contract, in order of presentation.

**Table 5:** Mention of policy themes in the *Contratto per il Governo del Cambiamento* and 2018 *Koalitionsvertrag*.

Policy areas in the <i>Contratto per il Governo del cambiamento</i>	<i>Koalitionsvertrag</i>	Placement in the <i>Koalitionsvertrag</i>
Environment	Yes	9
Agriculture	Yes	4
Economy	Yes	4
Regulation of the Politics-Private Relationship	No	-
Culture	Yes	11
Defence	Yes	10
Foreign affairs	Yes	10
Justice	Yes	8
Immigration	Yes	6
Labour	Yes	3
Corruption	No	-
Welfare	Yes	1; 5; 7
Institutional reforms	No	-
Health	Yes	5
School	Yes	2
Public order	Yes	8
Sport	Yes	8
Internal territorial inequalities	No	-
Costs of the institutions	No	-
Transportations and Infrastructures	Yes	7
Tourism	No	-
European Union	Yes	10
University and research	Yes	2

Note: the list of themes is based on an own elaboration. The same

21. “Contratto di governo, per la Lega mille gazebo nel week-end. Voto M5s online venerdì” *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 17 May 2018; 66 Prozent stimmen für große Koalition, ‘Süddeutsche Zeitung’, 4 March 2018.

22. The German contract “A New Awakening for Europe, a New Dynamics for Germany, a New Solidarity for Our Country” (*Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land*).

23. However, this relationship is mitigated in the single party electoral manifestos (Valbruzzi 2019).

*placement means that two themes are put in the same section. For a full list of themes in the Koalitionsvertrag see the article's Appendix. Source: own elaboration based on the two documents.*

Needless to say, themes and salience depend on national contexts and party preferences. However, it is worth noting that 74% of the themes in the Italian agreement are covered by the German document as well. Table 5 shows that the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition put social issues (i.e., family), higher education, and research at the beginning of the document. The German text closes with references to international politics (missing in the Italian text, if one excludes the European Union) and to the relationship with Europe (see Appendix).

Finally, one can investigate the *completeness* of the type of issues, distinguishing between policy, portfolio allocation, and procedures of coalition governance. In this regard, the Italian contract deals with the procedures of coalitional coordination in the opening section. The text introduces the aforementioned coalition committee; regulates relationships between parliamentary groups; and suggests how to define the governmental action at the EU level. Moreover, parties propose an ethical code of behavior for the government members; ask for future internal assessments of the governmental action; and define behavioral norms for future electoral campaigns (pp. 7-8). No reference to the distribution of ministerial responsibilities is made. This contrasts with the agreement of the Merkel IV government, where the allocation of portfolios between parties is clarified in the last page. Before dealing with portfolio allocation, the German document also defines procedures and rules for coalition governance, similarly to the Italian case. The *Vertrag* clarifies how parliamentary groups should cooperate; how the government should coordinate its action with the European Union; and suggests internal assessments of the government (pp. 173-174). The German agreement differs from the Italian one, in that it includes six lines ('Work within Government' – *Arbeit in der Bundesregierung*) about the equal representation of all coalition partners in decision-making arenas, such as committees and advisory councils. However, the *Koalitionsvertrag* does not provide – unlike

the Italian contract – any specific mechanism for conflict resolution. Overall, the level of detail of the German agreement results higher than the Italian agreement's also with respect to the fourth aspect of analysis.

## 4 Conclusions

This article has investigated mechanisms and processes of coalition governance in the Italian yellow-green coalition between June 2018 and August 2019. The Conte I cabinet defined itself the 'government of change' since the very beginning. Based on this, some empirical studies have sought to assess the actual level of innovation in the Italian political context after the 2018 general election (Giannetti *et al.* 2020; Pinto 2020). This article is a further contribution, which has tried to enter the black box of coalition governance and provided material for cross-country and longitudinal comparisons.

The theoretical framework has clarified the challenges that parties face within coalition government, especially in case of ideologically disconnected coalitions (Axelrod 1970). The investigation of the Conte I government in comparative perspective has produced insightful findings. In part, these findings contradict (and in part confirm) the rhetoric of exceptionality adopted by the Italian yellow-green coalition. The two relevant parties created mechanisms of mutual control, in line with other European executives. This holds especially for 'structural' devices, such as the proportional distribution of ministerial portfolios; the appointment of watchdog junior ministers and committee chairs; and the adoption of a written post-electoral coalition agreement defining procedures of conflict resolution. In particular, the coalition agreement has made the Italian case less dissimilar. However, the Conte I cabinet was peculiar from a procedural viewpoint, following a rare model of fragmented decision-making based on an acephalous oligarchy (Vercesi 2012, 20). Moreover, the coalition agreement proposed a coalition committee, which was never activated in spite of several conflicts. One can argue that coalition governance within the Conte I cabinet was dissociated, rather than cohesive.

The comparison with the coalition agreement of the Merkel IV cabinet has shown that that Italian contract is policy-wise relative incomplete. Moreover, no references to portfolio allocation were made in the final version, postponing any decision to further bargaining processes.

To sum up, the Conte I government has been, yes, different under some respects, such as its 'populist composition' and the late choice of an independent (albeit closer to the M5S) prime minister, flanked by two powerful party leaders. However, the Conte I government has moved closer to other European experiences, with regard to several mechanisms of coalition governance.

For its very nature, this article has been explorative. One possible research outlook is the systematic collection of original data for future broader comparisons of inter-ministerial relationships. This would enrich our understanding of coalition governance dynamics in general. Secondly, one could improve the knowledge of the coalition agreement, by investigating ways and rates of pledges' implementation. Possible deviations and similarities vis-à-vis other cases could be explained by more sophisticated theoretical models. Overall, this would provide sounder foundations to assess change and continuity in times of populist politics.

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# Joined-Up Governance at Local Level

## A Governação Conjunta ao Nível Local

Joaquim Filipe Araújo, University of Minho

**Abstract**—This article analyzes an interorganizational cooperation initiative among local actors to improve local policy coordination. Based on the network approach to local governance, the study provides insight into why local actors cooperate and how cooperation works. The analysis is based on interviews with local authorities, public managers and local politicians.

**Keywords**—Governance, Local Government, Networks, Collaboration.

**Resumo**—Este artigo analisa uma iniciativa de cooperação interorganizacional entre atores locais para melhorar a coordenação de políticas locais. Com base na abordagem de rede para a governança local, o estudo fornece informações sobre por que os atores locais cooperam e como a cooperação funciona. A análise é baseada em entrevistas com autoridades locais, gestores públicos e políticos locais.

**Palavras-Chave**—Governação, Governo Local, Redes, Colaboração.

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### 1 Introduction

THIS paper describes a local governance initiative of the former Civil Governor of the District of Braga in Portugal. The initiative started with the creation of a public-private partnership called the Prodisbraga which developed a strategic plan for regional development at District level, the creation of a consultative council to improve policy co-ordination and a network of organizations called the Gaddisbraga to share information about EU and domestic regional development programmes. The objective was to improve inter-organisational relationships and co-operation be-

tween local actors in the District. The initiative can be considered as an attempt to revitalise the role of the former Civil Governor at local level and to develop a proactive response to the regional development programme of the Portuguese central government.

The former Civil Governor of Braga created a sort of informal governance structure to improve inter-organizational cooperation and the quality of the dialogue between local actors, something which had been on his own political agenda for many years.

At the same time, this governance innovation also has to be seen in the context of the current regional policy programme of the Portuguese central government, which focuses on the reduction of regional disparities, the deconcentration of public services and the decentralisation of central government responsibilities to local government. As a result, there is a recognised need for joined-up programme implementation, so that different geo-

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graphical areas are better coordinated and there is better horizontal co-ordination of public policies. This case study provides an interesting insight into why local actors want to cooperate and how their cooperation works in practice. The analysis draws upon face-to-face interviews with eighteen members of the organisations which are part of the new governance institutions created by the Civil Governor at the District of Braga, including interviews with local officials, public managers and local politicians.

## 2 The institutional context of the new local governance initiative

The territorial organisation of Portuguese public administration is comparable to the French prefectural system with the only difference being that the Portuguese system is much more centralised than the French administrative system. As with the French prefect, the former Civil Governor was appointed by central government. He/she represented central government at district level and is the “eyes and the ears” of central government. Districts are the level which is nearest to local authorities.

During the era of the dictatorship, Civil Governors had strong and authoritarian powers in controlling public services and local government. The country was ruled by an autocratic regime which developed a very formal and hierarchical administrative system. For example, Mayors of local authorities were hierarchically subordinated to the Civil Governors of their district, who had the power to dissolve the local authorities if they proved to have behaved illegally, failed to fulfil their administrative tasks or refused to carry out decisions made at higher levels. Furthermore, they had the power to scrutinise Municipal Chambers (*Câmara Municipal*) and public services and even to control civic associations and corporations. They also had police powers and were responsible for the maintenance of public order (CAREAT 1998). The authoritarian role of Civil Governors at district level was supported by the highly hierarchical structure of the overall administrative system at the time. They ruled through a hierarchical set of controls, answering directly to the Minister of Interior.

The change of regime in 1974 and the new Constitution of 1976 led to the abolition of the districts and the Civil Governors. The Constitution also foresaw that the districts would persist until the creation of Administrative Regions (Art. 291 of the Constitution).

The districts used to have two formal bodies which were both presided over by the Civil Governor: the District Assembly (*Assembleia Distrital*) and the District Council (*Conselho Distrital*). The former aimed at fostering economic and social development and to coordinate activities of the local authorities and the parishes (the *Freguesias*, the smallest territorial administrative divisions) in equipping and maintaining their schools and in conserving the cultural heritage and traditions in their local areas. The District Council was an advisory body on all matters submitted to them by the Civil Governor, the District Assembly or the law (Law 79/77, Art. 87). The previous eighteen districts still exist even though there has been an erosion of their role and their elected bodies have ceased to exist.

As a result of these changes, the responsibilities of the Civil Governors were also reduced. Their powers were limited to the representation of central government and the coordination of decentralised services; improvement of the relationships between the administration and citizens; and administration of public safety and civil protection. Furthermore, the traditional control and supervision of Civil Governors over local authorities was reduced, as local authorities became more self-confident and increased their democratic legitimacy. Since the 1976 Constitution there have been local elections for the Municipal Assembly (*Assembleia Municipal*), the Municipal Chamber (*Câmara Municipal*) and the Parish Assembly (*Assembleia de Freguesia*).

The reformers envisaged a new regional map and the Constitution established that “administrative regions” would replace the districts and regional authorities would replace the Civil Governors. The new ‘administrative region’ would have three key functions:

- direction of public services in the regional area,
- co-ordinating and supporting the activities

of local authorities and

- preparing the regional plans. (art. 257 and 258 of the Constitutional Law 1/97).

However, the process of regionalisation and the creation of regional agencies has continually been delayed because national politicians have been hesitant to make any decision on these issues. Armando (1986) claims that the tradition of municipalism and the importance regained by the municipalities after the 1974 revolution weakened the enthusiasm for regional administration. This trend, together with the Jacobin argument against regionalisation, has constituted a strong countervailing force to the introduction of the constitutional provisions.

Consequently, regionalist pressures were nowhere strong, outside of the islands of the Azores and Madeira, where physical distance added a different dimension to the debate. Indeed, the constitution of 1976 institutionalised these two islands as Autonomous Regions with devolved powers.

Everywhere else, the centralised nature of Portuguese administrative system still prevails today. This can be seen from the slow changes in the balance of staff at central and local levels. In 1979, 84% of civil servants worked in central government and only 16% in local government (CICTRA 1987), while twenty years later in 1999, 80% of civil servants still worked in central government and 20% in local government (IGBDRHAP, 2001). In 2018 the percentage of civil servants in local government was 22% (SIEP 2018)

As a consequence, there is a gap in Portuguese politics between central government and local government which needs to be filled by an intermediate level with democratic legitimacy. The current regional institutions – the Commissions for Regional Coordination and Development (CCDR – *Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional*) lack the political legitimacy to manage regional problems effectively (Pereira 1992). To some extent, this gap is being filled by the establishment of local government associations. Since the 1970s inter-municipal cooperation has been growing, initially through technical offices called GATs, which gave technical advice on inter-municipal projects to improve local infras-

tructure. This form of cooperation was fostered in 1981 (Decree Law 266/81) and further reforms encouraged the cooperation between local authorities for the joint management of local facilities and energy resources.

The pressures to decentralise and to establish regions increased in the 1990s. The commitment of government to deconcentration and decentralisation was, apparently, an important issue on the administrative reform agenda. For example, it was an issue in the manifesto of the winning party in the 1995 election. However, the result of a national referendum to decide on the geographic configuration of the regions proposed by the government in 1998 caused a set back in this process.

The majority of voters said “no” to the regions, so that the government had to withdraw from this policy and find an alternative to regionalisation. The revitalisation of Civil Governors at district level and the redefinition of their role was, at the time, the expedient which Central Government found in order that it could continue to pursue the target of deconcentration. A new statute (Decree Law 213/2001) gave the Civil Governors a new role. Besides their role as a representative of central government, they now have to disseminate information to citizens about public services, to follow up issues which involve several organisations, ensuring that each service co-ordinates its actions with the others, and to give financial support to district social associations. In short, the new statute envisages a role which is closer to enabling the co-operation among public agencies and promoting the dialogue between them, rather than ordering them what to do. This was an attempted to revitalize an old institution which role in the political and administrative arena was in decline.

The governance concept and the idea of inter-organisational networks of public and private actors who are jointly engaged in policy implementation are useful to understand the governance innovations which the Civil Governor implemented in the District of Braga to foster the new role.

### 3 Local Governance and Networks

Recent literature on public sector reform shows a growing interest in network approaches to local

governance (Goss 2001; Bogason 2000; Bovaird and Loffler 2009; Lecy et al. 2014). Local governance stresses the increasing complexity of interactions between actors from different sectors in public decision-making and service delivery. The increased involvement of nongovernmental actors in public issues is often explained by the blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors. The externalisation of public services in the last decade or so is another factor facilitating new approaches to public governance.

New and innovative ways of organising and providing public services have given rise to a whole variety of new organizational forms. According to Rhodes the new forms of governance are “self-organising inter-organisational networks” (1996, 666).

This means that it is no longer sufficient to manage a public organisation efficiently in order to provide high quality public services to the right target groups. Indeed, many public managers now recognise the need for improved co-ordination of service delivery through the management of a network of relationships between government agencies, private and nonprofit organizations. Managing networks is about creating strategic consensus for joint action within a given setting and it includes strategies to improve co-operation between actors in order to achieve better co-ordination (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997).

The management of these networks is an important aspect of modern governance. However, this does not mean that local governance is equivalent to networking. As Bovaird et al. (2002) point out, there are other governance mechanisms which still remain important, such as hierarchies and markets (see also Rhodes 1996; Larmpour 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000).

Nevertheless, the changes which have taken place in the District of Braga illustrate a case where the hierarchical co-ordination of public services at district level has been largely replaced by more horizontal structures through which the Civil Governor tries to develop more co-operative and collaborative relationships between local stakeholders.

## 4 New Governance Structures in the District of Braga

### 4.1 EU Structural Funds as a Catalyst

The central government programme for regional development required changes in policy implementation in order to meet the requirements of the EU structural funds. Since the failure of the regionalisation process the government had been committed to starting a new approach, based on promoting coordination and cooperation between local actors. The strategic programme of the Constitutional Government favoured a more integrated approach towards regional development. It established three strategic axes in relation to regional development:

- a) correction of regional disparities in order to promote harmonious regional development;
- b) reform of deconcentrated public services;
- c) decentralisation of powers and responsibilities to local authorities, associations of municipalities and metropolitan areas.

Co-operation among deconcentrated services at local level has traditionally been low in Portugal. Common issues are hardly discussed between local actors. Fragmentation and lack of appropriately co-ordinated services are widely considered to be costly problems which impede the effective and efficient provision of public services. The formal and hierarchical nature of Portuguese administration has reinforced these characteristics and hampered lateral communication and the establishment of innovative organizational forms (Araújo 1999). The government envisaged the revitalisation of the role of Civil Governors at district level in order to tackle these issues, by promoting dialogue and co-ordination between local actors, and between central and local government, and by coordinating public investments at district level.

### 4.2 The Network Approach in the District of Braga

The Civil Governor, Mr Fernando Ribeiro Moniz, was the figurehead for this initiative. However, the real mentor and promoter was the deputy Civil Governor, Mr. Manuel Ferreira. He was appointed


by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after the Socialist Party had won the elections and been granted a mandate for its second term in government. He is known as a dynamic person with long experience as a local politician. As leader of a non-profit organisation he had developed skills as an innovator and networker, enabling the interactions between multiple stakeholders. In his professional background he had worked in the private sector, had been elected President of a Parish (*Presidente de Junta de Freguesia*), then Mayor of a municipality. Subsequently, he was the administrator of the Association of Municipalities of the Ave Valley, and then co-ordinator of the development Programme for the Ave Valley (*ProAve*), a programme for regional Development which was financed by EU structural funds. As he pointed out in his interview with the author, his personal experience at different levels of government had given him a better understanding of the need for integration. Hence he was well positioned to influence all levels of the administration with which the District had to deal and he had the ability to represent the intentions of central government toward local actors and to develop an integrated approach towards local development which would take account of the interests of the key local stakeholders involved. Other interviewees confirmed the vital role played by Mr. Manuel Ferreira in promoting dialogue and enabling the interactions between all local actors involved in the new governance structure. They stressed that he personally made the informal contacts to invite local personalities to join this initiative, whose presence would be essential to the success of the new local governance structure.

In order to deal with the problems and issues outlined above, the Civil Governor of the District of Braga established a new governance structure which consisted of three key elements.

- **PRODISBRAGA** - Governmental Programme for the District of Braga (*Programa do Governo no Distrito de Braga*),
- **FESDB** - Economic and Social Forum for the District of Braga (*Fórum Económico e Social do Distrito de Braga*),
- **GADDISBRAGA** - Office for District Development Support (*Gabinete de Apoio*

*ao Desenvolvimento do Distrito de Braga*)

**Figure 1** - The Governance Structure of the District of Braga



PRODISBRAGA aimed at involving the associations which represent all the municipalities of the District in order to develop an integrated approach towards regional development. First, it did an assessment of the investments needed in the District in order to improve regional development. This provided the basis for a strategic plan which was then submitted to central government. According to the participants involved in the strategic planning process, they believed that the strategic plan would give them more power to negotiate for domestic and EU funds with central government.

Another part of the new governance structure was the Economic and Social Forum for the District of Braga (FESDB). The FESDB was anchored in a “loosely formal” structure to enable local actors – organisations from the public, private and non-profit sectors – to share knowledge about local issues and promote dialogue, participation and interaction among them. It was a consultative body which was an important source of information and aims to coordinate public policies and public services. The FESDB was organised in working groups, according to the issues identified by participants, which are responsible for discussing and proposing initiatives in areas like regional development, administrative reform, welfare and volunteer services, ICT and e-Government, and training. One ambitious project of the FESDB was the development of one-stop shops (“single windows”) in all the parishes of the District which was done in co-operation with the National Association of Parishes.



A third element of the governance structure was the GADDISBRAGA which aimed at identifying strategies for policy implementation through joint action of the public and private sectors. The GADDIBRAGA was a network which had several aims such as:

- to organise and share information about financing from national programmes for public investment and EU structural funds and other programmes to promote regional development;
- to facilitate and promote inter-organisational co-operation through joint projects and programmes;
- to organise and gather information for District development and to transfer it to the PRODISBRAGA;
- to give technical assistance to those organisations whose activities are within the framework of the GADDISBRAGA proposals and which intend to apply for funding to the EU or national programmes;
- to contribute to the strategic development of the District; and
- to promote the establishment of other initiatives in social areas.

It aimed particularly to articulate national, regional and local policies and look for new methods of co-operation among local actors with an operational orientation. It was clear that these new arrangements depended on the voluntary cooperation of all key actors and their willingness to make compromises. At the centre of the new governance structure was the Civil Governor, with a new role as an enabler and facilitator of co-operation among local actors. There was a new emphasis on horizontal coordination within flexible forms of interaction. Hierarchical control had been replaced by a continuing process of negotiating among different interests.

The interviewees have suggested that it was the deputy Civil Governor who took the most active role in proposing an informal structure to support and improve relationships between local actors. The network had two layers of participants: an inner group, which was in the forefront of this process and was committed to its success, and a second group whose members saw the GAD-

DISBRAGA as an opportunity to enhance their own activities and who were looking for opportunities to participate in projects together with other partners. The former centralised, formalised and top-down administrative process has given way to a more loosely-coupled form which includes both hierarchic and non-hierarchic structures.

### 4.3 The emergence of new cooperative relationships

Co-operation between local stakeholders was not strong before the creation of the GADDISBRAGA and project management was not joined-up. In general, cooperation only existed within the two main areas of the District: the Cávado Valley and the Ave Valley. The deputy Civil Governor engaged personally in the promotion of the new governance structure in order to ensure that these old habits were changed.

The creation of the new governance structure allowed the development of new inter-organizational relationships based on consensus and cooperation. The stakeholders involved admit that consensus became important for the functioning because the formulation of programmes required that they must “work with each other” not “work against each other”, as had been traditionally the case.

The creation of the new governance structure allowed the development of new inter-organizational relationships based on consensus and cooperation. The stakeholders involved admit that consensus became important for the functioning because the formulation of programmes required that they must “work with each other” not “work against each other”, as had been traditionally the case.

Participation was not formally structured through the establishment of clearly defined units. An interviewee pointed out that everyone who was in the GADDISBRAGA was essentially in it simply for their own convenience, i.e. for what they can get out of it that could be of use in their area. In general, each participant only knows about the projects in which they were engaged. When asked about the areas where joint initiatives were taking place, interviewees could generally not identify them. Members tend to

join together according to the projects they want to implement. Consequently, there was not an integrated approach to local policies between participants. In fact, there was essentially a policy of “let a thousand flowers bloom”, where the outcomes were largely determined by the availability of domestic and EU funds. Nevertheless, it had been the growing affinity between some of the actors involved which influenced their decision to cooperate with each other, and other actors had started to share ideas about future projects. The participants of GADDISBRAGA admitted that this was only the beginning of a new way of doing things and they were still learning how to cooperate.

District development becomes a priority between some local actors which found in GADDISBRAGA the opportunity to develop joint projects. There were three main reasons for this option: *a)* the more active and participative actors worked in such issues; *b)* the two valleys showed low levels of economic and social development compared with other regions in the country and *c)* the central government policy for regional development and the EU structural funds stressed joined-up initiatives. The valleys showed in 1999 an Index of Adjusted Income<sup>1</sup> per capita of 0,860 for Cávado and of 0,873 for Ave which was well below the index of the capital (0,949) and the national average (0,894). Concerning the Index of the GNP it was 0,831 to the capital (Lisbon), 0,327 to the Cávado Valley and 0,374 to the Ave Valley (OCQV 2003, 49-51). Hence, regional development became a target for cooperation and the establishment of partnerships fostering projects in such area.

To have a deep and real knowledge about the economic and life quality of the district it was established a partnership between the University of Minho and the Agency of Regional Development of the Cávado Valley (ADRVC) to elaborate an economic chart of the Cávado Valley. The purpose of this project was to collect and analysed data in order to have a complete sort of indexes which helped to compare the region with other regions in the country and to have a concise picture of

the impact of regional policies in the district. The results of this study were available on the internet and would help public and private actors to make decisions concerning regional development. This project was fund in 75% by ERDF and 25% by the ADRVC, and the total amount was 89 923 Euros. To complement this diagnosis another project was established to study the social reality of the Valley Cávado. This initiative was a partnership of ADRVC, the Civil Governor and the Catholic University which aimed to elaborate a) a social chart of the Cávado Valley, b) an observational committee to study the life conditions of the population and c) to set up a social network for the Cávado Valley. This initiative focused on the social area and intended to be the basis for a better articulation between public and non-profit organization working in such issues. The total cost of this project was about 156 455 euros and it was fund in 62.5% by the European Social Fund (ESF) and in 37.5% by domestic funds.

Other projects developed jointly by actors of the GADDISBRAGA were under implemented. In some extent they were the result of the above mentioned initiatives, but above all, by the enabling role performed by GADDISBRAGA. For instances the Project Innovation in the Social Economy join nine non-profit organizations. The project cost about 586 081 euros and was fund in 75% by the ESF and in 25% by domestic funds. The main purpose was to provide technical assistance in management and increased employment in small family enterprises like handicraft, gardening, laundry, recycling. Another target was to give technical assistance to associations which aimed to integrate in professional life disable people and risk social groups like ex-drug addicted, ex-alcoholic and homeless. Particularly there was a concern to provide knowledge that increased the skills to manage their small business, to trade the products in the regional and local market, and to promote the integration of minorities in the labour market.

The data about the number of projects approved and fund by UE structural fund and national funds (Table 1) shows that its number increased sharply after the creation of GADDISBRAGA, from 91 projects in 1996 to 180 in 2001. In 2001 the number of projects approved

1. The Index of Adjusted Income shows the differences in internal distribution of real income.

for the Cávado Valley represented an increase of about 156% and for the Ave Valley an increase of about 91%. This was the result of the combination of two elements: a) the new EU cohesion and structural funds programme which started in 2000 and, b) the influence of GADDISBRAGA in promoting joined-up governance to develop new and innovative initiatives.

**Table 1 - Number of Projects Approved**

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<b>Cávado Valley</b>	36	30	49	45	39	100	58
<b>Ave Valley</b>	55	34	34	51	42	80	44
<b>Total</b>	91	64	83	96	81	180	102

**Source:** Marktest Sales Index 2003.

Concerning public investments through EU structural funds there was an increase particularly after 2000 (see Table 2). It is worth to stress that the Cávado Valley investments increased more than in the Ave Valley. Perhaps the fact that members of the inner group of GADDISBRAGA which was in the forefront of this process belonged to the Cávado Valley, explain, in part, this difference.

**Table 2 - Projects Approved and fund by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)**

	(thousand euros)						
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<b>ERDF (Projects Investments):</b>							
Cávado Valley	30074	23983	32757	29329	55594	101904	40972
Ave Valley	22873	41536	25666	27546	50736	55805	34359
<b>ERDF (EU contribution):</b>							
Cávado Valley	21438	15835	20626	17228	36271	59782	25298
Ave Valley	15688	25589	17505	18425	34636	32426	19323

**Source:** Marktest Sales Index 2003.

Public investments drawn into the district from central government followed a similar pattern of EU funds. After 2000 there was an increase in the amount of funds transferred from central government (Table 3) to fund investments in the district.

**Table 3 - Total of Central Government Public Investments in the District of Braga**

(Thousand euros)					
1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
55 564	68 383	115 945	136 837	253 639	284 300

**Source:** Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento 2001.

Many of the interviewees agreed that there was an important need to motivate more of the local actors and organisations to develop a strategy for co-operation which promotes District development and benefits from the EU structural funds. Other interviewees believe that the new governance structure was more important for getting additional information and building up deeper knowledge about the District, its problems and its challenges. These participants regarded the GADDISBRAGA mainly as an opportunity to exchange information between actors from the public and private sector. Indeed, the structures in the new governance arrangements, but particularly the GADDISBRAGA, facilitated and motivated the sharing of experiences between organisations, and allowed better identification of needs, planning of efforts, and elimination of overlap between activities.

There was a view shared across the interviewees that they needed to develop joint projects by looking at the experiences of other local actors and learning from them.

They believed that the GADDISBRAGA had promoted dialogue between local actors and filled a gap at District level, increasing the co-operation between local actors from the public and the private sector. All interviewees agreed that there remains a need to set up a more efficient system for the collection and dissemination of information about the District, but there was not any agreement about how to achieve this.

## 5 Conclusion

The case study of Braga illustrates the importance of new governance structures in order to foster dialogue and cooperation between different local stakeholders. It also showed that co-operation is

not just the result of a deliberate decision from participants to become engaged in a common initiative. The decision to co-operate and the areas where it happens have been partly shaped by the structural funds available for regional development and the initiatives promoted by central government. It was clear that working together would be a condition for getting funds into the District. Interaction between actors in GADDISBRAGA was greatly increased by the advantages and the funding opportunities offered by EU and national programmes, and the announcement of success in such applications has been important in bringing in more local actors. This was illustrated by the fact that there were areas where it was difficult to implement joint initiatives because there were no EU structural funds or national programmes.

Therefore, the stimulus to co-operation appears to depend on:

- the availability of funds from a national or a EU programme;
- the possibility of submitting joint projects;
- the requirement for horizontal public policy co-ordination;
- the need to draw up mutually consistent local and District programmes.

Consequently, while it can see among local actors an attempt to increase their interaction in public policy planning and implementation, this was driven by the need to fulfil the requirements of EU and national funding – at present, the cooperation is still driven by the self-interest of local actors.

The interviews showed that cooperation was the result of the need to find alternatives to improve activities and, for certain local actors, an opportunity to raise funds. However, and above all, there was a shared idea that local actors were learning how to cooperate and learning the benefits of that cooperation for local development.

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# The European Union Contribution to the Governance of the Arctic

## O Contributo da União Europeia na Governança do Ártico

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**Resumo**—The Arctic is a region that, although located in the far north of the globe and surrounded by a small number of countries, namely the Arctic States, has gained worldwide attention. The views that converge on the north polar circle essentially follow four main aspects in the region: environmental changes; the unfolding of relations between Arctic states; the opportunities for new navigation rotation and the exploitation of natural resources. Although the last three aspects are conditioned by the first, there is no natural determinism based on environmental changes that is responsible for the scenario that is being built in the region. On the contrary, cooperation underway in the Arctic is a result of governance in the region that has led to relations between the actors in the North Polar Circle and cooperative relations. However, even if cooperation is the current condition, world interests in the Arctic can cause destabilization in this geopolitical scenario. Therefore, we analyze in this article how an actor with the characteristics of the European Union (EU) can bring effective contributions to Arctic governance. For the region has increasingly attracted the eyes of non-Arctic actors, such as China, India, Japan, Germany, etc., and their presence in the North Polar Circle, strongly oriented towards economic purposes, may threaten peace in the Arctic. The EU, however, in addition to having a strong regulatory capacity, is also an actor who exercises global influence of values and norms, and seeks to articulate cooperative relations in its practices and discourses. And therefore, it can contribute to the maintenance of Arctic peace, in the 21st century, when global interests and non-Arctic actors in the region emerge.

**Keywords**—Arctic, Governance, European Union, Cooperation.

**Resumo**—O Ártico é uma região que, apesar de situada no extremo norte do globo e cercada por um número reduzido de países, nomeadamente os Estados do Ártico, tem conquistado a atenção mundial. Os olhares que convergem para o círculo polar norte acompanham fundamentalmente quatro aspectos principais na região: as transformações ambientais; os desdobramentos das relações entre os Estados do Ártico; as oportunidades de novas rotações de navegação e a exploração dos recursos naturais. Embora os três últimos aspectos sejam condicionados pelo primeiro, não há um determinismo natural a partir de mudanças ambientais que seja responsável pelo cenário que vem sendo construído na região. Pelo contrário, a cooperação em marcha no Ártico é decorrente da governança na região que tem conduzido as relações entre os atores do Círculo Polar Norte relações de cooperação. Contudo, ainda que a cooperação seja a condição atual, os interesses mundiais sobre o Ártico podem provocar desestabilização neste cenário geopolítico. Portanto, analisa-se neste artigo como um ator com as características da União Europeia (UE) pode trazer contributos efetivos na governança do Ártico. Pois, a região tem atraído cada vez mais os olhares de atores não-Árticos, tais como China, Índia, Japão, Alemanha etc, e a presença destes no Círculo Polar Norte, fortemente orientados para fins económicos, pode ameaçar a paz no Ártico. A UE, entretanto, além de dispor de uma forte capacidade normativa, é também um ator que exerce influência global de valores e normas, e busca articular relações de cooperação em suas práticas e discursos. E, portanto, pode contribuir na manutenção da paz ártica, no século XXI, quando emergem interesses globais e de atores não-Árticos na região.

**Palavras-Chave**—Ártico, Governança, União Europeia, Cooperação.

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## 1 Introdução

O ÁRTICO é uma região situada no extremo norte do globo terrestre. Não é um continente e tão pouco uma porção de terra pertencente a qualquer país. Antes trata-se de uma extensão territorial localizada entre os continentes europeu, norte-americano e asiático, no extremo norte do globo e é delimitado pelo Círculo Polar Ártico (ou Círculo Polar Norte). A região é composta por áreas terrestres que compreendem 12,5 milhões km<sup>2</sup> e por mares e rios que se estendem por 14 milhões km<sup>2</sup>. A extensão total do Ártico é, então, 26,5 milhões de km<sup>2</sup> que perpassam por territórios pertencentes à Rússia, Canadá, Estados Unidos, Islândia, Dinamarca e Noruega. Por esta área espalham-se igualmente cerca de quatro milhões de habitantes, pertencentes a populações indígenas (Inuit, Yupik, Saami, etc) e não-indígenas (indo-europeus e caucasianos).

Com um ecossistema frágil, esta região tem sofrido, em especial nas últimas décadas, o impacto das atividades humanas prejudiciais ao meio ambiente e que ocorrem em outras partes do mundo. Emissão de gases poluentes (provenientes de atividades industriais, mineração, agropecuária intensiva, bem como da própria vida urbana), degradação ambiental (por infiltração de tóxicos nos solos e lençóis freáticos, excesso de plásticos, de medicamentos e de metais pesados nas águas), desmatamento e desflorestamento, são todas elas atividades em constante crescimento na Terra e cujos reflexos são sentidos no Ártico, seja indiretamente através do aquecimento da temperatura do planeta, seja através da poluição que chega à região ártica por correntes de ar e de água (Moritz, Bitz, e Steig 2002; Ford, Smith, e Wandel 2006; Wang, Chen, e Kumar 2013).

O derretimento acelerado do gelo, por exemplo, afeta o nível dos oceanos em regiões litorâneas, altera a temperatura das correntes marítimas que percorrem outros mares, e impacta na reprodução de espécies marítimas e aves que, através da interação sistêmica do meio ambiente,

se relacionam com espécies animais de outros ecossistemas. Uma vez que as alterações no Ártico demonstram efeitos em todo o mundo e mudam os padrões climáticos em uma escala global, é evidente, portanto, que a Europa também sofrerá cada vez mais os reflexos destas alterações ambientais.

O comissário da União Europeia para o Meio Ambiente, Assuntos Marítimos e Pescas, Karmenu Vella, aponta que as alterações no meio ambiente da região ártica têm provocado, na Europa, verões mais secos, invernos mais curtos, e tempestades e inundações mais frequentes, sendo isso tudo consequência do intenso processo de degelo no Ártico. No entanto, tal como defende o comissário, a preocupação da União Europeia com o Ártico não é apenas em relação aos aspectos ambientais:

*But our concern for the Arctic is not only an environmental one. Our own security and prosperity are at stake: it is high time for an integrated European policy for the Arctic. We need a policy that champions social and economic development for the entire region above the polar circle. A responsible policy for the Arctic ecosystem. But also a policy that recognizes the Arctic's strategic value for regional and global security, and its crucial place in our foreign policy.* (Vella, e Mogherini 2016)

Brigham (2007, 27) defende que a combinação dos dois grandes fenômenos que estão ocorrendo no Ártico (mudança climática e aumento da exploração de recursos naturais) pode transformar esta outrora remota área numa nova região de importância para a economia global. E a consequência dessa condição é a transposição do Ártico de uma região limitada - política e economicamente - pelos Estados do Ártico e pelo Conselho do Ártico, para uma região global. De facto, a região é, no século XXI, uma zona globalizada cuja influência política, econômica, ambiental e cultural atrai as atenções de atores Árticos e não-Árticos, bem como de investigadores de diversas áreas do conhecimento, fazendo convergir sobre ela uma verdadeira plêiade de saberes e de abordagens transdisciplinares, intensificando os interesses de vários protagonistas sobre o Ártico.

As duas principais questões que vieram à tona, a partir do degelo no Ártico e que tem atraído os olhares do mundo para o extremo norte do

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globo são: (i) com o derretimento do gelo as áreas de navegação marítima no Ártico passaram a ser utilizáveis por mais tempo no decorrer do ano; (ii) a diminuição da espessura da camada de gelo facilitou o uso de maquinário especializado para a extração de petróleo e gás natural no Oceano Ártico.

Em relação ao primeiro ponto, ao invés de certas regiões do círculo polar ártico ficarem navegáveis, apenas, durante dois meses, no verão, o degelo tem possibilitado a circulação de navios por um maior período ao longo do ano. Tal condição tem implicações diretas em questões econômicas e comerciais, uma vez que a navegação pelo extremo norte do globo permite o transporte de cargas entre a Europa Ocidental, especialmente a região noroeste do continente europeu, e a costa leste asiática. Além disso, as conexões marítimas entre as costas leste e oeste do Canadá e também dos Estados Unidos, que utilizam hoje, essencialmente, o Canal do Panamá, poderão ser realizadas através dos mares no norte canadiano - zonas que anteriormente permaneciam inacessíveis, ou acessíveis somente por um curto espaço de tempo no decorrer do ano. O encurtamento das rotas de navegação, bem como o surgimento de novas rotas, tem incrementos significativos nas relações comerciais entre os países do Ártico, mas, também entre países de outras partes do globo e que podem se valer das novas oportunidades provocadas pelas mudanças climáticas.

O segundo ponto é igualmente decorrente do degelo. No entanto, ao invés de sua relação se dar com a extensão da camada de gelo, sua importância está na diminuição da espessura dessa camada. Pois, ao tornar-se mais fina, torna-se também mais fácil a perfuração do gelo e a consequente extração dos recursos naturais, especialmente, gás natural e petróleo. Portanto, as mudanças climáticas provocam efeitos que incidem tanto no equilíbrio ambiental da região quanto em interesses políticos e econômicos.

As duas condições mencionadas no parágrafo anterior poderiam sugerir o cumprimento dos dados da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) que indicam que 40% dos conflitos armados internos registrados nas últimas seis décadas, em todo o mundo, são decorrentes de disputas pelo controle de recursos naturais. Contudo, o Ártico tem

apresentado um cenário diferenciado, onde não se tem evidenciado conflitos armados e ameaças militares, apesar da intensificação da exploração de recursos naturais sob a superfície de gelo. Há, na verdade, sinais de cooperação na região que se diluem numa miríade de protagonistas, tais como Estados Árticos, organizações transnacionais, empresas multinacionais e Estados não-Árticos (mas, que tem demonstrado interesse em atuar no extremo norte do globo).

De acordo com o ministro das Relações Exteriores da Noruega - Borge Brende - o desenvolvimento político e econômico do Ártico se dá através de relações pacíficas entre os atores da região, com foco na preservação do meio ambiente, segurança e paz. Assim, os Estados do Ártico trabalhando no Conselho do Ártico [...] demonstraram que podem responder a novos desafios e estabelecer vínculos de cooperação<sup>1</sup> (Brende 2016).

Segundo o ministro, a região ártica desfruta de prosperidade e estabilidade que decorrem de muitos fatores, dentre eles acordos estabelecidos e cumpridos entre os Estados do Ártico e isso tem construído uma longa tradição de cooperação e não de confrontação entre os atores da região.

*Internationally, the Arctic has been a haven of international cooperation and respect for international law. The rest of the world is experiencing turbulent times, but the Arctic has remained an oasis of tranquility. The dangerous road of confrontation and conflict has been avoided. The principal actors have seen the benefits of win-win.*

Brende (2016) destaca que os oceanos árticos também são alguns dos mais bem administrados do mundo. No mar de Barents, a gestão baseada no desenvolvimento científico e na cooperação com a Rússia garantiram o uso maneira sustentável e rendimentos anuais altos. Portanto, o cenário de cooperação que está em andamento no Ártico não é decorrente dos desafios naturais e geográficos que a própria região impõe aos atores que atuam nesse espaço geográfico. Pois, seria viável pensar que as dificuldades de transpor as

1. Discurso proferido na *Arctic Frontiers* em 2016, disponível no website oficial da Conferência: <http://www.arcticfrontiers.com/>. O discurso do ministro norueguês está disponível no website oficial do Governo da Noruega: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/speech-arctic-frontiers/id2472163/>



limitações impostas pelo gelo e pelo frio intenso (e constante), levaria os atores da região a cooperarem para juntos conseguirem superar essas condições e alcançarem, de forma conjunta, seus objetivos comerciais e econômicos na região.

A cooperação entre os Estados do Ártico é decorrente de uma estrutura de governança que vem sendo construída no decorrer dos anos e que conseguiu estabelecer, com sucesso, a boa relação entre os atores nesta região. Além disso, a presença de um ator específico na governança do Ártico pode contribuir na continuidade da cooperação, qual seja: a União Europeia. Pois, a UE apresenta-se no cenário internacional como um *global actor* conhecido pela sua capacidade de influenciar o mundo com normas e valores, por defender estratégias de *soft power* com amplos recursos ao poder econômico e comercial (ao invés do uso de poder militar), e que dispõe de uma profunda capacidade de projetar o desenvolvimento global através da cooperação.

Para abordar tal perspectiva, estruturou-se este artigo em três partes: primeiro aborda-se a complexidade do Ártico, quando apresenta-se algumas questões muito particulares da região e cujas características são próprias do cenário geopolítico do círculo polar norte; depois considera-se a governança do Ártico, destacando-se como a complexidade da região é um desafio para analisar o seu regime de governança; e, por fim, sugere-se que a União Europeia pode contribuir na governança do Ártico, especialmente, no que diz respeito à manutenção da cooperação que vem sendo construída no extremo norte do globo.

## 2 A Complexidade do Ártico

A Governança do Ártico apresenta uma realidade demasiada complexa. Tal como observado na introdução, o Ártico não é um continente ou uma porção territorial pertencente à algum país, nem mesmo uma porção territorial em disputa entre países. É antes uma região que de características geográficas e climáticas singulares, que moldam todo o seu sentido geopolítico e geoeconômico no espaço mundial. Trata-se, portanto, de uma região formada por oceanos e por parte de territórios de cinco Estados soberanos cujos litorais estão na

região ártica, quais sejam: Dinamarca, Noruega, Rússia, Canadá e Estados Unidos.

Além das atenções sobre questões ambientais do Ártico, a região apresenta características muito peculiares e cuja importância emerge de relações (quase) simbióticas entre as dimensões ambientais, políticas e econômicas. E, portanto, é possível destacar duas questões muito particulares do Ártico: (i) o surgimento de novas condições políticas e econômicas na região não foi, unicamente, decorrente da ação de Estados e de atores transnacionais. Mas, também e principalmente decorrente das mudanças climáticas observadas a partir da segunda metade do século XX, e que atraiu a atenção mundial sobre essa zona geográfica; (ii) o Ártico é a única zona do globo completamente cercada por países que representam tipos ideais na comunidade internacional. Há na região um grupo de países que são internacionalmente reconhecidos como modelos de democracia (os países escandinavos), de multiculturalismo (o Canadá) e como grandes potências com alta capacidade militar (Estados Unidos e Rússia).

E em meio a tais características pode-se destacar uma condição muito particular, que se evidencia unicamente no Ártico, e que envolve duas grandes potências do Sistema Internacional. Estados Unidos e Rússia têm relações historicamente marcadas por animosidades e cujas tensões evidenciaram-se em diversas partes do mundo. Entretanto, estes dois atores não têm promovido ações confrontadoras no Ártico. Pelo contrário, é justamente no Círculo Polar Norte que estas duas potências se aproximam territorialmente<sup>2</sup>, mas apesar da proximidade geográfica, é também no Ártico que elas não promoveram embates diretos.

E entre as duas grandes potências mundiais que se caracterizam também como atores árticos, há ainda médias potências que são mundialmente reconhecidas pela abertura ao diálogo democrático (como os países escandinavos) e pelo interesse em mediar conflitos e contribuir na resolução de

2. A proximidade territorial se dá no Estreito de Bering. A largura do canal que separa a América do Norte da Ásia é de 85 km. No entanto, no meio do canal existem duas ilhas (Diomedes Maior e Diomedes Menor) que pertencem, respectivamente, à Rússia e aos Estados Unidos. A distância entre as duas ilhas é de apenas 4 km. Logo, o território soberano russo e o território soberano norte-americano ficam separados por apenas quatro quilômetros, quando se considera a distância entre as duas ilhas.

tensões políticas (como o Canadá). Portanto, no contexto geopolítico do Ártico há: uma superpotência do ocidente (Estados Unidos), uma grande potência do oriente (Rússia), uma média potência globalmente vista como um país multicultural (Canadá) e países que representam tipos ideias na concepção weberiana de democracias com fortes componentes de participação popular nas decisões políticas (os países escandinavos). Tais condições, por si só, já demonstram tanto as características assimétricas entre os atores do Ártico quanto a dificuldade de articular interesses comuns entre os seus protagonistas.

Depois, há que se ponderar as condições naturais da região. Os ecossistemas do Ártico apresentam características muito peculiares e algumas condições que são existentes apenas nesta área geográfica. Contudo, apesar de suas especificidades geográficas e climáticas, as consequências de suas transformações afetam o mundo todo, causando, por exemplo, aumento no nível dos oceanos ou déficit nas cadeias alimentares de outras regiões que dependem de aves e peixes que migram ou se reproduzem no Ártico. As condições naturais, ainda, poderiam incidir em aspectos políticos. Pois, poder-se-ia pensar que o histórico de cooperação e a ausências de conflitos militares no Ártico seja decorrente da imposição das condições naturais que marcam o cenário geográfico e meteorológico da região.

De facto, poderia se considerar que as dificuldades de transpor as limitações impostas pelo clima severo levariam os atores da região a cooperarem para juntos superarem essas condições. Todavia, observa-se que é mais evidente que a cooperação entre os Estados do Ártico é antes decorrente de estrutura de governança que vem sendo construída na região. Logo, a possibilidade de cooperação por causa de adversidades naturais e incontroláveis (como a questão climática, por exemplo) não é prioritária na dinâmica do Ártico. Os atores que lá atuam cooperam em função de acordos políticos e econômicos que vem sendo formalizados entre os Estados do Ártico desde o final do século XX.

Além destas questões, pode-se destacar que a complexidade política da região ártica se expressa também no facto de que nenhum Estado ou Organização Internacional possui soberania sobre

esta zona. Pois, a ausência de soberania na região poderia ocasionar conflitos, indiferente do cenário no qual os atores estão inseridos, especialmente se a lógica prevalecente fosse unicamente atuar de maneira unilateral. O Ártico, portanto, para além das condições únicas que apresenta, é até o momento uma zona que atrai a atenção de atores árticos e não-árticos e tem tido sucesso na manutenção da cooperação entre os seus protagonistas.

As atenções mundiais sobre o Ártico, contudo, nem sempre estiverem presentes nos olhares da política internacional. Palosaari e Tynkkynen (2015) apontam que a dinâmica da região recebeu atenção mais relevante somente no decorrer da Guerra Fria, mas, ainda assim ela era vista apenas a partir dos antagonismos emergidos entre os Estados Unidos e a ex-União Soviética. Na ocasião o Ártico fora considerado um possível palco de demonstração de força e os autores destacam que as atenções para a região, em termos geopolíticos, não passaram dessa esfera. De certa forma, outras perspectivas que não fossem militares eram assuntos periféricos e marginalizados nas análises sobre o Ártico.

Tammes e Offerdal (2014) concordam com esta percepção e sugerem uma extensão da marginalização dos estudos políticos acerca do Ártico até o início do século XXI. Para os autores, nos anos 90 o foco na militarização do Ártico mudou dramaticamente quando a região foi marcada não pela rivalidade, mas pela cooperação articulada em interesses comuns e em propósitos compartilhados. Entretanto, no mesmo período o Ártico foi novamente marginalizado na política internacional em função das ameaças emergentes no final do século XX, tais como as guerras nos Balcãs, no Afeganistão e a luta contra o terrorismo internacional. Contudo, no presente século uma miríade de questões ligadas ao Ártico tornou-se notória em temáticas de interesse global, colocando o Ártico nos debates das relações internacionais.

### 3 A Governança no Ártico

De acordo com o Relatório da Comissão sobre Governança Global (1996) a governança diz respeito à administração de problemas comuns, por diferentes meios, que afetam os indivíduos e as

instituições (públicas e privadas). E, sendo o Ártico um problema comum para toda a humanidade faz-se relevante olhar para a governança na região, bem como apontar a participação de novos atores que podem contribuir de maneira positiva na continuidade das relações que lá vem sendo estabelecidas, seja entre os atores árticos, seja entre atores não-árticos.

Sob a égide da governança, os Estados precisam demonstrar capacidade governamental de mobilizar os meios e os recursos necessários para a execução das políticas públicas. E ainda devem observar que os resultados sejam implementados percorrendo o caminho da eficiência e da eficácia, isto é, que se mostrem sustentáveis (no longo prazo). Assim, entende-se que a governança refere-se a padrões de articulação e cooperação entre atores sociais e políticos e arranjos institucionais que coordenam e regulam transações dentro e através das fronteiras do sistema econômico (Santos 1997, 342). Ademais, a governança considera também, além dos mecanismos tradicionais de agregação e articulação de interesses, as redes sociais informais e associações de diversos tipos (Santos 1997, 342).

Jönsson e Tallberg (2010, 1) apontam que:

*While international institutions were long the exclusive preserve of national governments, the past decades have witnessed a gradual and partial shift from interstate cooperation to more complex forms of governance, involving participation by transnational actors, such as non-governmental organization.*

Apesar do termo governança ser amplamente usado nos debates e nos aportes teóricos da Ciência Política e das Relações Internacionais, a sua definição ainda sugere diversos significados. No entanto, de maneira geral é aceito que governança abraça todos os atores, organizações e instituições, públicas e não públicas, envolvidos na estruturação de políticas e seus relacionamentos, seja dentro ou fora de um Estados-nação soberano (Jensen 2008, 381).

Ainda, de acordo com Jensen (2008) o termo pode expressar dinamismo e flexibilidade nos estudos das Ciências Políticas e sugere que há movimento e continuidade no cenário político, onde as relações de poder, jogos de interesse e protagonismos entre atores estatais e não estatais,

mantém-se constantemente vívidas e ativas. Pois, a governança expressa o caráter cinético e inquieto dos atores, revelando uma constituição dinâmica entre eles, através da prática cotidiana no decorrer do tempo (Jensen 2008, 381).

Portanto, entendemos que a governança apresenta possibilidades de identificar padrões que se articulam nas questões políticas da região ártica e contribuir na influência de ideias e ações que valorizem o Ártico em si, a fim de propagar, no longo prazo, a cooperação na região. E, especialmente, no século XXI, quando o Ártico tem ganho destaque e interesse mundial faz-se ainda mais necessário garantir a perpetuação do comportamento cooperativo que vem se evidenciando nos últimos anos. Juntamente com o crescimento das atenções voltadas ao Ártico, é também necessário a presença de um ator de destaque na governança global, tal como a União Europeia, para que haja reais possibilidade de manter a paz, apesar de interesses tão diversificados por parte de atores tão variados.

Lavenex (2004) aponta que as transformações da geopolítica mundial no século XXI, tem levado a União a adaptar-se, tanto interna quanto externamente, alterando a equação entre os Estado e as instituições da UE na formulação de políticas, bem como na sua responsabilização. Esta dinâmica pode ser melhor capturada na noção de governança como uma forma de organização política e que pode ser útil para estudar as relações com países terceiros que, embora não sejam Estados membros, estão incluídos na busca de seus objetivos (Lavenex 2004, 682).

Ademais, à medida que a região ártica se tornou um tema de importância internacional, a UE, através da Comissão e do EEAS (*European External Action Service*), considerou importante, segundo Østhagen (2013), o envolvimento da instituição a fim de continuar seu protagonismo como ator global através da sua política externa. E, por isso, as próprias instituições europeias e seus estados membros têm interesses na aproximação da UE com o Ártico. Associado a isso, tem-se as questões ambientais e climáticas que se mostram sempre desafiadoras, cada vez mais ganham notoriedade global e tanto pela proximidade geográfica com a Europa quanto pelo impacto social e ideológico que provocam, são também questões

que podem atrair o protagonismo da União no extremo norte do globo.

Por isso, o envolvimento cada vez mais amplo da União Europeia com o Ártico é relevante, a fim de fortalecer ligações políticas e normativas em diversas causas defendidas pela União, tal como a crescente autoconsciência da UE como "lutador climático". Tal condição estimula a necessidade de criar uma política europeia comum para o Ártico (Østhagen 2013). Por isso, Steinberg (2015) sugere que a UE pode buscar formar no Ártico relações como outrora construiu no Mediterrâneo, e de um espaço marginal pode tornar-se um espaço crucial e central para o futuro do continente. Pois, a União pode estender para o Ártico a sua influência já consolidada nas relações com diversos atores na política e na economia mundial. Levando, assim, para o círculo polar norte a garantia prolongada de relações amistosas e de cooperação entre múltiplos atores Ártico e não-Árticos com interesses na região.

E visto que a governança pode ocorrer tanto em nível regional, nacional ou global (Bjørkli 2015), a relação União Europeia/Ártico/Governança é compatível com o caráter da União. Pois, a UE é um ator global, o Ártico é um espaço geográfico, político e economicamente globalizado, e Governança é um tema de interesse mundial e cujo nível de atuação alcança dimensões globais. Portanto, um ator como a União que articula relações com todos os continentes e é capaz de influenciar o mundo com padrões e valores morais pode ser crucial para a manutenção da paz e da cooperação no circumpolar norte.

### 3.1 O Contributo da União Europeia no Ártico

Tal como explicado anteriormente, a complexidade do Ártico não é uma condição restrita às suas características ambientais ou geopolíticas. Antes, é consequência de décadas de acordos diplomáticos e tratativas de negociação pacífica que, gradualmente, foram formando as características da governança no Ártico. Mesmo sendo um cenário livre de conflitos militares e com uma estrutura de governança que tem se articulado com sucesso, ainda assim a governança na região é complexa e formada a partir de um mosaico de acordos e

negociações. Isto não se apresenta, contudo, como um problema. Pelo contrário, apenas reforça a argumentação acerca da importância da atuação da União Europeia no Círculo Polar Norte.

Para Heininen (2012), os estados do Ártico desfrutam de uma relação de alta estabilidade e cooperação, e compartilham os mesmos interesses económicos e comerciais. A região, segundo ele, é propensa à uma relação pacífica no que diz respeito a relação entre os Estados. E quando emerge algum conflito, estes não são nem exagerados e nem demasiadamente intensos, são apenas decorrentes das mudanças constantes pelas quais a região passa, especialmente pelo dualismo que se expressa na lógica regionalismo x globalização. Mas, sempre são resolvidos pacificamente por causa do alto nível de cooperação alcançado entre os atores do Ártico e a partir dos regimes de governança. Esta governança, ainda que tenha características mais regionais, nos últimos anos tem sido muito influenciada por uma dimensão global.

Depledge e Dodds (2017) também consideram que a governança na região contribua de maneira positiva para a estabilidade. Entretanto, destacam que o atual regime de governança é complexo e só poder compreendido se olhado como um mosaico de atores e instituições.

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*the recent literature on Arctic governance and shows that the dominant interpretation of the current regime is that the Arctic is a region governed by a patchwork or mosaic of institutions and legal instruments operating at multiple levels, while at the same time retaining some semblance of common purposenamely to promote peace and cooperation in the Arctic.*"(pp.146)

Para Dodds e Nuttal (2017), a própria geopolítica do Ártico apresenta uma dinâmica única e característica da região:

*Arctic geopolitics is defined as one attentive to the discursive and representational qualities of its subject matter, but also adoptive of a relational understanding of the world, which in turn is attentive to the connections between human and non-human elements. We therefore advocate a view of the Arctic as a lively space characterized by agency, change, and vitality.*"(Dodds, e Nuttal 2017, 142)

E Young (2005, 9) afirma que a Governança do Ártico apresenta um mosaico de acordos de cooperação emergentes no Ártico que difere das principais representações que caracterizam os regimes internacionais e evidencia a importância das respostas regionais aos problemas globais. E, por isso, o autor aponta que o regime de governança no Ártico ainda está em construção, enfrentando constantes alterações em aspetos sociais, políticos e ambientais, e demandando que a governança na região lide com dificuldades permanentes.

Para Young (2012) os próprios atores da região - os *Arctic Five*<sup>3</sup> - já apresentam assimetrias diversas entre si. Mas, ainda, soma-se a isso o facto de os efeitos das mudanças climáticas e o crescimento exponencial e contínuo da globalização fazem do circumpolar um sistema não apenas grande e heterogêneo, mas, holístico e complexo.

Young (2005, 10) também destaca que:

*Although the area generally included within the boundaries of the Arctic is vast, covering some 40 million square kilometers, or 8 percent of the earth's surface, the human population of the region includes only about 4 million people. Because the region is large and relatively remote, matters of policy relating to the Arctic have traditionally involved interactions between northern peripheries and the metropolises of states located far to the south. On the one hand, the pattern of interaction underlying this north/south axis looms as a barrier to be overcome for those seeking to foster a distinct identity for the Arctic as an international region. On the other hand, the shared experiences that accompany peripheral status constitute one of the starting points for cooperation among those concerned with issues of importance to the Arctic and its peoples.*

Por isso, como mencionado anteriormente, a União Europeia tem forte capacidade para contribuir na Governança do Ártico. Pois, quer o regime da governança no círculo polar norte esteja bem formatado, quer esteja ainda em construção, a UE tem plenas capacidades políticas e econômicas para atuar em qualquer um dos contextos, seja qual for condição em que a governança se encontre atualmente. Pois, como sugerido, a UE representa um tipo diferente de ator internacional,

3. *Arctic Five* é o agrupamento dos cinco Estados que abordam assuntos atinentes ao Ártico e cujos litorais estão dentro do círculo polar ártico, quais sejam: Canadá, Dinamarca, Noruega, Rússia e Estados Unidos.

e representa um novo tipo de poder na política internacional (Diez 2006, 614).

A União é, pois, aquilo que Manners (2002) designa como um ator internacional que tem influência global por conta do seu poder normativo sendo que este, por sua vez, vai muito além da promoção de suas próprias normas (que seria uma característica das potências globais contemporâneas). Pelo contrário, está intimamente relacionado com o seu contexto sócio-histórico e ultrapassa os limites do poder 'civilizante' e do poder militar. A UE, enquanto *global actor*, dispõe, portanto, de um poder normativo capaz de transitar entre modelos de governança supranacionais e internacionais que transcendem o modelo westfaliano de estados nacionais.

Para Bengtsson e Elgström (2012, 93) o poder normativo indica a capacidade de influenciar outros atores internacionais tanto em sua forma de pensar como de agir. E esta é, precisamente, a condição necessária para a continuidade da cooperação no Ártico através da governança na região. Pois, enquanto palco de interesses globais, o Ártico pode vivenciar a eclosão de disputas e confrontos diretos por causa da abundante oferta de recursos naturais dentro de suas fronteiras geográficas. E, por isso, a possibilidade de manter a cooperação entre os envolvidos na região pode depender do protagonismo de um ator capaz de envolver, de maneira pacífica, todos os interessados no Ártico através da difusão de normas e valores que prezem pelo bem-estar das populações locais, pela democracia, pelos direitos humanos e pela sustentabilidade econômica.

A União Europeia é, pontualmente, o ator global que reúne estas características e que é capaz de contribuir na manutenção e no equilíbrio futuro no Ártico. As próprias potencialidades de atuação da UE no círculo polar assumem um caráter relevante no que diz respeito às suas competências, tal como sugere Stpie (2015, 252):

*The EU has many competences, which also extend to the Arctic. Most EU policies in one way or another influence all regions where the EU is present as an economic, environmental, political or funding actor. This is true also for the Arctic, which has come to be one of the regions for which the Union decided to develop a region-focused policy.*

Ademais, a Comissão Europeia, que, segundo Blunden (2009) considera o Ártico como crucial para sua estratégia em matéria de segurança energética, considera também que as regras para o transporte marítimo, a extração de recursos e a pesca no Ártico devem ser estabelecidas por agências internacionais e não apenas pelos estados costeiros. Disseminando assim a perspectiva de uma governança global para o Ártico e paralelamente evidenciando a dimensão dos interesses e dos atores capazes de articular questões políticas e econômicas no círculo polar norte.

Blunden (2009, 136) também sugere que os estados não-árticos na Europa têm fortes interesses comerciais e legítimos na região, notadamente com a abertura de novas vias marítimas de comunicação e transporte. Mas, para além disso, esses Estados podem dispor de experiência, de recursos e de competências que venham a contribuir para o futuro do Ártico.

*The EU, though not a unified actor in Arctic matters, is a world leader in action to combat climate change, a major contributor to Arctic research and to relevant technologies such as carbon capture and storage, and a major player in Arctic regional associations such as the Northern Dimension and the Barents Sea Organisation. It should be an important Arctic voice. Accepting the applications of states and non-governmental organisations seeking permanent observer status, and granting these new applicants, and the existing permanent observers, a recognised status in the governance system for the Arctic would enlarge the body of available expertise and the sense of ownership of Arctic problems. It would help allay fears that the Arctic states are pursuing national interests, narrowly defined, at the expense of wider and longer-term global considerations. (Blunden 2009, 136)*

A União Europeia, em 20 de novembro de 2008, através do ‘Communication on the Arctic’, abordou a importância do Ártico para as suas relações econômicas e políticas. Segundo o documento:

*The EU has to state its position concerning a unique region of strategic importance which is located in its immediate vicinity. It is time for the EU to clearly assess its interest and develop a holistic and systematic Arctic approach. This will increase the efficiency of the EU's action and open new opportunities for cooperation with the Arctic states. (Arctic*

*Communication - European Commission 2008, 2)*

Na altura, a Comissão Europeia apontou que seus objetivos para o Ártico seriam a proteção e a preservação da região em harmonia com a sua população; a promoção e o uso sustentável dos recursos; e o desenvolvimento da cooperação internacional. Depois, em 26 de Junho de 2012, a Comissão Europeia e o Alto Representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e Política de Segurança emitiram uma comunicação conjunta, onde abordaram a necessidade de desenvolver uma política da União Europeia para a Região do Ártico.

Em 2016, um novo documento da Comissão Europeia, afirmou que desde 2008 a UE aumentou substancialmente o seu envolvimento no Ártico, especialmente através do seu engajamento com o *Arctic Council* (AC), que é tido como um dos principais fóruns para a governabilidade no Ártico.

*In recent years, the Arctic region has acquired a higher profile in international relations due to its increasing environmental, social, economic and strategic importance. The EU already contributes substantially to Arctic research, satellite observation and regional development as well to the work of the Arctic Council, wherein countries beyond the Arctic such as China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore now have observer status. (European Commission 2016, 3)*

Em direção ao crescimento contínuo da presença da UE na região, o comunicado de 2016 destacou que as experiências anteriores de envolvimento da União Europeia no Ártico expõe o caso de uma política da UE que se centre no avanço das cooperações internacionais.

*A number of EU activities and decisions are having an impact on economic developments in the Arctic region. For example, the EU is a major consumer of products coming from the Arctic states, such as fish products and energy. Investment by European companies can help advance sustainable development in the region, possibly aided by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and initiatives under the Investment Plan for Europe. A recent report estimated investment opportunities in the Barents region alone to be EUR 140 billion. Regional smart specialisation strategies, combined with EU funding, can help to develop local models of sustainable growth and job creation in the European Arctic with potential benefits*

*across the EU. The forthcoming Finnish Presidency of the Arctic Council (2017-2019) will offer an opportunity to bring European ideas and initiatives to the work of the Arctic Council.* (European Commission 2016, 3)

Logo, é possível identificar que o interesse da UE no Ártico não está apenas em uma dimensão retórica, mas, tem sido desenvolvido na prática e com reconhecimento dos próprios países da região. E os documentos emitidos pela Comissão Europeia, entre 2008 e 2016, indicam um crescimento contínuo do bloco no círculo polar norte, reforçando ainda o nosso interesse de investigar o papel da UE enquanto *global actor* na Governança do Ártico. Ademais, a extensão política do Ártico tem se alargado e caminhado em direção a globalização, não ficando apenas restrito as dinâmicas regionais. Questões econômicas tem emergido na região e atraído atores de todas as partes do globo para o Círculo Polar Norte. Conforme o acesso aos recursos naturais ficam mais facilitados, a partir das mudanças climáticas e ambientais, mais os interesses na região se intensificam e maior é a ação de atores não-Árticos, inclusive.

*One way to stimulate economic development in the North can be through responsible resource development. Demand for minerals in particular is expected to keep rising as a result of sustained economic growth in highly populated, emerging economies such as China and India, and as economies recover in Europe and the USA.* (CanNor 2012, 7)

Esta condição intensifica ainda mais as possibilidades de contributos da UE no Ártico. Pois, além das características assimétricas dos Estados do Ártico, a participação de atores economicamente fortes e geograficamente localizados fora da região ártica, são duas condições que exigirão um alargamento e uma intensificação da governança na região. Ainda que as fronteiras geográficas, marítimas e ambientais continuem a ser delimitadas pelas condições naturais, as fronteiras políticas do Ártico, contudo, têm ganho novas dimensões. O interesse de Estados e de diversos outros atores não-Árticos evidenciam a universalidade da região e, por isso, um ator com influência global, tal como a União Europeia, pode ser crucial para a continuidade da manutenção da paz e da cooperação

no circumpolar norte.

#### 4 Considerações Finais

O potencial do Ártico para usos econômicos e comerciais despontou no último quarto do século XX e desde então vem provocando, gradualmente, a atenção global para o extremo norte do planeta. A utilização de rotas comerciais (através do Oceano Ártico) e a possibilidade de exploração de recursos naturais têm colocado pressão sobre a governança no Ártico. Desde a criação do *Arctic Council* (AC), em 1996, ficou evidente a necessidade de constituírem-se organismos políticos especializados nas questões atinentes à região.

No início deste século a União Europeia vem expressando o seu interesse pelo Ártico. Além de já ter no *Arctic Council* três estados membros (Finlândia, Suécia e Dinamarca) o que confere à UE certa capacidade de envolvimento político no Círculo Polar Norte há também seis países europeus que são observadores do AC (França, Itália, Espanha, Polônia, Alemanha e Reino Unido) contribuindo para a União Europeia adentar cada vez mais com a sua influência normativa na região. Ademais, sendo o Ártico uma área de interesses (e de preocupações) comuns para toda a humanidade, faz-se relevante ponderar sobre a necessidade de atuação de um *global actor* que seja capaz de conduzir e influenciar meios e processos que contribuam na governança do Círculo Polar Norte.

Somente um ator como a UE reúne as condições requeridas para acompanhar as atenções globais sobre o Ártico, pois, o seu poder normativo que também se vinculou à sua atuação econômica/comercial compreende o envolvimento de atores diversos, e coloca forte ênfase em questões relacionadas à democracia, sustentabilidade e direitos humanos (assuntos, inclusive, de interesse dos Estados do Ártico e dos povos indígenas da região). E a capacidade da União de usar *soft power* para transmitir valores e até mesmo o seu interesse na cooperação mundial apontam para a EU como um ator provido de meios e de recursos que podem contribuir nas questões atinentes à região ártica.

É, ainda, importante destacar que a estrutura de governança em vigor no Ártico, apesar de articular com sucesso a cooperação na região, precisa

lidar com problemas cada vez mais críticos, que afetam as esferas sociais, políticas e econômicas, e cujas transformações estão se intensificando conforme mudam os cenários (sociais, políticos e econômicos) em todo o mundo. Isso aumenta significativamente a complexidade e os desafios do que seria considerado uma boa governança, pois, exige a (re)formulação de políticas e ações que sejam, não só adequadas nas respostas aos desafios que emergem, mas, também eficientes na resolução dos problemas.

Ou seja, não basta olhar para a cooperação atual. É preciso considerar a continuidade das ações políticas em vistas a manter, no futuro, a sustentabilidade da condição presente. E, para isso é necessário atentar para o posicionamento dos atores neste cenário, sendo que aqueles que irão atuar no Ártico, nos próximos anos, serão atores de diversos esferas e categorias. Além de organizações públicas e privadas que já atuam no Ártico, originárias dos Estados árticos, também haverá em breve um envolvimento de Estados e organizações não-árticos atuando no extremo norte do globo e trazendo, junto com a sua presença, ainda mais desafios e complexidades para a governança da região.

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# Transdisciplinarity and Politics. A Possible Encounter?

## Transdisciplinaridade e Política. Um Encontro Possível?

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**Resumo**—The issue surrounding the conditions and consequences of a transdisciplinary approach to politics clashes with the problem of the essential indifference of transdisciplinarity in the political thought. Transdisciplinary thinking, until today, has focused mainly on the domains of epistemology, ethics, and education. Our analysis will be divided into three fundamental moments: first, and in a preliminary way, we will try to clarify what is meant by transdisciplinarity. Second, and specifying our research, we will carry out an analysis of the relationship between transdisciplinarity and disciplinary knowledge, focusing on the general relationship between transdisciplinarity and humanities and the specific relationship between transdisciplinarity and political science. Finally, we will advance two fundamental hypotheses, strictly interconnected among them: on the one hand, that the politician represents one who is removed from transdisciplinarity, on the other, and therefore, that only a politicization of the transdisciplinary theoretical device would enable it to achieve its main objective: to become a theory capable of playing an active role in changing the world.

**Keywords**—Transdisciplinarity, Niclescu, Quantum Physics, Transpolitics.

**Resumo**—A questão em torno das condições e as consequências de uma abordagem transdisciplinar da política chocam com o problema da essencial indiferença da transdisciplinaridade face ao pensamento político. A reflexão transdisciplinar, até à atualidade, tem-se focado sobretudo nos domínios da epistemologia, da ética, da educação. A nossa análise dividir-se-á em três momentos fundamentais: em primeiro lugar, e de forma preliminar, procuraremos esclarecer o que se entende com transdisciplinaridade. Em segundo lugar, e especificando a nossa investigação, levaremos a cabo uma análise da relação entre a transdisciplinaridade e os saberes disciplinares, com foco na relação geral entre transdisciplinaridade e ciências humanas e na relação específica entre a transdisciplinaridade e a ciência política. Por fim, avançaremos duas hipóteses fundamentais, estritamente interligadas entre elas: por um lado a de que o político representa o removido da transdisciplinaridade, por outro, e por conseguinte, a de que apenas uma politização do dispositivo teórico transdisciplinar lhe permitiria alcançar o seu principal objetivo: tornar-se uma teoria capaz de desempenhar um papel ativo na transformação do mundo.

**Palavras-Chave**—Transdisciplinaridade, Niclescu, Física quântica, Transpolítica.

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### 1 Introdução

A QUESTÃO em torno das condições e as consequências de uma abordagem transdisciplinar da política chocam logo com o problema da essencial indiferença da transdisciplinaridade face ao pensamento político: até agora, a reflexão

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transdisciplinar focou-se sobretudo nos domínios da epistemologia, da ética, da educação, da arte (Cilliers e Preiser 2010; Darbellay e Paulsen 2008; Nicolescu 2008c, 2008d, 2010, 2012), enquanto que, pelo contrário, a esfera da análise política manteve-se periférica, marginal. Por conseguinte, a interrogação em torno de uma possível aproximação entre transdisciplinaridade e política terá que responder, necessariamente, à questão sobre o contributo que a transdisciplinaridade pode trazer à reflexão política e a questão sobre o papel que o pensamento político pode desempenhar com vista à aprofundação do ponto de vista transdisciplinar.

Na tentativa de abordarmos a referida problemática em todos os seus aspetos, dividiremos a nossa análise em três momentos fundamentais: em primeiro lugar, e de forma preliminar, iremos esclarecer o que se entende por transdisciplinaridade, focando o nosso olhar sobre o *Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity*, redigido em 1996 por Nicolescu, físico teórico, fundador e presidente do *Centre International de Recherches et Études Transdisciplinaires* (CIRET) e principal teórico da transdisciplinaridade. Em seguida, especificando a nossa investigação, levaremos a cabo uma análise da relação entre transdisciplinaridade e saberes disciplinares, focando o nosso olhar quer na relação geral entre transdisciplinaridade e ciências humanas quer na especificidade entre a transdisciplinaridade e a ciência política. Tentaremos deste modo mostrar que a transdisciplinaridade considera a esfera da política apenas como o âmbito específico de realização da visão transdisciplinar do mundo, a par da cultura, da arte, da religião. Por fim, tentaremos problematizar a referida redução da política à esfera particular de realização da visão transdisciplinar do mundo, avançando duas hipóteses fundamentais, estritamente ligadas entre elas: por um lado a de que o político representa o removido da transdisciplinaridade, por outro, e por conseguinte, a de que apenas uma politização do dispositivo teórico transdisciplinar lhe permitiria alcançar o seu principal objetivo: tornar-se uma potência ativa na constituição dum outro mundo.

## 2 Transdisciplinaridade: uma nova visão do mundo

A transdisciplinaridade representa o desafio teórico de ultrapassar a divisão e fragmentação disciplinar dos conhecimentos, assim como também as perspetivas da inter e pluri disciplinaridade. Com efeito, segundo Nicolescu:

*Disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity are like four arrows shot from but a single bow: knowledge. As in the case of disciplinary, transdisciplinarity research is not antagonistic but complementary to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity research. Transdisciplinarity is nevertheless radically distinct from multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity because of its goal, the understanding of the present world, which cannot be accomplished in the framework of disciplinary research. (Nicolescu 1996, 46)*

O objetivo fundamental da transdisciplinaridade é, portanto, a constituição de uma nova visão do mundo, edificada a partir de e para além da atual segmentação dos conhecimentos. O efeito fundamental da disciplinarização dos conhecimentos é a dissolução do sujeito e dos saberes éticos; o processo que *nietzschianamente* é definido como a morte do homem. O homem perde a sua capacidade de agir no mundo, de escolher e de fundamentar a realidade a partir de valores universais, para se tornar apenas um objeto do conhecimento científico:

*The Man-God has become a man-object, of which the only result can be self-destruction. The two world massacre of this century, not to mention the multiple local wars those too, have produced innumerable corpses are only the prelude to self-destruction a global scale. (Nicolescu 1996, 13-14)*

Contudo, Nicolescu recusa firmemente toda a atitude nostálgica de regresso a uma época pré-científica, na qual os homens ainda conseguiam questionar-se sobre o sentido do ser. Se a complexificação e especialização dos conhecimentos tem implicado uma crise na visão tradicional do mundo, tem também, por outro lado, definido as bases para suportar o humanismo em outros fundamentos teóricos, éticos e políticos:

*Le défi d'autodestruction de notre espèce n'est pas entièrement négatif car il engendre sa contrepartie d'autonaissance. A mon sens, 'la mort de l'homme' est une étape, après tout, nécessaire de l'Histoire, qui laisse augurer sa deuxième naissance.* (Nicolescu 1996, 50)

Segundo Nicolescu, as duas revoluções científicas fundamentais do século XX - a da física quântica e a da informática - implicitamente apontam para uma nova visão da realidade que, fundamentada na harmonia entre a subjetividade e a objetividade entre humano e científico, permitiria ultrapassar as tendências destruidoras da nossa época. Contudo, a referida nova visão do mundo, até agora, tardou por estar restringida aos especialistas científicos, não conseguindo impor-se no âmbito prático das consciências humanas, ainda dominado pela tradicional percepção do mundo, isto é, por uma visão da realidade fundamentada na presumida oposição entre a objetividade e a subjetividade. Apenas uma verdadeira revolução da inteligência permitiria, segundo Nicolescu, conseguirmos finalmente alcançar uma nova percepção sobre o humano e a natureza, e adequarmos assim as nossas consciências ao nível de conhecimento alcançado pelas ciências. Com efeito, inteligência é:

*la capacité de lire à la fois entre les lignes du livre de la Nature et entre les lignes du livre de l'être intérieur. Sans les passerelles entre les êtres et les choses, les avancées technoscientifiques ne servent qu'à agrandir une complexité de plus en plus incompréhensible.* (Nicolescu 1996, 52)

A revolução científica ocorrida na física alcançada através da descoberta do universo quântico, acarretou a formulação de três axiomas fundamentais: o dos níveis de realidade, o da lógica do terceiro incluso e o da complexidade, cada um deles contribuindo por um lado a questionar a visão tradicional do mundo, por outro a impulsionar o conhecimento no sentido da revolução da inteligência. O postulado dos níveis de realidade entende-se

*un ensemble de systèmes invariant à l'action d'un nombre de lois générales: par exemple, les entités quantiques soumises*

*aux lois quantiques, lesquelles sont en rupture radicale avec les lois du monde macrophysique. C'est dire que deux niveaux de Réalité sont différents si, en passant de l'un à l'autre, il y a rupture des lois et rupture des concepts fondamentaux (comme, par exemple, la causalité).<sup>1</sup>*

O axioma dos níveis de realidades é deduzido a partir da descoberta do universo quântico, isto é, de uma realidade infinitamente pequena e não perceptível aos nossos sentidos. Uma descoberta que acarreta uma verdadeira revolução ontológica, na medida em que, por um lado falsifica a concepção mono-dimensional da realidade, base da nossa tradicional percepção do mundo, mas que por outro abre o caminho para uma nova definição como "ce qui résiste à nos expériences, représentations, descriptions, images ou formalisations mathématiques"<sup>2</sup> (Nicolescu 1996, 12).

A realidade é, então, um conceito complexo, que engloba o infinitamente pequeno e o infinitamente grande, encontrando-se enraizado no pressuposto da possível coexistência de múltiplos níveis de realidade, cada um com uma sua especí-

1. "Il y a, certes, une cohérence de l'ensemble des niveaux de Réalité, mais cette cohérence est orientée: une flèche est associée à toute transmission de l'information d'un niveau à l'autre. Pour qu'il y ait une unité ouverte, il faut considérer que l'ensemble des niveaux de Réalité se prolonge par une zone de nonrésistance à nos expériences, représentations, descriptions, images ou formalisations mathématiques. La nonrésistance de cette zone de transparence absolue est due, tout simplement, aux limitations de notre corps et de nos organes des sens, quels que soient les instruments de mesure qui prolongent ces organes des sens. L'ensemble des niveaux de Réalité et sa zone complémentaire de nonrésistance constituent l'Objet transdisciplinaire. Les niveaux de Réalité peuvent être explorés grâce à l'existence en nous des différents niveaux de perception. L'ensemble des niveaux de perception et sa zone complémentaire de nonrésistance constituent le Sujet transdisciplinaire. La connaissance n'est ni extérieure, ni intérieure: elle est à la fois extérieure et intérieure. L'étude de l'Univers et l'étude de l'être humain se soutiennent l'une l'autre. Le vécu et l'expérience de soi-même ont autant de valeur cognitive que la connaissance scientifique. La zone de nonrésistance joue le rôle du Tiers Caché, qui permet l'unification, dans leur différence, du Sujet transdisciplinaire et de l'Objet transdisciplinaire. Elle permet et demande l'interaction entre le Sujet et l'Objet. La zone de transparence correspond au sacré, c'est-à-dire à ce qui ne se soumet à aucune rationalisation." (Nicolescu 2007, 6-7)

2. "We have to distinguish, in order to avoid further ambiguities, the words Real and Reality. Real designates that which is, while Reality is connected to resistance in our human experience. The Real is, by definition, veiled forever (it does not tolerate any further qualifications) while Reality is accessible to our knowledge. Real involves non-resistance while Reality involves resistance. (Nicolescu 2008a, 14)"

fica racionalidade, causalidade e lógica.<sup>3</sup>

Quais as ferramentas teóricas que permitem alcançar esta complexidade? Segundo Nicolescu, enquanto a lógica tradicional aristotélica, fundamentada nos postulados de identidade, contradição e do terceiro excluído, encontra-se ligada à visão mono-dimensional da realidade, o axioma do terceiro incluído, formulado pelo filósofo Lupasco, permite limitar a validade da lógica aristotélica ao nível de realidade macro-cósmica, estabelecendo as condições da sua coexistência com outras lógicas heterogêneas. De acordo com este axioma, os binómios opositivos, que na lógica tradicional necessariamente se excluem, podem na realidade encontrar um ponto de convergência por meio da afirmação de um terceiro, capaz de incluir ambos. Segundo Nicolescu, a lógica inclusiva de Lupasco expressa todas as suas potencialidades quando confrontada com o princípio dos níveis de realidade:

*In order to obtain a clear image of the meaning of the included middle, let us represent the three terms of the new logic A, non-A, and T and the dynamics associated with them by a triangle in which one of the vertices is situated at one level of Reality and the two other vertices at another level of Reality. The included middle is in fact an included third. If one remains at a single level of Reality, all manifestation appears as a struggle between two contradictory elements. The third dynamic, that of the T-state, is exercised at another level of Reality, where that which appears to be disunited is in fact united, and that which appears contradictory is perceived as non-contradictory. It is the projection of the T-state onto the same single level of Reality which produces the appearance of mutually exclusive, antagonistic pairs (A and non-A). A single level of Reality can only create antagonistic oppositions. It is inherently self-destructive if it is completely separated from all the other levels of Reality. A third term which is situated at the same level of Reality as that of the opposites A and non-A, cannot accomplish their reconciliation. (Nicolescu 2010, 30)*

3. O conceito de matéria também se expande, já não podendo ser identificado apenas com a substância: "Nous assistons, dans le monde quantique, à une perpétuelle transformation énergie - substance - information, le concept d'énergie apparaissant comme le concept unificateur: l'information est une énergie codée, tandis que la substance est une énergie concrétisée. Dans la physique contemporaine, l'espace-temps lui-même n'apparaît pas comme un réceptacle où sont plongés les objets matériels: il est une conséquence de la présence de la matière. La matière est associée à une complexe substance - énergie - information - espace-temps" (Nicolescu 1996, 38).

A principal implicação da lógica do terceiro incluído é a relativização da visão tradicional do mundo, fundamentada nos binómios contraditórios da subjetividade *versus* objetividade, racionalidade *versus* imaginação, simples *versus* complexo: o alcance de um outro nível de realidade permite uma percepção bem diferente dos referidos binómios, que aparecem já não como elementos antitéticos, mas como elementos coexistentes e edificadores da complexidade do real.<sup>4</sup>

A transdisciplinaridade abre deste modo o caminho para uma nova visão da realidade, fundamentada numa renovada harmonia de interior e exterior, de objetividade e subjetividade, de real e imaginário, de efetividade e afetividade.

A complexidade,<sup>5</sup> terceiro postulado que fundamenta da visão transdisciplinar do mundo, deixa emergir claramente as consequências éticas implícitas nos outros axiomas. Com efeito, a complexificação do mundo é, segundo Nicolescu, a causa fundamental do big bang disciplinar:

*Au cours du XXème siècle, la complexité s'installe partout, effrayante, terrifiante, obscène, fascinante, envahissante, comme un défi à notre propre existence et au sens de notre existence. Le sens semble phagocyté par la complexité dans tous les domaines de la connaissance. La complexité se nourrit de l'explosion de la recherche disciplinaire et, à son tour, la*

4. "A new Principle of Relativity emerges from the coexistence between complex plurality and open unity in our approach: no level of Reality constitutes a privileged place from which one is able to understand all the other levels of Reality. A level of Reality is what it is because all the other levels exist at the same time. This Principle of Relativity is what originates a new perspective on all fields of knowledge: religion, economics, politics, art, education, social life, etc. In other words, our approach is not hierarchical. There is no fundamental level. But its absence does not mean an anarchical dynamics, but a coherent one, of all levels of Reality, already discovered or which will be discovered in the future." (Nicolescu 2008b, 7)

5. "Existem várias teorias da complexidade. No contexto da nossa discussão, o que é importante a ser entendido é que as teorias existentes da complexidade não incluem nem a noção dos níveis de realidade nem a noção das zonas de não-resistência. Entretanto, algumas delas, como a de Edgar Morin, são compatíveis com estas noções. Por esta razão é útil distinguir entre a complexidade horizontal, que se refere a um único nível de Realidade e a complexidade vertical, que se refere a vários níveis de Realidade. É também importante notar que complexidade transversal é diferente da vertical, complexidade transdisciplinar. Complexidade transversal se refere ao cruzamento de diversos níveis de organização em um único nível de Realidade. De um ponto de vista transdisciplinar, complexidade é uma forma moderna do velho princípio da interdependência universal." (Nicolescu 2006, 8)

*complexité détermine l'accélération de la multiplication des disciplines* (Nicolescu 1996, 19)

A multiplicação dos saberes disciplinares, enraizada no desvendar da complexidade do mundo, por um lado acarretou um imenso desenvolvimento dos saberes e incremento dos conhecimentos, mas, por outro, na medida em que se estabeleceu sobre a visão do mundo tradicional, conduziu à redução do saber científico para o saber técnico e a realização da atual dominação do nihilismo.<sup>6</sup> O desafio ético implícito na reflexão transdisciplinar torna-se deste modo evidente: apenas uma nova visão da realidade, fundamentada na relativização da racionalidade científica e na sua inserção num horizonte de sentido mais amplo, permitiria dissolver a atual dominação das tecnociências, confiando aos saberes disciplinares um papel fundamental na constituição de uma civilidade mais evoluída, enraizada na harmonia do humano e da natureza.

A análise dos três postulados da física quântica deixa ainda aberta uma questão fundamental: apesar da física quântica ter desvendado a existência de múltiplos e diferentes níveis de realidade, abrindo a possibilidade teórica de uma hipotética reconciliação entre o homem e a ciência, a existência do homem demora limitada ao específico nível de realidade microfísico; o único perceptível aos nossos sentidos e dominado pela separação entre subjetivo e objetivo. Como ultrapassar então a nossa comum percepção do mundo? A resposta de Nicolescu é, no plano gnosiológico, a hipótese de um paralelismo entre níveis de realidade e níveis de percepção:

*Des observations scientifiques récentes montrent que les nourrissons ont une perception globale de leur environnement: pour eux c'est la non-séparabilité qui est naturelle et la séparabilité qui doit être péniblement apprise. Ils ont néanmoins une pensée, qui précède la pensée conceptuelle. Dans un sens, aux portes du monde quantique nous devons redevenir comme des enfants: sacrifier nos habitudes de pensée, nos certitudes, nos images. Car l'imaginaire quantique est un imaginaire sans images. Une véritable transfiguration s'opère ainsi: au-delà des images macrophysiques, un autre domaine de la Réalité s'offre à notre connaissance.* (Nicolescu 1996, 39)

6. "Les causes du big bang disciplinaire sont multiples et elles pourraient faire l'objet de plusieurs traités savants. Mais la cause fondamentale peut être facilement décelée: le big bang disciplinaire répond aux nécessités d'une technoscience sans freins, sans valeurs, sans autre finalité que l'efficacité pour l'efficacité. Ce big bang disciplinaire a d'énormes conséquences positives car il conduit à l'approfondissement sans précédent des connaissances de l'univers extérieur et il contribue ainsi volontiers à l'instauration d'une nouvelle vision du monde. Car un bâton a toujours deux bouts. Quand le balancier va trop loin dans un sens, son retour est inexorable." (Nicolescu 1996, 19)

Contudo, a resposta mostra-se insuficiente: na medida em que a superação da percepção global e a apreensão da separação representa um momento necessário da evolução da criança, a existência da percepção quântica mostra-se efêmera, portanto incapaz de fundamentar a hipótese de uma possível superação da nossa percepção tradicional do mundo. É apenas a segunda revolução científica fundamental do século passado, a informática, que, segundo Nicolescu, permite demonstrar empiricamente o efetivo alcance de um novo nível de percepção, deslocando a complexidade do plano teórico para o prático da existência, da vida. Com efeito o Cyberspace ou, de acordo com a definição de Nicolescu, o Cyber-espaço-tempo (CET), representa exatamente a abertura do humano a um outro nível de realidade:

*La dernière limite de notre corps - celle de notre propre cerveau - vient d'être transgressée. Le mental de l'être humain s'est projeté matériellement en dehors de lui-même en engendrant des résultats qui ne sont pas le produit des processus dit 'naturels'. [...] Tout d'abord, le CET est à la fois naturel et artificiel. Le CET est naturel car sa source est naturelle: le monde quantique. [...] Le langage fondamental est celui du monde quantique, donc de la Nature, donc, par définition, universel. En même temps, le CET est artificiel. Tout d'abord le langage utilisé est artificiel - celui des mathématiques - en commençant par le codage fondamental (0,1) et en finissant par des équations mathématiques de plus en plus élaborées qui sont comme le germe d'une infinité. [...] Ce double aspect naturel-artificiel pose très sérieusement la question d'une nouvelle interface, celle entre l'homme et l'ordinateur. En dernier ressort, cette nouvelle interface est engendrée par l'interaction entre l'homme et la Nature, qui pose à nouveau la question d'un troisième qui englobe et l'homme et la Nature.* (Nicolescu 1996, 43-44)

Assim, devido ao CET, a coexistência do subjetivo e do objetivo, do real e do imaginário, do natural e do artificial, deixa de ser um postulado teórico para tornar-se uma verdade prática, uma experiência vivida, uma realidade experimentada. Assim, com a descoberta do mundo quântico e a cybernavigação, *l'homo sui transcendentalis* commence son aventurez (Nicolescu 1996, 49).

### 3 Transpolítica: virtudes e limites da visão transdisciplinar da política

A reflexão da transdisciplinaridade sobre a política desenvolve-se no âmbito mais geral da relação entre transdisciplinaridade e ciências humanas. Nicolescu, partindo do pressuposto da necessária coexistência do subjetivo e do objetivo, critica a distinção entre ciências exatas e ciências humanas. Contudo, paralelamente, reconhece uma diferença fundamental entre as duas dimensões do conhecimento:

*D'un intérêt tout particulier est la pénétration du regard transdisciplinaire dans le domaine de la poésie, de l'art, de l'esthétique, de la religion, de la philosophie et des sciences sociales. Dans chacun de ces domaines un autre degré de transdisciplinarité est en action, qui implique non seulement ce qui traverse les disciplines, mais aussi ce qui les structure. Au fondement de toutes les disciplines, il y a un regard transdisciplinaire qui leur donne sens. Car au tréfonds de chaque discipline se trouve le sans-fond de ce qui relie le Sujet et l'Objet transdisciplinaires.* (Nicolescu 1996, 72)

No que diz respeito ao saber científico, a atitude transdisciplinar representa um elemento complementar que, embora necessário, é exterior ao saber disciplinar, no caso das ciências humanas, muito pelo contrário, a transdisciplinaridade constitui um elemento estrutural, imanente, essencial. Com efeito, temos, por um lado, a redução das ciências humanas a saberes disciplinares e técnicos, que reduz o homem a um objeto, colaborando ativamente na fragmentação e incomunicabilidade entre os saberes. Por outro lado, e por conseguinte, as ciências humanas têm que reconhecer o seu núcleo intimamente transdisciplinar, nunca esquecendo a questão em torno das condições do encontro entre subjetividade e objetividade. Em suma, segundo Nicolescu, as ciências humanas, não podendo prescindir do momento filosófico de procura do sentido do ser com vista a responder ao desafio ético de uma nova conceção do mundo fundamentada na centralidade do humano, desempenham um papel fundamental no processo de realização da visão transdisciplinar do mundo:

*La vision transdisciplinaire, qui est à la fois une vision transculturelle, transreligieuse, transnationale, transhistorique et transpolitique, conduit, sur le plan social,*

*à un changement radical de perspective et d'attitude. [...] La croissance économique à tout prix ne peut plus être au centre des structures sociales. L'économie politique et le vivant sont intimement liés. La recherche créatrice d'une économie politique transdisciplinaire est fondée sur le postulat que celle-ci est au service de l'être humain et non l'inverse. Le bien-être matériel et le bien-être spirituel se conditionnent l'un l'autre. Nous appelons transhumanisme la nouvelle forme d'humanisme qui offre à chaque être humain la capacité maximale de développement culturel et spirituel. Il s'agit de chercher ce qu'il y a entre, à travers et au-delà des êtres humains - ce qu'on peut appeler l'Être des êtres. Le transhumanisme ne vise pas une homogénéisation fatalement destructrice, mais l'actualisation maximale de l'unité dans la diversité et de la diversité par l'unité. L'accent sera ainsi mis non pas sur l'organisation idéale de l'humanité (par des recettes idéologiques qui aboutissent toujours au contraire de ce qu'elles préconisent), mais sur une structure flexible et orientée de l'accueil de la complexité.* (Nicolescu 1996, 83)

Apenas na medida em que a revolução transdisciplinar da inteligência se torna a atitude fundamental no questionamento religioso, político, cultural, artístico e económico, isto é, no questionamento em torno do ser humano, a visão transdisciplinar do mundo conseguirá ultrapassar a sua forma teórica, para se tornar um projeto prático de transformação do mundo. Neste esquema geral, o que poderá então significar transpolítica?

Une volonté politique efficace ne peut être, de nos jours, qu'une volonté poétique (Nicolescu 1996, 53); pode ser apenas a vontade de ultrapassar a fratura radical entre a interioridade e exterioridade, entre efetividade e afetividade, entre individual e social, com vista a alcançar uma sociedade em que cada um consiga encontrar o seu lugar:

*Certes, nous cherchons tous une place. [...] Mais, paradoxalement, cette place n'est pratiquement jamais notre propre place, la place qui serait conforme à la totalité de notre être. Il est rare, très rare, qu'un être humain sur cette Terre trouve une harmonie parfaite entre son être individuel et son être social. Ceci pourrait nous indiquer la voie de recherche d'une véritable transpolitique: celle fondée sur le droit inaliénable de tout être humain à une interaction harmonieuse entre sa vie intime et sa vie sociale. Chaque politicien peut et doit rester en accord avec ses propres orientations politiques tout en faisant tout ce qu'il peut faire pour respecter ce droit inaliénable de l'être humain.* (Nicolescu 1996, 51-52)

A inserção do Direito ao Sentido, entendido como direito de realizar a sua própria interioridade na sociedade, entre os direitos humanos, representa o núcleo fundamental de uma atitude transdisciplinar em política, isto é, de uma transpolítica. Com efeito, a harmonização da vida interior e da vida social, acarretando uma radical abertura à diversidade e à alteridade, representa a condição *sine qua non* para a instauração de uma comunicação autêntica, isto é, de um verdadeiro diálogo entre homens, culturas, tradições, religiões:

*ñL'attitude transculturelle, transreligieuse, transpolitique et transnationale nous permettra ainsi de mieux approfondir notre propre culture, de mieux défendre nos intérêts nationaux, de mieux respecter nos propres convictions religieuses ou politiques. L'unité ouverte et la pluralité complexe, comme dans tous les autres domaines de la Nature et de la connaissance, ne sont pas antagonistes.* (Nicolescu 1996, 78)

Podemos então, sob a forma de conclusões preliminares, afirmar que uma abordagem transdisciplinar da política implica o reconhecimento do seu núcleo humanístico, tornando impossível a sua redução, levadas a cabo pela conceção analítico-empirista das ciências políticas (e das ciências humanas em geral), a saber disciplinar e confiando-lhe, muito pelo contrário, uma dupla função de crítica do presente e de ferramenta pela transformação do mundo.

#### 4 O papel da política na realização da visão transdisciplinar do mundo

A problematização da relação entre transdisciplinaridade e política tem, de forma preliminar, que enfrentar a questão do estatuto da transdisciplinaridade: como definir o saber transdisciplinar? Como uma nova metodologia? Uma nova epistemologia? Uma nova ética? Uma nova filosofia? Uma nova religião?

*Le lieu de la transdisciplinarité est un lieu sans lieu. Il ne se trouve ni dans l'homme intérieur (en n'engendrant ainsi ni une nouvelle religion, ni une nouvelle philosophie, ni une nouvelle métaphysique), ni dans l'homme extérieur (donc en n'engendrant pas une nouvelle science, futelle la science des sciences).* (Nicolescu 1996, 69)

A reflexão transdisciplinar, colocando-se no intervalo entre interioridade e exterioridade, subjetividade e objetividade, ciências exatas e ciên-

cias humanas, parece escapar à possibilidade de encontrar uma definição, pelo menos enquanto continuar-mos a tomar como referência a tradicional divisão entre saberes objetivos e subjetivos.

Contudo, e de modo absolutamente paradoxal, a referida colocação da transdisciplinaridade no vazio, no espaço limiar entre subjetividade e objetividade, aproxima a transdisciplinaridade da definição da filosofia como *ívide dune distance prisež*, formulada por Louis Althusser (1998, 132), filósofo marxista francês do século XX. Segundo Althusser, a filosofia não tem um objeto, como as ciências, constituindo, pelo contrário, o termo mediano, embora não dialético, entre as revoluções científicas e o sistema de valores de uma época determinada, isto é, colocando-se no intervalo, no vazio da possível junção entre saber científico e saber político-ideológico, entre conhecimento objetivo e conjunto das normas, crenças e valores dominantes numa determinada sociedade:

*La philosophie représenterait la politique dans le domaine de la théorie, pour être plus précis: auprès des sciences et vice versa [...] la scientificité dans la politique.* (Althusser 1998, 134)

Deixando por enquanto de lado a primeira relação estabelecida por Althusser, focamo-nos na definição da filosofia como *scientificité dans la politique*: as grandes descobertas científicas, como a das matemáticas na Grécia Antiga ou a da física galileana ou a do cálculo infinitesimal, ou da química e da biologia, etc. acarretam sempre, de modo implícito, uma radical descontinuidade com a forma de racionalidade dominante na época, implicitamente contendo uma nova visão do mundo. A filosofia, enquanto *scientificité dans la politique*, por conseguinte, desempenha o papel fundamental de retomar as descobertas científicas, para produzir numa forma de racionalidade nova (Platão após as descobertas dos matemáticos do século IV e V A.C., Descartes após Galileu; Leibniz com o cálculo infinitesimal, etc.) (Althusser 2006, 256).

Em suma, segundo Althusser, a filosofia permite impulsionar as ciências para além dos seus limites disciplinares, conceptualizando as implicações políticas (mas também ideológicas, isto é, culturais e éticas) implícitas nas descobertas científicas. Deste modo, estabelecendo uma ponte



entre o saber disciplinar e o domínio do subjetivo, consegue encontrar um novo sentido do ser, radicalmente diferente da tradicional visão do mundo.

A referida definição da filosofia como *scientificité dans la politique* parece, de facto, sintetizar a perspectiva teórica da transdisciplinaridade. Não estamos a lidar com uma tentativa de conceptualizar uma nova e mais ampla forma de racionalidade, oposta à racionalidade científica tradicional e fundamentada nas revoluções científicas ocorridas nos domínios da física quânticas e da informática?

No nosso entender, a recusa de Nicollescu em identificar a transdisciplinaridade como filosofia fundamenta-se, de facto, numa conceção idealista da filosofia, entendida como processo de secularização e racionalização da religião, cujo objeto específico de investigação é o espírito humano. Contudo se, de acordo com Althusser (e, mais em geral, seguindo a sua definição materialista), entendemos filosofia como uma reflexão sem objeto, no limiar entre subjetividade e objetividade cuja finalidade é a criação de uma nova visão do mundo, será então legítimo concluirmos que a transdisciplinaridade é efetivamente uma nova filosofia.

A transdisciplinaridade, enquanto nova filosofia, enquanto *scientificité dans la politique*, enquanto conceptualização das implicações políticas e ideológicas implícitas nas revoluções científicas, representará também, de modo paralelo, a *îpolitique dans le domaine de la théoriez* (Althusser 1998, 134). A tese fundamental que Althusser pretende avançar com esta segunda definição da filosofia é a de que existe um núcleo político das ciências, isto é, uma ligação necessária entre a forma de racionalidade e a forma de política dominante numa determinada época. Assim, a racionalidade científica dominante ao longo da modernidade encontra-se indissolúvelmente associada por um lado à potência expansiva do capitalismo, isto é, a sua tendência em alcançar um mundo global, mas, por outro lado, às suas tendências destruidoras: a morte do homem, a sua redução a objeto, a perda de sentido, o nihilismo, não sendo apenas os resultados da progressiva expansão da lógica científica e da fragmentação dos saberes, mas sim consequência do laço indissolúvel entre o processo de progressiva redução das ciências a tecnociên-

cias e o paralelo de submissão da dimensão da política à lógica sistémica.

A tradição filosófica ocidental, segundo Althusser, desenvolveu-se na *dénégation* da alma política das ciências, fundamentando-se no pressuposto da sua essencial neutralidade. A nossa hipótese é que a transdisciplinaridade, participando da referida *dénégation* da sua ligação necessária com a política, resulta num bloqueio na investigação, num impasse teórico insuperável.

Nicollescu, se por um lado reconhece que as duas revoluções científicas da física quântica e da informática estabelecem as condições para a instauração de uma nova era da humanidade, admite que este potencial revolucionário pode vir a ser anulado em virtude da recondução dos outros níveis de realidade ao universo macrofísico e à sua lógica determinista.

*Le choix auquel nous sommes confrontés a une apparence binaire: ère de marchands ou ère de marchants. [...] Un bout du bâton 'village global' correspond à une formule démagogique pour cacher une nouvelle forme de la domination de la terre par les riches. Les riches seront de plus en plus riches et les pauvres de plus en plus pauvres. C'est ce que j'appelle 'l'ère des marchands'. L'autre bout du bâton 'village global' correspond à l'émergence possible d'un village des villages (comme on dit "système des systèmes"). Peut-on rêver qu'un jour, la terre sera couverte de villages-béguinages, reliés par le CET? [...] Le village des villages pourrait ainsi devenir un lieu d'accueil de la transreligion, de la transculture, de la transpolitique. [...] C'est, très sommairement, ce que j'appelle 'l'ère des marchants'. [...] L'ère des marchants est-elle en opposition avec l'ère des marchands? Non, si chaque bout du bâton garde sa place, ne se prenant pas pour le bâton tout entier. (Nicollescu 1996, 47-48)*

Ère de marchands e ère de marchants apresentam-se como opostos contraditórios apenas do ponto de vista da nossa tradicional visão monodimensional da realidade, que admite uma única lógica e apenas uma forma de racionalidade. Seguindo, pelo contrário, a lógica do terceiro incluído, tornar-se-ia possível conceber a coexistência das duas eras, enquanto elementos constitutivos de uma realidade mais complexa.

Qual é então o Terceiro incluído? Qual o elemento que, excluindo a possível redução da complexidade à simplicidade, permite estabelecer as condições para a coexistência de ère de mar-

chands e ère de marchants? Da lógica sistémica determinista e da lógica da liberdade humana? De facto, Nicolescu não oferece respostas, e esta indeterminação constitui, no nosso entender, o ponto mais fraco e o principal *impasse* teórico da perspectiva transdisciplinar.

Trata-se, de facto, do mesmo *impasse* presente na teoria de Habermas, do agir comunicativo (Habermas 1997a, 1997b): as duas perspectivas teóricas, recusando o socialismo, não visam abolir o capitalismo, mas sim procurar definir um conceito mais amplo de racionalidade, que seja capaz de conciliar a lógica sistémica do mercado com a da liberdade humana. Contudo, tanto Habermas como Nicolescu, por um lado relevam o constante perigo de uma colonização por parte da lógica do mercado das outras esferas da realidade, reconhecendo-lhe uma tendência imanente à sua absolutização e à interiorização da exterioridade, mas, por outro lado, assentam na completa indeterminação do que diz respeito à especificação do elemento que, conseguindo relativizar as dinâmicas sistémicas, possa garantir a sua efetiva coexistência com outras lógicas, isto é, com lógicas subjetivas. Deste modo, tentando ultrapassar a presumida dicotomia entre sistémico e humano, quer Habermas quer Nicolescu, paradoxalmente não conseguem ultrapassar a dicotomia de ideal e real, a oposição entre uma realidade que continua a ser dominada pela absolutização da lógica do mercado e uma visão ideal fundamentada na presumida harmonia entre subjetivo e objetivo.

A hipótese que pretendemos avançar é que apenas uma politização do dispositivo teórico transdisciplinar (e também habermasiano) conseguiria superar o referido *impasse*: a interpretação da transpolítica como âmbito particular da obtenção da visão transdisciplinar do mundo que, embora com a vantagem de salientar a sua necessária função crítica, representa uma abordagem ainda insuficiente na questão política, na medida em que a redescoberta da sua função crítica deve implicar a sua inserção no cerne da reflexão teórica transdisciplinar.

O reconhecimento da existência de um núcleo político das ciências, para além da sua presumida neutralidade, permitiria por um lado desvendar o laço indissolúvel entre desenvolvimento da racionalidade moderna e desenvolvimento do capi-

talismo, assim encontrando uma motivação não apenas técnico-científica, mas também política, às tendências destruidoras da nossa época. Por outro lado, a mesma politização do dispositivo transdisciplinar permitiria definir a ligação necessária entre transdisciplinaridade e política: o renascimento do homem para além da sua morte não pode constituir apenas um postulado teórico ou uma esperança ética, mas, muito pelo contrário, tem de ser reconhecido como núcleo fundamental de um projeto político transdisciplinar, isto é, o pressuposto para fundar uma nova política ou, melhor, para conseguir reinventar uma autonomia da política, depois da sua definitiva submissão aos poderes tecnocráticos-sistémicos.


Em suma, perante a lógica essencialmente expansiva da racionalidade instrumental, a política não pode constituir apenas um *além* formal, como pretende Habermas, nem, seguindo Nicolescu, uma simples região de realização prática da visão transdisciplinar do mundo. Muito pelo contrário, a política representa o único elemento que com a capacidade de bloquear a tendência expansiva da lógica sistémica do mercado, assim estabelecendo as condições para um mundo diferente. O Terceiro incluído, perdendo finalmente a sua indeterminação, deve ser reconhecido como uma política transdisciplinar, isto é, como processo crítico de restabelecimento da autonomia da política, como processo jurídico de definição dos princípios normativos pela subordinação da lógica sistémica ao projeto de uma sociedade humana, alicerçada nos princípios transdisciplinares de úRigueur, ouverture et tolérance (Nicolescu, Morin e Freitas 1994).

Concluir-se-á então que a transdisciplinaridade nos permite redescobrir uma função crítica da política, afastando a sua possível redução a saber técnico e impondo a centralidade da questão em torno do sentido, mas, por outro lado, esta visão crítica da política, longe de ser apenas um dos momentos de realização prática da visão transdisciplinar, deve ser reconhecida como um momento fundamental da teoria transdisciplinar, como condição *sine qua non* para ultrapassar o *impasse* teórico da oposição entre realidade e idealidade e para impulsionar a reflexão transdisciplinar no caminho da definição das condições teórico-práticas para uma nova visão do mundo, transcúl-

tural, transreligiosa, transeconómica, transnacional, transpolítica.

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**Irene Viparelli** is an Editor of *Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science*. She has a Ph.D. in Ethics and Political and Legal Philosophy from the University of Salerno and is a Specialist in Political Theory, Political Science and Political Philosophy. Between 2010 and 2017 she has developed a post-doctoral project in Political Science, founded by FCT. Presently she is an assistant professor at University of

Évora, an integrated member of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP) and a collaborator of Labcom/IFP of University of Beira Interior.



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