

Sobre o fenómeno da guerra e da paz Estudo do "evento" ucraniano

On the Phenomenology of War and Peace Studying the Ukrainian Event

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Resumo—Os estudos atuais sobre o acontecimento e o fenómeno da guerra (e da paz) reflectem os problemas ontológicos e temporais da teorização das RI, decorrentes da natureza puramente intersubjectiva do campo das RI, da sua falta de âncora de objetividade autónoma em contraste com as ciências positivas e sociais. Como tal, os estudos teóricos neste campo tornam-se processos genéticos, alterando o dado imediato, pré-teórico e intersubjetivo dos fenómenos e acontecimentos das RI nas suas narrativas, de acordo com as suas construções anteriores. No entanto, a fenomenologia, com a intervenção da ontologia fenomenológica onde esta recai na teorização, oferece noções e ferramentas para um acesso e descrição pré-teóricos da imediaticidade intersubjectiva dos mesmos. A fim de delinear um tal estudo, este artigo examina o acontecimento da Guerra da Ucrânia e, através dele, os fenómenos da guerra e da paz. Tenta descrever a sua imediatez pré-teórica e intersubjectiva na sua unidade sintética em termos ontológicos e temporais. Esta tentativa traz à tona uma base descritiva e temporalmente progressiva de dados composta pela referencialidade à intersubjetividade interestatal, às formas interaccionais "dadas" dos actores envolvidos, que formam a unidade sintética do acontecimento (a Guerra Ucraniana e o estado de Paz precedente/próximo) e dos fenómenos relacionados (guerra e paz).

Palavras-Chave — Guerra, Paz, Ucrânia, Rússia, Fenomenologia, Relações internacionais

Abstract—The current studies of the event and the phenomenon of the war (and of the peace) reflect the ontological and -ensuing- temporal problems of the IR theorising, stemming from the IR field's purely intersubjective nature, from its lack of the anchor of self-standing objectivity in contrast to the positive and social sciences. As such, the theory-based studies in the field become genetic processes, altering the immediate, pre-theoretical, intersubjective givenness of the IR phenomena and events within their narratives, in accordance to their preceding constructs. Yet, the phenomenology, with the intervention of the phenomenological ontology where it relapses itself into theorising, offers notions and tools for a pre-theoretical access to and description of the intersubjective immediacy of them. In order to outline such a study, this paper examines the event of the Ukrainian War and through it, the phenomena of the war and the peace. It attempts to describe its pre-theoretical, intersubjective immediacy in its synthetic unity in ontological and temporal terms. This attempt brings forth a descriptive and temporally progressive ground of givenness composed of the referentiality to the interstate intersubjectivity, to the "given" interactional forms of the involved actors, which form the synthetic unity of the event (the Ukrainian War and preceding/ upcoming state of Peace) and of the related phenomena (war and peace).

Keywords — War, Peace, Ukraine, Russia, Phenomenology, International relations.

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Key Terms

Givenness: The innerworldly appearance of an event and of the related phenomenon/phenomena-, in pre-theoretical and intersubjective immediacy.

Appresentation: The givenness' inherent, intersubjective and immediate co-presentation of related events, phenomena and temporal states that makes it appear meaningfully as a synthetic unity.

Intersubjectivity: Expansion and "expanded" appearance of objectivity through collective recognition of meanings, entities and phenomena that have otherwise no direct correspondence with the objectivity in the narrow sense.

Mitsein: The Heideggerian depiction of the intersubjectivity as the inherence of the being-with-others to being, the a priori interactional nature of being in contrast to the Husserlian "monadologic intersubjectivity" depicted as "constituted" through communicative processes, the social sciences' intersubjectivity of social/ socio-psychological processes and to the Husserlian "transcendental intersubjectivity" that is mainly "inherited" yet also "product" of the communicative processes.

Mitwelt: The intersubjective world/ environment and the intersubjectivity of the world/ environment as inherent to being-as-Mitsein, lived-in and referred-to in the innerworldliness.

Universal reduction: Putting into perspective the mental acts that form the meaningful appearances of things through bracketing the assumption of the objectivity of the world and of the meanings attached to things, events, phenomena.

Eidetic reduction: Putting into perspective, through bracketing, the given thing's, event's, phenomenon's "generic way of presenting itself".

1 Introduction

As of August 2023, the war in Ukraine has been going on with no immediate prospect of peace. Depending on their nature and the degree of involvement with Russia or Ukraine, the war has also been affecting the non-belligerents and affected by them, with consequences on the general shape of the interstate relations, in other words, the international "system". Eventually this individual event of war shall end in reaching to a state of peace, which will also be related to an individual event, that of the "Russo-Ukrainian peace".

The Russo-Ukrainian War already is and will continue to be, together with the Russo-Ukrainian peace that will ensue it, a forthcoming matter of the IR studies. The well established ways of thought in the field, namely the realist/structural realist, liberal, constructivist and also-post-structuralist schools (and their derivatives) will narrate this war (and peace) in accordance with their already present theoretical grounds and constructs. The narratives of these specific events will substantially differ among themselves, as do these schools' definitions and approaches to the phenomenon of war. The realists/structural realists shall deal with this event on the basis of "objective", even "quantifiable" power-relations, interests or threats¹, or on that of the also -"objective" class -relations/ dialectic in the case of the Marxist realism, and form a causality narrative. The (neo)liberals will approach to the event through the prism of the rationality, the irrationality (of cooperation and of conflict), the interdependence and the lack of it,

1. Be they systemic or reductionist in Waltz' terms. See for example Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing 1979); Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (NY: Columbia University Press 2001); Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (NY: Alfred A.Knopf 1948); Mearsheimer John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (W. W. Norton Company, 2014) Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981). On the perception and balance of threat Walt, Stephen M., *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990); Power-transition as hegemon-rising power dialectic Organski A.F.K *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984); Richard Ned Lebow 2010, "The Past and Future of War", *International Relations* 24(3): 243270; For Marxist "realism": Lenin, Vladimir I., *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, (Martino Fine Books 2011).

the "enabling" or failing normative frameworks including the States' regimes and international institutions². The constructivists shall centre their study on the intersubjectivity as product (and re-product) of communicative/ social (and psycho-social) processes, consequently on the social constructs and narrate the event through perceptions, discourses, identities, social interactions, practises and motivations³. The post-structuralists, on the other hand, shall target these narratives/ meta-narratives, dissect world-views, universal validity assumptions and related discourses through de-centering/ de-constructing and shall build their own alternative, critical after all- "narratives" on their own after all- selected parameters and pre-postulations such as freedom, participation, diversity or antithetically- sovereignty, oppression,

2. See for example Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry 1999, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order", *Review of International Studies* 25(2):179-196; Charles Lipson 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs", *World Politics*. 37 (1): 123; Keohane Robert, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984); Nye Joseph S., *The Paradox of American Power* (NY: Oxford University Press 2002); Risse-Kappen, T., *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995); also Copeland Dale C., *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015), Keohane, R., and Nye. J.S., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 1977); Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004). In addition, Morgenthau's work needs to be related to the liberal notions as well, as regards regimes, international law and the domestic/ international public opinion therefore values- as restrictive parameters, Morgenthau 1948, op.cit.

3. Wendt Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999); Onuf Nicholas, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (London: Routledge 1989); Onuf Nicholas, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations*, (London: Routledge 2013); Also Katzenstein, Peter J., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (NY: Columbia University Press 1996).

violence⁴.

The IR study of the event shall produce as many narratives as there are theoretical grounds, constructs and their derivatives or critics, each being coherent enough with its own grounds.

But the event itself, the Ukrainian War, is *singular*, both ontologically and temporally. As such, it is not bound to the multiplicity of the narratives about itself. In fact, the *self-standing* singularity of the Ukrainian War as event shall constitute a contradiction not only with this multiplicity but also with each individual element of it due to their *common ground* that fundamentally separate them from the event itself. This common ground is theorising, the theoretical attitude, which works against its basic aim of grasping the phenomenon or event when it is pursued in a *purely intersubjective* field of study, such as the IR.

The IR field is purely intersubjective in the sense that its actors, phenomena and events have no direct correspondence in the objectivity, no *self-standing* substance. No one has directly experienced a State, a nation, a war, a border, an international organisation as "themselves". These experiences are mediate, *appresented* by other, concrete, immediate experiences on the ground of an intersubjective attribution of meaning. The IR phenomena and events are thus "given" without an immediate, direct objectivity anchor. As such, the IR field contrasts, not only to the sphere of the positive sciences but also, to an extent, to that of the social sciences. The matters of

the positive sciences are self-standing, objectively present and thus accessible independently from a theoretical construct, at least as possibility. The social sciences, for example the sociology or the socio-psychology, operate *between* the intersubjectivity and the objective reality: They study real, objectively present individuals' groupings in their intersubjective "life" through their communicative processes, motivations, behaviour patterns, and constructs. The self-standing presence of their "subjects" provides the study with an independent "anchor" *approximate* to that of the positive sciences, if not identical.

Consequently, in the fields of the positive and the social sciences, theorising serves its purpose of enabling the study and the grasp of phenomena and events: Given that these are anchored to objectivity in their fashion, therefore independently accessible, the theoretical constructs' validity may be assessed independently against "facts" for the former and "actors/subjects" in the case of the latter. However, in the IR field which lacks such an anchor, where there is but the purely intersubjective *givenness* of phenomena and events without direct correspondence in the objectivity "as themselves" but only appresentation, theorising goes beyond its reason of existence.

The IR theorising approaches the given phenomenon/event such as the war (and peace)/ the Ukrainian War (and peace) from pre-postulates that also replace/ fill the gap of the objectivity anchor. These pre-postulates may be imported from or inspired by other disciplines, as in the examples of constructivism's sociology/ socio-psychology grounds or the realist/ structural realist schools inspiration from microeconomy. Within the IR sphere, these operate differently from their original fields due to the lack of "anchor", form rather a *Weltanschauung* of the researcher, which becomes a genetic ground in the study, as the IR theorising assumes a *genetic, constitutive* function. "Theorising" in the field of the pure intersubjectivity which is relatively immune to the intervention from an independent reality ground but having pre-postulates at the same time as the necessary starting point, alters and reshapes the immediate, intersubjective, pre-theoretical givenness, fits the phenomena and events into the its pre-built theoretical framework in its narrative of them.

4. Ashley R., 1996. "The Achievements of Post-Structuralism", in Smith S., Booth K., Zalewski M, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp240-253; Bartelson J., Teorell J., 2018. "After De-Centering: A New Research Agenda for State Making", in Bartelson J., Hall M., Teorell J., eds., *De-Centering State Making: Comparative and International Perspectives* (Edward Elgar Publishing); E. Jeffrey Popke 2003, "Poststructuralist ethics: subjectivity, responsibility and the space of community", *Progress in Human Geography* 27 (3): 298-316; O'Tuathail, Georaid and Dalby, Simon, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics*, (New York: Routledge 1998); Chris Brown 1994, "Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations", *Millennium* 23 (2): 213-236; Der Derian, James, *Critical Practices in International Theory* (London: Routledge 2008), pp188-207 on the "eternal return of ethics in IR"; Der Derian, James. and Shapiro, Michael, *International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington Books 1989); Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995).

In other words, it approaches to the phenomena and events as malleable material, which brings ontological and temporal complications into the study. The genetic function, therefore the ontological complication of the IR theorising is related to defining the coming-into-being of the phenomena and events in accordance with its preceding, *a priori* ground in contrast to the innerworldly, pre-theoretical givenness of them. Its temporal complication stems from the accomplishment of this genetic narrative. Once formed, for the theoretical approach's consistency, it must be carried upon the *immediacy* of the phenomenon or event at hand, therefore upon its *post-genetic* givenness which is not necessarily identical to its genetic narrative. It therefore temporally distorts the immediacy of the givenness in reference to the narrative of its *past* coming-into-being. The multiplicity of the IR theories and their narratives stems from the *multiplicity* of these pre-postulations and ensuing narratives related to the *singularity* of the immediate, pre-theoretical, intersubjective givenness of the IR phenomena and events, with their ontological and temporal complications of the same nature.

But is there a way of meaningfully studying the IR phenomena and events, here the Ukrainian war (and peace), in their intersubjective, immediate, pre-theoretical givenness? In other words, is it possible to conduct an IR study without theorising (or de-centering with the same effect), therefore without ontological and temporal complications? Phenomenology promises this *in general* and the first sub-section of this paper will be reserved to debate the "reductions" as the method it proposes, to be able to reach to the eidetic "irreducibles" of the givenness to be studied. The second sub-section shall propose an outline for the phenomenological description of the givenness on this basis, "as it appears" in a synthetic unity on its proper ontological and temporal meaning grounds. There the Husserlian phenomenology's understanding of intersubjectivity which "relapses" into a genetic description as well as its depiction of temporal states as egologically (and artificially) divided to the detriment of the givenness in its synthetic unity shall also be debated through the prism of the Heideggerian phenomenological ontology. Here, the Heideggerian understanding of

the intersubjectivity as *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt* shall be proposed and integrated to the study. As to the temporality, the Heideggerian conceptualisation of having-been (with), dwelling-with and to be-with shall be integrated to the otherwise more givenness-centred Husserlian temporal states of *retention-protection* (the actuality), the recollection (the past state) and the *anticipation* (the contingent future state) to express the givenness in its synthetic unity.

2 Studying the War and the Peace

The givenness of war (and peace): Eidetic reduction toward the irreducibles

How are the war and the peace given immediately, pre-theoretically and intersubjectively? How they appear, as events and phenomena, without theoretical interference and alteration? How they may be worked with as they "are", not as a narrative of a theoretical construct (or a theoretical deconstruct) where they constitute rather malleable materials of the theoretical attitude? In Husserlian terms, how the IR study pertaining to the war and the peace may "return to things themselves"⁵?

The endeavour engenders a question of method and a question of form. The question of form shall be dealt with in the following sub-section. The method, on the other hand, is already proposed by phenomenology (assuredly out of the IR field), namely as the universal and eidetic reductions for putting into perspective, the theoretical attitude as attitude, the *Weltanschauung* as *Weltanschauung*, the construct as construct, the narrative as narrative in order to display the phenomena and events "as they appear". The first reduction aims at reaching to the immanence of the "subject" through suspending/ bracketing/ putting into perspective the "naive belief in the world", the "natural attitude" which also encom-

5. Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations*, ed. Dermot Moran. (London: Routledge 2001), p 168

passes the theoretical attitude and constructs⁶—that are issue of the former, in furtherance of the Cartesian doubt. Husserl proposes that in doing so, "nothing is lost"⁷: The sphere of immanence which has in fact everything lived or potentially to be lived, as it is the venue of the intentionality⁸. This "egology", which continued to be controversial in Husserlian thought despite his revision in the *Crisis*⁹, will not be further debated in our context. It is however important to state that at the first glance, the phenomenological/ universal reduction on behalf of the State has no at least immediate- sense since the State is not "ego"but an intersubjectively constituted "entity". Still, it is also of note that the State is "given"and referred-to pre-theoretically as a *simulacrum* of subject, since it "acts"at that immediacy of appearance and only an a *posteriori* theoretical effort "invalidates"this appearance¹⁰. This peculiarity of the constitution of the State unifies, to a degree, the universal reduction with the eidetic reduction, making the former at least partially "valid", yet as part, as content of the latter.

The eidetic reduction is toward the thing's *generic way of presenting itself, its Erscheinen*¹¹ and constitutes our focus in the context of war

6. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy Ideen I-* (Hague: M. Nijhoff 1983),pp. 5155. This also includes the suspension of the criticism of the "naïve belief", which is inherently attached to it, issue of it, in questioning or even negating. Phenomenology's attitude in bracketing, however, is not predicating or judging, therefore attributing a supplementary content to what already "is". Husserl's emphasis on the "disinterested spectator"(See Michele Averchi 2015, "The Disinterested Spectator: Geiger's and Husserl's Place in the Debate on the Splitting of the Ego", *Studia Phaenomenologica* 15:227-246) applies to this fundamental act of phenomenology, which is the reduction.

7. Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideen I)*, (Indianapolis: Hackett 2014), p91

8. Jacques Taminiaux, "Immanence, Transcendence, and Being in Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology" in Sallis, J.C., Moneta, G., Taminiaux, J., eds, *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten Years*, *Phaenomenologica*, vol 105, (Dordrecht: Springer 1988), pp. 4776.

9. Husserl 1970,op.cit., p168 and for a return to "egology", p182.

10. The lived, immediately given meaning of the State-as-subject simulacrum precedes a "mere convenience of expression", which is, as judgment, reflective and therefore a posterior, unlike the reference given to Stein in: Salice A., Schmid, H.B., *The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems*, (Springer Switzerland 2016), pp 2-13

11. Taminiaux 1988,op.cit., p62

and peace. Here, however, it becomes necessary to point out to the distinction between the phenomena and the events of war and peace, between the inauthenticity (being "any"of its kind among its kind in the sense of "generic") in Heideggerian sense and its individuality, which both may be counted as the thing's generic way of presenting itself¹²: An immediate givenness of war and peace—may be reduced to a phenomenon that is its inauthentic state or to its own individuality as specific event. Are we talking of "any"war/peace or, for example, of the "Ukrainian War"and peace? Do we have to talk of "any"war/peace in a reduced state in order to talk of the reduced state of the Ukrainian War? In other words, how the current occurrence in Ukraine is given, individually or "inauthentically"?

Here the answer is "both"and it appears simultaneously with another question, that of the *temporal precedence* in givenness. The experience of the ongoing event in Ukraine consists, in its most immediate and "rawest"form, of a series of occurrences: Declarations of persons on behalf of their States and institutions, movements of military units and materiel, advances and retreats, clashes, bombings, casualties, "fallen"and "retaken"territories. Yet these occurrences appear/ are given meaningfully in reference to/ in appresentation of a meaning ground which is "there"and precedes occurrences. As such, the myriad of occurrences become eidetically reducible to this meaning ground, at the first glance to the phenomenon of war, which is irreducible. As it is, the phenomenon is "inauthentic" in an adaptation of Heidegger¹³. It is "any"war (as the state of "anyone"of the Dasein)". But is that all? Are (or may) for example, the belligerents, the space or the fundamental discord as individuating elements (be)

12. Not "authenticity" in Heideggerian sense of the Dasein's being, since the Dasein is toward its own authenticity in the anticipatory resoluteness and the authenticity always remaining at the anticipatory resoluteness.

13. See Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, (Albany: SUNY 1996), p111; Heidegger, Martin, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985), p245: Heidegger depicts inauthenticity in the context of the Dasein. A phenomenon is not Dasein. However, this state of "inauthenticity"also fits in the context of the eidetically reduced "thing", as the depiction of the experience of a specific chair being possible with the experience of the "generic"chair shows (see Taminiaux 1988, op.cit., p62).

suspended, bracketed in this reduction? It is of note that the ongoing war in Ukraine is not given as pure phenomenon but as a specific, individual occurrence with a form and temporality. The series of occurrences that are exemplified above do not appear meaningfully in reference to "any" war but to a specific war. What is, after all, immediately and intersubjectively given in "everydayness", which equates to a pre-theoretical state within the "lifeworld", is not an amorphous phenomenon of war but an individual occurrence, the Ukrainian War. Yet, the individuality of the givenness is meaningful only *with* the phenomenon and the phenomenon may be given in the everydayness only *with* the individual event. In other words, the phenomenon and the individuating elements form a unity that constitutes the "Ukrainian War's generic way of presenting itself", therefore the aim of the eidetic reduction, the irreducibles of the object of the study.

The reduction *ipso facto* puts into perspective the individually attributed *contents* of *not indifferent-spectators*, who elaborate and "enrich" the synthetic unity of the givenness. The horizon to be bracketed not only consists of "everything" *a posteriori* to the immediacy of the givenness, which are the narratives in general sense, but also of the *Weltanschauung* and the theoretical attitude/construct that are *a priori*, in reference to which the givenness is "rearranged" into the narrative.

Until where the reduction is to be performed and where it reaches to the irreducibility of the givenness?

Clausewitz and then Aron seem to have already performed their *tacit* reduction toward the *phenomenon*, by stating that the war is the continuation, the ulterior stage of interstate politics¹⁴, be it a *real* war or an *absolute* war¹⁵. This reduction has been followed by others in the study of war quite matter-of-factly¹⁶. Still, the war and diplomacy (politics) seem to be further reducible to a common denominator, namely to "interstate

interaction" of which they appear as "modes". Yet, this further reduction carries the war (and the peace) out of their given meaning ground. This is similar with furthering the reduction of the experience of a "specific" chair beyond a "generic" chair and toward its material (wood) that does not directly appresent but alters, *denatures* the very meaning ground of it.

The *phenomena* of war and of peace that are reached through the reduction are by nature "amorphous", devoid of concrete content. They however form the meaningful unity of the givenness with irreducible individuating elements. The eidetic reduction is not applied to an idea but to a state of affairs, an occurrence, an event in the everydayness, to something which is immediately, intersubjectively, individually, pre-theoretically given. The reduction, as mentioned above, should not extend to denaturing the givenness itself (as from chair to "wood"). The *residuum*, the *specific* war (and peace) event's "generic way of presenting itself" is that of the direct, immediate, intersubjective and "non-interfered" meaning ground of the event, the meaningful whole of irreducibles in relation to which the multitude of the experienced elements of the event appear (such as declarations, war effort of all kind, actual fighting and so on).

Grounds for a phenomenological description: Intersubjectivity as *Mitsein/Mitwelt*, temporality and appresentation

The reduction therefore constitutes the method to reach to the unity of givenness of the phenomenon and of the individuating elements of the event that is being studied, here the Ukrainian War. By nature, the reduction makes the study *descriptive*, since the bracketing of the theoretical attitude, construct and narrative¹⁷ *ipso facto* puts the explicative effort between the same parentheses.

How to describe a war (and peace) event on its eidetically reduced ground? The description of the war (and peace) event is mainly the description of

14. Von Clausewitz, Carl, *On War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007); Aron, Raymond, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge 2017).

15. Von Clausewitz 2007, *op.cit.*, pp223-225

16. Szanto, Balazs, *War and International Relations: A Critical Analysis* (Oxon: Routledge 2022), p21;

17. As well as the their "negative" version of the post-structuralism, which is naturally bound to what it "de-centers".

subjects/ State-actors *in their relatedness* to the event, in their being the subjects of the event, in their act of making the event appear. Yet on which ground and with which terminology this relatedness may be described?

The immediate givenness of the State-actor within the field of the IR is that of a simulacrum of a true subject in the *fundamental* state of interaction with "Others". The interaction here is inherent to the actor's being and as such, irreducible¹⁸. As such, the actor meaningfully "is"/ exists *relative* to other actors and vice versa. Consequently, the "Other" is inherent to the actor through interaction as the actor is inherent to the "Others" in the same manner.

The purely intersubjective nature of the IR field resides, as mentioned in the introduction, on its being composed of co-constituted and co-assumed entities and meanings that have no direct correspondence in the objectivity, in total contrast to the sphere of the positive sciences and in *partial* contrast to that of the social sciences. Beyond this *generality*, the *interactional* nature of the intersubjectivity comes forward at this point. The irreducibility of the interaction in the State-actor's being differentiates the intersubjectivity in the IR field from the Husserlian understanding of the intersubjectivity in a similar manner to the case of the constructivist intersubjectivity. Husserl theorises through depicting the "personalities of higher order" (including the State) *genetically* in the *Cartesian Meditations*¹⁹ through social/

18. For the fundamental character of the (interaction with) "Other" to the subject-self, see Husserl's depiction of the experience of the "Other" through encounter, empathy and givenness of the irreducibility of the other to ego/mine-ness: Husserl 1982, op.cit., pp92-105, 108-116; Husserl, Edmund, Sur l'intersubjectivité. Trns. Ed. Depraz N. (Paris: PUF 2001), pp27-29, 63-87, 382-383. The interaction with the Other constitutes the intersubjectivity of the world (and provides the Husserlian egology's solipsism problem with a remedy). As such, it appears as fundamental to the innerworldly existence of the subject. On the other hand, Heidegger defines the interaction with the "Other" as inherent to Dasein in its/ which is being-with/ *Mitsein*, therefore neither as a product of experience nor as a collective (social) act of constituting a common environment which are a posteriori: "Being toward others is not only an autonomous irreducible relation of being, as being-with it already exists within the being of Dasein... Empathy (Einfuehlung) does not first constitute being-with, but is first possible on its basis, and is motivated by the prevailing modes of being-with in their inevitability", Heidegger 1996, op.cit., p117

19. Husserl, Edmund., Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1982), the Vth Meditation

communicative processes. Even in his later work the *Crisis*²⁰, his passage to the transcendental intersubjectivity still appears on the ground of the "inherited" product of the communicative processes instead of clearly preceding them, therefore repeats his *theorising*, only with a change in its temporal state.

However, the Heideggerian term of *Mitsein* (being-with) fully expresses this pre-given, inherent-to-being, fundamental nature of the intersubjectivity and separates it from the understanding of produced, a *posteriori* intersubjectivity of the constructivism and of the Husserlian phenomenology²¹.

Secondly, the interaction is possible and meaningful only in a common environment of the entities-in-interaction. The givenness of the intersubjective environment is referential to all State actors-as-*Mitsein*, being an "anchor" that *pre-theoretically* replaces the self-standing objectivity of the world as its simulacrum, like the State-actor's givenness as simulacrum of the true subject. This is approximate to the notions of "international system", "international order", "international community" or "international structure". However, these IR notions reflect their *Weltanschauung*-theoretical attitude-construct-narrative line. They are inherently genetic, therefore prone to theorising's complications. On the other hand and as is with the *Mitsein*, the Heideggerian term of *Mitwelt* fully expresses the givenness of the interstate intersubjectivity as referred-to by every actor-in-*Mitsein*.

The structural realism's polarity terminology is useful for *expressing* the given *Mitwelt*²². The legitimacy of using this terminology *outside* of its (bracketed) theoretical construct but within its original, *pre-theoretical* meaning stems from the structural realism's quite accidental assumption of the pre-theoretical givenness as part "objectivity" before proceeding with its theoretical effort. As is with the realist school's *assumption* of the State-as-actor, the structural realist *references* to

20. Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. (Northwestern University Press 1970)

21. Heidegger 1985, op.cit., pp238-239; Heidegger 1996, op.cit., pp111-112, p116.

22. Waltz 1979, op.cit., pp129-145, 161-170

multipolarity, bipolarity (and then unipolarity) precede the structural realist theorising, which comes a *posteriori* as definitions and explications. The polarity terms for expressing the *Mitwelt* thus constitute part of the phenomenological description of the war (and peace) event in question.

Yet the *Mitsein(en)* and the *Mitwelt* refer to the substance in the description of the war (and peace) event. The given substance is not *temporally* "isolated", a "dimensionless moment" akin to a "dot" in geometry. It appresents a past and a future that makes its actuality meaningful. *Temporality* is inherent to the pre-theoretical, immediate givenness of the event and as such, it even *precedes* both causality and history which are, in contrast to temporality, *narrated* with the theoretical attitude and thus become *reducible*. The phenomenological description of the substance of the war (and peace) event should therefore be a temporal one. The temporal terminology to be employed here is Husserlian, namely the *retention-protention* and the *anticipation*, yet not without incorporating some proposals of Heidegger on time.

The retention-protention defines the actuality of the experience of something through the unity of its immediate past and immediate future states. Husserl's example to that is a music piece where the individual notes are not grasped self-standingly but as a meaningful whole in *progressive* retention of the last note played and in *protention* of the next note to be played²³. Still, the experience of something "static" / not progressive as to its substance (in contrast to the music piece), for example that of a "chair", is also a retentional-protentional continuity and as such, a givenness as a meaningful synthetic unity. However, this synthetic unity is not necessarily confined to its "actuality". The Husserlian phenomenology's terms "recollection" and "anticipation" express the non-actual elements of the synthetic unity. Yet, how are they incorporated to the actuality to fully and meaningfully form the givenness?

Here, it is difficult to state that Husserl's separation between the retention and the recol-

lection²⁴ is justified in relation with the synthetic unity of the givenness. The recollection may not be an "arbitrary" intentional act of the subject (ego) that is independent from the givenness itself. Not denying the *intentional*²⁵ nature of the act from the subject's perspective, from the angle of the givenness itself, it appears as the givenness' living, immediate retentional-protentional actuality's *appresentation* of contents on a past *horizon*, forming its synthetic unity in the temporal sense. Likewise, the anticipation expresses the givenness' appresentation of its non-immediate future on a *horizon* of contingencies and *not* another independent egological intentional act related to the future²⁶. This horizon cannot not be infinite, since the actuality of the givenness, in appresentation, *ipso facto* determines the extent of contingencies. Here the anticipation appears as the reverse-recollection, the integral part of the retentional-protentional actuality of the givenness on the basis of appresentation. This is also the case when it includes the contingency of the givenness' invalidation/ suppression in positing its temporal and substantial "completion"²⁷.

The past and future temporal appresentations of the givenness may be searched within the substance in its living, immediate actuality. The Heideggerian concepts of *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt*, as related to the givenness, make the horizons of recollection and of anticipation appear in shape. Again not possibly denying intentionality from the subject's perspective, the three Heideggerian temporal states of having-been (with), dwelling-with and to be-with²⁸ bring forward, from the givenness' angle, the appresentation's (as well as

24. Carr, David, *Time, Narrative and History*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991), p24

25. In the phenomenological sense, expressing the subject's mental processes in relation with the object as intended.

26. Also see *Ibid.*, p.24

27. It is interesting to see this connection within the framework of the Heideggerian anticipatory resoluteness towards authenticity, as a sort of "completion": "Dasein's past must be appropriated for its own authentic future so as to constitute the authentic Self", A. Mansbach, 1991, "Heidegger on the Self, Authenticity and Inauthenticity", *The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 40:65-91. Still, the terminus cannot necessarily be such a "positive" completion: The invalidation is also a completion and is not a necessarily constant future state as in the case of "authenticity".

28. Heidegger, Martin, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982), pp266-267

23. Husserl, Edmund, *Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*. (Paris: PUF 1964), pp39-50

intentionality's) inherence to the *Mitsein* and through the *Mitsein*, to the *Mitwelt*. Consequently, the givenness of something in the purely intersubjective field of the IR appears in substance *and* in temporality through the *relatedness* of the *Mitsein(en)* and of the *Mitwelt* to it. These temporal states are still compatible with and *complete* the more *practical* terms of recollection, retention-protection and anticipation. As such, the three Husserlian terms need to be taken beyond their "egological" Husserlian understanding, within the framework of the ontological and temporal synthetic unity of temporality and substance through appresentation and in their inherence to *Mitsein* and *Mitwelt*.

Lastly, there is a need to underline the ontological and temporal unity of the war and the peace in their phenomenological description. Here Clausewitz's statement about the war's being the continuation of politics by other means is of note. It refers, beyond causality, to consecutiveness, to the temporal relationship between the two states of affairs (peace and war). The actual givenness of the war ontologically and temporally appresents the *preceding* and *upcoming* givenness of the peace, as being consecutive to a retained-as-recalled peace and as being toward an anticipatory peace. Through appresentation, the war is given in a synthetic unity with the two states of peace, to which actors-in-*Mitsein(en)* (in their relatedness to the givenness) and the *Mitwelt*-references are inherent.

3 Phenomenology of the Ukrainian War and Peace

On the grounds of the previous section, the study of the Ukrainian war in its synthetic unity with the preceding and the upcoming peace through appresentation, consists of;

- The reduction and the description of the intersubjective reference to *Mitwelt*, including the preceding bipolarity and its transformation into the successive stages of the post-bipolarity. This description is to extend to the actors-in-*Mitsein* as they are related to the current war event within/ according to

the *Mitwelt*. As such, this part expresses the *retentional* elements of the Ukrainian War with the recollectional content as appresented by, integrated to and thus forming the retentional-protection actuality of the event.

- The description of the anticipatory horizon of peace and of the interstate *Mitwelt*, extending to the actors-in-*Mitsein* as they are related to the event, through appresentation of the actuality of the event of the Ukrainian War.

Retentional elements of the Ukrainian War

In February 2022, *Russia invaded Ukraine*. In bracketing all explanation and judgement, all theoretically built a *priori* ground for them, all a *posteriori* narrative that harbours definition, causes/consequences, morality, rationality, justification and so on, *this* appears as the rawest, most immediate expression of the event, the facticity to which everything that is bracketed refers. Yet the pre-theoretical givenness of this specific occurrence does not consist only of the "Russia invaded Ukraine" statement: This facticity *appresents*, also immediately and intersubjectively, its substance and temporality that includes past, actual and future states in a synthetic unity. This appresentative completion of the givenness makes visible the State-actors' *Mitsein as related to it* as well as the *Mitwelt within* and *in reference to which* it meaningfully appears, providing the phenomenological description of this specific event with ground and content.

Let us begin outlining the description of the Ukrainian War by its intersubjective context, the interstate *Mitwelt's* "generic way of presenting itself" in retentional-protection actuality, where the retention is extended to and meaningfully formed by "recollection".

It would probably be correct to start with the early post-bipolarity as the nascence of the continuum toward *this* war. Here the immediate givenness of the early post-bipolarity does not only appresent the passage from the bipolarity to the post-bipolar interstate *Mitwelt* but also takes

its very meaning from it, more like the invalidation of the bipolar *Mitwelt's* givenness. The givenness of the bipolar *Mitwelt* was reducible to a central dialectic of the two poles which the State-actors referred-to in their *Mitsein(en)*, be they pole, aligned or non-aligned²⁹. It is useful to reiterate that here, the use of the polarity terminology to depict the irreducible givenness of the interstate *Mitwelt* pertains to an intersubjective reference. Therefore it does not refer to the a *posteriori* structural realist explanation³⁰, but to the *preceding* structural realist "assumption". The givenness of a central dialectic appresents restricted alignment mobility³¹, therefore restricted policy mobility in State-actors' interactions/*Mitsein*. The referential transformation of the interstate *Mitwelt* was given as the invalidation of this central dialectic³²: The "unipolarity" was narrated on the ground of this invalidation³³. The *invalidation* provides the earlier "post-bipolar" times with meaning ground on which the theoretical attitude built its narratives upon its varying postulations, such as the that of "unipolarity" with its material explanations and normative aspects or that of the "multipolarism/polycentrism" with its *antithetic*, critical, reactio-

nary therefore also normative- contents³⁴.

Why the invalidation and not the validation of something constituted the ground reference of the early post-bipolar *Mitwelt*³⁵? Apparently, this givenness presented an inherent "incompleteness", expressible as the cancellation of a thesis without replacing it with something intersubjectively self-evident. Waltz's *earlier* suspicion on the nature of the post-bipolarity indicates this givenness of "incomplete transformation" in a structural realist narrative³⁶. The post-bipolar environment indeed preserved some fundamental elements of the bipolar practices, statuses and structures despite the invalidation of the bipolarity itself. The bipolarity "ended" but not wholly: *Liberum veto* of the P-5 continued in the UN Security Council, the issues of nuclear and conventional arms' balancing remained "bipolar", NATO preserved its original identity (therefore its *potential* opponent) while *creating* new measures against new threats and so on.

The early post-bipolarity thus appeared with inherent contradictions, which reflected on the Russian *Mitsein*. Even very early after the USSR's disintegration and at a time when the westernist "euphoria" in terms of the later Russian "critics" was strong in Russian politics³⁷, Moscow encouraged, supported and protected pro-Russian regimes, factions and on occasion secessionist mo-

29. Non-alignment being meaningful as a reference to the bipolar dialectic.

30. Waltz 1979, op.cit.

31. In contrast to the preceding multipolar *Mitwelt*. See also Sayle T.A., *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2019), pp1-17; Waltz 1979, op.cit., pp168, 170-173; De Keersmaeker, Goedele, *Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared*. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018), pp16-21

32. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and then of the USSR.

33. See Charles Krauthammer 1990/1991, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs*, 70(1):23-33.

34. The widespread and to a degree inconclusive debate on the existence, validity or durability of the unipolarity displays this, while the invalidation of the central dialectic is a given: See, for example, Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective", *World Politics* 2009 61(1):188-213; John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, William C. Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior and Systemic Consequences", Eds. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, Wohlforth, *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (Cambridge University Press 2011), pp1-32; Monteiro, Nuno, *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (Cambridge University Press 2014) Robert A. Pape, "Empire Falls", *The National Interest* 2009 (99):21-34; Christopher Layne, "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", *International Studies Quarterly* 2012(56,1):203-213; Mearsheimer, John J., *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (Yale University Press 2018)

35. For comparison, the passage from multipolarity to bipolarity showed the character of the validation of the latter, with its distinct nature, see also Waltz 1979, op.cit.

36. The bipolarity's continuation in an altered state. Kenneth Waltz 1993, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security* (18:2):44-79

37. See for example Tsygankov, Andrei P., *Russia's Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity*. (Lanham: Rowman Littlefield 2016), pp59-96

vements within the ex-USSR countries which displayed a potential to "adhere" to the "West". This created frozen conflicts in Moldovan, Georgian and arguably Azerbaijani territories³⁸, transformed Belarus into a strongly pro-Russian State and Ukraine into a scene of "dialectic equilibrium" of questionable sustainability between the ethnically/ linguistically defined pro-Russian and pro-Western factions³⁹.

During this period the concept of the "near-abroad" gained substance⁴⁰ as the expression of a sort of "outward-sovereignty" on the newly independent countries, within the meaning framework of the Russia- "West" interactions in political and normative senses. This appeared as a recollected content from the past bipolarity horizon (of the USSR) that was intergrated to the retentional-protentional actuality of the Muscovite *Mitsein*. This appresentation resides on the actual Russian *Mitsein's* reference to the "incompleteness" of the passage from the bipolarity into post-bipolarity. Another example to the same appresentation appears as the Russian stance toward the post-bipolar international conflicts/ Western military interventions, ranging from uneasy neutrality to intense criticism such as in the cases of the Ko-

sovo incident and the Second Iraqi War⁴¹. The interventions were mostly labelled as "unilateral" and were linked to the "unipolarity", therefore to "structural" objections to the post-bipolar state of the international politics on the recollected referential grounds of the bipolarity. It was accompanied by the *reactionary* discourse of multipolarity/ polycentrism which existed *in reference* to the "unipolarity" (therefore not self-standingly) in political and normative senses⁴². Here the Russian counter-proposal to "unipolarity" rather appeared a bipolarity-like, rigid political and normative bipolarisation which was further reinforced through her growing rapprochement with China that displayed the same "concerns"⁴³.

The differences in referring to the "incompleteness" of the early post-bipolar *Mitwelt* were increasingly displayed, through events of the Russo-Western discordance. The successive NATO (and EU) enlargements toward the ex-Warsaw Pact countries (as well as these countries' willingness of integrating to the "West" politically and normatively) clashed with the "Russian near-abroad". The "unilateral/ unipolar" interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya apparently fuelled the Muscovite appresentation as recollection integrated to the actuality- of the bipolar-references including for example arguments pointing at the lack UN Security Council mandate as well as at the dismissal of the Russian interests and positions as a "grand power"⁴⁴. Also, Russia vocally reacted to the normative "penetration" of

38. See Coyle, James J., *Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018); Jackson, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions* (London: Routledge 2003), pp81-139; Ryan Kennedy, 2016. "The Limits of Soft Balancing: The Frozen Conflict in Transnistria and the Challenge to EU and NATO Strategy", *Small Wars Insurgencies* 27(3): 512-537; Nicola Lemay-Hebert N., 2018. "The Frozen Conflict that Turned Hot: Conflicting State-Building Attempts in South Ossetia", *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 5(53): 151-159; Souleimanov, Emil, *Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2013)

39. As examples, see Kalb, Marvin, *Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine and the New Cold War*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2015), p127 as to Kosovo Conflict's influence on the public opinion; Coyle 2018, op.cit., pp42-46 for the Orange Revolution; Vladimir Panitko (Director General) *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology "The Ukraine Presidential Election: Comparing the 2010 and 2004 Exit Polls"*, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/The%20Ukraine%20Presidential%20Election.pdf>; and also, data related to the Ukrainian Census 2001 : <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua> for a demographic overview of the regions.

40. See Zhao Huasheng for a "pro-near abroad" account: March 2021, <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-and-its-near-abroad-challenges-and-prospect/>

41. See also Zacklin, Ralph, *The United Nations Secretariat and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World: Power v. Principle*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2010), pp91-154

42. See Melville A., Shakhleina T., eds., *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, (Budapest: Central European University Press 2005) for the evolution the three "fundamental policy papers" of the Russian Federation (Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Concept) from 1993's Foreign Policy Concept onwards; See also Elena Chebankova 2017, "Russia's Idea of the Multipolar World Order", *Post-Soviet Affairs* DOI:10.1080/1060586X.2017.1293394

43. As early as the 1997 "Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order": <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7131&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=>; also see Catherine Jones, *China's Challenge to Liberal Norms: The Durability of International Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2018); Ann Kent, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations and Global Security*, (Singapore: Nus Press 2009)

44. See the consecutive versions of the three fundamental policy papers in Melville, Shakhleina, op.cit.

the West into the near-abroad, as during the events of the colour revolutions⁴⁵ and the emergence of the GUAM initiative⁴⁶ which notably included Ukraine, as its inner balance visibly tilted in favour of the pro-Western faction. The Russian reaction did not reach to the level of direct confrontation during this period.

The Russian President's address at the 2007 Munich Security Summit⁴⁷ constituted, at least in hindsight, the referential passage from the early into the late phase of the post-bipolar *Mitwelt*, which has been characterised by the revivification of the bipolar-like Russo-West interactions, in the sense of further increasing the "incompleteness" of the passage to the post-bipolarity (instead of progress toward a completion). There, Putin depicted the Muscovite *Mitsein* in reference to the interstate *Mitwelt* as to Russia's place there and the incompatibility of the Western *Mitsein* with it, underlining the NATO enlargement process into the near-abroad. Except unprecedented clarity, these were not new. However, Putin also announced in no uncertain terms that Russia would take countermeasures in line with what had been depicted, which contrasted to the Muscovite avoidance of direct confrontation until then, including the more than 7 years' of the Putin government.

This "passage" was validated by its audience's partial recognisance of it: Germany and France *de facto* blocked⁴⁸ the grant of MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. During the same year, Moscow effectively displayed the "passage" by militarily crushing the Georgian attempt against the secessionist entity of South Ossetia and by recognising the latter's and Abkhazia's "independences"⁴⁹. The "West"s response was "protest" and relatively insubstantial

45. See Gerlach, Julia, *Color Revolutions in Eurasia* (Cham: Springer 2014); Mitchell, Lincoln A., *The Color Revolutions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2012); Stent, Angela, *The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014), pp97-134

46. <https://guam-organization.org/en/>

47. <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>

48. And *de jure* "postponed". See James Arbuthnot, 2008. *The Bucharest Summit and the Future of NATO*, *The R.U.S.I. Journal* 153(3):40-44

49. Asmus, Ronald D., *A Little War That Shook The World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West* (New York: Palgrave McMillan 2010).

solidarity with Tbilisi. This was followed by the US' initiation of the "Reset" with Russia⁵⁰. In 2010, the Ukrainian "balance" tilted in favour of the pro-Russian faction as Yanukovich won the elections⁵¹.

Yet soon after, the "Arab Spring" soured the "Reset" climate, since the "West"s apparent compliance with the Russian vision of her near-abroad did not extend to that of "matters of international importance"⁵², therefore to the generality of the interstate *Mitwelt*.

In 2014, Ukraine had *another* "revolution" (after her colour revolution) which displayed the contrast between the early and late post-bipolar state of affairs. Kiev had then the necessity to choose between signing the EU Association Agreement and the EAEU Agreement, directly opposing its pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. The pro-Russian government chose the EAEU, the opposition initiated the "Euromaidan" and the government fell⁵³. Russia militarily intervened as she did in Georgia, secured the secessions in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, occupied and then annexed Crimea⁵⁴. The annexation, triggered Western reaction in form of sanctions, which proved to be at best of limited efficiency as the main sectors of the Russian trade with

50. See Stent 2014, op.cit., pp211-234; "US-Russia Relations: "Reset" Fact Sheet" The White House Office of the Press Secretary 24 June 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet>; Excerpt: "The Reset that never was", *Foreign Policy* December 9, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/09/the-russian-reset-that-never-was-putin-obama-medvedev-libya-mikhail-zygar-all-the-kremlin-men/>; Karl Roberts 2014, "Détente 2.0? The Meaning of Russia's "Reset" with the United States", *International Studies Perspectives* 15(1):1-18.

51. See D'Anieri, Paul, *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019), pp175-210

52. Also see Stent 2014, op.cit., pp235-254; Antonio Perra 2016, "From the Arab Spring to the Damascus Winter: The United States, Russia and the New Cold War", *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 3(4):1-24 and Alexander Vysotsky 2014, "Russia and the Arab Spring", *Connections* 14(1):41-64

53. D'Anieri 2019, op.cit., pp211-252; Hahn, Gordon, *Russia, the West and the New Cold War* (Jefferson: McFarland and Company 2018), pp177-221

54. See Hahn 2018, op.cit., pp222-285

the "West" were spared⁵⁵. The sanctions and even the limited yet visible NATO's collective defense "recovery" process in the Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016 and Brussels 2018 Summits⁵⁶ did not channel the Russian side to revise its policies. Simultaneously, the Russo-Chinese rapprochement gained momentum as Beijing provided Moscow with secure alternatives of its energy exports and with Chinese capital for the grand projects in the Russian Far-East⁵⁷. The crises provided the late post-bipolar meaning ground of confrontation with more substance.

In 2015, Russia upgraded her support to the Damascene regime to the level of direct military intervention against the opposition supported by the "West", going outside of the near-abroad and into the domain of the "matters of international importance" in force. The Russian intervention practically saved the regime from collapse, balanced the Western influence and then reversed the course of the war⁵⁸.

The late phase of the post-bipolarity may thus be reduced to the following, in relation with the Russia- "West" interactions:

- The Muscovite *Mitsein* becoming gradually confrontational in increased retention of the "bipolarity-references" to the detriment of that of its "invalidation", through

55. Irina Shchetinskaia 2016. "Economic Sanctions against Russia after Crimea: Limitations of Impact", North Carolina State University Journal of International Studies, Vol.6 Spring/Fall; Konstantin A.Kholodilin, Aleksei Netunajev 2019, "Crimea and Punishment: The Impact of Sanctions on Russian Economy and Economies of the Euro Area", Baltic Journal of Economics 19(1):39-51

56. See Burton, Joe, NATO's Durability in a Post-Cold War World, (Albany: SUNY 2018), pp156-166

57. Indra Overland, Gulaikhan Kubayeva, "Did China Bankroll Russia's Annexation of Crimea? The Role of Sino-Russian Energy Relations", in Blakkisrud H., Wilson-Rowe E., eds., Russia's Turn to the East Domestic Policymaking and Regional Cooperation (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018), p100, pp104-111; Helge Blakkisrud, "An Asian Pivot Starts at Home: The Russian Far East in Russian Regional Policy", in Blakkisrud H., Wilson-Rowe E., eds., Russia's Turn to the East Domestic Policymaking and Regional Cooperation (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2018), pp11-30

58. See Geukjian, Ohannes, The Russian Military Intervention in Syria (McGill-Queen's University Press 2022); Phillips, Christopher, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press 2020), pp213-231

presentation of the incomplete passage.

- "The West"s inconsistencies and inner discordances face to the Russian confrontationality gradually surface, also appresenting the incompleteness of the passage into the post-bipolarity but from a diametrically different angle from Moscow's. Whereas Moscow retained, through appresentation, the preserve "bipolarity-like" part of the incomplete passage, the Western inconsistency shows its retention of rather the bipolarity's "invalidation" part.
- The weakness of the Western reaction validates the Russian confrontational stance as to its anticipatory horizon, appresenting the validity of further moves on the same line. As such and at least to a degree, the late post-bipolarity appears like the *reversal* of the early post-bipolar positions of the "West" and Russia toward each other, when Western advances in the form of NATO/EU enlargements and western normativity-motivated interventions in third countries were being objected but not effectively deterred by Moscow.
- Russia's validated confrontationality spreads from the near-abroad into the generality of the "matters of international importance", gradually altering the more "unipolar" nature of the early post-bipolar *Mitwelt* into a political and normative bipolarisation (with the discourse of multipolarity/polycentrism), attracting actors that are currently or potentially discordant with the "West"s normative and political preponderance.

The Russian *Mitsein* of the late post-bipolarity inherently projected these retentional-potential "irreducibles" of the Russo-"West" relations to its anticipatory horizon. As to the near-abroad, this horizon included the domestication or the neutralisation of the pro-western regimes on the ground of the apparent/"given" weakness of the western reaction until then. With Georgia being relatively isolated

and Moldova being held in arm's length by the "West"⁵⁹, increasing pressure on Kiev appeared as the immediate component of the Russian *Mitsein* as related to the near-abroad (and the relations with the "West" in that context). The war constituted a contingency, among others, on this narrowed horizon.

The said contingency's becoming actual seems to have followed the elimination of other contingencies: Ukraine did not accommodate her attitude to Russian positions on the matters of the occupied Ukrainian territories. She did not step back from its pro-Western foreign policy including NATO/ EU membership aspirations. She continued to reinforce her military. In other words, she did not recognise Russia's anticipatory horizon but "undermined" it with her own. On the other hand, the Russo- "West" relations conduct during the late post-bipolarity did not appresent, as a strong contingency, a forbidding western reaction in the case of "war". It might not be incorrect here to say that, during the months of gradual escalation, the US President's repeated statements which neatly excluded the *possibility* of deploying US troops in Ukraine reinforced the anticipation of the limited/ undetering western reaction⁶⁰.

This, in its turn, seems to have appresented the anticipation of the quick neutralisation of the Ukrainian resistance, with ensuing effects/ meanings related to the near-abroad and to the interstate *Mitwelt* in general, in line with the Russian *Mitsein*.

The anticipatory horizon of the Ukrainian War: The contingencies related to the upcoming peace

As mentioned before, the war is a phenomenon and an event that appears in a synthetic unity with a temporally retained and an anticipated state of peace. In the context of the ongoing Ukrainian War, the upcoming state of peace presents a horizon of differing contingencies, in relation with the individual horizons of the belligerents and of other principal- involving actors. These horizons

at the very beginning of the event have also visibly changed in line with its (temporal) progress and have the potential of changing further.

To begin with the instigator of the war event, during the earlier days of the invasion, the *contents* of the Russian anticipation of the upcoming state of peace were apparently the cessation of the coherent military opposition and the quick decapitation of the Kiev regime, therefore the creation of a Belorussian-like, Russia-friendly government, the Ukrainian political scene's "denazification"⁶¹, the country's demilitarisation or at least, the cancellation of Kiev's anticipations of joining the NATO through the imposition of constitutional neutrality. The Russian discourse on the invasion other than the bilateral-level arguments- had heavy emphasis on the NATO expansion⁶², in line with the post-bipolar Russian *Mitsein* and its so far validated- confrontationality at its later stage. For Ukraine, the initial anticipation of a peace apparently consisted of securing Western aid, stopping the Russian advance or delaying it long enough to reach to a solution other than a total defeat, even including constitutional neutrality or plebiscites in seceded or Russia-annexed Ukrainian territories in 2014⁶³. In this state of affairs, the "West"s earlier anticipatory contents of the state of peace after the first shock which included providing the Ukrainian government with means of asylum, since the fall of Kiev seemed almost inevitable then- appeared to be largely "defensive" in terms of preventing a total collapse in Ukraine. The rapid yet restricted aid to Ukraine, consisting of defensive weaponry or non-lethal military material depending on the contributor

61. To be translated more or less as purge and pacification of anti-Russian elements

62. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts>

63. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/ukraine-offer-neutrality-meaning-constitution-russia-what-does-neutral-status-country-mean-how-would-it-work>; <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-zelenskyy-says-ukraine-is-willing-to-consider-declaring-neutrality-and-offer-security-guarantees-to-russia-12576688>; <https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1>; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/03/29/russia-ukraine-talks-ukraine-hints-at-progress-on-crimea-while-both-sides-optimistic-on-putin-zelensky-meeting/?sh=4f806e6e27d3>

59. In terms of NATO and the EU membership aspirations

60. <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/24/politics/us-troops-ukraine-russia-nato/index.html>

country, effective sanctioning of Russia⁶⁴ and the acceleration, almost as a reflex, of the political and military "awakening" of the NATO's collective defence identity which had been reluctantly underway since the 2014 Wales Summit⁶⁵ are fitting to this framework.

As regards the Ukrainian *Mitsein*, the anticipatory state of peace was reducible to "survival", mere existence as autonomous entity, including limited restrictions on sovereignty as mentioned above. As regards Russia, the state of peace to be achieved through "victory" transcended Ukraine and extended to a sort of revalidation of a bipolar-like central dialectic, the solid establishment of Russia's "equal counterpart" status with the "West" interlinked with exclusivity/ outward sovereignty in its "near-abroad". In this sense, victory appresented the progress, if not the achievement, of the Russian *Mitsein* in reference to the late stage of the post-bipolar interstate *Mitwelt*.

As regards the "Western" actors, the discourses being bracketed, the initial anticipations related to the war appeared more or less as temporal extensions of their Russian policies of the later post-bipolarity. Newer NATO members of East Europe, in particular Poland and the Baltic Republics⁶⁶ mobilised for stopping Russia in Ukraine or at least guaranteeing their own security through raising substantial NATO commitment, in fact *continuing* to further validate the bipolar-like central dialectic "vision" of Moscow from the "other side". The UK and the US continued with their *relative* determination on display in particular after the 2014 events, as they pioneered sanctioning Russia and helping Ukraine, also "affirming" the bipolar-like central dialectic envisioned by Moscow yet by acting toward its invalidation. The EU-core, in particular Germany, continued with her attitude of *relative* balancing/ *relative* appeasement as adapted to early war circum-

stances, displaying reluctance in *militarily* helping Ukraine and favouring a "diplomatic" solution to the outright invasion.

The progress of the war seems to have altered the anticipatory horizon of these principal actors to an extent, yet not fundamentally. Russia has obviously been failing to reach to its anticipatory positions/ initial war aims. She was defeated on the Kiev and then the Kharkov fronts and forced to withdraw to the borders. She was stopped and partially pushed back in the Southern front, has so far failed to breakthrough in the Donbas front. Still, Ukraine's current counter-offensives have not broken through the existing frontline either.

Currently, the Russian anticipations of peace, in parallel to the narrowing of the frontline, seem to have been changing toward rather "defensive"/ "conservative", even "face-saving" contents, still with recognisance of 2014's and the current war's territorial gains, as they were "annexed"⁶⁷. Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to have let aside her earlier openness to constitutional neutrality and plebiscites in Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk as the war front was pushed away from her vital areas and the Russian momentum apparently faded. Kiev is currently anticipating a state of peace that would consist of the Ukrainian territorial integrity and a true independence from the Russian "near abroad" which means the annulment of the late post-bipolar *de facto* Russian restrictions on her alignments, more clearly on her westward, NATO (and EU) policies, which had proved to be very much in place as the Bucharest Summit of 2008 and afterward amply showed. In other words, the Ukrainian anticipation of the upcoming peace seems to have transformed from mere survival and limited-independence into independence (also in foreign policy) and territorial integrity, as it had been before the war, yet at the current circumstances, *through* the war⁶⁸.

64. Early in the war: <https://fortune.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-sanctions-economy-timeline/>; for the war-related up-to-date sanctions list: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/sanctions-against-russia-8211-a-timeline-69602559>

65. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm; "Ukraine war: Russia demands annexations recognised before talks", 2 December 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63832151>

66. With the notable exception of Hungary, which also continued with its relatively pro-Russian inclination.

67. <https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/27/occupied-areas-of-ukraine-vote-to-join-russia-in-referendums-branded-a-sham-by-the-west>

68. Reuters' outline of November 2022 about the peace-stances of the two belligerents has not substantially changed as of February 2023: [urlhttps://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-russia-ukraines-positions-talks-end-war-2022-11-30/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-russia-ukraines-positions-talks-end-war-2022-11-30/)

Here the Western actors' anticipatory horizon of peace seem to have been ranging from a state of affairs *partially* validating the Russian *Mitsein* as regards the near-abroad (an acceptable *diplomatic solution*) to the radical transformation of the late post-bipolar *Mitwelt* at least as regards Russia (a Russian defeat). The shaping of this horizon is dynamic, depending on what the progress of the war appresents to the individual Western actor's *Mitsein* as related to the late post-bipolar *Mitwelt*, which would form the future state of the characteristic, ontologically and temporally given inconsistencies among the Western actors. Despite the increased coherence among the Western actors in the war climate, it is still not possible to speak of a reliable collective anticipation - therefore of reliable collective acts-. As immediate examples, Germany's and US' long wavering about and failure in granting adequate numbers of Leopard II and "Abrams" tanks to Ukraine for a decisive offensive not even talking about the grant of an adequate number of fighter planes may be cited. A diplomatic solution through searching a "midway", the exhaustion of the willingness to support Kiev's war effort are still among contingencies and is susceptible to prevail if, for example, the current Ukrainian offensive does not yield results. The statements of the Chief of Staff to NATO Secretary General, though withdrawn, give an indicator to these inconsistencies and their contingent forms⁶⁹.

In short, Russia is now fully engaged into this war and currently she has not been achieving an end compatible with her anticipations, yet she is not being "defeated" or exhausted enough as yet for her horizon of peace be cancelled. The West is not coherent enough to engage further and definitely invalidate, in deeds, the Russian anticipations in instigating the war. Ukraine's preservation and actualisation of her anticipations are dependent on the West's coherence and acts. Still, this appearance of stalemate is not sustainable, as the event of war is ontologically and temporally unsustainable.

But how can the anticipatory horizon of peace be described, in completion of the Ukrainian

War's givenness as a synthetic unity in ontological and temporal senses?

Russia's "failure to win" defines a *part* of contingencies of that horizon. The "failure" may be given in the forms of military rout, war losses' and sanctions' becoming intolerable⁷⁰ or domestic political transformations which would prohibit the continuation of the offensive war. Regardless of form, the failure would equate to the invalidation of Russian *Mitsein's* anticipatory horizon related to the upcoming state of peace. The description of that part of the peace horizon may be outlined as follows:

- Ukraine's "independence" from the pre-war *de facto* restrictions of the post-bipolar *Mitwelt's* late stage, such as those related to her NATO and EU memberships.
- Degradation or disappearance of the "near-abroad" in the sense of the Russian preponderance over most of the ex-USSR countries that is characteristic in particular to the late post-bipolar *Mitwelt*.
- The reversal the late post-bipolar process that has been making Russia an alignment alternative for state-actors in political and normative discordance with the "West".
- Decrease of the post-bipolarity's "incompleteness" of transformation from the bipolarity, through the invalidation of its retentional contents in the Russian *Mitsein*, which are the "preserved" references of the preceding *Mitwelt* as mentioned before.

On the other hand, a Russian "victory" can be reducible to the validation and the furtherance of the Russian *Mitsein* related to the post-bipolar *Mitwelt*. In this sense, other than the total Ukrainian defeat, also a "diplomatic solution" that would actualise some part of the Russian anticipatory horizon would present the same character, with even more validity. Peace through the defeat and surrender of Ukraine might limit the said "validation and furtherance" since the

69. <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/nato-ukraine-war-land-stian-jenssen-b1101073.html>

70. Similar to Germany's exhaustion in Autumn 1918

war-induced increase of the Western coherence, NATO's recovery/ mobilisation and heavy sanctions against Russia would probably remain intact. On the other hand, a peace that would consist of Ukraine's constitutional neutrality and cessation of territory, the validation and the furtherance would be more complete, as it would degrade the recently increased coherence among the Western actors and suppress the rationale of the sanctions.

The description of the peace horizon with reference to Russia's "victory" may be outlined as follows:

- Validation of the "near-abroad" as Russia's outward-sovereignty over the ex-USSR countries with the exception of the three Baltic NATO and EU members.
- Validation and furtherance of Russian alignment alternative for State-actors in actual or anticipatory political and normative discordance with the "West".
- Decrease of the post-bipolarity's "incompleteness" of transformation from the bipolarity, through the invalidation of its retentional contents in the Russian *Mitsein*, which are the "preserved" references of the preceding *Mitwelt* as mentioned before.
- Decrease of the post-bipolarity's "incompleteness" of transformation from the bipolarity, through the weakening of its retentional contents in collective Western *Mitsein* that are related to the "invalidation" of the bipolarity's central dialectic, as mentioned before. Therefore, the replacement of the post-bipolarity's "negative" ground by a validation of something, here of a political and normative central dialectic in the interstate *Mitwelt*, possibly in the form of a bipolarised multipolarity, thus effectively ending the "post-bipolar *Mitwelt* in ontological and temporal senses.

4 Conclusion

The study of the war (and of the peace) is not exempt from the fundamental problem of the IR theories, which is none other than the act of theorising in a purely intersubjective field that brings serious ontological and temporal problems into the study. As the IR theorising lacks the anchor of self-standing objectivity in contrast to the positive *and* social sciences, it becomes a genetic process that reshapes the immediate, intersubjective givenness of phenomena and events as "malleable material" and temporally distorts them as it has to impose its genetic narrative upon their post-genetic immediacy. The IR theorising inherently lacks access to the IR phenomena's and events' immediate, pre-theoretical, intersubjective givenness as it "is", as it "appears", as it is "given".

However, there is a possible way for a pre-theoretical, descriptive study of the immediate, intersubjective givenness in the field, with notions and tools for anchoring the study directly to the givenness of the phenomena and events, without pre-postulates, preceding constructs and ensuing narratives that create the said ontological and temporal complications. The Husserlian phenomenology's notions of intersubjectivity, reductions, appresentation and temporal states, *after* their revision through the prism of the Heideggerian phenomenological ontology to remedy their own relapses into the genetic processes of theorising, may enable the researcher to study the IR phenomena and events without distorting them. This paper's first purpose was to outline *the* possibility of a phenomenological study of the IR phenomena and events.

Still, outlining the grounds of such a study is not meaningful without content, without effectively studying a given phenomenon and an event. The notions themselves are not self-standing in the innerworldliness and the method is little different from "rumination" without being expressed "in content". The proposed study's basic notions and its reductive/ descriptive method must be displayed *with* the givenness in order to be meaningfully expressible. In other words, proposing a phenomenological study needs conducting a phenomenological study "of something". This paper took the current and very consequential event of

the ongoing Ukrainian War and its immediate appresentation of the war and peace phenomena as content. It attempted to describe its givenness as synthetic unity in ontological and temporal terms, in its pre-theoretical, intersubjective immediacy and in what it appresents.

The study of the Ukrainian War and related peace gives, through appresentation, a pre-theoretical, pre-causal descriptive ground composed of "inter-appresenting" actors-in-*Mitsein* and of the interstate *Mitwelt* that are reducible to their relatedness to the event and the phenomenon. Here comes forth the temporal progress, in successive phases, of an ontologically discordant/confrontational relationship between Russia on the one side and the "West" on the other, on the ground of the incomplete and invalidation-based (rather than the validation of something) transformation of the bipolar *Mitwelt* into the post-bipolarity. This relationship precedes and appresents its material and discursive forms and contents. The event of the Ukrainian War and peace appear as the manifestation of this relationship in its temporal process and is likely to manifest, as content, its future (and possibly final) form within the upcoming state of peace, which is to give the actors-in-*Mitsein* and the interstate *Mitwelt* in their relatedness to it, in their "new" form. On this anticipatory horizon of the event and through appresentation, of the upcoming descriptive ground of "inter-appresenting" actors-in-*Mitsein* and of the interstate *Mitwelt*, there are two general contingencies that might be conducive to the ontological and temporal achievement/end of the post-bipolarity (and its characteristic "incompleteness") together with the related forms of interstate interactions. The first one is a Russian "victory" with the emergence of a form of bipolarised multipolarity in line with the Russian *Mitsein*. The second one is a Russian "defeat", with the emergence of a form of political/normative "unipolarity" in line with the "Western" *Mitsein*.



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