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Eurosteoporosis: A Novel Proposal for a Discussion on the Acting Level of the European Union in International Politics

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ABSTRACT:

This study claims that the state of “Eurosclerosis” experienced in the European Union countries has been transformed into “Eurosteoporosis” as a result of developments resulting from several causes. As the European Union’s ability to solve the problems today it faces decreases, the prominence of its functional disability in institutional meaning and the ineffectiveness of steps taken to overcome problems increase the concerns about the future of the European Union. It is not possible to claim that the European Union has undergone such a transformation that it can overcome the robust problems of the millennium through the reforms after the Lisbon Treaty. The developments in international politics in the 2000s and the effects of the global financial crisis that emerged after 2008 triggered the state of “Eurosteoporosis”.

KEY WORDS:

Eurosclerosis, Eurosteoporosis, the Lisbon Treaty, the Eurozone, the future of the EU, Global Financial Crisis.

Introduction

The aim of this work is to demonstrate how the economic crisis creates restrictive consequences on the integration process of EU. Also it is claimed in the study that the Eurosclerosis which was thought to be ended in 1980s had never fully disappeared; on the contrary, due to the political developments in the 2000s, the state of Eurosclerosis transformed to a new state named as Eurosteoporosis. The concept of Eurosteoporosis will be described in the first part of the study; moreover at the second part it will be revealed of how Eurosteoporosis occurred in EU countries; hence at the third part the recent problems which are caused by Eurosteoporosis will be expressed; lastly whether it is possible to opt out of this situation will be discussed.

The phase the European Union (EU) – today the sui generis structure of which is relatively different from the one as it was during the years of early organization – has been particularly going through since 2001 can be explained by the concept of *Eurosteoporosis*¹. This conception was formulated after having been inspired by Giersch’s² inventing the concept of *Eurosclerosis*, who prefixed the word *euro* to the term *sclerosis*, which means hardening of tissue, to refer it to Europe.

Giersch mentioned the state of Eurosclerosis to portray the economic problems raised within the Community after the oil crisis in 1973 that caused the achievements of the cooperation after WWII to be questioned for the first time. This state of Eurosclerosis that Giersch emphasizes here is a kind of state that cannot be solved by the Single European Act as some thinkers claim to be. The situation that the Community is in can be claimed to be transforming from Eurosclerosis to Eurosteoporosis considering the fact that the steps taken for deepening the cooperation among member states fell short (Balkir 2010: 77-86) with the effects of so many developments within the first decade of the millennium (Keskin and Arman 2010: 4). Making the concept of Eurosteoporosis much more concrete so as to support this claim can contribute much to the academic discussion about this conception.

This study first of all sets forth the reasons why the current political and economic condition of the EU is defined as Eurosteoporosis. Then it analyzes the conditions making the state of Eurosteoporosis visible which causes difficulty in coping with the problems it faces by considering its founding principles. After all, this study analyzes the current situation and promotes proposals for potential risks and to overcome Eurosteoporosis.

1. Conceptual Dimension

Osteoporosis; osteoporosis, a medical term, is the name of a disease stemming from a decrease in bone mineral density owing to the deterioration in bone micro architecture and an increase in bone fragility (Hearn and Silber 2010). *Osteoporosis*, is the term which is also called as bone loss, causes thinning, weakening and fracture in bones.

Eurosclerosis; Giersch used the concept of Eurosclerosis in his article he wrote in 1985 to illustrate the economic profile of the Community after the growth rate decreased, unemployment rates increased and inflation rose up among the Community members with the second oil shock in the fall of 1979 while the oil crisis in 1973 still prevailed. Giersch, who claimed that real wage rates were much higher than in the USA was one of the important reasons of Eurosclerosis, stated that as a result the competitiveness of Europe decreased and the above-mentioned macroeconomic numbers came forth. Moravcsik (1991: 19) argues that the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s are defined as the periods of europessimism and Eurosclerosis in terms of the efforts for the European integration. The hardening in the structure of the EC connoted a slowdown both in the economic and political integration process of EC after 1973.

Eurosteoporosis; The morbid situation created by the drawbacks Europe faces is defined by the concept of Eurosteoporosis considering the two definitions above and associating it with osteoporosis (Eurosteoporosis, euro prefixed to osteoporosis, describing the situation the EU is in) that is a disease seen after advanced sclerosis (Eurosclerosis, euro prefixed to sclerosis, describing the situation the EU is in). I firstly used the term Eurosteoporosis, to express the current political and economical outlook of the EU in my paper named "Eurosclerosis'ten 'Eurosteoporoz'a: Avrupa Birliđi'nin Uygur Güç Nosyonunun Sonu" (From Eurosclerosis to Eurosteoporosis: the end of Civilian Power Notion of the EU) in order to express the foreign policy absence of EU which is rooted from wrong political decisions and economic problems after the global economic crisis. I claim that the financial collapse in EU market caused a divergence in the exercise of the fundamental principles of the EU. So the unprincipled implementations disrupted the structure of the EU, and the structure of the EU became soft and spongy; that means "*tailored to the needs of current day*" and "*not based on any principle*"

Eurosteoporosis state refers to erosion in the integration policies of EU due to the effects of the political problems that could not be coupled of Eurosclerosis. Because

of the unresolved structural economic problems, the support to supranationalism in EU countries has decreased so the founding principles of the EU have arisen by the effect of the earned interests by intergovernmental discussions within the EU. When the founding principles began to be frayed by this case at the beginning of the 2000s, the political and the economic problems followed the situation. To conclude, Eurosteoporosis is a blockage process in EU integration because the EU does not conform to his own founding principles.

2. The progress of *Eurosteoporosis* in the EU

The main reason underlying high inflation, unemployment and low growth rate triggered by oil crisis shock of 1973 is the insufficient capacity of European economy to challenge the sudden increase in oil prices. The period starting with the Single European Act (SEA) resulted in both the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU)³ as a solution for this situation and the integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states with the EC for the purpose of enlarging EC internal market. Therefore, the introduction of Euro into circulation (Balkir 2010: 284-287) would leave the obstacles before trade, and the market (Peterson and Birdsall 2008: 55) would have 130 million more people and reach up to 500 million people with the accession of twelve new members. However, the European economy was forced to compete with the US and Japanese economies in the 1980s and with BRICS⁴ states in the beginning of the 1990s, which resulted from a comprehensive structural problem that could not be solved solely by increasing trade volumes.

Even though the EU has the most advanced social policy on the globe, it however lacks a young population to support it. Additionally, it could not create an education system that was able to produce information economy to compete with Japan and the USA and with the labour wages of BRICS states. In addition, the EU could not reveal its entrepreneurial energy to sail to new markets. Hence, even though it was aimed that the EU would become an information society in a decade to find a solution to the situation at Lisbon Summit in the beginning of the 2000s (Soete 2009: 46) this objective also failed. Furthermore, when some of the twelve states were admitted as members against most of the founding principles of the Union, some problems emerged not only in the economy but also in some other issues related to the founding principles. For example the membership of Cyprus is an infraction of the principle that a country cannot be a full member if she

has boundary problems. Moreover Bulgaria and Romania have been full members without meeting the criteria for structural development.

Consequently, the USA strongly deployed in the EU's hinterland after 9/11 that also added to the existing problems⁵ within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that the EU had been struggling to form. The fiscal crises of 2008 and 2011 also made it much more difficult to overcome all these problems. As the crisis was deepening particularly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal it gave rise to discussions on the Eurozone. It was even suggested that Greece should be expelled from the Eurozone.⁶

2.1. Economic Crises

There are comments that the deterioration in the economies of EU member states resulting from the global economic crisis⁷ starting in 2008 marks the return of eurosclerosis (Boeri and Garibaldi 2009). However, this study rejects this approach and claims that this economic deterioration puts forward another condition different from eurosclerosis. Eurosclerosis indeed implies isolation from integration crisis that emerged after a total economic recession while Eurosteoporosis means that the structure of the EU has become soft and spongy contrary to its hardening in the 1970s. To put it simply there is a dialectical difference between Eurosclerosis and Eurosteoporosis. Whereas Eurosclerosis identifies political results coming out of economic problems, Eurosteoporosis refers to the morbid situation due to the heavy economic crisis that followed political problems that emerged in Europe. In other words, while the term Eurosclerosis describes the condition of stiffness of EC states in terms of integration, Eurosteoporosis refers to EU's malleability regarding the integration process.

The factors underlying Eurosteoporosis, which is defined here as the so called norms claimed to form the EU's identity that are constantly violated and the EU cannot show any resistance to preserve its own norms and values (Arman 2011: 102), are mentioned as follows in Arman's study:

- *The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which was formed in the 1990s and for which a great deal of efforts was made, became already absolutely inefficient with the Middle East policies of the USA after 9/11,*
- *"The Notion of Civilian Power" became questionable with the split by Iraqi crisis,*

- *Russia disabled the European Neighbourhood Policy⁸ exerting a great influence on Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine after her powerful comeback.*
- *12 countries became new members of the EU with the enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007 and the crisis for deepening between those states and the EU could not be overcome.*
- *The effects of the fiscal crisis of 2008.*

The above mentioned five factors can contribute to explaining the state of Eurosteoporosis considering that the Eurosclerosis that was thought to be over with the SEA (Falkner, 2011: 41) is still going on and the unemployment and limited growth have continued in the 2000s. The average unemployment rate was 8.5% and the growth rate was around 2% in the EU member states in the 2000s (Dhont and Heylen 2009: 540). Both indicators hardly show any assertive developments throughout the period and after 2008 they gradually became worse. In other words, the problem became chronic. The crises in Greece, Italy and Spain can be regarded as indicators signalling that there will be no potential improvements. This proves that there is not much difference between the indicators of Eurosclerosis and the current situation. In the same way the Lisbon Summit of March 2008 sets the objectives for increasing the competitive power of the EU against the USA and Japan and building up an information based society and economy in the EU member states, therefore improving sustainable economic growth and social integration (Borras and Radaelli 2011: 470). However, these objectives were not attained in the last decade. In addition, the share that the BRICS states had in world trade in the last eleven years negatively affected the economic performances of European states.

The EU could not attain its objectives set in the 2000s, which can be considered as one of the symptoms of Eurosteoporosis causing the European tissue to become softer and spongy. In addition to the downward trend observed in economic developments, political developments can also be considered as indicators signalling the EU's divergence from its founding values. The statement "*the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom democracy equality and the rule of law*" of the Lisbon Treaty (Lisbon Treaty Preamble 1.1.a.) became just a goodwill. The political developments to be mentioned below can be regarded as evidence pointing out that this statement is nothing more than a wishful thinking.

As it will be discussed in the conclusion the founding values were ignored to a great extent especially after 2001. The distortion in these values underlying both theoretical and philosophical foundation of the EU demonstrates that the existing structure of the EU has been deformed. The similarity between the porous and spongy structure of bones in *osteoporosis* and the deformation within the EU's structure inspired the creation of the conception of Eurosteoporosis. It can be claimed that this deformation did not only stem from the above mentioned reasons but also from the ill-treatment of Eurosclerosis. The cases that can be introduced as arguments asserting that the EU is in a state of Eurosteoporosis are listed below:

- *The Constitutional Agreement was shelved and demands for revising the Lisbon Treaty have emerged even before the ink on the agreement dried,*
- *The deficiency in the policy the EU is pursuing towards social movements and insurgences in the Northern Africa,*
- *The violation of the condition stating that there shall not be any border issues to become a member state in the EU by Cyprus' membership,*
- *The violation of the Maastricht Criteria by welcoming such countries as Greece, Italy and Spain that do not meet the necessary criteria for the entry into Eurozone,*
- *The multiculturalism norm wounded heavily by Islamophobia rising up in Europe after 9/11 has lost its meaning with the decision of France to deport Romani immigrants and with Merkel's statement of October 2010 that multiculturalism policies of Germany have gone bankrupt,*
- *The inertia of decision making mechanism that is becoming much more complex as the Council, Commission and Parliament have become more crowded after the Big Bang.*

The five reasons causing Eurosteoporosis will be explained in the third part of this study and the above mentioned six indicators will be analyzed in the conclusion.

3. The reasons underlying the progress of Eurosteoporosis in the EU

The five factors will be analyzed as the reasons causing Eurosteoporosis in this part of the study and it will be discussed which events make this state of Eurosteoporosis

observable. It is possible to add more to these five factors. This study can also be regarded as a proposal suggesting that new reasons be discussed.

3.1. *The Middle East policy of the USA adopted right after 2001 and its negative effect on the CSDP that the EU tried to construct throughout the 1990s*

The most distinctive area that Eurosteoporosis can be observed is the external relations of the EU. The main reason why I use the term 'external relations' instead of 'foreign policy' is because of the foreign policy deficiency to which Eurosteoporosis contributes. Waltz (1993: 45) defines the foreign policy of a state as its behaviour defined by its power position in the international system. However when one takes a glance at the external relations of the EU, he can simply discern that the external relations of the EU is the sum of foreign policy actions of the member states – even mostly the sum of leading states just like the intergovernmentalists claim – which any of them takes into account the situation of EU in the international power system.

Constructivist thinkers introduced normative dimensions to foreign policy making by adding state's identity and values as an independent variable to this definition (Boekle *et al.* 2001: 105) and stated that what the Structural Realists defined as the system is a structure that emerges due to the interaction among states. According to the Constructivists, the intersubjectivity between structure and agents constructs the identity of the state. Although, the absence of European identity, which became more visible after the big bang, gave a result of absence of the foreign policy as a dialectical sequel.

Considering both Waltz's definition and Constructivist thinkers portraiture, one can only mention the EU's external relations, not its foreign policy. At this point I prefer a much more self-possessed approach than Waltz and claim that it is possible to observe the determination of the EU for constructing a common foreign policy since the foundation of European Political Cooperation. However, it is hard to tell that clear-cut results can be achieved through foreign policy attempts other than enlargement. The efforts especially after the Maastricht Treaty for constructing a foreign and security policy in this way came to a full stop with the crisis in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The Lisbon Treaty introduced new arrangements on the CSDP to settle the problem of foreign policy deficiency when the Constitutional Treaty was rejected.

Nevertheless, the EU's attitude during the people's movements that started in

North Africa and spread in a wave throughout the Middle East showed that the arrangements in the Lisbon Treaty did not make any contributions to the CSDP to function. The reaction of Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, to the insurgences in Egypt and Tunisia can be given as a good example of the EU's lack of a foreign policy. Ashton did not show any reaction to the insurgences for a long time, but made a statement⁹ calling the parties to reinstate order after the insurgences escalated. The EU did not display a common attitude towards the events in Egypt and Tunisia at the first months of 2011, and therefore the policy the EU adopted towards the insurgency in Libya in March 2011 raised some doubts on a common decision. After the UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973 for shutting Libyan airspace to all traffic and imposing arms embargo¹⁰ on Libya it was agreed during the Summit held in Paris on 18 March 2011 that the EU should take the responsibility to implement the UN resolutions. After this decision taken during the European Council on Foreign Relations on 21 March 2011, an air operation against Libya to which France led brought along discussion within the EU. NATO officially declared on 31 March 2011 that the operation is under its control. Many strategists regarded France's impatient behaviour as an investment of the President Nicolas Sarkozy for the presidency election to be held in 2012 in France. This can be seen as a failure of EU foreign policy. In fact, the operation performed by France without a common decision can be regarded as an indicator showing that short-term interests come before the principles (Arman 2011: 102).

2.2. The questionability of 'the notion of civilian power' after the split by Iraqi crisis

The question of under which power classification the EU should be defined has been one of the important discussion matters in the sub-discipline of European studies. The concepts like *soft power*, *normative power* and *ethical power* defining the EU are the fruits of this discussion. However, even though there is no special reference to the term civilian power in the official documents of the EU, the use of names emphasizing the civilian power in the units particularly related to military capability (*EU Civil Military Coordination [CMCO] or EU CivMil Cell*) shows that decision makers give importance to the perception of the EU as a civilian power. Francois Duchene (1972) first introduced the term civilian power to the literature in social sciences and Hedley Bull (1982) benefited from this concept to define the EU's acting level in international politics. A significant emphasize is given to the

society forming the state and it is assumed that only a state founded by a civilized society will prefer economic and diplomatic mechanisms to military operations. In this sense the German political scientist Senghaas (2004: 6) characterizes the conditions of a state which a civilized society will set with a model* he calls 'civilization hexagon'. According to Harnisch and Maull (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 4) an international actor that takes initiatives and has the ability and will to maintain these initiatives that demonstrate its willingness to hand over its sovereignty and autonomy to international organizations contributing to the maintenance of collective security and preventing unilateral interventions and that can abdicate some of its rights in order for an international order to come into existence even if this prejudices its short term interests can be defined as a civilian power. Civilian powers can play an important role in conflict analysis techniques, but military instruments should be regarded as a supplementary element to non-military methods. In addition, military operations should be conducted strictly pursuant to the norms of international law and yet they should be organized to protect and defend human rights. Civilian powers should take all the measures to keep the loss at minimum for the conflicting sides when using military power. Why the EU has been defined as a civilian power for a long time can be understood from this perspective.

However, the *hesitant* attitude adopted by the EU member states towards the occupation of Iraq after 9/11 has tarnished the EU's image. Italy, Poland, Romania, Denmark and Bulgaria joined the coalition for invasion called "*Operation Iraqi Freedom*" by the USA in March 2003 with 3085, 1700, 730, 496 and 450 troops respectively, which can be regarded as a break in the EU's so called consensus based foreign policy. After some of the member and candidate countries took part in this operation without a high-level decision taken at the EU, the *Missile Shield Project*¹¹ including a radar system to be built in Turkey will monitor the Asian airspace and NATO's deployment of ten missile defence systems in Poland which can be activated between the years of 2010-2015 have been put into effect. As the EU member and candidate states take part in this project, the availability of the necessary requirements to define the Union as a civilian power has been much more questionable.

Even though, if I accept that these operations are made on humanitarian grounds, I should also accent that the term "civil" has been clearly bruised due to the ontological roots of the term stressing the non-violence.

2.3. Russia's negative effect on the European Neighbourhood Policy exerting a great influence on Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine with her powerful comeback

As Moravcsik also mentioned, three visionary German Chancellors had envisaged the integration before the European Integration reached its stage in the 1990s (Moravcsik 2005: 3-44). Adenauer, Schmidt and Kohl became guides during the gloomiest periods of the European Integration Project, which has a brilliant success compared to other integration projects in the world. The Single European Act mentioned in the beginning of this study was introduced not only to overcome the economic troubles caused by Eurosclerosis but also to challenge new problems that will arise in a predictable future with the end of the Cold War. Kohl's political will is of great importance in drafting this act despite the UK's objection.

The Single European Act, which laid the foundation for the EMU thought to be established in order for Europe to overcome the prevailing economic crisis, has formalized the European Political Cooperation. The Soviet Union disintegrated in the meanwhile and this was not a surprise for a leader like Kohl, who had reunited his own country. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty set the rules for the CEE states to integrate into a bigger market. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's (2004: 669-687) criteria that they called governance by conditionality were envisaged to integrate the CEE states into the EU. The crises in Russia which was evidently undergoing a transformation process paved the way for the EU to follow a much more defiant policy in the region in the beginning of the 1990s. Besides, it was of vital importance for the EU as is for the USA in terms of energy security to support the elections of pro-western governments in the region from the north of Black Sea, which is the southern border of Russia, to the Caspian Sea. Therefore, it can unassumingly be pointed out that the coloured s¹² in the region are appropriate for EU interests.

In addition to coloured revolutions, the second policy adopted to integrate the Caucasus and the Middle East which are under Russia's influence into the EU is the European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Neighbourhood Policy¹³ formulated by the document *Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours* the Commission drafted in March 2003 arranged the relationship between the EU and the Northern Africa, the Middle East, Caucasasia and the Black Sea region. The first one of the instruments the European Neighbourhood Policy defined for this relationship was to enlarge

the internal market and its concerning arrangements, to establish preferential commercial relations with the partner states to the European Neighbourhood Policy and finally to open the EU's market to those states. The other objectives included legal migration, necessary arrangements to be made for working in Europe, intensive cooperation for security, a more active political intervention of the EU for the conflict and crisis management. In addition to the increasing efforts for the improvement of human rights and cultural cooperation, the integration of those states into energy, transportation and communication networks and the European Research Area, the new investment and protective instruments, supporting integration into the global trade system, strengthening civil society and local governments, and providing new financial sources are also among the objectives¹⁴.

We can claim that the EU is trying to set its own area of influence creating a new model of relationship even though the European Neighbourhood Policy does not include full membership. However, the return of Russia back to the balance-of-power system in the region has undermined this project. The oil price rising up to 140 USD due to the 2008 crisis helped Russia, the sixth biggest oil producer of the globe with her 60 billion barrels of oil production, to come back to the chessboard as a powerful rival. Not only did the oil prices but also the charismatic regime of Putin play an important role in Russia's comeback. The tensions and conflicts between the Southern Ossetia, Russia and Georgia in August 2008 and finally Abkhazian crisis can be considered as evidences for Russia's strong comeback into the region. This comeback was especially apparent in Russia's intervention in Ukraine's elections and military intervention in Georgia. Both incidents led to these states' break with the Western axis.

To sum, the most distinctive feature of the Putin rule in Russia is to re-penetrate the ex-Soviet's control geography. Thanks to the rise of oil prices and the charismatic leadership of Putin, Russia largely carried out her goals. At the end of 1990's and beginning of 2000's EU was very active especially in Caucasus and Black Sea Region, but especially by the beginning of 2010's Russia has wielded enormous influence on both two regions. Moreover the support of Putin to Syria prevents the Western will to intervene to Syria. Not only the Syrian example, all the Arab Spring era showed us although the US and Russia are the players of the big chess-board in greater Middle-East, but the EU is not.

2.4. Twelve new member states to the EU with the enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007 and the deepening crisis between those states and the EU

The most controversial enlargement waves were the ones in 2004 and 2007 when twelve states became EU members. A discussion on whether there will be an important deepening crisis in the EU with the accession of ten CEE states in 2004 and two Eastern Balkan states in 2007 has been going on for a long time. However, as Onaran states the optimistic view that the Eastern Europe can swiftly integrate into the West did not prove to be right in the course of time (Onaran 2011: 224). On the other hand, the global financial crisis that started in 2008 slowed down the integration of these twelve states into the EU institutions. The only successful example of the enlargement is the end of negotiations with Croatia and determination of an exact date for the membership in 2013 whereas the negotiations with the FYROM have not started yet and only a limited progress has been achieved in the negotiations with Turkey.

Ágh points out that these twelve states have problems not only in economic matters but also in their experiment with democracy (Ágh 2010: 76-80) Ágh states that these states have serious problems with democratic participation and problems in equal representation resulting from their election systems, and that their governments have fragile structures. He also adds that weak coalition governments are holding power in most of them and systematic channels are blocked from the ground to the top in the field of public administration.

If we consider deepening in the sense to further democracy and economy, the matters that are not seen as a priority of foreign policy by the EU's core states are evaluated as priorities by the new members. For instance, according to the results of a survey conducted by Shapiro and Witney on behalf of the European Council on Foreign Relations, while supporting the US operations in Afghanistan is perceived as rather necessary in Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Spain to improve relations with the USA and to obtain NATO membership for some countries, it prevails among most of the old members that this operation is not appropriate for the European interests (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 52). The same study concludes that Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus owing to their Orthodox ties behave in a more different way in their relations with Russia than most of the EU members (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 54) and new members remain much closer to the US foreign policy in matters regarding the Middle East like Iraq and Israel-Palestine whereas the old

members desire to follow a much more independent European foreign policy (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 56). These examples can be regarded as evidence demonstrating that foreign policy preferences of member states stemming from their interests do not always run in with the foreign policy decisions the Union is trying to take as a whole.

These reviews reveal the fact that the ongoing economic problems together with the deficiency in democratic criteria and the difference in foreign policy issues have not made up the evident difference between the new states and the core ones despite the eight (the membership of ten CEE states in 2004) and five years (the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007) passed. In fact, there were fewer states during the previous enlargement processes and the accession of these states was much more digestible; and this makes us think of the possibility that this enlargement process will be much more painful. The EC that encountered a deepening crisis during the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal gambled the accession of these twelve states to recover from Euroclerosis. Since the precipitous enlargement towards these states after the Russian influence coincided with Russia's powerful comeback to the chessboard, this new enlargement process resulted in a much more profound deepening crisis than the previous enlargement processes.

2.5. The effects of the fiscal crisis of 2008

The most destructive reason of Eurosteoporosis that the EU suffers from is the financial crisis started in 2008. Radical proposals such as taking Greece out of the Eurozone and quitting Euro were even the subjects of the discussions held during the financial crisis that seriously hit Italy among the founding states and the Mediterranean states that joined the EU in the 1980s such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. According to Jackson, the reason why Europe did not take timely measures against this crisis is the deep differences between the economic ideals of member states (Jackson, 2010). Even the existence of deep differences makes us think that the common allegations that the European economic integration was excellently put into practice and concerns on sovereignty transfer in foreign and security policy stand before the political integration are nothing but a myth. This crisis has demonstrated how the EU that adopted economic and monetary union at the end of the 1990s is vulnerable to crises. The Greek example has also pointed out that how the Euro made national economic policies fragile in the face

of economic crises. The crisis not only shook the economic and monetary union but also resulted in an observable deviation and obscurity in the objectives the new members need to achieve. Unlike the hardening felt in the economic crisis in the 1970s, the crisis of 2008 makes us think that the EU has not economically hardened. On the contrary, it makes us think of the state of osteoporosis where all the norms and rules are open to discussion. The violation of the criteria for transition to the Euro in order to prevent Greece and Italy from going bankrupt can be regarded as another example of the deformation of norms.

All these reasons revealed a notable policy gap within the EU. The EU has entered into the period that the EU law had difficulty in solving numerous matters from economy to foreign policy and from democracy to human rights. This study defines the deformation of norms as Eurosteoporosis; the deformation has become quite observable with the EU's democratic principles' difficulty in finding solutions for the bankruptcy of multiculturalism, rising nationalism and xenophobia.

3. Conclusion and Evaluation

The state of Eurosclerosis occurred only for economic reasons. However Eurosteoporosis is an economic and political consequence of a combination of unresolved structural economic problems and political mistakes. The reason of economic problems is that the information society could not be created in Europe; moreover, the political problems occurred because of the EU countries which could not create information societies caused a weakness in EU integration.

One can regard the demands for a revision of the Lisbon Treaty before the ink on it has not dried yet and the suspension of the EU Constitution as a criteria to comprehend the existence of Eurosteoporosis. The Constitutional Treaty drafted with the support of studies conducted by the Convention throughout the 2000s (Christiansen 2010: 22) and all the social parties was expected to have the same uniting effect like the Single European Act in the 1980s. However, The Lisbon Treaty that was aimed to meet the requirements resulting from the Constitution, which was shelved after the referendums in France and the Netherlands, did not yield the expected results. The Lisbon Treaty was planned to end the discussion of intergovernmentalism versus supranationality, but the complicated decision-making process created to satisfy the intergovernmentalists transformed the EU into an organization taking no decisions.

The deficiency in the EU's policy towards social movements and insurgences in the Northern Africa is another criterion to comprehend the concept of Eurosteoporosis. The silence of the EU during the first days of the Arab Spring, France's impatient attitude during the Libyan intervention without NATO's decision for a joint operation and the concept of *ethical power* formulated with an assertion that the EU has good intentions in what it does concluded the discussion of *normative power* or *civilian power*. Above all, the French ex-President Sarkozy and British PM Cameron's attempt to do *tour de force* in Benghazi before the arrival of the Turkish PM was perceived as a negative message indicating that the EU preferred oil and construction business to humanitarian dimensions in the Libyan intervention.

The violation of EU membership criteria stating that there shall not be any border issues to become a member state with the membership of Cyprus not only resulted in corrosion of the membership criteria but also in new crises like the drilling issue with Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus issue which badly affected relations between Turkey and the EU triggered much deeper problems with the accession that does not fit the criteria. It even caused membership negotiations to come to a standstill that started together with Croatia. Turkey's Friends Group formed by Sweden, the UK, Spain, Italy and Finland is making efforts to renew negotiations between Turkey and the EU, but the EU seems to be closer to the risk of losing Turkey, which is one of the fifteen biggest economies and the second fastest growing economy in the world and whose influence on the Middle East policy is increasing day by day as never before (Pinto, 2010: 90).

The violation of the criteria to enter into the Eurozone by Greece, Italy and Spain and the EU's falling behind to take structural measures despite the violations are indicators of not only political but also economic effects of Eurosteoporosis. Since Greece cannot overcome the crisis, this raised question on the common belief that the economic dimension of the integration has been successfully completed.

Multiculturalism heavily wounded by Islamophobia that rose in Europe after 9/11 also lost its meaning after France's decision to deport Roman immigrants and Merkel's statement of October 2010 that Germany's multiculturalist policies have gone bankrupt, which weakened the belief that the championship of democracy is the most challenging thing the EU owns in international politics. It is one of the important questions of how Europe that could not develop a model after the assertions that multiculturalism has gone bankrupt will reorganize its relationship with its increasing Muslim population.

After the last enlargement including ten CEE states' full membership to the EU, the risk of slowing down in decision-making mechanism that became much more complicated as the Council, Commission and Parliament got crowded make it difficult to solve the above-mentioned problems. Different foreign policy preferences and different policies the member states follow for their relations with the great powers like the USA, Russia and even China bring about an important risk of having difficulty in taking decisions regarding possible international political developments for the EU.

Finding an answer to the question of what can be done to overcome the situation defined as Eurosteoporosis in this study stands before European wise men as a vital issue. Europe has not only been limited to Europe throughout the history even since the advent of the modern ages. Europe, homeland of most of the ideas developed for humanity for the last four hundred years, presented a good example with its integration project that started in the 1950s and demonstrated that interests can be achieved without fighting and people can live in peace by maintaining democracy and even implementing it at the highest level on the earth. However, the EU's lack of capacity to solve the problems it faces in the new millennium is being observed anxiously by other peoples that desire to achieve peace and welfare by taking the EU as a model. The formula devised to overcome Eurosteoporosis will be a magic formula not only for Europe, but also for all the peoples in search of welfare, peace and freedom.

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¹ The concept of Eurosteoporosis was first used by Arman. See: Murat Necip Arman. 2011. From Euroclerosis to Eurosteoporosis: The End of Civilian Power Notion of the European Union, *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika (Review of International Law and Politics)*, 7, 26: 87-106.

² The concept of Euroclerosis was first used in 1985 by the German economist Giersch to define the isolation and decrease in integration pace in the European Community after the oil crisis in 1973. See: Herbert Giersch. 1985. Euroclerosis, *Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge*, 112, Kiel: Inst. für Weltwirtschaft.

- ³ Please see the official website of the European Central Bank for stages of the EMU and other technical details: Economic and Monetary Union; <http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/emu> (Access Date: 28.08.2011)
- ⁴ Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
- ⁵ For a general evaluation of the problems occurred in NATO-EU relations with the US pressure after the 9/11 please see: Fotios Moustakis and Petros Violakis. 2008. European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy, *European Security*, 17, 4: 421-433, s. 421.
- ⁶ For the discussions suggesting that Greece be taken out of the Eurozone please see: Matthew Lynn. 2011. *Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis*, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- ⁷ The economic and fiscal crisis that started in 2008 and is still continuing is mentioned as global economic crisis in this study considering that the crisis of 2008 is not over as of 2011 and its effects are still sensible today.
- ⁸ For a general evaluation of the Neighbourhood Policy the EU adopted please see: Valentina Kostadinova. 2009. The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders, *Geopolitics*, 14: 235–255.
- ⁹ For the statements made by Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle, please see: (<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/12>) (Access Date: 21 September 2011)
- ¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolutions (2011) on Libya – Full Texts (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011>) (Access Date: 21 September 2011)
- ^{*} Monopoly for using violence; potential monopoly by legitimate government bodies; democratic participation; emergence of a conflict solving culture; social equality; increase of interdependency among individuals and subjugation of their influence on each other.
- ¹¹ Please check NATO's website for Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence /ALTBMD that is called as Missile Defence System in short and started in 2005 with the coordination of several NATO projects and participation of eight NATO members: (http://www.tmd.nato.int/what_we_do.html) (Access Date: 22 September 2011)
- ¹² Government changes in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Serbia at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s are called as colour s. There are lots of studies stating that the EU had influence on these s. Please see for more details: Michael McFaul. 2007. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange, *International Security*, 32, 2: 45-83. Paul D'Anieri. 2005. What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics?: Assessing the Implications of the Orange, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52, 5: 82-95. Anders Aslund, Michael McFaul. 2006. *in orange: the origins of Ukraine's Democratic breakthrough*, Carnegie Endowment: Washington DC.
- ¹³ For a general evaluation of the Neighbourhood Policy the EU adopted please see: Valentina Kostadinova. 2009. The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders, *Geopolitics*, 14: 235–255.
- ¹⁴ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003), 104 final, 2003.