

How Citizens View and Evaluate Political Parties and Why it Matters? The Case of Portugal (1985-2009)

Conceição Pequito Teixeira
Paulo Almeida Pereira

Conceição Pequito Teixeira, Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP-UTL)
Lisboa, Portugal
cteixeira@iscsp.utl.pt

Paulo Almeida Pereira, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics, Management and Social Sciences
Portuguese Catholic University (UCP), Viseu Campus, Portugal
ppereira@crb.ucp.pt

ABSTRACT:

This article reviews the case of the often-claimed “crisis of parties” in Portugal, and argues that such controversy rests partly on “ambiguous” evidence. Our two main objectives are: 1) finding out the nature and extension of public support (or lack thereof) of parties; 2) determining what are the consequences of the lack of public support for parties in citizens’ pressure to reform democratic institutions. Based on data of four National Public Opinion Surveys, we show that attitudes regarding parties comprehend two conceptually and empirically distinct dimensions: diffuse support and specific support. Afterwards, we saw how a strong criticism of parties’ performance coexists in Portugal with strong citizen pressure over political actors compelling them to implement democratic institutional reforms. Lastly, through logistical regression models, we can conclude that both lack of specific support (“critical antipartysism”) and lack of diffuse support (“delegitimizing antipartysism”) are strong predictors of Portuguese citizens’ reformist orientations and calls.

KEYWORDS: political parties; public opinion; anti-party sentiments; democratic institutional reform; Portugal.

Political parties are universally regarded as essential components of democratic regimes and key vehicles in the process of political representation, voter mobilization, government organizing and public policy shaping (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Webb, 2005: 634). Perhaps no political institution is so closely identifiable with representative democracy as are political parties, precisely because no one has yet shown how representative government could function without them (Dalton and Weldon, 2004: 1). Hence the current relevance of James Bryce when he states that “parties are inevitable” (Bryce, 1921: 119), or E. E. Schattschneider who says, “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties” (Schattschneider, 1941: 1).

Yet, in today’s established democracies the role of parties is often more limited than it would appear given their formal position within democratic systems, precisely because many citizens, political scientists and analysts consider them incapable of fulfilling some of the classic functions attributed to them, while recognizing they enjoy undue and improper privileges (Dalton and Webb, 2000: 203; 2005). The linking of both views on the failures of the political parties explains not just popular disenchantment towards parties in Western European democracies as it is in the centre of the debate about the thesis supporting the “crisis” or “decline” of parties (Daadler, 1992; 2002: 51-54; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995).

The public belief that parties currently enjoy undue and inappropriate privileges also leads to similar feeling by citizens, as we see in Richard Katz and Peter Mair when they argue, in regard their concept of “cartel party”, that leading political parties across Western European democracies depends increasingly on resources made available by the state (such as financial subventions or other subsidies and benefits) in order to ensure their corporate survival and hinder the entry of new and potential rivals (Mair 1995; Katz and Mair, 1992: 7-12; 1993, 1995, 2002: 113-114).

On the other hand, there is a parallel detachment between political parties and civil society, because parties are no longer able to mobilize citizens into participating in their conventional activities – hence the recent and symptomatic weakening of parties as membership organizations – implying that parties have also moved from society towards the state. In fact, the hypothesized “cartelization” of parties is also reflected in the apparent growth in popular feelings of alienation from, or even mistrust in, mainstream politics and parties (Katz and Mair, 2002: 134).

Literature Review: Party Crisis and Reform of Democratic Institutions

In recent years several indicators seem to show that the relationship between citizens and parties is becoming increasingly distant, detached and problematic in established democracies. This observation is commonly coupled with several behavioral indicators, notably erosion of party identification, declining of electoral turnout, increasing electoral volatility reflected in greater uncertainty in the electorate's party choices (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1991; Franklin, 2004), striking decay in party membership (Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2009; Mair and Biezen, 2001), and also the rise of anti-establishment parties and the widespread of anti-party sentiments. More broadly, anti-party rhetoric has become a phenomenon that cuts across several contemporary democracies (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, 2000; Poguntke 1996: 320, 2002; Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996; Torcal, Montero and Gunther, 2002: 258).

But, as Paul Webb rightly argues, while it is undeniable that there is enough empirical evidence consistent with the alleged thesis of "party decline", we cannot infer automatically from this that most citizens regard parties with indifference, disaffection or dissatisfaction (Webb, 2005: 633). Because we are dealing with "imperfect" instruments of measurement, which may be related to the public image of parties in an indirect way, the close-ended survey-based evidence available must be understood and interpreted prudently, especially when some of the individual-level indicators are generally collected from national surveys often designed with the purpose of gauging anti-party feelings in mind, or when wording of survey questionnaires is very ambiguous (Torcal, Montero and Gunther; 2002: 258-259; Webb, 2005: 635-636). But also because, as any survey researcher knows, mass surveys have certain limitations, mostly stemming from the demands of standardization. Another difficulty also, is related to the use of different attitudinal and behavioral indicators to sustain the same diagnosis; indeed a long-standing debate about the meaning of such indicators remains largely unresolved and unclear after more than two decades.

It is therefore important to contextualize and understand all evidence concerning public opinion of parties and its ambiguity, to assume that these indicators are potential correlates of party sentiments, but not the party sentiments themselves. It is precisely this empirical ambiguity that makes it relevant to study this subject thoroughly. Especially in Portugal's case, where the roots of "party malaise" seem both of institutional and attitudinal nature, reflecting its late and singular transition towards democracy as well as the direct effects over the party system's structure and over the nature of parties themselves (Biezen, 1998, 2003; Jalali, 2007).

In our country the strong public support for democracy as a regime¹ seems to coexist with strong citizens' mistrust towards parties: While in 2008, 19 percent of Portuguese citizens revealed tendency to trust parties was 19 percent (EB 69); in 2010 percentage dropped to 14 percent (EB 74). Such low levels in regard to trust in parties are, however, far from being an exception. If we look at the set of 27 EU members states, trust in parties was of 18 percent in 2008 and 15 percent in 2010 (see Eurobarometer 69 and 74).

For all this, it is important to develop research supported by more direct attitudinal and behavioral evidences and by a deeper understanding of what Portuguese citizens actually view and how they evaluate parties as main political actors in representative democracy. It is also essential to know the extent to which citizens' attitudes towards parties determines public claims and appeals for reform or transformation of Portugal's democratic institutions.

This issue is extremely important because it is in the centre of the current academic debate about symptoms and consequences of what Pippa Norris calls the "democratic deficit" (Norris, 2009: 5), i.e., the gap between the growing of public aspirations in relation to how representative democracy and its key institutions should function and the citizens' dissatisfaction as their failing performance. This phenomenon was been captured by the concepts of "critical citizens" (Norris, 1999), sophisticated publics (Dalton, 2008) or disaffected democrats (Torcal and Montero, 2006).

Growing levels of literacy, education, cognitive skills and emancipative values leading to a citizenship that aspires to democracy as an ideal form of government, remains yet at the same time deeply skeptical and critical when evaluating how democracy and its main actors work in practice. In other words, a citizenship that strongly endorses democratic values, yet at the same time is extremely suspicious and distrustful of elite-controlled hierarchical political organizations, such as parties, bureaucracies, and large interest groups. Why does this new paradox matter?

While the debate on this issue continues, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish two basic theoretical positions. The most positive interpretation suggests that citizens' disaffection and distrust may spark progressive institutional reforms and serves ultimately to improve the quality of democracy (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2004; Norris, 1999; 2009). On the other hand, the most alarmist and negative interpretation emphasizes that ideas about continuous democratic reinforcement are naïf and remember us that previous historical waves of democratization were followed by periods of sustained reversal or recession (Diamond, 2008; Huntington, 1991).

This article is a single case study about the relationship between public support for parties (or lack thereof) and the reformist orientations of citizens and part elites in Portugal. It is thus a case study analysis that have a useful purpose for comparative analysis because it allow us to generate some hypotheses to be tested in analytical studies involving more than one case and it also enables us to refine existing theories about the puzzling relationship between citizens and parties in the context of contemporary representative democracies (Lijphart, 1971: 691).

Research Questions and Hypotheses

In Portugal's case, there are also several aspects and symptoms to which established parties and their leadership are not indifferent, namely growing mistrust regarding representative institutions, criticism and discontent of parties' performance and also skepticism regarding political elites. Consequently, calls for institutional reform have become the new catchphrases of national politics since the end of the 1990s, similar to what has happened in other European democracies (Cain, Russell and Scarrow, 2006: 9-13; Dalton, 2007).

But more than reproducing the political and theoretical debate about whether institutional reforms in democratic institutions are feasible or desirable – whether they will move us towards democratization or away from it – we seek to answer three fundamental questions:

- (1) What is the nature and extent of public support (or lack thereof) for parties in Portugal?
- (2) To what extent mistrust and growing dissatisfaction with the performance and functioning of established parties have translated into real and significant citizen pressure for democratic reform or institutional change?
- (3) How are established political actors, especially traditional actors of representative democracy (i.e. political parties) responding to this pressure for institutional reform?


We shall start with empirical data on the attitudes of Portuguese citizens towards parties withdrawn from four national opinion public surveys (1985, 1993, 2002 and 2008). From here, and based on the idea of “political support” as a multidimensional phenomenon ranging from the most diffuse to the most specific levels (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999, 2009: 10), we will be able to proceed both to the operationalization of the “public support for parties” notion in two empirically

and conceptually distinct dimensions and to a longitudinal analysis of Portuguese citizens’ attitudes towards parties, starting from the transition period of the democratic regime to its post-consolidation.

Subsequently, our focus will be Portugal’s national survey of 2008-2009 (N = 1 350), which took place under the “Portuguese MP’s in a Compared Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Political Representation” International Project” (FCT-MCTES: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006). On the one hand we want to know whether Portuguese citizens agree or not to a set of future reforms of the political system (bottom-up dimension). On the other hand, we are also interested in knowing what is the understanding that main political actors have of those reforms, and whether these have been part or not of their most recent reformist strategies (bottom-up dimension).

Lastly, we will test the relation between Portuguese citizens’ anti-party sentiments and a set of institutional reforms, regarding the reinforcement of representative democracy and its complementarity with direct democracy (cf. Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. Potential changes in democratic institutions and processes in Portugal



Hence, after this brief review of the literature and preceding research questions, we want to present our main investigation hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1

Citizens' attitudes towards parties acquire a multidimensional nature, with two conceptually and empirically distinguishable dimensions: one expressing diffuse support and another specific support for parties.

Hypothesis 2

In a democracy that is, above all, a party democracy, if so many citizens are discontent and extremely critical of the way established parties are carrying out their functions, one of the potential consequences is the increase in calls for political reform made by citizens, which can occur at several levels.

Hypothesis 3

"Delegitimizing antipartisanship" constitutes a strong predictor of pressure for institutional reform mainly linked to the reinforcement of direct democracy, here understood as more of a refusal of than a complement to representative democracy.

Hypothesis 4

"Critical and reactive antipartisanship" constitutes a strong predictor of pressure for institutional reform mainly linked to the reinforcement of representative democracy, while as a complement of direct democracy.

Public Support for Parties in Portugal: Meaning and Measurement

Is there a crisis of citizens' support for parties in Portuguese democracy? We face two challenges in answering this general question. First, there is the conceptual change of what is meant by "political support" or "public support" for parties. Second, is the empirical problem of assembling the appropriate data to evaluate national trends and changes in public opinion towards parties. Therefore, we need to clarify the concept of political support. By political support, we mean the extent to which individuals evaluate political objects positively, namely the political community, the political regime and institutions. Like David Easton (1965, 1975) we

too distinguish between these different objects of political support for several reasons, both theoretical and empirical.

Regarding political parties, we are interested first and foremost in the dichotomy made by Easton between types of support, namely diffuse support, which reflects more generalized and normative orientations towards political objects, and specific support, which is more directly tied to evaluations of a political object (Easton, 1965, 1975; see also Ekman and Kindle, 2004; Klingemann, 1999; Norris 1999, 2009). While the former represents deeper political feelings that might provide a potential reservoir of support in times of political stress, the latter might reflect the immediate performance of any object, such as political parties. While the diffuse support has also been interpreted as measuring the legitimacy of political system or political institutions, in contrast the specific support is closely related to the actions and performance of the government or political institutions or authorities.

In effect, Easton's conceptual distinction between specific and diffuse or generalized support seems plausible theoretical, and worth maintaining, especially if this is understood as a continuum rather than as a dichotomous typology (Norris, 2009: 22). Consequently, the emphasis in the conceptual distinction between diffuse and specific support for parties is useful because it helps to distinguish the short-run impact of immediate political events and the accumulated experience over the long term, and also because this distinction have implications for the empirical evidence that we should collected.

We start the empirical analysis of public support for parties in Portugal by finding out if citizens' attitudes regarding parties are contradictory or not, and what were the national trends between 1985 and 2008/09. In order to do so, we will use a set of national surveys containing four standard questions designed to measure the respondent's opinions on whether they believe that (1) "without parties there can be no democracy"; (2) "thanks to parties people can participate in political life"; (3) "political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same"; and (4) "parties are only useful to divide people".

Table 1 shows that most Portuguese (69 percent) considers parties to be indispensable actors of representative democracy, an opinion that remains almost unaltered since 1993 until 2008. Likewise, after the political instability during the democratic transition, most respondents (70 percent) understand that "it is through parties that citizens can participate in political life", curiously this opinion reaching almost 80 percent in 2008.

TABLE 1. Citizens' attitudes towards political parties in Portugal (1985-2008)

Indicators	1985	1993	2002	2005	2008	Average
<i>Parties are only useful to divide people</i>						
Agree completely + Agree	59%	52%	47%	35%	57%	50%
Neither agree nor disagree	–	15%	–	13%	–	14%
Disagree completely + Disagree	23%	29%	42%	44%	35%	35%
Doesn't know / Didn't answer	18%	4%	11%	8%	8%	10%
(N)	(2 210)	(2 000)	(1 303)	(3 001)	(1 350)	–
<i>Political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same</i>						
Agree completely + Agree	60%	59%	71%	–	82%	68%
Neither agree nor disagree	–	14%	–	–	–	–
Disagree completely + Disagree	22%	24%	21%	–	14%	20%
Doesn't know / Didn't answer	18%	3%	8%	–	4%	8%
(N)	(2 210)	(2 000)	(1 303)		(1 350)	–

SOURCES: Sani, Giacomo, Ossorio, Julián Santamaria et al., *A Cultura Política do Sul da Europa: Estudo Sobre Quatro Nações. Database*. Lisbon: ICS, 1985; Bacalhau, Mário and Bruneau, Thomas, *Continuidade e Mudança do Sistema de Partidos em Portugal. Database*. Lisbon: ICS, 1993; Freire, André, Lobo, Marina Costa and Magalhães, Pedro (eds), *Comportamento Eleitoral e Atitudes Políticas dos Portugueses, Database*. Lisbon: ICS 2002. Lobo, Freire, André, Viegas, José Manuel L. and Seiceira, Filipa (eds), *Representação Política em Portugal – Inquéritos e Bases de Dados*, Lisbon: Sextante, 2009.

Even if this data allows us to conclude that there is a broad consensus within Portuguese citizens regarding the parties' democratic legitimacy, the fact is that citizens are still heavily critical of their performance. As table 2 demonstrates, between 1985 and 2008 almost 70 per cent of respondents agrees to the statement "while parties criticize each other often, in reality they are all the same" æ this percentage changed from 60 percent in 1985 to 82 percent in 2008. On the other hand, half of the Portuguese population considers that "parties are only useful to divide people", and while greater oscillations are registered, the opinion of Portuguese citizens is very similar both in 2008 and 1985, when the transition ended and democratic consolidation started in Portugal.

TABLE 2. Citizens' attitudes towards political parties in Portugal (1985-2008)

Indicators	1985	1993	2002	2005	2008	Average
<i>Without parties there can be no democracy</i>						
Agree completely + Agree	58%	70%	71%	72%	73%	69%
Neither agree nor disagree	–	15%	–	6%	–	11%
Disagree completely + Disagree	13%	10%	21%	10%	14%	14%
Doesn't know / Didn't answer	29%	5%	8%	12%	13%	13%
(N)	(2 210)	(2 000)	(1 303)	(3 001)	(1 350)	–
<i>Thanks to parties people can participate in political life</i>						
Agree completely + Agree	57%	72%	72%	–	77%	70%
Neither agree nor disagree	–	15%	–	–	–	–
Disagree completely + Disagree	15%	9%	14%	–	11%	12%
Doesn't know / Didn't answer	28%	4%	14%	–	12%	15%
(N)	(2 210)	(2 000)	(1 303)	–	(1 350)	–

SOURCES: Ibid.

In conclusion: if on the one hand the democratic legitimacy of parties is undeniable, on the other the dissatisfaction about the way established parties carry out their representative and governmental functions it is also evident. We can thus state that to the Portuguese citizens' eyes parties became a kind of "necessary evil", being criticized for "what they actually do" and supported for "what they are supposed to do", which is in turn apparently paradoxical or puzzling.

This interpretation can be addressed through the concept of "democratic deficit", since here also the aspirations of citizens regarding the role and functions that parties should have in a representative democracy as a form of government seem to be quite distant from how the parties actually work.

Data Analysis, Discussion and Interpretation

To understand these paradoxical perceptions that Portuguese citizens have towards established parties we need to know what those latent variables have in common. For this we used the exploratory factor analysis of data gathered in the 1985, 1993, 2002 and 2008 Portuguese national surveys.

Table 3 presents the results of principal components analysis. The first and second questions introduced in this table intend to measure overall support for political parties, or in other words, the dimension of diffuse support for parties. The third and fourth questions seek to capture what we hypothesized to be the basic orientations towards the Portuguese traditional party alternatives, which are part of the specific support dimension.

TABLE 3. Dimensions of citizens' attitudes towards parties in Portugal (1985-2008)

		<i>Parties are only useful to divide people</i>	<i>Political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same</i>	<i>Thanks to parties people participate in political life</i>	<i>Without parties there can be no democracy</i>
1985	Factor 1	0.851	0.858	0.064	-0.143
	% Variance		37%		
	Factor 2	-0.074	0.000	0.873	0.854
	% Variance			37%	
1993	Factor 1	0.833	0.868	-0.144	-0.109
	% Variance		39%		
	Factor 2	-0.182	-0.071	0.866	0.875
	% Variance			37%	
2002	Factor 1	0.807	0.809	-0.061	0.018
	% Variance		35%		
	Factor 2	-0.036	-0.005	0.833	0.837
	% Variance			33%	
2008-09	Factor 1	0.568	0.941	0.189	0.243
	% Variance		44%		
	Factor 2	0.566	0.189	0.859	0.808
	% Variance			33%	

NOTE: Principal components factorial analysis (Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization)

SOURCES: Ibid.

The results suggest some immediate conclusions. On the one hand, they show us that Factor 1 is made up of items involving the recognition of the democratic systems' need of political parties. As we can observe in table 3, the two variables related to diffuse support dimension belong to this cluster; the magnitude of factor loadings, the percentage of variance explained by this factor ranging between 33 and 37 per cent. On the other hand, a second autonomous dimension clearly emerges from the principal components analysis, now formed by a combination of feelings of lack of support for the current performance of established parties. Also here the magnitude of factor loadings, the percentage of variance explained by Factor 2 ranging between 35 and 44 per cent.

It is also important to note that in each public support dimension three types of attitudes can be found: "pro-party", "ambivalent" and "anti-party" attitudes or sentiments. Therefore, regarding diffuse support for parties, we can speak of "pro-party" attitudes when respondents disagree with the following statements: "without parties there can be no democracy" and "thanks to parties people can participate in political life". In opposite fashion, if respondents agree with these statements we are faced with "anti-party" attitudes, and when they agree with one statement only, we can observe "ambivalent" attitudes.

In regard of specific support for parties, we are interested in knowing whether respondents agree or not to the following statements: "political parties criticize each other often, but in reality they are all the same" and "parties are only useful to divide people". If they disagree with both, we have "pro-party" attitudes, while if they agree with both statements we are before "anti-party" attitudes. Finally, if respondents disagree with one statement only, we then have "ambivalent" attitudes. We shall now see how these three attitude types are distributed regarding each separate dimension of popular support for parties.

As for diffuse support, in table 4 we see "pro-party" attitudes assuming a clear preponderance over "anti-party" ones: in average, 84 percent of the Portuguese population recognizes parties as necessary to democracy, supporting Schattschneider's view which states that "democracy without parties is unthinkable to most citizens" (1941: 1). This value remains stable between the end of the democratic transition (1985) and the present moment, with the political regime in a period of post-consolidation (2008).

TABLE 4. Evolution of citizens' attitudes towards parties in Portugal, 1985-2008
(Diffuse support dimension)

Citizen's attitudes	1985	1993	2002	2008	Average
Pro-party	80%	87%	84%	83%	84%
Ambivalent	11%	5%	6%	5%	7%
Anti-party	9%	8%	10%	12%	10%

SOURCES: Ibid.

Nevertheless, if democracy without parties is unthinkable to the great majority of Portuguese citizens, it still doesn't keep them from being extremely skeptical and critical of parties' democratic performance. Table 5 shows that between 1985 and 2008 over 60 per cent of the Portuguese population reveal strong dissatisfaction regarding the traditional party alternatives due to their poor performance or some possible failures. Simultaneously, little over 20 per cent seem satisfied with the way major parties have been performing.

Regarding specific support, it is surprising to observe that in 2008 "anti-party" attitudes are higher than in 1985 values, exactly after the end of the democratic transition and beginning of the regime's consolidation. This shows that the strong critical sentiments of the Portuguese public opinion towards parties are relatively independent of political, economic and social mid and long-term changes in our country – a pattern more expectable concerning diffuse support for political parties.

TABLE 5. Evolution of citizens' attitudes towards parties in Portugal, 1985-2009
(Specific support dimension)

Citizen's attitudes	1985	1993	2002	2008	Average
Pro-party	15%	23%	27%	18%	21%
Ambivalent	24%	14%	15%	16%	17%
Anti-party	61%	63%	58%	66%	62%

SOURCES: Ibid.

From this data we can draw the following conclusion: the legitimacy that most Portuguese population recognizes to parties as pillars of representative democracy coexists clearly with a strong and generalized feeling of disappointment about the way of major parties have been carrying out their functions in the democratic political system.

Public Support for Parties and Democratic Reform of Institutions

Arrived here we are left with the question: Does it matter if many people consider parties to be necessary even when they are widely criticized for their poor performance? If our arguments about the value of public support for parties are correct, it does. Due to the central role that the support to parties play in representative democracy, this apparent paradox should have obvious and predictable effects on citizens' orientations and political behavior. We are interested in finding if dissatisfaction with parties can be a strong and important stimulus for political reform in order to address some of Portugal's representative democracy shortfalls. Therefore, it is important to know in Portuguese case whether the citizens' dissatisfaction with existing parties can prove to be or not a challenge to representative democracy while also providing to new choices about our democracy's future.

The National Opinion Public Survey (2008) shows the attitudes of the Portuguese citizens regarding the way of democracy currently works and whether it does or doesn't need reform at the level of its main institutions and procedures. About two thirds of respondents agree that the functioning of the democratic system is progressively losing the trust of most citizens. Also, an overwhelming majority of citizens (76 percent) recognize that the way democracy works in Portugal should be object of deep reform. Furthermore, we can statistically observe a strong correlation between the citizens' mistrust about the way of democracy works and their belief that its institutions and procedures need deep reform. This can be seen through the values of the Kendall'tau-b (0.262), Pearson R (0.278) and Spearman (0.286) correlation measures, with a significance level of .000 in every case.

However, if there is a general perception that the Portuguese democratic system is increasingly mistrusted and reform is seen as a way of improving the quality of democracy, then one must ask what type of political institutions citizens have in mind considering they are also massive supporters of profound reforms.

In the 2008 National Public Opinion Survey one type of change involves reforms directed towards improving political representation and the functioning of the electoral process. Under this category we must firstly consider the assessment citizens make of the performance of the current electoral system for the national Parliament. Secondly, we have preferences shown for some reform proposals in order to create more favorable conditions to more proximity, knowledge, and accountability of elected representatives to voters. This can eventually contribute

to a higher electoral turnout and greater confidence in political institutions in general, and politicians specifically.

The reaction of Portuguese citizens against party monopoly of political representation is pretty much evident. In effect, the support for the possibility of independent candidacies to national Parliament proposed by citizens is very high (66 percent), similarly to what already happens in local elections where the possibility of independent candidacies, if supported by a certain number of citizens, constitutes an exception to the rule of exclusive party mediation in our country. Hence, the usual and recurring criticism against the excessive power of the parties that makes Portuguese democracy a genuine “partitocracia” (Teixeira, 2009).

It is worth reminding here that Portugal’s electoral system is a proportional representation (PR) according to Hondt’s formula, where the conversion of votes into mandates occurs in each of the 22 multi-member electoral districts, many of high magnitude. This is also an electoral system with closed lists: voters cannot change the candidate order previously chosen by parties according to a very informal, centralized and non-inclusive process (Freire, 2003: Ch. 6; Teixeira, 2009; Teixeira and Freire, 2011).

On the other hand, the expressive support (56 percent) for the possibility of citizens being able to vote more for candidates than for parties apparently demonstrates that Portuguese citizens are favorable to a representation relationship which allows for an improved proximity between voters and representatives as well as a higher accountability of the latter in relation to the former. This must, however, allow also what citizens see as the (undesirable) monopolizing role that parties play in political representation.

It is important to stress that such favorable position regarding the electoral system’s reform constitutes a “window of opportunity” to proceed with it. This reform constantly defended by Portugal’s major parties (especially the two largest ones (Socialist Party and Social-Democratic Party) has been invariably postponed since it was first designed by the Constituent Assembly in 1976.

Disenchantment and strong criticism regarding parties translate into support for the implementation of reforms designed to make parties more open, participated and especially closer to civil society, similar to what has happened to the intra-party reforms in other European democracies (Kitillson and Scar row, 2006). By looking at the data in Table 6, we conclude that Portuguese citizens are largely favorable to reforms which reinforce the power of rank and file in what are the

main areas of the decision-making process inside parties, such as the direct election of leaders (75 percent), direct participation of members in the choice of MP candidates (79 percent) and, lastly, direct participation in the definition of the party's manifestos and policies (73 percent).

TABLE 6. Public support for intraparty democratic reforms, 2008 (%)

<i>Party members should...</i>	Elect directly the party leader	Participate directly in the selection of parliamentary candidates	Participate directly in the elaboration of the party program
Very important	15	16	13
Important	60	63	60
Little important	10	13	15
Not important	15	8	12

SOURCE: 2008 National Public Opinion Survey

One way to approach the degree of democracy within parties is to examine the formal distribution of power, asking who selects and removes party leaders and who is involved in the selection of party candidates. In the 1990s parties in a number of countries showed a strong trend towards granting more procedural access to the rank and file, thus transferring to them responsibility over decisions which previously belonged to the party congress (see Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006: 71-72).

Similarly to what occurred in other European countries, the two major parties in Portugal were also committed to reinforcing the power of mass membership and attracting new members through internal selective incentives. These incentives were expressed mainly through the possibility given to ordinary members of electing their leader directly (closed primaries). A reform which was first implemented by the Socialist Party in 1998, followed by the Social-Democratic Party in 2006 and, afterwards, by CDS-PP (a right-wing party and a small party coalition but capable of providing absolute majorities with the party that occupies the center-right of the ideological spectrum, the Social-Democratic Party).

This innovation in leadership selection with the objective of strengthening links with the rank and file is a phenomenon consistent with what is happening in other European countries and has been interpreted in light of Katz and Mair's

“cartel party” theses, according to which this type of organizational change has the fundamental goal of weakening mid-level elites and strengthen the autonomy of leaderships (Katz and Mair, 1995: 20-21).

In the case of Portugal, we agree with Marco Lisi interpretation when he states that these changes contributed to a greater autonomy of national leaders and to erode the position of the party activists, reinforcing not only “plebiscitary” dynamics inside parties, but also spreading them to the political system due to the large media coverage of parties’ direct elections (Lisi, 2009: 215-216).

In respect of the intervention of rank and file in the elaboration of electoral manifestos, the two largest parties adopted two different approaches: “debate forums”, understood as platforms of encounter and political discussion between parties and civil society, namely with its most reputed and specialized representatives in distinct areas of government – the Socialist Party’s States-General and New Frontiers platforms (<http://www.ps.pt/>) regarding the party’s programmatic bases and, more recently, the More Society movement promoted by the Social-Democratic Party (<http://www.psd.pt/>); or “parties’ websites”, in order to allow citizens to contribute to the programmatic debate, expressing online what they understand to be the political priorities for government – can ease the party’s task of transforming several specific citizen demands into more manageable proposal packages or electoral manifestos, while simultaneously opening up to civil society.

There is another type of change, which involves the introduction, and use of new forms of direct democracy that provide citizens with a more influential role in the democratic process; that is, the citizen’s direct involvement in political decision-making through referendums and other forms of direct democracy (Scarrow, 2006, Ch. 3). Where the dealignment or even anti-party sentiments tend to create a climate of distrust of representative institutions, citizens are expected to look more favorably at electoral procedures that minimize the party’s role and give them a more direct voice (Buttler and Ranney, 1994; Gallagher and Uleri, 1996).

During the 1990s, there were some institutional changes that increased Portuguese citizens’ direct access to political decision. Although national referendums were allowed according to the fundamental law since the second constitutional revision in 1989, the truth is only in 1998 the first national referendum of the democratic era (Freire, 2007; Freire and Baum, 2001).

The low participation of citizens in national referendums that took place in 1998 and 2007 contrasts sharply with respondents’ answers to the National Opinion

Public Survey (2008-2009). When asked whether agree or disagree with the statement “People should be more often consulted through referendum”, 65 percent of respondents strongly agree with this statement, while only 15 percent disagree. The contrast between political attitudes and behaviors of Portuguese citizens regarding this matter becomes even greater when asked if they agree or disagree with the following statement: “The law should allow a certain number of citizens to initiate a national referendum”. Here, about 72 percent of respondents strongly agree with the opinion expressed in the national survey, while only 8 percent disagree.

According to the empirical data analyzed until here there are good reasons to sustain that the growing number of Portuguese citizens who are disenchanted and dissatisfied with the country’s established political parties apparently creates a fertile ground for citizen calls for institutional democratic reform – which confirms our second hypothesis. In order to demonstrate that calls for institutional reform are supported by most of the Portuguese population, but are also dictated by the lack of public support for parties (diffuse and specific), we need to test hypotheses 3 and 4.

As Table 7 shows the results of the logistic regression of dependent variables concerning institutional reform in Portugal (dichotomous) on a series of independent variables measuring political sophistication, value orientation of citizens, their attitudes towards parties and even the way they assess political and economic performance.

Variables related to political sophistication were introduced in all three models to test Dalton’s (1999), Norris’ (1999), and Inglehart’s (1997) arguments, which defend that growing criticism regarding traditional representative institutions (i.e. political parties) is positive and favorable since it reflects a more demanding citizenship (politically more sophisticated and post-materialist in its value priorities) regarding the functioning of democracy in Portugal. On the other hand, the introduction of variables related to attitudes towards parties in the regression models aims to find out to what lack of support and distancing of citizens from major Portuguese parties constitute good predictors of reformist demands. Lastly, we held into account variables related to the political and economic performance of the democratic system, in order to know whether it has any impact over the massive citizen support for institutional reforms.

TABLE 7. Individual determinants of institutional changes or reforms in Portugal (2008)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables		
	Electoral change	Intra-party change	Direct democracy
<i>Political sophistication</i>			
Political interest	1.440*** (8,17)	0,972*** (2,92)	1,554** (5,20)
Internal political efficacy	0,236 (2,30)	0,318 (2,75)	0,483 (1,97)
Exposure TV news	0,352 (1,56)	0,365 (1,11)	0,380 (1,17)
Post-materialist values	0,898** (3,98)	0,727* (2,91)	1,743*** (8,85)
<i>Attitudes towards parties</i>			
(Lack of) diffuse support for parties	0,345 (0,52)	1,180 ** (4,40)	1,754** (6,31)
(Lack of) specific support for parties	0,914** (4,75)	1,647*** (6,48)	0,844** (3,17)
Party identification	-0,119 (0,15)	-0,890** (3,45)	-1, 220*** (4,35)
Support for incumbent party	-0,597* (2,78)	-0,236 (0,47)	-0,552* (2,42)
<i>Political and economic performance</i>			
Trust in political institutions	-1,954*** (6,80)	-1,044** (3,21)	-1,323*** (5,32)
Assessment of government performance (negative)	1,753** (2,47)	1,324** (4,01)	0,954** (4,23)
Assessment of the state of the country's economy (negative)	0,875 (5,21)	0,772* (3,04)	0,513 (2,54)
Constant	1,82	1,97	0,36
Nagelkerke R ²	0,27	0,32	0,23
Number of cases	925	622	714
Correctly predicted (%)	78,5	75,7	82,2

* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001.

SOURCE: 2009 National Public Opinion Survey

NOTES: **1.** Column entries are standardized regression coefficients with Wald statistics shown in parentheses. Controls are included for relevant social background characteristics. **2.** The dependent variable (electoral change) results from positive answers by respondents to the following questions: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) Groups of independent citizens should be able to present candidate lists to the Assembly of the Republic + (2) The electoral system should be modified in order for citizens to vote more attending to their candidate choice than party choice". The combination of these two questions gives us the dependent variable, which was recoded as a nominal and dichotomized variable: Agree + Agree completely 1; Disagree + disagree completely 0. **3.** The dependent variable (intra-party change) results from positive answers by respondents to the following questions: "Considering political parties in general, to what extent do you find important that base militants participate in the taking of the following decisions: (1) Directly elect the party leader; (2) Directly participate in the definition of the party's program". The combination of these two questions gives us the dependent variable, which was recoded as a nominal and dichotomized variable: Very important + important 1; Not important + low importance 0. **4.** The dependent variable (direct democracy) results from positive answers by respondents to the following questions: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) The population should be consulted more often through referendums; (2) A certain number of citizens should be able to start a referendum process". The combination of these two questions gives us the dependent variable, which was recoded as a nominal and dichotomized variable: Agree + agree completely 1; Disagree + disagree completely 0.

If we look at the results of the logistic regressions of dependent variables concerning institutional reform in Portugal, we can conclude that, whether referring to changes regarding representative democracy (i.e. the electoral system for the national Parliament) or direct democracy (i.e. more frequent use of referendums), citizens' interest for politics is a common variable and with strong explanatory capacity; and, in a statistically more moderate way, the same is valid regarding citizens' support post-materialist values.

Consequently, the greater the interest in politics, the greater are citizen reformist appeals; the greater the support for post-materialist values, the greater the acceptance of institutional change, particularly regarding direct democracy. In the case of representative democracy, we can observe that the greater is the lack of specific support for parties, the greater is the support given to reformist measures. In the opposite sense, the stronger is party identification and proximity to the party in government, as well as trust in institutions, the weaker are demands for a reform of the electoral system that can effectively improve the quality of political representation.

On the other hand, the lack of specific support for parties ("critical and reactive antipartysism"), differing from what we observe in other attitudes towards parties present in the regression model, constitutes a strong predictor of pro-reformist attitudes in Portugal. This is equally endorsed regarding the case of intra-party reforms or the use of direct democracy methods (national referendums and referendums called by petition). We want to stress the explanatory capacity the lack of diffuse support for parties in relation to direct democracy forms: the greater is "delegitimizing antipartysism", the greater is demand for a more recurrent and systematic use of the referendum in the political decision-making process.

These data confirm our hypotheses 3 and 4. While diffuse and specific support are conceptually and empirically distinct in relation to parties, it is expectable that their effects at the level of calls for institutional change are equally different (see Table 7).

Conclusions

We try to shed light over the attitudinal Portuguese map towards political parties, whose misunderstanding sometimes seems to justify some contradictions and ambiguities. With a set of questions in four national opinion public surveys, we

showed that the attitudes of Portuguese citizens towards parties could be grouped into two dimensions, theoretically and empirically distinct.

As we have seen, diffuse support for parties is not an issue in Portugal, and strong dissatisfaction over the functioning of major parties is far from producing any “contagion effect” capable of eroding the “reservoir of favorable attitudes” regarding the indispensability of parties and the functions they perform in the context of representative democracy. If they might be considered an evil, they are, however, a necessary one. Furthermore, if there is a crisis of political parties in Portugal, it is certainly not a crisis associated with legitimacy loss (“delegitimized antipartysism”) but rather with a poor and challenged performance (“critical or reactive antipartysism”).

On the other hand, we also demonstrate that the strong and growing dissatisfaction regarding established parties coexists with the acknowledgement that institutional reforms with the scope of improving the “quality of democracy” in Portugal are necessary, through perfecting its representative component and complementing it with direct democracy’s own principles.

We can also verify that the lack of diffuse support (“delegitimizing antipartysism”) and specific support (“critical and reactive antipartysism”) are strong predictors for reformist pressures regarding the current functioning of democracy and its main political institutions; all this in a direction, which confirms our hypotheses. In sum: if anti-party feelings of “delegitimizing” nature are strong predictors for reformist pressure, especially for the reinforcement of direct democracy; “critical and reactive antipartysism” has greater explanatory capacity regarding reforms that seek the improvement of representative democracy and its complementarity with direct democracy’s tools such as referendums.

In conclusion, these are the good news, since results show that more than a “constraint”, growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of established parties is an “opportunity” towards the “democratization of democracy” in Portugal – which can happen as long as “discontent democrats” do not limit themselves to simply demand reforms of democratic institutions, but yet opt to actively exercise their own “voice” (Hirschmann, 1970), thus not limiting their criticism and apparent drive for reform to a passive and “negligent loyalty” (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn, 1982).

Bibliographic References

- Bacalhau, M. and Bruneau, T. (1993), *Continuidade e Mudança do Sistema de Partidos em Portugal* (Base de dados), Lisbon, ICS.
- Biezen, I. (1998), *Sobre o Equilíbrio Interno do Poder: As Organizações Partidárias nas Novas Democracias*, *Análise Social*, 32, n.º 148, pp. 685-709.
- Biezen, I. (2003), *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Biezen, I., Mair, P. and Poguntke (2009), *Going, going... Gone? Party Membership in 21st Century*, Paper presented at the joint Workshops at the European Consortium for Political Research, Lisbon.
- Budge, I. (1996), *The New Challenges of Direct Democracy*, Oxford, Polity Press.
- Buttler, D. and Ranney, A. (1994), *Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Democracy?* Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute.
- Bryce, J. (2001), *Modern Democracies*, New York, Macmillan Company.
- Cain, B., Dalton, R., and Scarrow, S. (2006), *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Cruz, M. B. (1998), *Sistema Eleitoral Português. Debate Político e Parlamentar*, Lisbon, Imprensa Casa Nacional da Moeda.
- Daadler, H. (1992), *A Crisis of Party?* *Scandinavian Political Studies* 15, n.º 4, pp. 269-270.
- Daadler, H. (2002) *Parties, Denied, Dismissed or Redundant? A Critique*, *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, R. Gunther, José Jamón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 39-57.
- Dalton, R. (1999) *Political Support in Advanced Democracies*, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Pippa Norris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-78.
- Dalton, R. (2000), *Values Change and Democracy. Disaffected Democracies*, S. Pahr and R. Putnam (eds.), Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 252-270.
- Dalton, R. (2004), *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Decline in Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, R. (2008), *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, New York, Chatham House Publishers.
- Dalton, R. and Scarrow, S. (eds.) (2003), *Democracy Transformed? The Expansion of Citizen Access in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, R., Scarrow, S., and Cain, B. (2006), *New Forms of Democracy? Reform and Transformation of Democratic Institutions*, *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-22.

- Dalton, R. and Wattenberg, M. (2000), *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, R. and Weldon, S. (2004), Public Images of Political Parties: A Necessary Evil?, *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 34, n.º 3, pp. 379-404.
- Diamond, L. (2008), *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*, New York, Times Books.
- Easton, D. (1965), *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, Wiley.
- Easton, D. (1975), A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support, *British Journal of Political Science* n.º 5, pp. 435-457.
- Ekman, J. and Linde, J. (2004), Public Support for Democracy in the New EU Member States, *Perspectives*, 21, pp. 39-54.
- Eckstein, H. (1975), Case Study and Theory in Political Science, *Handbook of Political Science*, F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby (eds.), Mass, Addison-Wesley, vol. 7, pp. 79-137.
- Eurobarometer, European Commission, n.ºs 69 and 74.
- Franklin, M. N. (2004), *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Franklin, M. N., Mackie, T. T., and Valen, H. (1991), *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Freire, A. (2003), Recrutamento Parlamentar e Reforma das Institucionais, Elites, Sociedade e Mudança Política, A. C. Pinto and Freire, A. (eds.), Oeiras, Celta, pp. 181-217.
- Freire, A. (2007), *Sociedade Civil, Democracia Participativa e Poder Político: O Caso do Referendo do Aborto*, Lisbon, Fundação Friedrich Ebert.
- Freire, A. and Baum, M. (2001), Partidos Políticos, Movimentos de Cidadãos e Referendos em Portugal: Os Casos do Aborto e da Regionalização, *Análise Social* 36, n.º 158/159, pp. 9-41.
- Freire, A., Lobo, M. C. and Magalhães, P. (2002), *Comportamento Eleitoral e Atitudes Políticas dos Portugueses (Base de dados)*, Lisbon, ICS.
- Freire, A., Meirinho, M., and Moreira, D. (2008), *Para Uma Melhoria da Representação Política. A Reforma do Sistema Eleitoral*, Lisbon, Sextante Editora.
- Freire, A., Viegas, M. L., and Seiceira, F. (2009), *Representação Política em Portugal, Inquéritos e Bases de Dados*, Lisbon, Sextante Editora.
- Hirschmann, A. (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Holmberg, S. (2003), Are Political Parties Necessary?, *Electoral Studies* n.º 22, pp. 287-299.
- Huntington, S. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press.

- Inglehart, R. (1977), *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997), *Postmaterial Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority, Why Americans Mistrust Government?*, J. Nye, P. Zelikow, and D. King (eds.) 217-236. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 217-236.
- Inglehart, R. (1999), *Postmodernization, Authority and Democracy. Critical Citizens, Global Support for Democratic Governance*, P. Norris (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 236-257.
- Jalali, C. (2007), *Partidos e Democracia em Portugal, 1974-2005*, Lisbon, ICS.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1992), *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Parties in Western Democracies*, London, Sage Publications.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1993), *The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organization, Political Parties in a Changing Age*, W. Crotty (ed.), *American Review of Politics*, n.º 14, pp. 593-617.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1995), *Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of Cartel Party*, *Politics* n.º 1, pp. 5-28.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1996), *Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Rejoinder*, *Party Politics*, n.º 2, pp. 525-534.
- Katz, R. and Mair, P. (2002), *The Ascendency of the Party in Public Office: Party Organization Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies, Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, R. Gunther, J. R. Montero and J. J. Linz (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 113-135.
- Kittilson, M. and Sacrow, S. (2006), *Political Parties and the Rhetoric and Realities of Democratization, Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 59-80.
- Klingemann, H-D. (1998), *Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, P. Norris (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 31-56.
- Lijphart, A. (1971), *Il Metodo della Comparazione*, *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, pp. 67-92.
- Linz, J. J. (2002), *Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Problems and Paradoxes, Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, R. Gunther, J. R. Montero and J. J. Linz, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 291-317.
- Lisi, M. (2009), *A Arte de Ser Indispensável: Líder e Organização no Partido Socialista Português*, Lisbon, ICS.
- Mair, P. (1995), *Political Parties, Popular legitimacy and Public Privilege, Western European Politics*, n.º 18, pp. 43-45.

- Mair, P. and Biezen, I. (2001), Party Membership in Twenty European democracies, 1980-2000, *Party Politics*, 7 (1): 5-22.
- Martins, M. M (2009), Breve Síntese das Reformas Eleitorais em Portugal, *Revista de Assuntos Eleitorais*, n.º 12, pp. 11-25.
- Montero, J. R. (2006), Some Basics Conclusions about Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies, *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies. Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*, M. Torcal and J. R. Montero (eds.), Londres, Routledge, pp. 335-343.
- Muller, E. and Jukam, T. (1997), On the Meaning of Political Support, *American Political Science Review*, n.º 71, pp. 1561-95.
- Muller, E., Jukam, T., and Seligson, M. (1982), Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior, *American Political Science Review*, n.º 26, pp. 240-64.
- Norris, P. (1999), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Norris, P. (2009), *Democratic Deficit. Critical Citizens Revisited*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. (1999), Introduction. The Growth of Critical Citizens?, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, P. Norris (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-27.
- Poguntke, T. (1996), Explorations into a Minefield: Anti-Party Sentiments, *European Journal of Political Research*, 29, n.º 3, pp. 319-344.
- Poguntke, T. and Scarrow, S. (1996), The Politics of Anti-party Sentiment: Introduction, *European Journal of Political Research*, 29, pp. 319-344.
- Rusbult, C. E., Zembrodt, I. M., and Gunn, L. K. (1982), Exite, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: Responses to Dissatisfaction in Romantic Involvements, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43, pp. 1230-1240.
- Sani, G. and Ossorio, J. S. (1985), *A Cultura Política do Sul da Europa: Estudo sobre Quatro Nações (Base de dados)*, Lisbon, ICS.
- Scarrow, S. (1996), Politicians Against Parties: Anti-Party Arguments as Weapons of Change in Germany, *European Journal of Political Research*, 29, n.º 3, pp. 297-317.
- Scarrow S. (2006), Making Elections more Direct? Reducing the Role of Political Parties, *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 44-58.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1941), *Party Government*, New York, Rinehart.
- Schmitt, H. and Holmberg, S. (1995), *Political Parties in Decline. Citizens and the State*, H-D Fuchs (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 95-134.
- Teixeira, C. P. (2009), *O Povo Semi-Soberano? Partidos Políticos e Recrutamento Parlamentar em Portugal*, Coimbra, Almedina.

Teixeira, C. P and Freire, A. (2011), *A Escolha antes da Escolha. Selecção dos Candidatos ao Parlamento: Regras Formais e Contexto Institucional*, *Revista de Estudos Sociais e Políticos*, Lisbon, ISCSPP (forthcoming).

Torcal, M. and Montero, J. R. (2006), *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics*, London, Routledge.

Torcal, M., Montero, J. R. and Gunther, R. (2002), *Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe, Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, J. R. Montero, R. Gunther, and J. J. Linz (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 291-318.

Ware, A. (1987), *Citizens, Parties and the State*, Oxford, Polity Press.

Wattenberg, M. (1991), *The Rise of Candidate Centred Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Webb, P. (1996), *Apartisanship and Anti-Party Sentiment in the UK: Correlates and Constraints*, *European Journal of Political Research* 29, n.º 3, pp. 376-377.

Webb, P. (2000), *Political Parties in Western Europe: Linkage, Legitimacy and Reform, Representation*, 37, n.º 3, pp. 203-214.

Webb, P. (2006), *Political Parties and Democracy: The Ambiguous Crisis?*, *Democratization* 12, n.º 5, pp. 633-650.

Webb, P. (2009), *The Failings of Political Parties: Reality or Perception?*, *Representation*, 45 n.º 3, pp. 265-275.

¹ Between 2008 and 2009 around 90 percent of the population simply agreed or totally agreed with the statement: "Democracy may have some flaws, but it is still the best form of government".