

**Coalition for Security? The SADC
Security Community and Lesotho's
Coalition Government.**

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ABSTRACT

Lesotho's 2012 elections resulted in the formation of a coalition government. Ideally the formation of a coalition government is accompanied by positive expectation of compromise and development. However, a turn of events in Lesotho's coalition government has threatened the stability of that country. This article examines the dynamics of security and insecurity in Lesotho's coalition government. The point of departure is an overview of security in Southern Africa in order to define security in the context of the SADC security community. The paper discusses South Africa-Lesotho relations highlighting the interdependence between the two countries. An evaluation of the efficacy of Lesotho's coalition government and the impact of the coalition

Security and Insecurity in Southern Africa

Southern Africa's colonial legacy played an integral part in the regions definition of security. Africa and Molomo (2013:22) state that;

Southern Africa is a vast geographical region situated at the southernmost end of Africa. The deep natural ports along the Indian and Atlantic Oceans make the region ideal for global trade. Major powers have long been interested in southern Africa given its strategic importance as a gateway to trade between Europe, the Americas and Asia.

It is such considerations which prompted the scramble and partitioning of Africa. Countries in the region were subjected to colonial rule, albeit under different colonial masters. Leysens and Thomson (1999:70) state that "The concentration of minerals, including strategic minerals such as gold, chrome and uranium, as well as energy sources such as coal, gas, and oil continue to make Southern Africa an area of great interest." The colonisation of Southern African states led to the compromise of their security and way of life.

Because of a history characterised by liberation struggles to gain independence, security in Southern Africa initially conformed to international relations traditional conception of the term. This traditional perception is drawn from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which gave rise to the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. Essentially this Diplomatic Congress established the principles of self-determination and non-interference within the territorial affairs of other states. As such, it placed emphasis on the protection of a states boundaries and this led to a military preoccupation on security matters in international relations. Schalkwyk and Cillers (2004:112) note that "the traditional concept of security emphasises the security of the state as a sovereign entity in a hostile environment. It emphasises the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the state and advocates military responses to external and internal factors that may threaten the stability of the regime." The principles of self-determination, non-interference and protection of state boundaries were some of the key factors which contributed to newly independent Southern African states. The implications of such a conceptualisation were that independent states were preoccupied with preserving and protecting their territorial integrity against external threats. Important as it may be, such an appreciation of security is insufficient in contemporary security studies.

When this paper speaks on security and insecurity, it does so from a traditional

standpoint of the concept. It refers to the security of the state from a militaristic approach with referent objects been the territory itself, the rule of law within the territory, the government and other areas associated with the traditional concept of security. Section 7(ii) g of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy points out causes of intra-state conflicts/tensions. In particular it identifies "coup d'états and unconstitutional changes of government; and situations which prevent and undermine the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, including the absence of the rule of law." Internal coups have been among the causes of interstate conflicts. Given that most conflicts in Southern Africa are intra-state rather than interstate, states in the region do not face threats of external aggression, but suffer from internal instability. The impact of internal instability also has the potential to affect neighbouring territories. Apart from this, internal instability affects the security of the citizens of a given country. To this end, this paper also defines security and insecurity in terms of human security which "generally implies more than the mere absence of harm. It includes the concept of safety, which is freedom from danger, risk or injury. The freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear as well as confidence is also included" (Goto, 2012:30). The absence or the compromise of the aforementioned characteristics of traditional and human security leads to a state of insecurity. One such country which has been affected by internal instability is Lesotho.

Within Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a security community mandated to ensure the defence and security of the region. Formed in 1992, SADC consists of 15 member states. Namely, these are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its security objectives as stated in Article 5(b) (c) of the SADC Treaty are to;

- b) promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate, and effective;
- c) consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability.

In pursuance of these and other objectives, SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996. The OPDS main objective is to promote peace and security in the SDAC region. Generally, OPDS has a variety of responsibilities which include military or defence, crime prevention, intelligence, peace-making

on Lesotho's security is made in this paper. The article analyses the role of the SADC in resolving the impasse in Lesotho. The article identifies factionalism, a strong military involvement in politics, military insubordination and power struggles as contributing factors towards the 2014 crisis in Lesotho.

KEY WORDS:
Security Community, Coalition Governments, Lesotho, military

and peace-keeping enforcement, foreign policy conflict management, prevention and resolution and human rights. Specifically, the Organ is responsible for the following key areas: politics and diplomacy, defence (includes military and police), state security (includes regional early warning centre), and regional peace-keeping (includes standby force and regional peace-keeping committee). The scope and depth of the OPDS responsibilities inevitably make it the primary driver of all peace-building and security related initiatives of the regional body.

South Africa-Lesotho Interdependence

Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa from all sides. Its geographical location has created a reliance on South Africa for access to other borders and trade. Pefola (2009:49) states that Lesotho is reliant on South Africa for most consumer goods. “Many of the large businesses are South African-owned. Lesotho uses South Africa’s ports and harbours to export goods (such as clothing, footwear and wool) internationally. South Africa is thus the main conduit for materials leaving or entering Lesotho, legally or illegally.” South Africa and Lesotho share an economic dependency partly borne out of Lesotho’s geographical location and water resource. Of significance is the bi-national Lesotho Highlands water project which supplies water to South Africa’s Gauteng Province and industrial heartland (Johannesburg and Pretoria) for industrial, commercial and residential use. Smith and Flessner (<http://thinkafricapress.com/lesotho/not-too-late-lesotho-thabane-zuma>) observe that;

Gauteng Province, the administrative, industrial, and mining heartland of South Africa – and arguably the SADC region – relies heavily on access to Lesotho’s water supply. South Africa’s leaders are well aware that when they bathe, cook, and enjoy a swim, they do so with water from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a massive 30-year multi-billion dollar cooperative venture between Lesotho and South Africa

Economic and social activities in South Africa therefore are to a great extent premised upon water supplies from Lesotho. The water supply project also encompasses a hydropower component and caters for agriculture, augmenting for seasons of poor rainfall and drought in South Africa. Lesotho in turn benefits from the sale of the water and electricity through the hydropower component.

Apart from a socio-economic interdependence between the two states, there also exists a political interdependence. Both countries are members of the SADC

and the SADC and South Africa in particular, has played important roles in the security of Lesotho. For example, in 1998 when there was dissatisfaction amongst opposition parties who were demanding the dismantling of parliament since they believed that it had been fraudulently elected. On 22 September 1998, South Africa and Botswana launched operation Boleas under the banner of the SADC and deployed troops in Lesotho. Pryce et al (1998:26) describes the situation prevailing in Lesotho at that time; “Mutinous members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers. Government vehicles were hijacked, the broadcasting station was closed and the Prime Minister and other ministers were virtually held hostage” The SADC intervention force therefore sought to prevent further anarchy and create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order. Section 6 of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy states that the “security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole.” To this end, the African Union (AU) and the SADC, with South Africa in particular took an active interest in events which threatened the security of Lesotho in 2014.

While there are mutually beneficial relations and projects between the two countries, it stands to reason that Lesotho reflects a high dependency on South Africa for its survival. The former is geographically encompassed, cannot trade without South Africa thereby relying on South Africa for revenue and access to markets. South Africa provides employment for migrants from Lesotho and to some degree Lesotho’s territorial integrity is dependent on South Africa. These are some of the factors which add to South Africa’s national power over Lesotho. It is in this respect and on the premise of membership to the SADC as well as been Chair of the SADC OPDSC, that South Africa took an active interest in Lesotho’s 2014 political and military deadlocks.

The Efficacy of Coalition Governments

Arguably, Lesotho’s complex electoral system has contributed towards insecurity in that country through the formation of a coalition government following elections in 2012. The Institute for Security Studies (<http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/challenges-ahead-for-sadcs-mediation-in-lesotho>) explains that the coalition government was formed as a matter of political expediency after the country produced a ‘hung parliament’ where no one party has an outright majority to constitute

government. The Democratic Congress (DC), received the biggest number of seats in Parliament but smaller parties aligned together to form a majority. The coalition government comprises Prime Minister Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC), Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing's Lesotho's Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party (BNP) led by Minister Thesele Maseribane.

However, relations amongst these partners in government became strained because of factionalism and the struggle to obtain power through discrediting each other. For example, a local Lesotho newspaper, the Lesotho Times (August 8, 2014) carried an article in which the LCD Deputy Secretary General, Tseliso Mokhosi claimed that a faction within the LCD, which was working with a group within the ABC pushing for the dismissal of party leader (and Lesotho Deputy Prime Minister, Mothetjo Metsing). Apart from factionalism within political parties which are party to the coalition government, the article also alleged factionalism amongst the partners themselves stating that "the LCD has publically accused ABC leader (Prime Minister Thabane) of not consulting the other parties when making key decisions"(www.lesothotimes.co.ls). The effectiveness of Lesotho's coalition government therefore became compromised partly because of divisions, lack of consultations and lack of trust among political parties.

The situation further escalated through manoeuvres by coalition partners to constitutionally remove the Prime Minister from office. On June 11 2014, an alliance agreement was signed between the LCD and the DC, creating a likelihood of Prime Minister Thabane being voted out by a motion of no confidence. In response to this alliance, the Prime Minister asked King Letsie III for permission to suspend Parliament which was granted to him. By suspending Parliament, he was able to counter a democratic attempt to remove him from office. Coalition governments by nature are relatively difficult to maintain. They are a combination of different ideologies, perspectives and motives. Their effectiveness is largely dependent upon the ability of the concerned partners to work together in good faith for the administration of the country and service delivery. The focus of Lesotho's coalition government as evidenced by factionalism has shifted from the people it was meant to serve to a power preservation and power struggle scenario.

When the SADC Heads of State and Government held a summit in August 2014 in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, the resulting communiqué expressed the organisations support on finding a solution to the impasse concerning the Lesotho Parliament. It called on the coalition partners and the people of Lesotho to "refrain from any action that may undermine peace and stability in that country." Unfortunately,

the subsequent move by the Prime Minister to replace the leader of the Lesotho army with his ally generated a new wave of instability in Lesotho.

Alongside the impasse created through the suspension of Parliament, tensions and hostilities in Lesotho's coalition government is a polarisation of the country's security sector. This has further contributed towards insecurity in Lesotho's coalition government. Smith and Flessner (<http://thinkafricapress.com/lesotho/not-too-late-lesotho-thabane-zuma>) state that "the decision by Thabane to replace the head of the army, Lieutenant General Tlali General Kamoli, with his ally Mahao, was seen as an underhand and self-serving move by those outside Thabane's camp." On August 29, 2014 Government Gazette Legal Notice 64 was published proclaiming that Lesotho Defence Force Chief Lieutenant- General Tlali General Kamoli had been relieved of duty and replaced by Lieutenant- General Maaparankoe Mahao. According to a report published in Sunday Times (2014:12);

At 3am on Saturday, General Kamoli launched a simultaneous attack with armoured vehicles on four police stations, including the national headquarters and the paramilitary special operations unit base. One police official was killed and nine wounded in the attacks which lasted for one hour. General Kamoli's men also attacked Mahao's home, killing his dog. He was not home. General Kamoli led a convoy of army Land Rovers and armoured vehicles...to State House. The entourage entered the grounds and General Kamoli demanded to know where Thabane was.

Thabane had fled to South Africa, and while there has been debate on whether to term the incident a coup or an attempted coup; it threatened the security of Lesotho. General Kamoli's aggressive response was indicative of an attempt at an unconstitutional change of government. A military coup against a democratically elected Government is one definition of an unconstitutional change of government as contained in the Lome Declaration of July 2000 on the Framework for and OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (AHG/DECL.5 (XXXV1). The unfolding events in Lesotho therefore necessitated the response of the SADC to restore Lesotho's security. Before an evaluation is made on how the SADC reacted to the growing insecurity concerns in Lesotho, it would be worth examining why the retired army General General Kamoli reacted in the manner he did, threatening the security of the country. An appreciation of the army's involvement in the politics of Lesotho would aid is important

Lesotho has a history of military rule (1986-1993). On 15 January 1986, General

Justin Lekhanya, the Head of the Lesotho Army, ousted Lesotho Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan in a military coup. Gen Lekhanya went on to strip of his executive and legislative powers and exile Gen. Lekhanya King Moshoeshoe II. In April 1991 Gen. Lekhanya was removed from power in a military coup led by Colonel Elias Tutsoane Ramaema. In the case of Lesotho, Vaudran (2014:19) states that the 2014 attempted coup was a result of an unchecked army with insufficient civilian oversight which became a law unto itself. The involvement of Lesotho's military in the country's politics has also historically contributed towards insecurity in the country.

It is worth briefly noting that unconstitutional change of governments or their attempts whether or not by the military are not unique to Lesotho and have also in some cases been the cause of much political and economic instability on the continent. Coups have characterised the continents political landscape in the Central African Republic (2003), Egypt (2013), Guinea (2008), Mali (2012), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Niger (2010), Togo (2005), Sao Tome and Principe (2003) and Madagascar (2013). In many cases, coups have served to undermine democracy and democratic processes by usurping the right of the electorate to decide on its own leadership. Article 2(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance states one of its objectives to “prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development.” In the case of Lesotho, an evaluation of SADC's response will be made.

The SADC response to the Lesotho Crisis

Concerning the implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and in line with other regional security arrangements, the SADC and other regional economic groupings are to oversee conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms as contained in Article 26 of the Solemn Declaration. The response of the regional bloc, the SADC, towards the suspension of Parliament and General Kamoli's actions was rapid. The Chairman of the SADC, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, immediately embarked on a fact finding mission. In order to obtain more information on the situation unfolding in Lesotho, he dispatched two Ministers to Lesotho. Foreign Affairs Minister Simbarashe Mumbengegwi and Defence Forces Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, meet between 31 August and 1 September 2014 in South Africa to discuss the situation in Lesotho with other SADC

Ministerial Committee to the Organ ministers. It was also around this period that the Troika Defence Chiefs held a meeting in Lesotho with General General Kamoli to discuss a way forward on in resolving the impasse. It is perhaps because of these initial responses by members of the SADC bloc that the situation did not escalate further. Perhaps the return of the Prime Minister to Lesotho from South Africa shortly after these initial meetings was a result of the SADC intervention.

The SADC held an emergency meeting in Pretoria, South Africa, on 1 September 2014 to discuss the precarious security situation. The meeting comprised of President Jacob Zuma of South Africa as Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC OPDSC), the SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Stergomena Tax; the leaders of the current coalition government parties; Thabane; his deputy and the sports minister, Maseribane. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) states that the resulting position was an acknowledgement by the coalition partners that the political and security situation had deteriorated, and needed immediate intervention and support from SADC. What the coalition partners respectively sought from the intervention, however, was arguably not the same thing. For example, Motsamai (<http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/challenges-ahead-for-sadcs-mediation-in-lesotho>) states that;

Thabane, for instance, went into the meeting requesting the deployment of SADC peacekeepers to protect his life upon his return to the capital, and to help restore order. SADC, instead, opted for political dialogue... the meeting led to the agreement that a 'roadmap', with clear timelines on how to remove the Parliament prorogation. it was agreed that SADC would send a facilitator to Lesotho to 'work with the coalition government in implementing the agreed roadmap; and that it further deploys an observer team from the Organ as a matter of urgency to the country.'

The SADC therefore sometimes finds itself balancing between pressures from a member state to act in a certain way and the need it has as an organisation to respond to a situation. The chairperson of the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, also voiced concern about developments in Lesotho. The AU website, (<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.com.lesetho.30.08.2014.pdf>) on 30 August 2014 stated that the chairperson of the AU was;

following with deep concern the ongoing developments in the Kingdom of Lesotho and the deteriorating political situation in the country. She urges the various parties in Lesotho to resolve their political differences through peaceful means and

within the framework of the country's Constitution. She emphasizes the AU's firm rejection of unconstitutional changes of Government and warns that the AU will not tolerate any seizure of power by illegal means. She expresses AU's full support to the ongoing efforts of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to assist the Lesotho stakeholders address the challenges currently facing their country and preserve democracy and the rule of law.

The SADC arguably partly chose dialogue, agreeing therefore with the AU's position. Article 9 (d) of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration places emphasis on "The peaceful resolution of disputes, with emphasis on seeking African solutions to African problems; (e) the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts provide the enabling environment for peace, security, stability and development to flourish." According to Nye (2002:12), power in the international system is no longer defined solely on the basis of strength for war, military force, and conquest. This type of power would have encouraged military intervention in Lesotho, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions. Power according to Nye has widely been broadened to encompass what he refers to as 'soft power'. Nye (2002:12) states that soft power uses strategies that are non-confrontational and SADC's option for dialogue reflects the use of soft power. Monyae (2014:40) is of the view that "Africa's foreign policymakers pronouncements, actions and inaction tend to align with the soft power concept." The SADC also made use of soft power through mediation talks in Zimbabwe which resulted in an inclusive government.

However, while the decision by the SADC not to deploy a peacekeeping or intervention force has its merits, it also has its demerits. A number of issues can be raised over the decision by the SADC not to deploy peacekeepers to protect Prime Minister Thabane and restore order. Lesotho was presented with a grave security threat of a military nature which risked deterioration in the event that General Kamoli continued to pursue aggressive resistance and refuse to surrender. The situation was made even more volatile by the fact that General Kamoli raided security institutions and was in possession of weapons and ammunition. The SADC's efforts towards dialogue in cases of conflict or potential conflict are commendable and in some cases bring results but at times they need to be backed by a real and present counter force or buffer force on the ground. The SADC could have chosen to pursue soft power and dialogue to resolve the Parliament impasse while simultaneously using hard power to tackle the hostile and aggressive General Kamoli insurrection. Alternatively, while the SADC settled for dialogue to resolve both

situations, dialogue could still have taken place simultaneously with the presence of peacekeepers on the ground. A case is made here for deployment because it has the effect of a readily available roll back measure for the SADC in the case that dialogue fails. In addition, it would have been a proportional response to the militaristic actions of General Kamoli. General Kamoli, has shown disregard for authority in the Executive, the police and the military, compounded by the fact that he has loyalists in the military; there is therefore need for SADC intervention in reigning him in.

A SADC peacekeeping force would also assist in the security of the citizens of Lesotho as its presence, drawing from the definition of 'human security', would help create a 'freedom from doubt, anxiety, fear...and build confidence' in the citizens. According to Smith and Flessner, (<http://thinkafricapress.com/lesotho/not-too-late-lesotho-thabane-zuma>), insecurity affects the ordinary citizens of Lesotho "many of who are concerned about access to basic services like electricity and the human security that comes with the rule of law and a functioning democracy...the average person can ill-afford disruptions to their schooling, jobs, and livelihoods." Therefore apart from the security of the state and the region, the coalition government has also contributed towards the insecurity of the citizens and a peacekeepers presence would support human security in Lesotho.

According to a report published in Sunday Times (Hofstatter, 2014:12), General Kamoli "has taken to the hills with 200 soldiers, deploying his weapons around Maseru (the capital)...the rebel army consists of 40 veteran Special Forces members and 160 recruits trained by Special Forces." General Kamoli's retreat into hiding is similar to Afonso Dhlakama of Mozambique's return to his former military base in Gorongosa with a force of 800 men following acts of insurgency by his party. General Kamoli, likewise, has assumed a threatening posture and there is need for the SADC to have a physical force on the ground in case General Kamoli does not step down and carries through with his threats of bloodshed.

SADC was initially faced with a number of challenges in addressing the situation in Lesotho. These challenges included preparations for the holding of early elections, the reopening of parliament, stabilization of the security situation and the return to constitutional normalcy. It can be argued that the SADC's goal in overcoming these challenges was to create a climate conducive for the people of Lesotho to resolve their political challenges in accordance with the constitution, laws of the land and in line with democratic principles. In pursuance of the aforementioned and to discuss and consider developments in Lesotho, Jacob Zuma, the President

of South Africa and Chairperson of the OPDSC met the delegation of the Coalition Government of Lesotho consisting of the Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, the Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing and Hon. Morena Maseribane, Minister of Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation on 1 September 2014 in Pretoria, South Africa. According to a resulting joint statement, an agreement on a Roadmap with clear timelines on how to remove the Parliament prorogation was reached. However, it is worth noting that prior to this meeting, the SADC Ministerial Committee to the Organ Troika (MCO) plus Zimbabwe as Chair of the SADC council had already begun fact finding missions and laid the groundwork for mediation.

Pursuant with the organisations desire to settle tensions in Lesotho peacefully, the SADC appointed the Deputy President of South Africa, Ramaphosa as mediator. The SADC Double Troika of Heads of States and Government plus DRC and Tanzania meeting in Pretoria on 15 September 2014 mandated Ramaphosa, alongside a SADC Facilitation Mission, to facilitate dialogue among all political and other role players in Lesotho. Together with President Zuma, the two made frequent trips to Lesotho and also held a number of meetings with various Lesotho delegations in order to come up with mutually accepted terms of reference to resolve the Lesotho impasse. It was at this Summit that the SADC Troika gave an ultimatum to Lesotho's Prime Minister Thomas Thabane to reopen the suspended parliament with immediate effect to pave way for early elections. The SADCs aim was to assist the country to return to constitutional normalcy, political stability and restoration of peace and security. The SADC led mediation also took into consideration the capacity of the Lesotho army in terms of insubordination. In a report carried on a South African News Broadcaster (<http://www.sabc.co.za/news>), Ngatane quoted SADC appointed mediator Ramaphosa as stating that;

The army is accountable to the leadership of Lesotho and SADC wants to make the right decisions. Decisions were taken that the head of the defence force needs to make way for another and that issue is being addressed with a view of making sure that we implement correct decisions that the Lesotho defence is not unaccountable or lost at sea.

The resulting agreement which was consequently reached by the SADC and Lesotho stakeholders was announced on 2 October 2014. The parties to the dialogue signed the Maseru Facilitation Declaration which they believed would resolve the Lesotho crisis. Part of the declaration stated;

His Majesty, King Letsie III, will reconvene parliament on 17 October 2014. The sitting of parliament will be limited to the passing of a budget and all other related matters regarding the holding of elections. National General Elections will be held towards the end of February 2015 and on a date to be set by His Majesty. Parliament will be dissolved at the beginning of December 2014 to prepare for the holding of the general elections

Progress in meeting timelines of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration was reflected by the opening of the Lesotho parliament on 17 October 2014. Speaking at the opening of parliament, SADC mediator Ramaphosa stated (<http://www.sabc.co.za/news>), "We are making a great deal of progress. The fact that parliament could be opened under conditions of peace and stability testifies to the fact that SADC is working together with government here in addressing the very issue of security." There is need for continued mediation and monitoring to ensure that the entire facilitation declaration is complied with.

As was the case in the SADC led mediation which resulted in the formation of a coalition government in Zimbabwe, South Africa also took the lead mediation role in the Lesotho crisis. There is need for the parties in the coalition government to engage each other and the SADC in good faith during the mediation process and remain committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the country's political impasse. The SADC has successfully resolved tensions in countries like Zimbabwe and Madagascar through mediation and the coalition partners in Lesotho have the opportunity to draw relief from the assistance of the regional body.

Conclusion

Recurring incidents of political instability in Lesotho have threatened the security of the country and of its citizens. Rivalries in the country's coalition government have seen actors manoeuvring to undermine and outplay each other for the maintenance or attainment of power. Factionalism has resulted in the polarisation of the army and undermined the security of Lesotho. The actions of General Kamoli reflect elements of insubordination and indiscipline among some members of the Lesotho army. The combination of political power struggles and military insubordination have created a crisis that has the potential to escalate if remained unchecked.

As a security community, the SADC is to be commended for its rapid reaction to events unfolding in one of its member states. Its commitment towards pacific settlement of disputes reflects on the security community's commitment to regional stabilisation and conflict management. In pursuance of its organisational objectives, the security community played an indispensable role in pursuing the stability and security of Lesotho's coalition government. However it can only go so far. The stabilisation of the situation and the effective implementation of the agreed roadmap and timelines are also dependent upon the coalition partner's ability to commit to the terms of reference and comply in good faith.

The absence of an active SADC Brigade promotes aggressive and bold manoeuvres such as those by General Kamoli, thereby undermining the security community's ability to prevent and/or manage such aggressive actions. If the security community is to be more effective in the defence and security of the region, there is a need for it to be more assertive through the use of the SADC Brigade as a conflict prevention and management mechanism. The multifaceted political and security challenges facing Lesotho since the 2014 attempted coup are a serious test of the conflict management capacities of the SADC. The organisations' adoptions of short, medium and long-term approaches to the Lesotho crisis test the will and capacity of the SADC in relation to defence and security. As a landlocked state, completely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho's security and defence interests are largely dependent on sub-regional security arrangements. The SADC as a security community has a central role in finding a lasting solution to Lesotho's impasse.

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